Soon after the start of Russia’s official military involvement in Syria, another army, hundreds of miles away, ramped up its activity: Ukraine’s armed forces became emboldened in their war with separatists in the east. Under the radar, they have been retaking control of a narrow strip of contested, crime-ridden no-man’s land in the war-torn Donbas region using a tactic known as “creeping advances.” Between February and May, for example, they managed to advance about 6 miles deeper into the area, deploying small, highly professional units. The slow-paced advances, ongoing since February 2016, have enabled Ukraine to take firmer control over the porous demarcation line with its separatist republics, to improve its military’s tactical capabilities (and, possibly, its morale) and to test Russia’s response—which, so far, has been minimal. For now, Ukrainian troops have focused their efforts mostly on small villages. On one hand, some analysts suspect that attempts to take bigger, strategically important settlements could provoke a large-scale Russian military response; on the other, Russia may be reluctant to deepen its involvement in eastern Ukraine’s grinding war. The paradox seems to be that, whatever Russia’s response to the creeping advances, Ukraine’s leadership—struggling to retain legitimacy and the confidence of citizens and Western donors—stands to reap a net benefit from the tactic.

The geographic focus of the stealthy advances has been the so-called gray zone (map here)—a strip of land between Ukrainian armed forces and the self-proclaimed, separatist-controlled Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics (DPR and LPR, respectively). This territory formally fell to Ukraine under the Minsk armistice agreements, but was not under Ukraine’s de facto control. As a result, it has been used for the most part by smugglers and criminal groups or, in places, remains under separatist control.  

While Ukraine’s creeping advances have largely been disregarded by media and Ukraine watchers in the West, they were a central feature of a recent spike in violence in the country’s east. In mid-May—after a week that the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission for Ukraine called “in many ways the worst we have seen so far this year,” with some 7,700 ceasefire violations—Ukrainian troops, through slow and steady advances, reached the outskirts of Horlivka, or Gorlovka, a strategically important outpost located in separatist-controlled territory near the road to Donetsk.

Ukraine’s official position is that the advances do not violate the Minsk agreements and Ukrainian troops have been careful not to cross the Minsk I line, which is the only demarcated “border” with the DPR and LPR that Kiev has officially accepted. However, the Sept. 19, 2014, memorandum accompanying Minsk I explicitly forbids any offensive operations by either side. This perhaps explains why, according to media reports, Ukraine portrayed its actions near Horlivka as defensive: “This is not an offensive; it’s taking control of potentially dangerous spots,” an unidentified official reportedly told the Russian Kommersant newspaper, explaining that separatist forces could have used the heights around Horlivka to fire on Ukraine’s military. The two sides, as in previous cases, blamed each other for the uptick in violence. (U.S. diplomats, including the special envoy for Ukraine, Kurt Volker, put the blame squarely on Russia, as they have in the past.)

Other territory gained by the Ukrainian army via creeping advances, according to media reports, includes: Svetlodarsk strip near Debaltseve, which had been occupied by separatists in 2015 (October 2016); the villages of Novoluhanske and Spartak, just a few miles from Donetsk city borders (December 2016); Gladosovo and Travneve villages (December 2017); two more villages, Katerinovka and Novoalexandrovka (January-February 2018).

While creeping advances have been carefully executed to avoid larger confrontations, there has been at least one occasion when Ukrainian troops seized a strategically important site and DPR forces responded with a large-scale counter-offensive. This resulted in the battle of Avdiivka (Jan. 28-Feb. 4, 2017), less than 4 miles from the city of Donetsk. The village was significant for the separatists both because the Donetsk water filtration plant is located on its outskirts (the plant, incidentally, was damaged during May’s fighting) and because Avdiivka’s industrial suburb, Promzona, is the key logistics point connecting two DPR-controlled enclaves. The Ukrainian military had succeeded in occupying Promzona in late 2016 using creeping advances; in response, DPR units launched a large-scale assault to re-capture it, but failed. Rather than intervene, Russia played down its proxies’ unsuccessful attack on Avdiivka, describing it as a minor border skirmish.

According to several Ukrainian military analysts—including Dmytro Tymchuk, Konstantin Mashovets and Yuri Butusov—the purpose of creeping advances is to improve the armed forces’ defensive capability and to retake control over the line of demarcation, which fits into a broader strategy of boosting morale and building confidence in the armed forces. The advances also give Ukraine more chances to deploy its NATO- and U.S.-trained infantry units: The bulk of creeping advances have reportedly been carried out by the 72nd mechanized brigade, which has been part of a pilot training project by the United States and NATO at the Yavorov range. Despite some risks, Ukrainian troops seem to gain a net tactical advantage from their stealth offensives. While greater proximity to separatist forces exposes the Ukrainian military to a greater risk of small-arms fire, it also reduces the threat from separatists’ long-range artillery and heavy firepower, according to Ukrainian military expert Oleh Starikov. And the U.S.-supplied Javelin anti-tank missile systems—which the military began using in mid-May—will be a significant asset for Ukrainian troops during advances into rebel-controlled settlements, says another Ukrainian military expert, Mikhail Zhirokhov, because the key threat to Ukrainian units at close range has come from the separatists’ Russian-supplied tanks. (The Javelins’ major advantage is their vastly superior aim compared to Ukrainian-made Korsar anti-tank systems, currently the only alternative available to Ukrainian forces.)

Another significant objective pursued by the Ukrainian military through creeping advances is to test how separatists and Russia will respond to them. Apart from Avdiivka’s Promzona, areas taken by Ukrainian forces using the tactic have been of little strategic importance for the separatists, and their reaction has been limited to artillery and tank fire at the recaptured villages. Russia has had no visible reaction thus far, so the Ukrainian army may continue relying on creeping advances. Some Ukrainian commentators, however, have suggested that any effort to retake larger towns, such as strategically important Horlivka, could lead to a more robust Russian response.

The key question is this: If Ukraine attempts to advance toward any other large city in separatist-controlled territories, would Russia be compelled to give the separatists direct military support, as it did in late 2014-early 2015? And, if it is, how would the West respond?

In terms of the creeping advances’ broader foreign and domestic policy implications, Ukraine is likely to benefit from the tactic regardless of Russia’s response. Military escalation on the border—including Moscow’s direct (or covert) intervention—could lead to more U.S. and EU sanctions against Russia and/or more significant U.S. weapon supplies to Ukraine. But the absence of a Russian reaction would be similarly favorable for Kiev, allowing the Ukrainian military to retake lands currently not under its control and to improve its counterinsurgency and reconnaissance capabilities. Also, either outcome could be used during the March 2019 presidential election by President Petro Poroshenko, whose recent ratings have barely crept above single digits: If Russia does not respond, Poroshenko, who has pledged to rebuild Ukraine’s military, can brandish “de-occupation” via the creeping advances as a major success (arguably the military’s only one since the implementation of Minsk II, despite large volumes of aid from NATO, the U.S. and the EU); if Russia does respond, Poroshenko can call on Ukrainians to rally around the flag and support him in the face of a formidable foe. 

