This Week’s Highlights

• The Czech government’s announcement that Russia was behind an explosion in an arms depot in 2014 and consequent expulsion of 18 diplomats speaks volumes about the Kremlin’s wider thinking, writes RUSI’s Mark Galeotti. Since then, a Russian leadership convinced it is fighting an underground yet existential struggle for its country’s place in the world and true sovereignty, has adopted a wartime mentality, willing to take risks, accept tactical defeats and bear the burdens of sanctions and censure alike in the name of the struggle, Galeotti argues.
• Unless Washington increases its strategic pressure on Beijing and Moscow to such an extreme that both states feel compelled to consolidate a formal alliance, China and Russia will continue to pursue a hedging strategy but avoid entering an outright alliance, writes Prof. Wang Dong of Peking University.
• Financial Times’ Gideon Rachman argues that a U.S. pullout from Afghanistan could be seen as a Vietnam-like failure, emboldening Russia and China to test the Biden administration’s resolve in Ukraine and Taiwan, respectively. “There are voices in the U.S. calling for America to now make an explicit security guarantee to Taiwan, and for NATO to accelerate the process that would allow Ukraine to join its alliance. … The argument against these policy changes is that China and Russia may interpret them as a threatening shift in the status quo—and feel compelled to respond,” he writes. 
• The Belfer Center’s transatlantic, Russia and energy-focused experts share their thoughts on the implications of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline for Europe's security and energy supply, transatlantic relations and policy toward Russia, as well as what actions the U.S. and European countries should take at this point. 
• Carnegie Moscow Center director Dmitri Trenin and Russia Matters director Simon Saradzhyan explain why, in their views, Russia will not launch an offensive against Ukraine, while The National Interest’s Mark Episkopos explores how the fighting would evolve if war did erupt between the two former Soviet republics.  
• U.S. President Joe Biden and Congress should link specific nuclear modernization goals to specific future arms control objectives, placing adversaries on notice regarding what the United States expects of them in future negotiations and highlighting the real security consequences of ignoring American offers, argues Prof. John D. Maurer. For example, funding the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent missile could be tied explicitly to further reducing the size of Russia’s own intercontinental missile forces, Maurer suggests.
• Whether the U.S. and Russia can go beyond intelligence sharing toward broader counterterrorist cooperation will depend to a great degree on a host of domestic political factors that neither government fully controls, writes George Beebe, director of studies at the Center for the National Interest. Most significantly, each country has come to believe that the other is using information technology to exacerbate its rival’s social divides and weaken or even overthrow the other’s government. Such perceptions will be powerful obstacles to significant bilateral cooperation of any kind for as long as they remain dominant, according to Beebe.

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Great Power rivalry/New Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“After Afghanistan, China and Russia will test Biden,” Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 04.19.21. The author, chief foreign affairs columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “The danger is that the pullout from Afghanistan will be seen outside America as a Vietnam-like failure that could eventually lead to the fall of Kabul to the Taliban, a replay of the fall of Saigon to North Vietnam in 1975. Rival powers, in particular Russia and China, could now be emboldened to test the Biden administration’s resolve a little further. The obvious flashpoints are Ukraine and Taiwan.”
• “The strategic situation in Asia and Europe is similar in one key respect. The U.S. has expressed strong support for both Taiwan and Ukraine, but neither country enjoys an explicit American security guarantee.”
• “There are voices in the U.S. calling for America to now make an explicit security guarantee to Taiwan, and for NATO to accelerate the process that would allow Ukraine to join its alliance. The hope is that these moves would deter Moscow and Beijing, and so reduce the risk of war starting by miscalculation. The argument against these policy changes is that China and Russia may interpret them as a threatening shift in the status quo—and feel compelled to respond.”
• “Even the most confident and nationalistic officials in Beijing and Moscow will still be conscious of the risks of head-on confrontation over Taiwan and Ukraine. The likelihood is that Russia and China will continue to use ‘grey zone’ tactics that stop just short of all-out conflict. As America discovered in Afghanistan, it is much easier to start a war than to control its outcome.”

