In the Thick of ItA blog on the U.S.-Russia relationship
President Vladimir Putin showered criticism on the “so-called West,” particularly on Washington, in a speech and question-answer session in Sochi on Oct. 19, leaving foreign-relations analysts in the audience with a rather grim view of the foreseeable future of U.S.-Russia ties. The Russian leader did make a point, however, of blaming the troubled relationship on Congress and President Donald Trump’s predecessors rather than the current administration.
Putin spoke calmly for most of his three or so hours at the Valdai Discussion Club—an annual international gathering of Russia experts, policymakers and journalists—but grew visibly emotional when discussing the Ukraine crisis, showing no readiness for any concessions and blaming the West and pro-Western political forces in Ukraine for both the conflict and the stalemate in implementing the long-stalled Minsk-2 peace accords. In contrast, he was cool and collected when claiming he was not worried about the deployment and training of NATO forces on Russia’s western flank.
In an unusual twist, Putin also repeatedly emphasized his discontent with U.S.-Russian interactions in the area of nuclear security, blaming the U.S. for what he saw as a failure to reciprocate for Russia’s unilateral granting of access to its nuclear weapons facilities in the 1990s. Not only did he reiterate earlier grievances that Washington had taken advantage of Russia’s weakness at the time, but he invoked the perceived one-sidedness of that early cooperation when answering seemingly unrelated questions. One of those concerned Russia’s response if the U.S. declares the American bureaus of state-funded Russian media RT and Sputnik to be “foreign agents” (Putin said the response would be “symmetrical”). This indicates that Americans’ purported betrayal of Russia’s good will on nuclear security is now another official talking point on Russia's list of grievances vis-à-vis the U.S.
The Russian president didn’t face any direct questions on his plans to run for re-election in March and dodged indirect ones, but he did not sound like a man preparing to step down.
His comments concerning the most salient aspects of U.S.-Russian relations are below, paraphrased except for remarks in quotation marks, which are direct speech. The original Russian can be found via this link . The compilation was prepared by RM Staff in Sochi and Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Update: The Kremlin's English translation is now available .
Among the topics broached in Tefft’s interview were Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria and the retaliatory expulsions of diplomats that has left the Moscow embassy short-staffed—severely so, in Tefft’s view. Still, the outgoing ambassador suggested that he saw promise for U.S.-Russian cooperation on several fronts, including Syria and North Korea, and he was receptive to a Russian plan to deploy U.N. peacekeepers in Ukraine—with some big caveats. At the same time, Tefft bluntly insisted that Russia needed to acknowledge meddling in the election and to restore Ukraine’s “territorial integrity.”
One topic that was notably absent from Tefft’s interview was arms control, even as differences between Moscow and Washington threaten to kill the INF Treaty and hobble the Treaty on Open Skies. What follows are highlights of the interview, back-translated from Kommersant. (We presume the interview was in English, but no transcript was publicly available at the time of publication.)
With all the talk lately of a “new Cold War” between the U.S. and Russia, historian Odd Arne Westad’s latest book is a timely one. “The Cold War: A World History” examines the conflict from its ideological roots in the late 19th century through the collapse of the Soviet Union. In it, Westad offers keen insights into how the Cold War and its dénouement have given rise to the current conflict between Russia and the West, as well as the ascendance of China and the emergence of a multipolar world order. Westad, who teaches at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, recently discussed these topics in a book talk and in an essay called “The Cold War and America’s Delusion of Victory” in the New York Times. What follow are key points from the talk and the essay, some paraphrased and some directly quoted.
- “The Cold War: A World History” is “not an attempt to say, ‘If we only understand how the Cold War ideological divide works, we will understand everything about the 20th century,’” Westad said at the talk. “But I would probably argue the opposite: If we want to understand the Cold War, we have to understand how it fits into the 20th century.”
- Westad examines the Cold War through three significant turning points:
- The split between social democrats in Europe and communists, which allowed the former to continue to develop without being labeled communist.
- The Korean War, the first hot war of the conflict, which led to the militarization of the two superpowers on a global scale.
- And the 1970s—a decade typically seen as a moment of American weakness, but in fact a time when the globalization of capital allowed the U.S. to buy into markets in Asia, while the U.S.S.R. remained isolated.