As noted above, the shift in Russia’s military and strategic interests from eastern Ukraine to Syria in September 2015 emboldened the Ukrainian military to become more active in Donbas and to adopt the creeping-advances tactic. But Russia’s attempts to scale back its own military involvement in Ukraine seem to have arisen even earlier: Since the implementation of the Minsk II agreement in February 2015, Moscow has appeared to be committed to preserving the status quo in Donbas—cleansing the DPR and LPR leadership of radical elements in 2016-2017 and seeming much less willing to escalate the conflict militarily than it was in early 2015 when it supported separatist offensives. This is unlikely to provide a long-term solution to Ukraine’s problems, but it has certainly given Kiev more room to maneuver.

Huseyn Aliyev is the Lord Kelvin Adam Smith Fellow in Central and East European Studies at the University of Glasgow.

Photo by U.S. Staff Sgt. Adriana Diaz-Brown shared in the public domain as a U.S. government work. 

The opinions expressed in this blog post are solely those of the author.

Why did U.S.-Russian relations under Trump deteriorate contrary to the expectations of many? What can we learn from measuring Russia's national power? What is the publicly available evidence for and against Russia's involvement in the 2016 U.S. presidential election? Find answers to these questions and many more in our wide-ranging top exclusives. Check them out below. 

Top 10 of 2018 (so far)

1. Measuring National Power: Is Vladimir Putin’s Russia in Decline? by Simon Saradzhyan and Nabi Abdullaev
2. Russia and the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election: Laying Out the Publicly Available Evidence by David Filipov, Kevin Doyle and Natasha Yefimova-Trilling
3. Team Trump on Russia: John Bolton’s Views by Kevin Doyle
4. Unintended Escalation: 5 Lessons From Israel for the Russia-NATO Standoff by Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky
5. Putin's Pivot: 4 New Features of Russian Foreign Policy by Daniel Treisman
6. Russian Strategists Debate Preemption as Defense Against NATO Surprise Attack by Alexander Velez-Green
7. Blog: Armenia: Why Has Vladimir Putin Not Intervened So Far and Will He? by Simon Saradzhyan
8. Thomas Graham on Russia: Insights and Recommendations by RM Staff
9. Contrary to Expectations, US-Russian Relations Deteriorate Under President Trump by Thomas Graham
10. Kissinger on Russia: Insights and Recommendations by RM Staff

Top 10 of all time

1. Measuring National Power: Is Vladimir Putin’s Russia in Decline? by Simon Saradzhyan and Nabi Abdullaev
2. Russia and the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election: Laying Out the Publicly Available Evidence by David Filipov, Kevin Doyle and Natasha Yefimova-Trilling
3. Kissinger on Russia: Insights and Recommendations by RM Staff
4. Yes, Russian Generals Are Preparing for War. That Doesn’t Necessarily Mean the Kremlin Wants to Start One by Simon Saradzhyan
5. Russian Military Buildup in the West: Fact Versus Fiction by Michael Kofman
6. Russian Nuclear Forces: Buildup or Modernization? by Hans M. Kristensen
7. Putin as Bismarck: Ehud Barak on West’s Russia Blind Spots, the Middle East and More by RM Staff
8. Sen. Sam Nunn: 'We Have a Choice Between Cooperation or Catastrophe' by Mariana Budjeryn
9. Blog: How to ‘Think Like the Russians’: A Partisan Perception Chart for Improving US-Russian Relations by Bruce Allyn
10. A Sino-Russian Military-Political Alliance Would Be Bad News for America by Simon Saradzhyan

Photo shared in the public domain.

PONARS Eurasia, a partner of the Russia Matters project, has just launched Point & Counterpoint, a new multimedia initiative for those looking to know more about Russia and Eurasia. Point & Counterpoint features in-depth analysis, research-based debates and informed book reviews by Russia and Eurasia experts, all as part of a non-ideological platform for the study of the region. The chief editors for the initiative are Maria Lipman and Marlene Laruelle.

Posts include:

Rebalancing Russia’s Spatial Development? Infrastructural Transformations Under Vladimir Putin by Jean Radvanyi

Putin’s Reelection: Capturing Russia’s Electoral Pattern, a discussion with Kirill Rogov

The resignation of Armenia’s Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan after more than a week of mass protests in Russia’s backyard begs the question: Why has Moscow not intervened so far? The fist-pumping demonstrators bring to mind “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet neighborhood that the Kremlin seems to abhor, like the ones in Georgia and Ukraine. But even genuine color revolutions (which Armenia has not yet seen—more on that below) are not enough by themselves to prompt Russia to stage either a covert or overt intervention. As I have argued before, for Moscow to intervene in one of its Soviet-era satellites at least two conditions need to be present: First, Vladimir Putin has to see an acute threat to Russia’s vital national interests, such as the potential expansion of antagonistic Western-led alliances too close to Russia’s borders; second, the chances for defending or advancing its interests through the use of force have to be relatively high.

The first condition is absent in Armenia because the dominant, pro-Russian wing of the country’s ruling elite continues to retain power. Sargsyan’s Russia-friendly Republican Party and its Dashnak allies control a majority in parliament, which means they can nominate and approve the next prime minister. (This was made possible under the current constitution, which Sargsyan successfully pushed to change in 2015, when he was president, in an ill-thought-out plan to retain power after his second and final presidential term expired this April.) If protest leader Nikol Pashinyan succeeds in ending the party of power’s control of parliament through protests or early elections, then, yes, that would be a revolution. For Russia to intervene, however, Pashinyan would not only have to oust the current party of power, he would also have to show a determination to move Armenia westward, into the EU and NATO. So far, Pashinyan has showed no such intentions, which should come as no surprise: Whatever his personal views, he realizes NATO is in no mood to accept more post-Soviet states in the short to medium term, and Armenia, therefore, has no viable alternative but Russia as its guarantor of security while it faces two hostile bordering states, Azerbaijan and Turkey. That pro-Russian elites have so far remained in control of Armenia in spite of Sargsyan’s resignation explains why Vladimir Putin—who is said to have a much cooler personal relationship with Sargsyan than with ex-President Robert Kocharyan—has not condemned the events in Armenia. Moreover, representatives of the Russian government and parliament vowed support for Armenia and some of them even welcomed the change, for example deputy speaker of the State Duma Igor Lebedev.

Armenia’s situation stands in stark contrast to cases when former Soviet republics have come under the rule of leaders intent on bringing them into blocs that Russia views as unfriendly competitors, such as NATO and the EU. When Russia intervened in Georgia in 2008 it did so because Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, with strong backing from George W. Bush, nearly succeeded in obtaining a Membership Action Plan from NATO. By that time, Georgia had been growing both friendlier with the West and more democratic for over four years. Yet Putin did not intervene until he saw the Bush administration come close to winning a MAP for Georgia and Ukraine at NATO’s Bucharest summit, which the Russian leader attended personally to head off the efforts. Although the summit ultimately did not offer the MAPs, thanks in part to opposition from German Chancellor Angela Merkel, its final communique did say that “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO.” That meant that any of the following summits could give Georgia and Ukraine MAPs, which Putin would have seen as an unacceptable threat to Russia’s interests. At the time, Putin probably thought he could not afford a double intervention into both Georgia and Ukraine. He picked Georgia, as least in part, because Saakashvili gave him a good pretext by taking Russia’s bait and launching a ground assault to establish control over breakaway South Ossetia. Ukraine may have been next, but in 2010 its then-leader Viktor Yushchenko lost the presidency to the more Moscow-friendly Viktor Yanukovych, who made it clear he would not seek membership in NATO. Therefore, the need to intervene in Ukraine subsided until 2014 when a pro-Western faction of Ukraine’s ruling elite came to power again amid expectations it would take the country into the EU and NATO in the wake of the Euromaidan revolution.