“A Seven-Year Fuse Blows Up Czech-Russian Relations,” Mark Galeotti, The Moscow Times, 04.19.21. The author, a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), writes:

• “It can be disconcerting to discover you have been at war for seven years. The Czech government’s announcement that Russia was behind an explosion in an arms depot in 2014 and consequent expulsion of 18 diplomats has not only brough new acrimony to Prague’s relationship with Moscow, it also speaks volumes about the Kremlin’s wider thinking.”
• “The blast and subsequent fire in Depot 16 in Vrbětice destroyed 50 tons of munitions and killed two workers. Originally assumed to have been the result of an accident, at a dramatic weekend press conference, Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš announced that as of Friday [April 16], he had received ‘clear evidence’ linking officers from the GRU, Russian military intelligence, was behind it.”
• “The implications of all this are sobering, providing evidence that Russia’s covert campaign against the West dates back to 2014, even if then the focus was still on Ukraine. After all, the Euromaidan rising—another CIA and MI6 operation in the Kremlin’s eyes—likely represents the crucial turning point. Since then, a Russian leadership convinced it is fighting an underground yet existential struggle for its country’s place in the world and true sovereignty, has adopted a wartime mentality, willing to take risks, accept tactical defeats and bear the burdens of sanctions and censure alike in the name of the struggle.”
• “If [GRU’s] Unit 29155 is Russia’s secret weapon, solidarity is the West’s. The only question is whether the states arrayed with the Czechs are willing to use it anywhere near as liberally as Moscow turns to its tame hit-squad.”

“NATO is best when it is doing nothing,” Anatol Lieven, Responsible Statecraft, 04.13.21. The author, a professor in Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar, writes:

• “NATO is an organization that is very good at not actually doing anything—and it should stay that way. It is when NATO tries to do things that it causes endless amounts of trouble.”
• “The disastrous role of NATO in international affairs began when the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet power gave NATO the chance to do something, and the fear that otherwise it would be abolished gave it the motive to do so. This apprehension was compounded by European anxiety over the perceived loss of U.S. protection, America’s perceived loss of regional hegemony, and the worry that NATO officers and bureaucrats would lose their jobs. Under the grotesquely self-serving slogan of ‘Out of Area or Out of Mission,’ NATO turned itself into a vehicle for the expansion of liberal democracy and American power in the world. The negative results were threefold.”
• “Russia was quite unnecessarily turned back into an enemy. … America’s dangerous belief in its mission to bring freedom to the world was strengthened; and Europeans were encouraged to go on wallowing in strategic irresponsibility under America’s security blanket, at the expense of the U.S. taxpayer.”
• “For NATO to perform this basic role, all it has to do is what it did in the Cold War: sit still, and do nothing. And we may be sure that without Washington to encourage their ambitions and save them from the consequences, even the most expansionist European members of NATO will in fact be very glad to do nothing.”

“Restoring European Security: From Managing Relations to Principled Cooperation” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 04.15.2021. The contributors to the report write: 

• “European security is broken. Whereas war in Europe was ‘unthinkable’ just a few years ago, recently there has been heavy fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan, a simmering conflict in Ukraine, unrest in Belarus and protracted conflicts in other parts of Europe.” 
• “We asked [experts and students] for their views on what European security could look like in the next five to ten years … 14 percent of respondents expressed the view that the future will be characterized by insecurity, with major players dictating the rules of the game … One quarter of respondents felt that Europe will muddle on much like at present: the system is fragmented, the crisis in Ukraine simmers on, there is a multi-speed EU, and a stabilization in relations between Russia and the West – but no major breakthroughs … Around one-third of all respondents believe that … the EU [will become] more united [and have] its own army… Russia [will not be part] of the European security architecture, but there [will be] dialogue and peaceful coexistence … [22 percent] envision … [a system] characterized by states … recognizing their self-interest in working together, greater economic connectivity, and a shared understanding of security.” 
• “Two thirds of respondents … believe that Russia should be part of the European security system, and detail why: it is a participating state in the OSCE, a major nuclear power, and faces threats similar to those confronting many countries in the rest of Europe.” 
• “It should not take a war to rebuild the European security system – as was the case in 1815, 1919 or 1945. Governments must realize that they have a self-interest in cooperating: to deal more effectively with the crises of today, and to prepare for threats on the horizon.” 