- As China increasingly embraced the free market, the space for the Soviet Union to operate narrowed—which would prove to be a major factor in its collapse. Westad takes issue with the idea that Ronald Reagan’s hardline stance toward the Soviet Union was the main reason for its demise. While this may have contributed to Moscow’s isolation, Westad notes that Reagan was a willing negotiator on everything from nuclear weapons to regional conflicts.
- The flawed belief that the Cold War had been won by the West would have lasting consequences. The West bought into two versions of post-Cold War triumphalism, Westad writes in his essay: “First was the Clinton version, which promoted a prosperity agenda of market values on a global scale. Its lack of purpose in international affairs was striking, but its domestic political instincts were probably right: Americans were tired of foreign entanglements and wanted to enjoy ‘the peace dividend.’ As a result, the 1990s was a lost opportunity for international cooperation, particularly to combat disease, poverty and inequality. The second was the Bush version. Where President Bill Clinton emphasized prosperity, President George W. Bush emphasized predominance.”
- U.S. actions in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East can be directly traced to this flawed understanding: “As America entered a new century, its main aim should have been to bring other nations into the fold of international norms and the rule of law, especially as its own power diminishes. Instead, the United States did what declining superpowers often do: engage in futile, needless wars far from its borders, in which short-term security is mistaken for long-term strategic goals,” Westad writes.
- There were also lost opportunities in the 1990s for greater cooperation with Russia. More should have been done to “link Russia in” with the European Union, especially through security cooperation. “Both the West and Russia would have been considerably more secure today if the chance for Russia to join the European Union, and possibly even NATO, had at least been kept open in the 1990s,” Westad writes. (In remarks made last year, Westad noted that, in hindsight, the biggest problem in the 1990s with regard to Eastern Europe was the lack of will to build structures in which Russia could participate, especially in terms of economic integration.)
- As a result of this flawed approach, America is “less prepared than it could have been to deal with the big challenges of the future: the rise of China and India, the transfer of economic power from West to East, and systemic challenges like climate change and disease epidemics,” Westad writes.
- On the Russian side, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a disaster and the “ultimate tragedy,” as Westad noted in his talk. The U.S.S.R. had gone from a superpower to nearly irrelevant in the span of years, naturally leading to feelings of discontent among Russians, who had been under repression for decades and now faced dire economic woes and a complete collapse of familiar institutions. “The collapse left Russians feeling déclassé and usurped,” Westad writes. Meanwhile, the West applauded the economic reforms under Boris Yeltsin, which were disastrous for Russia. In this context, the rise of Vladimir Putin and his promise to restore Russia’s lost glory is understandable.
- The prime beneficiary of the end of the Cold War is China, which is now well integrated into the world economy and is directly challenging U.S. hegemony. “Russia and China, unlike the Soviet Union, are not likely to seek isolation or global confrontation,” Westad writes. “They will attempt to nibble away at American interests and dominate their regions. But neither China nor Russia is willing or able to mount a global ideological challenge backed by military power. Rivalries may lead to conflicts, or even local wars, but not of the systemic Cold War kind.”
- Westad cautions against a false romanticism of the Cold War period. His book is meant in part to show younger generations that it was in fact “a dismal epoch” in history, he said. There was little sense of security and balance; rather, it was an incredibly dangerous time, with the superpowers often poised on the brink of war.
Kevin Dolye is a masters-degree candidate at Harvard's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies and a student associate at Russia Matters.
Photo courtesy of the Missouri State Archives.
The opinions expressed in this blog post are solely those of the author.
Perhaps Trump would do well to reflect upon his foreign policy, given the fact that more people trust the leader of the country that NATO’s leadership has described as an adversary, including in such NATO countries as Germany, France, Greece and Italy, as well as Japan and South Korea. In addition to flaws in Trump’s policies, the results may also reflect the fact that not all residents of the surveyed countries necessarily share the West’s mistrust of Russia.
Alas, while shots of Putin’s spearfishing expedition may impress those with no knowledge of the sport (likely the bulk of his voters), seasoned spearos in and out of Russia, who know about diving for fish “on breath hold,” will see little more than a novice—no matter how many times state-controlled TV channels tell them the Russian president “chased a giant pike for two hours before catching it with [his] bare hands.”