It is important to note that Russia does not intervene militarily in its post-Soviet neighbors’ affairs just because they have undergone a revolution and/or become more democratic or because their leaders want to build friendlier relations with Russia’s competitors. A threat to Moscow’s vital interests is the key. Take Armenia: It is ranked as more democratic than Russia and it also has friendly relations with the West. It has recently signed an EU Association Agreement (though it was watered down because of Russia) and it participates in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. It also has troops in the NATO-led campaign in Afghanistan and even had troops in the U.S.-led campaign in Iraq (withdrawn in 2008). Yet Russia has not intervened in Armenia—because, as stated above, its leadership has not displayed any ambition to pursue NATO membership. Likewise, Kyrgyzstan has consistently been ranked more democratic than Putin’s Russia and it even hosted a U.S. base (which Russia reportedly pressured Bishkek to close down). Yet Russia chose not to intervene during Kyrgyzstan’s revolutions of 2005 and 2010, despite then-President Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s pleas for such intervention in 2010. Again, the reason is that the victorious opposition did not espouse a desire to remove the country from Russia’s zone of influence to join or ally with a hostile bloc.

 The second condition for Russia to intervene is that the overall situation in question has to be conducive to the use of force. In other words, Russian leaders must be sure they will prevail in a military confrontation or at least ensure a stalemate that would constrain the targeted state’s ability to maintain activities Russia sees as seriously undermining its vital interests. That condition is at least partially present in the case of Armenia. It is true that Russia is already heavily involved in Syria and Ukraine, and recent polls show that Russians aren’t eager for further military engagement absent any clear threat to them or Russian-speaking minorities abroad. However, Russia has a large military base in Armenia, so if Moscow were to decide to use force there, it could theoretically do so more quickly than in Ukraine or Georgia. But the consequences and costs of such an intervention could outweigh the benefits, especially in the absence of a dramatic change in Armenia’s integration preferences, such as its “escape” to NATO. Any attempt to take control of Armenia, especially in the absence of a credible threat to Russia’s vital interests, would seriously undermine Moscow’s efforts to keep other post-Soviet republics in its various international integration projects because it would demonstrate that even membership in Russian-led coalitions—like the Collective Security Treaty Organization and Eurasian Economic Union—does not preclude losses of territory or independence to Moscow. These republics would then probably start looking around for guarantors and patrons other than Russia, forcing Moscow to expend resources on dealing with the consequences.

So if not Armenia, then who (if anyone) could be next?

If Armenia remains a Russian ally, as it likely will, then Moldova, which reluctantly plays host to a large Russian military contingent in its separatist province of Trans-Dniester, could be the next target of Russian intervention—if its efforts to pursue integration with the EU and deeper cooperation with NATO progress to what Putin sees as a point of no return. There’s also a chance that Putin may choose to escalate in Ukraine or Georgia if these two countries manage to somehow convince NATO to grant them MAPs. However, the prospect of such NATO action plans is unlikely for either of the two, and for Moldova as well. Therefore, the probability of Russian intervention in these countries is low, though not negligible.

Simon Saradzhyan is the director of Russia Matters. The views expressed here are his own.

Photo: Serzh Sargsyan during a visit to Moscow as president, March 2017. Courtesy of the Kremlin.

The opinions expressed in this blog post are solely those of the author.

Donald Trump’s decision to launch strikes, jointly with the U.K. and France, at what U.S. Defense Department officials described as the ''heart'' of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad's chemical weapons program came as no surprise. The U.S. leader had spent much of the previous week building momentum, warning Assad’s patrons in Moscow via Twitter “to get ready” for “nice and new and 'smart’” missiles after the suspected use of deadly chlorine gas by the Syrian dictator’s forces in Douma. When announcing the strikes Trump said the main purpose was to establish "a strong deterrent" against future use of chemical weapons. With a total of 105 missiles launched at three suspected chemical-weapons-related targets, Trump declared “mission accomplished.” But is it? And what should this mission be?

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley may have believed it when she said after the strikes that they had “crippled Syria's chemical-weapons program,” but I would be very surprised if the destruction of three CW facilities can put an end to the production of chemical weapons, including chlorine gas, making which, some say, is hardly rocket science. Even if the strikes did not exactly cripple the Syrian regime’s ability to produce chemical weapons, did they deter Assad from using them in the future? My guess is no. The Syrian dictator benefits in at least two ways from continued gassing of his opponents. One is that he intimidates some of them to surrender or leave without sending more of his soldiers into harm’s way. And the second is that each such use of chemical weapons widens the wedge between the U.S. and its allies on one side and Russia on the other, as such attacks have done before. The bigger the wedge, the less the already slim probability that Washington and Moscow would agree to any sort of plan for a peaceful resolution of the Syrian conflict. Assad has good reason to be concerned about any such plan as it would be far less favorable to him then the forceful solution he is trying to impose with Moscow’s and Tehran’s support.

But what’s good for Damascus is not necessarily good for Moscow … or for Washington. While Assad may benefit from a direct conflict between the U.S. and Russia, as Fidel Castro once tried to during the Cuban Missile Crisis, neither U.S. nor Russia stand to benefit from deepening animosities over Syria if only because an escalation of bilateral tensions increases the risk of accidental war. There are conflicting reports on whether the U.S. alerted Russia about the upcoming strikes and, if so, using what channels. For instance, according to RFE/RL, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford said Russia had not been notified before the strikes, but that normal “deconfliction channels” had been used for “airspace issues.” Alerted or not, no Russian personnel was hit in the strikes, though Trump had apparently weighed targeting Russian assets in Syria. According to the Wall Street Journal, late last week Trump pressed his national security team to “consider strikes on Russian and Iranian targets in Syria” when deliberating strike options. In the end U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis convinced Trump to opt for a more limited strike, so the world was spared from learning whether Russia’s chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov had been bluffing when he vowed in March that “if the lives of Russian officers are threatened [in Syria], the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will retaliate against missile and launch systems.” However, this does not mean that Trump will show similar restraint if another chemical-weapons attack occurs in Syria. Moreover, as suggested by a recent Washington Post story on how Trump thought he was expelling as many Russian diplomats as European allies over the suspected use of a chemical weapon against the Skripals, Trump may not always grasp the precise nature of the response options presented to him. Even if America’s commander-in-chief does not err when picking among options during another Syrian chemical-weapons crisis, there are still multiple things that can go deadly wrong on lower levels, as the Cuban Missile Crisis has taught us.