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

“The Case for a New Engagement Consensus. A Chinese Vision of Global Order,” Wang Dong, Foreign Affairs, 04.15.21. The author, professor at the School of International Studies and executive director of the Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding at Peking University, writes:

• “A new consensus has taken hold in the U.S. foreign policy establishment: U.S. analysts increasingly define the U.S.-Chinese relationship in terms of strategic competition. … But a new Cold War between China and the United States is not inevitable. Structural arguments about predetermined rivalry miss the fact that agency as much as structure accounts for the recent downturn in U.S.-Chinese relations.”
• “A new engagement consensus would require both Washington and Beijing to abandon a zero-sum mentality and instead conceive of power as a positive-sum game. … A new engagement consensus would not mean an end to hedging strategies. Hedging has always been an element of U.S.-Chinese engagement, offering a prudent insurance policy and a way to continue to shape the other side’s behavior.”
• “China’s hedging strategy can be seen in its deepening relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Russia. The relationship with Russia is especially illustrative. Despite calls by some Chinese strategists to form a Chinese-Russian alliance, … Beijing has pursued the strategy of … (forging a partnership without forming an alliance) and insisted that the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination should be characterized as ‘not aligned, not confrontational and not targeted at any third party.’ … Unless Washington increases its strategic pressure on Beijing and Moscow to such an extreme that both states feel compelled to consolidate a formal alliance, China and Russia will continue to pursue a hedging strategy but avoid entering an outright alliance.”
• “Ultimately, both Americans and Chinese must ask themselves the same question: Do they want to let suspicion and antagonism define the years ahead or face competition with confidence and patience? If both choose the latter, a new engagement consensus and a new G2RS world are still possible—though far from certain. The stakes are too high for both sides not to try.”

“Can Biden's Resolve Weather Putin and Xi?” Walter Russell Mead, Wall Street Journal, 04.13.21. The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “The global storm clouds are darkening. Last week a Chinese aircraft carrier strike group patrolled the waters east of Taiwan as U.S., Taiwanese and Chinese warplanes flew sorties.”
• “Meanwhile, as Alexei Navalny's health continued its mysterious and dramatic decline, Russian forces ostentatiously maneuvered near the contested Donbass region of eastern Ukraine … Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov warned of the possibility of ‘full-scale hostilities’ as Vladimir Putin informed an alarmed Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan about what the Russian president called Ukraine's ‘dangerous provocative actions’ in the Donbass. … Compounding tensions with Washington, last month the Chinese and Russian foreign ministers announced their intention to deepen their relationship.”
• “The question for Americans is what all this means. Is Mr. Putin merely attempting to divert domestic attention away from his falling poll numbers and the ravages of Covid? Is Xi Jinping playing the nationalism card to assuage restless public opinion at home? Is this all a move to frighten the Biden administration away from its hardline rhetoric and to drive it toward what China and Russia hope is its real agenda: looking dignified, purposeful and concerned while retreating from global leadership? Or is something more dangerous at work?”
• “The picture isn't entirely bleak. The deepening cooperation between China and Russia amounts to a backhanded compliment. In Russian eyes the U.S. remains a much more formidable power than China—otherwise Mr. Putin would be siding with Washington in an effort to counter Beijing's rise. There is more good news. Beginning with the Obama-era "pivot to Asia" and continuing more energetically if sometimes erratically under President Trump, American foreign policy started, slowly, to adjust to a more dangerous world.”
• “The Biden administration must strengthen U.S. alliances while revamping defense planning and doctrine for a more turbulent era. But it also must convince a dovish Democratic base that national defense, strategic thinking and a forward-leaning foreign policy offer our only hope of preserving the peace.”

“Deter Russia in Ukraine and Avoid a Sino-Russian Dual Alliance,” Jakub Grygiel, The National Interest, 04.16.21. The author, a professor of politics at The Catholic University of America, writes:

• “The Biden administration would do well, therefore, to continue Trump’s efforts to convince European allies to increase their defense spending and to take their security seriously. For the United States, Europe’s security is tied to Asia’s balance of power. A European theater that invites Russian aggression creates the conditions for [Sino-Russian] opportunistic cooperation, which poses immense challenges for the United States. The goal is thus to stabilize Europe, deter Russia and then focus on China.”

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms control:

“Restoring Nuclear Bipartisanship: Force Modernization and Arms Control,” John D. Maurer, War on the Rocks, 04.14.21. The author, a professor at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Air University, writes:

• “The Biden administration has already taken the first step toward nuclear bipartisanship by extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty for the next five years. This extension will constrain Russian forces while the United States begins the long work of rebuilding its nuclear arsenal.”
• “The White House and Congress should now recommit to modernizing the American nuclear arsenal, which, despite vague promises in the recent budget topline, remains in doubt. At a minimum, this should include continued funding for the B-21 bomber and the Long-Range Standoff Weapon, the Columbia-class submarine, the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent missile and fully rebuilt warheads like the W93.”
• “Biden and Congress should link specific modernization goals to specific future arms control objectives, placing adversaries on notice regarding what the United States expects of them in future negotiations and highlighting the real security consequences of ignoring American offers.”
• “For example, funding the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent missile could be tied explicitly to further reducing the size of Russia’s own intercontinental missile forces, as well as a freeze on ‘new types’ of strategic weapons like nuclear-powered cruise missiles or ‘doomsday’ torpedoes. … Similarly, the development of new warheads like the W93 could be linked to greater transparency over, and control of, weapons-grade fissile material production and reproduction among the nuclear great powers. … New intermediate-range and hypersonic missiles could be linked to the control, and perhaps elimination of, such weapons, much as they were in the 1979 NATO dual track approach.”
• “Even in an era of deep political polarization, the president and Congress can advance American security through nuclear bipartisanship. Linking nuclear modernization and strategic arms limitation would promote political cooperation at home and strengthen the United States against the geopolitical challenges of the 21st century.”

Counter-terrorism:

“Russia’s Impact on US National Interests: Preventing Terrorist Attacks on US Homeland and Assets Abroad,” George Beebe, Russia Matters, 04.13.21. The author, vice president and director of studies at the Center for the National Interest, writes:

• “Over the past two decades, Russia has made a significant contribution to preventing attacks on the United States by providing valuable intelligence and logistical support after September 11 that helped our fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban. It also warned U.S. authorities about the radicalization of Tamerlan Tsarnaev, one of the Boston Marathon attackers, in 2011.”
• “The primary terrorist threats facing the United States today include Islamist groups such as Islamic State, or ISIS, and al Qaeda, as well as domestic groups on the far right and far left, with the possibility ever looming that terrorists anywhere in the world might gain access to nuclear materials. As one of the world’s foremost repositories of nuclear weapons, materials and expertise, Russia can play a leading role in combatting nuclear terrorism.”
• “Counterterrorist cooperation can take many forms … Moving beyond basic sharing of threat warnings to more extensive operational cooperation, however, requires a significant degree of trust between the U.S. and Russian governments and their intelligence services that is currently lacking.”
• “Counterterrorist cooperation with Russia can indirectly discourage Russian support for terrorist groups that oppose the United States but pose little threat to Russia, including extremists based in the American homeland. Gaining an explicit Russian commitment to refrain from supporting extremists in the United States, however, would probably require an American pledge not to support political opposition in Russia.”
• “Whether the two countries go beyond intelligence sharing toward broader counterterrorist cooperation will depend to a great degree on a host of domestic political factors that neither government fully controls. Most significantly, each country has come to believe that the other is using information technology to exacerbate its rival’s social divides and weaken or even overthrow the other’s government. Such perceptions will be powerful obstacles to significant bilateral cooperation of any kind for as long as they remain dominant.”

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

• No significant developments.

Elections interference:

“The New Russia Sanctions Resolve a Mystery That Mueller Left Unanswered,” Quinta Jurecic, Lawfare Blog, 04.17.21. The author, managing editor of Lawfare, writes:

• “On April 15, the Treasury Department answered one of the biggest questions left unresolved by the Mueller investigation—and left unanswered as well by the 2020 Senate Select Intelligence Committee report about 2016 election interference … [T]he department announced that [Konstantin] Kilimnik—whom the press release described as a ‘Russian and Ukrainian political consultant and known Russian Intelligence Services agent’—had, in 2016, ‘provided the Russian Intelligence Services with sensitive information on polling and campaign strategy.’”
• “Both the Mueller report and the Senate investigation established that Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort had passed that sensitive information to Kilimnik—but only now, years later, has the Treasury Department unveiled what Kilimnik did with it. … As the New York Times put it, the Treasury Department’s press release provides ‘the strongest evidence to date that Russian spies had penetrated the inner workings of the Trump campaign’ in 2016.”
• “The Kilimnik revelations aren’t an argument for refocusing American anxiety over election interference back to the threat posed by foreign actors. But they are another reminder that after 2016 and 2020, and in a political environment in which 78 percent of Republicans still believe Biden did not legitimately win the election, the guardrails that previously constrained what political candidates would do in order to win—lie, cheat, overturn the vote outright—have been shattered. There is a danger that another Kilimnik will, in 2024, reach out to another politician’s campaign to offer foreign support. The greater danger by far, though, is that the new campaign will be all too eager to listen.”