It is imperative, therefore, if the U.S. and Russia want to avoid stumbling into a war, that the sides rigorously use the existing deconfliction channels, rather than Twitter, to not only discuss “airspace issues” but also make sure they avoid significantly harming each other’s soldiers on the ground. It should also be both America’s and Russia’s mission to end the stalemate in the U.N. Security Council and empower the U.N. to conduct a thorough investigation of the use of chemical weapons in Douma and then jointly punish the perpetrators, while also pushing the conflicting sides toward a peaceful resolution of the war, perhaps along some of the lines that Ryan Crocker and Michael O'Hanlon suggest in today’s Wall Street Journal. Otherwise, if the culprit was indeed Assad as much of the publicly available evidence seems to indicate, he would be sooner or later tempted to use such weapons again, killing more innocent civilians and pushing the U.S. and Russia closer to a direct conflict that neither side wants or needs.

Photo credit: Department of Defense photo by Army Sgt. Amber I. Smith.

The opinions expressed in this blog post are solely those of the author.

The most recent event hosted by Russia Matters focused on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reelection to a fourth term and what those six years may have in store for U.S.-Russian relations and Russia’s policies toward other countries. Below is a summary of the three speakers’ key points in the order presented (all of them spoke in a personal capacity).

In addition to the remarks below, the speakers raised a number of important questions whose answers were not yet clear. How these questions are answered will shape not only Russia’s policies, but also policies by the U.S. and its allies toward Russia: Will Putin see a prospective successor among the up-and-coming cadre of 40-something Russian officials? How will the questions that concerned his predecessor Boris Yeltsin—namely, guarantees of safety from prosecution and from a loss of assets or privileges after stepping down—play out in the search for that successor? Could the world come a step closer to peace and stability in Ukraine by thinking up a phased approach to deploying peacekeepers along the front lines? Or would Russia be comfortable with the prospect of a “wrecked Ukraine”? And what are other places where Russia has the capacity to use military force to defend its national interests—Belarus? Moldova? Other former Soviet republics?

Roadblocks to Rapprochement

In his presentation, Prof. Nikolas Gvosdev of the U.S. Naval War College reviewed the results of Russia’s presidential elections, which Vladimir Putin won, and explained why expectations of a U.S.-Russian rapprochement under President Donald Trump have proved to be futile. Gvosdev called the results of the March 18 presidential poll sobering for those in Washington who overestimated the weakness of Putin’s regime and Russians’ unhappiness with their president. Looking at the actual election results should throw some cold water on the assumption that Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny would have won in free elections, according to Gvosdev. Gvosdev pointed out that in regional urban centers, approximate numbers indicate 10-20 percent supported Navalny’s call for a boycott—high enough to say it had an impact, but not enough to be a national movement. In fact, the call for a boycott may have actually hurt Russia’s liberal candidates, he said. Twenty percent voted for the “red/brown” candidates, meaning there is not insignificant support for more socialist, more anti-West ideas, while the liberal candidates did not even break 5 percent. Had a liberal candidate pulled 15-20 percent, indicating a critical mass for the liberal constituency, the post-election conversation would be very different, Gvosdev said. As it is, a reset between Washington and a President Navalny or a President Sobchak is not going to happen.

In his presentation, Gvosdev also explained why such a reset has not materialized in spite of expectations that Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections would lead to an improvement of U.S.-Russian relations. He said that Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. election has created an environment in the U.S. in which one part of the national security establishment rejects the possibility of a relationship with Russia as long as Putin remains in the Kremlin, while another segment believes that Trump cannot be trusted to make concessions to the Russian leader, even if those were needed to advance U.S. interests. This belief has left Trump no flexibility to lift even those sanctions that he has power to lift. There are also sanctions that Trump cannot lift because they are coded in the  Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act, Gvosdev said. These sanctions would be binding on every president after Trump until Congress removes these guidelines, which, as illustrated by the Jackson-Vanik amendment, can take many years. Gvosdev also noted that there are a number of additional longer-term factors that prevent a rapprochement between the U.S. and Russia. These include the enduring differences between the U.S. and Russia over the future of Russia’s post-Soviet neighbors in Eastern Europe and the lack of trust between NATO and Russia. These roadblocks have contributed to the failure of rapprochement under Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and then Barak Obama, and they have done so again during Trump’s presidency. Gvosdev also pointed to the ideological differences between Russia and the U.S., which, in his view, did not end with the Cold War.

Little Optimism for Arms Control Cooperation

Gary Samore, Executive Director for Research at Harvard’s Belfer Center, painted a bleak picture for prospects of U.S.-Russian progress on arms control and cooperation on nonproliferation issues. He noted that even prior to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and Russian election interference in 2016, these prospects were bleak. In 2013, Russia rejected a proposal to discuss further reductions beyond the New START Treaty limits, claiming that it would make the Russian nuclear arsenal more vulnerable to a U.S. first strike, as the U.S. was not willing to accept constraints on ballistic missile defense. Things got even worse in 2014, according to Samore. In July, the U.S. formally accused Russia of violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty by allegedly testing an intermediate-range land-based cruise missile and Russia responded with its own accusations. Also in 2014, the Obama administration decided to punish Russia over the Ukraine conflict by freezing bilateral cooperation on nuclear energy and Moscow retaliated by cutting off cooperation on nuclear security. Additionally, Samore noted, that by the end of the Obama administration, the U.S. launched an ambitious program to modernize its nuclear triad. Moscow was bound to view this as a threat, even though Russia has been modernizing for years. The only bright spot was U.S.-Russian cooperation on the Iran nuclear deal. However, Samore said, under Trump, even this cooperation is now in jeopardy. If Trump withdraws from the deal in May, this will create another source of conflict with Moscow, except in this instance, Russia and the European Union will be on the same side.   The Trump administration has also approved a Nuclear Posture Review that builds upon Obama’s modernization effort, but also suggests that the U.S. would develop a new submarine launched cruise missile so that it can be traded in exchange for Russia’s renewed compliance with the INF treaty. However, Russia is not likely to find that an attractive offer, Samore said. The Trump administration is also taking steps to expand missile defenses again North Korea. With respect to North Korea, the Trump administration sees Russia as irrelevant or obstructionist. Trump’s potential meeting with Kim Jung Un could produce a diplomatic breakthrough, creating a new opportunity for U.S.-Russian cooperation, but Samore believes such a development is unlikely. Samore concluded by saying that under the circumstances, there is little reason to be optimistic, but Russia and the U.S. do still have a very strong common interest: to maintain strategic stability and reduce the risk of conflict that could lead to mutually destructive nuclear war.  To minimize that risk, it is important to institute regular military-to-military “deconfliction” channels in Europe and Syria and to continue strategic dialogue. It is also very important to preserve the New START Treaty and prepare for its possible five-year extension in 2021, he said.

The Influence of National Power

Simon Saradzhyan, director of the Russia Matters Project, examined how changes in national power might have affected Russia’s foreign policy changes under Putin. Saradzhyan based his presentation on a report that he has drafted with Nabi Abdullaev of Control Risks’ Russia and CIS division. The report uses several methods of measuring national power to establish that Putin’s Russia has declined vis-à-vis China, but has risen vis-à-vis the U.S. and several other Western countries. The report argues that Russia’s decline vis-à-vis China and its rise vis-à-vis Western competitors in the 21^st century could have been among the factors that made Moscow more accommodating toward the Middle Kingdom, on one hand, and more assertive in its competition with the West in the post-Soviet neighborhood, on the other hand. However, while Russia has outperformed the U.S. and several Western countries in terms of the rate of growth of national power in the 21^st century, it continues to lag behind the U.S. in terms of absolute volume of national power, according to the measurements by Saradzhyan and Abdullaev. Moreover, some of the sources of the recent growth in Russia’s national power relative to Western competitors are finite and that growth may peter out unless Putin launches deep structural reforms needed to improve the country’s economic and demographic performance, according to Saradzhyan. If Russia’s national power declines significantly, Russia may become more accommodating to the West, but it would still continue to oppose a world order in which the U.S. would be the sole hegemon.

Top photo by Kremlin.ru shared under a CC BY 4.0 license. Event photo by Benn Craig.

The opinions expressed in this blog post are solely those of the author.

Of all the annual addresses Vladimir Putin has delivered to the Russian Federal Assembly since becoming president of Russia in Dec. 1999, his most recent speech, on March 1, has proven to be the most militarized. Although the Russian leader began by focusing on the need to modernize the Russian economy and reduce poverty, most of the speech and accompanying videos were devoted to guns rather than butter. While the parliamentarians warmly welcomed Putin’s showcasing of Russia’s new military might—offering frequent applause—the rest of the world felt a distinct Cold War chill. While his warning that Russia would respond to a nuclear attack on an ally with a nuclear counter-strike is consistent with the language of Russia’s current military doctrine, many of his other statements broke new ground in post-Soviet Russia’s belligerency toward the U.S. and its allies. His tedious listing of Russia’s new and not-so-new R&D in the strategic attack systems domain were reminiscent of Nikita Khrushchev’s claim that Soviet Russia was producing rockets like sausages, which the Soviet leader made at the height of the Cold War. Putin’s repeated emphasis on the superiority of the newly-developed systems over those of competitors comes as no surprise. The Russian leader—who once remarked to former President George W. Bush that his dog “was bigger, stronger and faster than” his Scottish terrier Barney—is a born competitor. So it was only a matter of time before Putin responded to President Donald Trump’s touting of U.S. military might in what feminists might describe as a missile envy contest.

While it may be reactive, Putin’s loudest saber-rattling thus far is also clearly designed to achieve several objectives. One is to stoke the patriotic mood in Russia to ensure more people show up and vote for Putin in the March 18 elections, with the goal of meeting the reported target of 70 percent turnout and 70 percent of the vote for the incumbent. Prioritizing defense spending has also been explained by some Russian insiders as a way for the Kremlin to help increase GDP. More importantly, the bellicose speech may be intended to not only deter the West from interfering in Russia’s affairs before and after the March 18 elections, but also to respond to Trump’s planned increases in military procurement and the recent release of a batch of strategic documents that shift the U.S. focus from counterterrorism to countering Russia and China. It may be that this saber-rattling is a ploy to convince the U.S. to enter substantive negotiations on various aspects of strategic stability between Moscow and Washington, which have now gone the longest period of time without substantive arms control talks since the height of the Cold War. If this is the case, however, I doubt that the U.S. would respond by elevating a half-hearted dialogue on strategic stability into full-blown arms control negotiations. If anything, Putin’s belligerence would only provide extra ammunition to those pushing for sharper increases in the scale and scope of strategic systems the Pentagon plans to procure. Putin’s speech confirms that, after having seen its attempt last year to reset U.S.-Russian relations fail, the Kremlin is now settling in for a period of protracted confrontation with the U.S.—and that’s bad news not only for the two nuclear superpowers, but for international stability as a whole.

What follows below are selected points from Putin’s nearly two-hour address, compiled by RM staff.

Highlights of Vladimir Putin’s March 1 Address to the Russian Parliament

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• Vladimir Putin cited the fact that the U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction programs enabled U.S. personnel to visit Russia’s nuclear enterprises in the 1990s as an example of how weak Russia was at the time. “There was a way underway in (Russia’s North) Caucasus, while American inspectors were sitting at our leading uranium-enrichment enterprises,” he said in his address to the parliament. (Russia Matters, 03.01.18)

Sabre-rattling/New Cold War:

• Putin said Moscow would regard a nuclear attack on its allies as a nuclear attack on Russia itself and would immediately respond. This statement is consistent with the language of Russia’s current military doctrine, which says the Russian Federation “reserves the right” to use nuclear arms if either Russia or its allies are subjected to aggression with nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.  He also singled out a new U.S. nuclear-strategy document as threatening to lower the threshold for using the weapons, and he delivered a stern warning to the U.S. that Russia has a series of new high-technology nuclear weapons that he said can overcome any defenses. “No one has managed to restrain Russia,” Putin said in the nearly two-hour address, which he illustrated with video clips of the new arms that he said were developed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russian president devoted nearly thirty minutes of his two-hour long address to discussing and showing off Russia’s newly improved military capabilities. (Bloomberg, 03.01.18, The Moscow Times, Bloomberg, 03.01.18, Kremlin.ru, 03.01.18) Among the systems developed since the collapse of the Soviet Union were:
  • The Sarmat multiple-warhead ICBM, which will be equipped with a broad range of powerful nuclear warheads, including hypersonic warheads. He claimed that Sarmat practically had no range restrictions and it could attack targets both via the North and South Poles. Putin said the liquid-fuel missile is being mass-produced. (Russia Matters, 03.01.18)
  • A miniature nuclear propulsion unit that can be installed on Russia’s air-to-surface Kh-101 missiles that can carry nuclear warheads. He claimed that installation of that unit turns the Kh-101 “into a low-flying stealth missile carrying a nuclear warhead, with almost an unlimited range, unpredictable trajectory and ability to bypass interception boundaries.” Putin said the nuclear-powered missile, which has not been previously reported in open sources, was tested in 2017 and that can bypass existing missile defenses, rendering them “useless.” (Russia Matters, 03.01.18)
  • A high-speed underwater drone that was tested in 2017 and that has "intercontinental" range and is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead that could target both aircraft carriers and coastal facilities. He said it has "very big" operational depth and a speed that is at least 10 times faster than any other vessel, which would make it immune to enemy intercept. A computer video showed the drone being launched by a submarine, cruising over the seabed, hitting an aircraft carrier and also exploding near the shore. Russia has been previously reported to have been working on a Status-6 underwater nuclear attack drone.  (AP, 01.03.18, Bloomberg, 03.01.18, Russia Matters, 03.01.18)
  • The Avangard strategic missile system with fundamentally new combat equipment—a gliding wing unit, which has also been successfully tested. This system, development of which has been previously reported, is capable of intercontinental flight at supersonic speeds in excess of Mach 20, according to Putin. “It flies to its target like a meteorite, like a ball of fire,” he said. (Russia Matters, 03.01.18)
  • A high-precision hypersonic aircraft missile system that can fly at 10 times the speed of sound and that can maneuver during all phases of its flight trajectory, Putin said. The Kinzhal (Dagger) system is carried by Soviet-designed MiG-31 interceptors and it has a range of more than 2,000 kilometers, according to chief of Russia’s aerospace forces, Sergei Surovikin. (Bloomberg, 03.01.18, Financial Times, 03.01.18, Russia Matters, 03.01.18)
  • A new laser weapon was shown on video preparing for operation, and Putin said Russian troops have been “armed with laser weapons” since 2017. (Bloomberg, 03.01.18, Russia Matters, 03.01.18)