Energy exports from CIS:

“The Dilemma over the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline,” Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 04.15.21. In this survey, respondents said:

• Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook, executive director, The Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, Future of Diplomacy Project: “If it [Nord Stream 2] cannot be stopped, it must be urgently and creatively rethought. Amelioration efforts might include snapback/shutdown mechanisms to prevent Russian manipulation; alternative and renewable energy investment and development in Ukraine; and strong EU oversight and application of energy regulations.”
• Nicola De Blasio, senior fellow, Environment and Natural Resources Program/Science, Technology and Public Policy Program: “Trying to block a $11 billion project, that will deliver up to 55 billion cubic meters of gas per year (1.9 trillion cubic feet), was always a tall order. … [T]he only realistic alternative is for the EU and the U.S. to find a common path forward to address the geopolitical implications.”
• Karl Kaiser, fellow, Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship: “Nord Stream must become part of a broader U.S.-European strategy that combines a shorter term policy to deal with Putin’s aggressive behavior, including support of Ukraine and a longer term effort to keep open the option of a more cooperative relationship with Russia.”
• Benjamin L. Schmitt, postdoctoral fellow, Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics: “Any future ‘deal’ on Nord Stream 2 would have to get real, verifiable behavior changes from Moscow for the pipeline to ever proceed.”
• Torrey Taussig, research director, Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship: “In the near-term, a mutual suspension of sanctions and construction of the pipeline would create breathing room for dialogue. But of greater importance is transatlantic unity on Russia policy, as well as a longer-term solution to Europe’s energy supply that ensures diversification away from Russian sources and fossil fuels.”
• Simon Saradzhyan, founding director, Russia Matters: “My out of the box idea would be for Russia to agree to Western countries’ and Ukraine’s joint financing of a stake in Nord Stream 2 for Ukraine.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Biden will not change Putin but is right to talk to him,” Philip Stephens, Financial Times, 04.14.21. The author, associate editor of the news outlet, writes:

• “As Putin apparently threatens war in Europe by overseeing a menacing build-up of Russian troops on Ukraine’s eastern border, two thoughts arise. The Russian president is not about to change his ways. And the U.S. and Europe have to deal with him.”
• “Western diplomats are not sure what to make of the latest troop build-up. It contains an obvious warning to Kyiv not to seek to overturn the ceasefire with the pro-Russian separatists … And there is a message to the U.S. and NATO not to write a blank cheque for Volodymyr Zelensky … Whatever the Kremlin’s ultimate military intentions, the deployments have served Putin’s purpose in grabbing the attention of the White House.”
• “The U.S. president’s offer this week of a summit on neutral territory to discuss Ukraine and a clutch of other issues looks calculated to appeal to Putin’s vanity. Success or failure, a summit will offer clarity. And if it can take some of the tension out of the relationship by massaging Putin’s ego, why not. … It will not presage, however, a fundamental change in the relationship.”
• “Russia can survive U.S. and European sanctions, but it badly needs Western investment and technology. Its long-term strategic interests lie in a close economic relationship with Europe. If the Kremlin is in search of threats, it would do better to take a close look at China’s Eurasian ambitions. … Russia’s interests, though, are not Putin’s. His priority is the preservation of his own power and wealth. Autocrats need enemies.”
• “The question then becomes how much room there is for cooperation … The answer must be that the possibilities are worth exploring. Putin has already accepted Biden’s offer to extend the last remaining strategic arms treaty. … Where it can, the West should work with Russia. Just not on Putin’s terms.”

“A Bad Day for Vladimir Putin,” Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, 04.15.21. The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Sanctions are often a half-measure, but some of the retaliatory actions announced by the Biden Administration Thursday will have serious consequences. Most important is a ban on American financial institutions purchasing new bonds from the Russian finance ministry, central bank or sovereign-wealth fund after June 14. The executive order also allows the U.S. government to sanction any part of the Russian economy, which will make U.S. firms think twice about doing business in Russia. The weakness of the plan is that U.S. traders will still be able to access Russian debt in secondary bond markets.”
• “On a Tuesday [April 13] call with Mr. Putin, the President suggested a summit meeting in a third country in the coming months. The Kremlin said the sanctions could blow up Mr. Biden's offer, but don't count on it. As Russia's economy stumbles along, Mr. Putin needs a summit more than Washington does. Mr. Biden shouldn't accept a meeting absent a change of behavior from his Russian counterpart.”
• “The world would be a safer place if Washington and Moscow got along. A natural place to start would be cooperation against Islamic extremism or Chinese adventurism. But getting to that point will require Russia to act like a responsible country.”