Missile defense:

• “I hope what was said today will sober any potential aggressor or unfriendly gestures towards Russia, like the deployment of an ABM system and the development of NATO infrastructure close to our borders. That should be seen from the military point of view as inefficient, financially costly and simply useless. Nobody listened to us before. Listen to us now,” he said. (Bloomberg, 03.01.18)

Other bilateral issues:

• “We are interested in normal and constructive cooperation with the United States and the European Union. We hope that common sense will prevail and our partners will opt for honest and equal work together,” Putin said. (Kremlin.ru, 03.01.18)

II. Russia’s domestic news

Politics, economy and energy:

• Russia must not only gain a firm foothold as one of the world’s five largest economies by the middle of the next decade, but increase our GDP per capita by one and a half times,” Putin said. “Falling behind in technology is the main threat and enemy to our country. If we do not change the situation, it will inevitably intensify.”  (Bloomberg, 03.01.18, Bloomberg, 03.01.18)
• Putin said Russia had to double spending on road infrastructure by committing over 11 trillion rubles (141.44 billion pounds) to improve the country's road network. He also told lawmakers that a bridge being built between Russia and Crimea, which was annexed from Ukraine in 2014, would start operating in the next couple of months. (Reuters, 03.01.18)
• Putin told lawmakers that Russia had to halve the poverty rate within six years and provide jobs for people. Putin said that as many as 20 million Russians were living in poverty and that the government had to ensure that real incomes grew. (Reuters, 03.01.18, Reuters, 03.01.18, Bloomberg, 03.01.18)
• “This trend will continue in the coming years and will become a serious obstacle to economic growth,” Vladimir Putin said in reference to Russian demographics. Over the next six years, Russia will allocate at least 59.9 million dollars for demographic development, he said. “Life expectancy needs to exceed 80 years by the end of the next decade,” he added. All in all Russia will spend 3.4 trillion rubles ($60.07 billion) to support families and demographic growth in the next six years, he said. (Bloomberg, 03.01.18, Reuters, 03.01.18)
• Russia must lower mortgage rates and get them down towards 7 percent in order to solve the country's housing problem, Putin said. (Reuters, 03.01.18)
•  “It is important to make it easier to get Russian citizenship. The focus should be on people that the country needs — young, healthy, well-educated people,” Putin said. (Bloomberg, 03.01.18)

Defense and Aerospace:

• “The operation in Syria has proved the increased capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces. In recent years, a great deal has been done to improve the Army and the Navy the Armed Forces now have 3.7 times more modern weapons. Over 300 new units of equipment were put into service,” Putin said. (Kremlin.ru, 03.01.18)
• No significant developments.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

III. Foreign affairs, trade and investment

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

• “Our policies will never be based on claims to exceptionalism. We protect our interests and respect the interests of other countries. We observe international law and believe in the inviolable central role of the UN. These are the principles and approaches that allow us to build strong, friendly and equal relations with the absolute majority of countries. Our comprehensive strategic partnership with the People’s Republic of China is one example… We will also continue to work on a greater Eurasian partnership,” Putin said.  (Kremlin.ru, 03.01.18)

Photo credit: Russian Presidential Press Office

The opinions expressed in this blog post are solely those of the author.

On Feb. 13, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats was joined by CIA chief Mike Pompeo and FBI Director Christopher Wray in presenting to a Senate committee the intelligence community’s annual Worldwide Threat Assessment—a document in which Russia figures prominently. Russia Matters has compiled a selection Russia-related excerpts, divided into categories similar to those in our news and analysis digests.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Military issues, including NATO-Russia relations:

• Russia will compete with the United States most aggressively in Europe and Eurasia, Moscow will employ a variety of aggressive tactics to bolster its standing as a great power, secure a “sphere of influence” in the post-Soviet space, weaken the United States, and undermine Euro-Atlantic unity. However, Moscow will also seek cooperation with the United States in areas that advance its interests.

Nuclear arms control:

• Russia has developed a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) that the United States has declared is in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Despite Russia’s ongoing development of other Treaty-compliant missiles with intermediate ranges, Moscow probably believes that the new GLCM provides sufficient military advantages to make it worth risking the political repercussions of violating the INF Treaty.

Conflict in Syria:

• The Syrian opposition’s seven-year insurgency is probably no longer capable of overthrowing President Bashar al-Assad, but rebels probably retain the resources to sustain the conflict for at least the next year, .Russia and Iran are planning for a long-term presence, securing military basing rights and contracts for reconstruction and oil and gas exploitation.

Cyber security:

• [The U.S. intelligence community expects] that Russia will conduct bolder and more disruptive cyber operations during the next year, most likely using new capabilities against Ukraine.
• Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea will pose the greatest cyber threats to the United States during the next year. Russia, Iran, and North Korea are testing more aggressive cyber attacks that pose growing threats to the United States and U.S. partners.

Elections interference:

• Influence operations, especially through cyber means, will remain a significant threat to U.S. interests as they are low-cost, relatively low-risk, and deniable ways to retaliate against adversaries, to shape foreign perceptions, and to influence populations. Russia probably will be the most capable and aggressive source of this threat in 2018 … [and] the 2018 U.S. mid-term elections are a potential target for Russian influence operations.

II. Russia’s domestic news

Politics, economy and energy:

• In his probable next term in office, President Vladimir Putin will resort to more authoritarian tactics to maintain control amid challenges to his rule. He is likely to increase his use of repression and intimidation to contend with domestic discontent over corruption, poor social services, and a sluggish economy with structural deficiencies.

Defense and Aerospace:

• In 2018, Russia will continue to modernize, develop, and field a wide range of advanced nuclear, conventional, and asymmetric capabilities to balance its perception of a strategic military inferiority vis-a-vis the United States.

III. Foreign affairs, trade and investment

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

• In his probable next term in office, President Vladimir Putin will rely on assertive and opportunistic foreign policies to shape outcomes beyond Russia’s borders. … Moscow will use a range of relatively low-cost tools to advance its foreign policy objectives, including influence campaigns, economic coercion, cyber operations, multilateral forums, and measured military force. Russia’s slow economic growth is unlikely to constrain Russian foreign policy or by itself trigger concessions from Moscow in Ukraine, Syria, or elsewhere in the next year.

China:

• China and Russia will seek spheres of influence and to check U.S. appeal and influence in their regions. The leading state intelligence threats to U.S. interests will continue to be Russia and China, based on their services’ capabilities, intent, and broad operational scope. Both Russia and China continue to pursue antisatellite (ASAT) weapons as a means to reduce U.S. and allied military effectiveness. … Russian and Chinese destructive ASAT weapons probably will reach initial operational capability in the next few years.

Ukraine:

• The conflict in eastern Ukraine is likely to remain stalemated and a major offensive by either side is unlikely in 2018. Ukraine will remain at risk of domestic turmoil, which Russia could exploit to undermine Kiev’s pro-West orientation. These factors will threaten Ukraine’s nascent economic recovery and potentially lead to changes in its foreign policy that further inflame tension between Russia and the West. Popular frustrations with the pace of reforms, depressed standards of living, perceptions of worsening corruption, and political polarization ahead of scheduled presidential and legislative elections in 2019 could prompt early elections.

Russia’s other post-Soviet neighbors:

• Tension over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh could devolve into a large-scale military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which could draw in Russia to support its regional ally. Both sides’ reluctance to compromise, mounting domestic pressures, Azerbaijan’s steady military modernization, and Armenia’s acquisition of new Russian equipment sustain the risk of large-scale hostilities in 2018.
• Russia views Belarus as a critical buffer between itself and NATO and will seek to spoil any potential warming between Minsk and the West.
• Moldova’s ostensibly pro-European ruling coalition—unless it is defeated in elections planned for November—probably will seek to curb Russian influence and maintain a veneer of European reform while avoiding changes that would damage the coalition’s grip on power.
• Russia will pressure Central Asia’s leaders to reduce engagement with Washington and support Russian-led economic and security initiatives, while concerns about ISIS in Afghanistan will push Moscow to strengthen its security posture in the region.

Photo credit: U.S. Navy

International press keeps digging up additional details of the Feb. 7 clash between the U.S. and its allies in Syria’s Deir el-Zour region and what has reportedly turned out to be a group of private military contractors, most of whom were reportedly Russian nationals, but also included some Ukrainian nationals. Apparently, these contract soldiers, some of whom may have belonged to a Russian private military company known as the Wagner Group, tried to advance on a base located east of Deir el-Zour held by U.S. and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The formation that tried to advance was no smaller than a battalion supported by artillery, tanks, multiple-launch rocket systems and mortars, according to chief Pentagon spokesperson Dana W. White. SDF commander Gen. Hassan told The Washington Post’s David Ignatius that he called his regular Russian liaison contact in Deir el-Zour, hoping to avoid a battle with the advancing unit. In response a Russian liaisons officer reportedly assured coalition officials that they would not engage coalition forces in the vicinity However, in spite of the assurances, the mercenary battalion still attacked, prompting the targeted site to fire back, according to the U.S. and SDF version of events. As a result, as many as 200 members of that battalion-sized unit were killed in U.S.-led air and artillery strikes. It was then that the Russian liaison officer contacted the SDF again, asking for a pause to collect those killed in the U.S. strikes, according to Hassan’s account as narrated by Ignatius. Most of the fatalities were attributed to an American airstrike on enemy columns, according to the New York Times. Russian nationals killed in the U.S.-led counter-strike include Vladimir Loginov, Kirill Ananyev, Alexei Ladygin, Stanislav Matveyev and Igor Kosoturov, some of whom had earlier fought in Donbass, according to the Conflict Intelligence Team. Both Kurdish commander Hassan and Washington Post columnist Ignatius interpreted the incident as a breach of faith by the Russian military. However, it is possible that the Russian military was not aware of the attack planned by the Russian contract soldiers acting on orders of the Assad regime. As Bloomberg’s story points out, “The Russian assault may have been a rogue operation.” The proposition that the attempted assault was not cleared with Russia’s “official” military is also supported by the Kremlin’s muted reaction to the event. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov declined to comment on the incident, in which the death toll of private Russian soldiers may have been five times greater than the Russian Defense Ministry’s official count of servicemen who have died in Syria. “We only handle the data that concerns Russian forces servicemen,” Peskov was quoted as saying by the New York Times. “We don’t have data about other Russians who could be in Syria.” Given such a reaction, chances are that the Kremlin will choose not to escalate over the incident. Nevertheless, the incident serves as a grim reminder of the complexities of the multi-party (and multi-proxy) conflict in Syria, in which there’s always a chance that rogue players’ actions may end up dragging great powers into a direct conflict in spite of their continued deconfliction efforts.

Photo credit: U.S. government work in the public domain.

Just 12 minutes before the deadline, the U.S. treasury published a list of “Senior Foreign Political Figures and Oligarchs in the Russian Federation and Russian Parastatal Entities” which the Trump administration was supposed to supply to the U.S. Congress in compliance with the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 (CAATSA). Some Russian insiders were quick to dismiss the list of 210 names, which includes Russia’s richest persons and top Russian government officials, describing it as a compilation copied and pasted from the Forbes list of Russian billionaires and the Kremlin’s phone book. Markets also largely ignored the publication. In fact, it was clear as early as last week that they would (see the “Bilateral issues” section in the Jan. 26 issue of our Russia in Review digest). Moreover, investors were so relieved that no new punitive measures were announced that they pushed yields on Russian 10-year bonds to the lowest levels in five years, following the publication of the list, according to Bloomberg. They did so for a good reason: While unveiling the list, the Trump administration chose not to impose any new sanctions on Russian individuals and entities, arguing CAATSA is already causing pain by deterring billions in Russian arms exports. However, one should not dismiss this development entirely. First, in addition to the public portion of the list, there’s apparently a separate, classified portion, which contains more names, including those of less-senior political figures and businesspeople with less than $1 billion in assets, and which may outline their involvement in corrupt activities, according to RFE/RL and Financial Times. Second, the very publication of the list will keep potential foreign business partners from doing business with those on the list. Third, while the Trump administration’s present abstention from sanctioning anyone on either the public or secret portions of the list (with the exception of those who have been sanctioned earlier) is good news for those who want to stop further deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations, this does not mean sanctions won’t be imposed in the future, especially if Congress applies pressure. In fact, while unveiling the list, the Treasury warned that it has the right to use "all available sources of information," including classified versions of the report, when making decisions about additional sanctions, according to the Wall Street Journal.

See below for the RM staff’s selection of highlights from the Russia list’s publication coverage as of Jan. 30 afternoon.

Who Is and Is Not on the List

• The list, which the Treasury released in the late evening of Jan. 29, contains 210 names viewed as close to Putin’s government. Russians with a net worth of more than $1 billion were included in the list of 96 oligarchs, according to the document. 114 others, including senior Kremlin and government officials, as well as CEOs of state companies, were also named. (Bloomberg, 01.30.18)
• The officials on the list include 43 of Russian President Vladimir Putin's aides and advisers including Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, 31 cabinet ministers including Dmitry Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, senior lawmakers and top officials in Russia's intelligence agencies. The list omitted a few liberal-minded senior officials, including central bank governor Elvira Nabiullina, Rusnano chief Anatoly Chubais and Alexei Kudrin, a former finance minister who advises Putin on the economy. (Financial Times, 01.30.18, RFE/RL, 01.30.18)
• The 96 people on the oligarch list correspond exactly to the 96 billionaires on last year’s Forbes list of Russian billionaires. The tycoons on the list include Roman Abramovich, Alisher Usmanov, U.S. NBA basketball team owner Mikhail Prokhorov, aluminum magnate Oleg Deripaska and Kaspersky Lab founder Yevgeny Kaspersky. The list also included a few businessmen with no obvious links to the Kremlin, including Yandex’s Arkady Volozh, supermarket magnate Sergei Galitsky and online bank entrepreneur Oleg Tinkov. The CEOs of major state-owned companies, including energy giant Rosneft's chief, Igor Sechin, and the head of state-controlled Sberbank, German Gref, are also on the list. (RFE/RL, 01.30.18, RFE/RL, 01.30.18, Financial Times, 01.30.18)

Markets’ and Businesses’ Reaction

• The Moscow exchange’s equity index, which includes companies controlled by nearly all the men listed, went up four points on Jan. 30 after the report was published. The Moscow Stock Exchange’s dollar-denominated RTS index was up 1.15 percent at 1,290.21 points as of 1217 GMT after briefly touching its lowest since Jan. 19 at 1,266.48. The ruble-based MOEX Russian index, previously known as MICEX, was 0.3 percent higher at 2,290.19 points, inching toward an all-time high of 2,328.48 it hit last week. (Reuters, 01.30.18, Financial Times, 01.30.18)
• Relieved investors pushed yields on Russian 10-year bonds to the lowest levels in five years as the Treasury provided no details on a separate report on the effect of expanding sanctions to Russian sovereign debt. (Bloomberg, 01.30.18)
• The ruble opened down 0.1 percent against the dollar on Jan. 30. Shares in some big companies fell, although Russian stocks and the ruble later edged higher overall. Norilsk Nickel was down 1.2 percent after its co-owner Vladimir Potanin was included on the U.S. list. Aluminum giant Rusal, whose co-owner Oleg Deripaska was also named, saw its shares tumble 1.4 percent in Hong Kong. (Reuters, 01.30.18)
• IPSCO Tubulars, the U.S. subsidiary of Russia’s largest maker of steel pipes for the oil and gas industry TMK, said on Jan. 29 it launched an initial public offering (IPO) of its common stock. TMK chairman Dmitry Pumpyanskiy has been included on the U.S. Treasury’s list. (Reuters, 01.29.18, Interfax, 01.30.18)
• Credit Bank of Moscow, whose owner Roman Avdeev is one of the people on the list, said that it would launch a U.S. roadshow for a dollar-denominated bond later this week. Vladimir Yevtushenkov, owner of the Sistema conglomerate, said he saw “no risks” for his business. (Financial Times, 01.30.18)
• Russia’s economy has gained enough resilience to withstand new Western sanctions and the country’s sovereign rating may be upgraded by the end of the year, Kristin Lindow, a senior vice president at Moody’s Investor Service, said in an interview. “Our analysis is that the economy and public finances are in good shape and can withstand new sanctions,” Lindow told Reuters late on Jan. 29. (Reuters, 01.30.18)
• “We believe that the current U.S. approach significantly diminishes the risk of harsh measures against Russian sovereign debt over the short term,” Societe Generale SA analysts led by Phoenix Kalen said in a note. (Bloomberg, 01.30.18)

Reaction in Russia

• Russian President Vladimir Putin said a list of Kremlin-connected individuals released by the U.S. Treasury was a "hostile step" and an affront to all Russians that would harm bilateral relations. “In effect, all 146 million of us have been put on some list,” he said, calling it “indisputably an unfriendly act.” However, he dismissed its impact as an empty threat. Describing the Treasury report as “nonsense” that would “reduce our bilateral relationship to zero,” Putin mocked the U.S. for bundling together North Korea, Iran and Russia as threats while asking Moscow for help in dealing with Tehran and Pyongyang. "I won't hide it: we were waiting for this report. We were ready to take steps—serious ones that would have brought our relations to nothing," Putin said. Joking that it was “offensive” that he wasn’t included, Putin told a campaign event that Russia will “refrain for the moment” from implementing serious retaliatory measures it has prepared. "We do not intend to … escalate the situation," Putin said at a meeting with backers of his sure-thing reelection campaign. "We want and intend to patiently build relations to whatever degree the other side—the American side—is ready." (Financial Times, 01.30.18, RFE/RL, 01.30.18, Bloomberg, 01.30.18, AP, 01.30.18)
• "The importance of this list is null," said Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, who then added a joke: "I believe in this case not being included on this list provides grounds for resignation." Medvedev also said the list was "absolutely discriminatory" and would "poison our ties, our relations for quite a long period of time—which is bad in itself." (RFE/RL, 01.30.18, The Washington Post, 01.30.18)
• Dmitry Peskov, Vladimir Putin's spokesman, said the Jan. 29 publication of the U.S. list of Russian officials and businessmen as part of a sanctions law shows that the United States views the entire Russian government as enemies. "De facto, everyone [on the list] is being called an enemy of the United States," Peskov said on Jan. 30. (AP, 01.30.18, RFE/RL, 01.30.18)
• A spokesman for Rosneft’s Igor Sechin, who is already subject to U.S. sanctions imposed in 2014, said the list was based on “vicious principles.” (Financial Times, 01.30.18)
• Russian Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich has dismissed the Trump administration's list of Russian politicians and businessmen as simply a "who's who" of Russian politics. (AP, 01.30.18)
• Valentina Matviyenko, the chairwoman of the upper chamber of the Russian parliament says the Jan. 29 publication of the list of Russian officials and businessmen as part of a U.S. law on sanctions against Russia is an attempt to influence Russia's upcoming presidential vote. (AP, 01.30.18)
• A senior Russian lawmaker has described the Trump administration's list of politicians and business figures released late on Jan. 29 as "political paranoia which, it turns out, is very hard to cure." In a Facebook post Jan. 30, Konstantin Kosachev, chairman of the Federation Council's foreign affairs committee, said U.S. intelligence failed to find compromising material on Russian politicians and "ended up copying the Kremlin phone book." (AP, 01.30.18)
• A Russian businessman who is on the Trump administration's list of Russian politicians and businessmen, released as part of a U.S. law aimed at punishing Russia for meddling in the 2016 U.S. election, says he will nevertheless advocate for better ties with the West. Boris Titov, presidential ombudsman for business, is on the list along with two other Russian presidential envoys for human rights. (AP, 01.30.18)
• "One does not have to be very smart to make this list," Mikhail Fedotov, the head of the Kremlin Human Rights Council, told the news agency Interfax. He was also on the list. (The Washington Post, 01.30.18)
• Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny has lauded the Trump administration's list of Russian oligarchs and politicians as a "good list." (AP, 01.30.18)
• Evgeny Kaspersky, whose cybersecurity firm Kaspersky Lab was recently banned from supplying U.S. government agencies under separate action, tweeted: “Calling all successful businessmen from the Forbes ratings ‘oligarchs’ is incorrect. I believe @BillGates @WarrenBuffett & @JeffBezos would agree with me here.” (Financial Times, 01.30.18)

Reaction in the U.S. and Other Countries

•  “The State Department claims that the mere threat of sanctions will deter Russia’s aggressive behavior. How do you deter an attack that happened two years ago, and another that’s already underway? It just doesn’t make sense,” said Rep. Eliot Engel, the top Democrat on the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee. “I’m fed up waiting for this Administration to protect our country and our elections,” he said in a statement. (Reuters, 01.30.18)
• “By naming the whole Russian government, presidential administration and all Russian billionaires, the Trump administration has undermined and ridiculed the U.S. sanctions on Russia,” Anders Aslund, an economist and frequent Putin critic who had published recommendations for the list before its release, wrote on Twitter. (Bloomberg, 01.30.18)
• Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko praised the United States in a tweet on Jan. 30, expressing "sincere gratitude to Washington" for what he called its "demonstration of leadership in countering Russian aggression." (RFE/RL, 01.30.18)

Simon Saradzhyan is the director of the Russia Matters project.

The opinions expressed in this blog post are solely those of the author.