“Why Would Biden Want a Summit With Putin, Whom He Calls a 'Killer'?” Garry Kasparov, Wall Street Journal, 04.18.21. The author, chairman of the Human Rights Foundation and the Renew Democracy Initiative, writes:

• “Mr. Biden says he wants a ‘predictable’ relationship with Mr. Putin, but that's exactly what he has. Mr. Putin attacks; the West retaliates weakly, then offers concessions for dialogue until Mr. Putin attacks again. … [D]iplomacy has never changed the behavior of a dictator. The U.S., combined with its allies in the free world, has the ability to threaten an overwhelming response to Mr. Putin's invasions, hacking, election meddling and assassinations. What it has always lacked is the will.”

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Alexei Navalny Needs His Doctors,” Editorial Board, New York Times, 04.17.21. The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Alexei Navalny’s wife, doctor and colleagues have sounded an anguished alarm that the incarcerated Kremlin critic’s health is rapidly deteriorating and his heart could stop any minute. They and many other supporters of Mr. Navalny are demanding that his doctors be immediately allowed to see and treat him. The decision clearly rests with President Vladimir Putin of Russia, and he should promptly agree.”
• “On Saturday [April 17], more than 70 prominent international writers, artists and academics—including Benedict Cumberbatch, Henry Louis Gates Jr., Orhan Pamuk, Vanessa Redgrave, J.K. Rowling, Salman Rushdie and Tom Stoppard—signed an open letter, published in British, French, German and Italian newspapers, calling on Mr. Putin to ensure that Mr. Navalny is ‘immediately given the medical treatment and care that he urgently requires—and is entitled to under Russia law.’”
• “The Kremlin has long tried to stifle Mr. Navalny, sometimes with brief stints in jail. Last August, however, the game radically changed when Mr. Navalny fell grievously ill on a flight over Siberia from what was later identified by Western experts as poisoning with the nerve agent Novichok. An independent investigation concluded that the attempt on Mr. Navalny’s life was the work of a group of Russian secret agents who had long been shadowing him.”
• “It is imperative that Dr. Vasilieva and her team of doctors be allowed to promptly examine Mr. Navalny and get him into intensive care if necessary. If Mr. Navalny dies, there is no question who should be held responsible, and the cost will be high.”

“Russia Beat the World to a Vaccine, so Why Is It Falling Behind on Vaccinations?” Joshua Yaffa, The New Yorker, 04.12.21. The author, a Moscow correspondent for the news outlet, writes:

• “Russia’s vaccine market appears to be operating efficiently: supply and demand intersect, just at a low level. The danger is that this gives the virus room to continue to spread and mutate. A partial vaccination program, one that challenges the virus without completely blocking its proliferation, creates the perfect conditions for the appearance of new, more contagious strains. … And, even if some large cities may be reaching herd immunity, there is plenty of space left for the virus to circulate among Russia’s population.”
• “After falling for the first months of the year, daily infection rates began to climb again in late March. On March 30, the deputy health minister warned of a possible ‘third wave’ of the pandemic. Russia has a vaccine that could help protect against such a scenario, but the country may not have enough of it to go around—or enough people willing to receive it.”

“From Citizen Investigators to Cyber Patrols: Volunteer Internet Regulation in Russia,” Françoise Dauce, Benjamin Loveluck, Bella Ostromooukhova and Anna Zaytseva, NYU Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia, April 2021. The authors of the report write:

• “Since the early 2010s the Russian State has considerably reinforced its control over the Internet. Regulation has been entrusted not only to dedicated administrations (in particular Roskomnadzor, Russia’s telecommunication watchdog), but also to citizen initiatives. Networks of volunteers, involving ordinary people reporting on ‘illegal’ content, have, for instance, increased in number and taken on new shapes.”
• “The blocking of websites, deployment of surveillance technologies and plans for the ‘sovereignization’ of the Russian Internet also question the place of citizen initiatives in the field of online security. Cyber vigilantism is part of a political model seeking legitimacy through shared moral and patriotic references. Russia is thus a laboratory for plural forms of citizen participation in online security, at a time when surveillance instruments are increasingly available to public, private and civilian actors; their relationship involves cooperation as well as competition.”

“Russia’s surveillance state still doesn’t match China. But Putin is racing to catch up,” Robyn Dixon, The Washington Post, 04.17.21. The author, Moscow bureau chief for the news outlet, writes:

• “Russian authorities are ramping up the use of facial recognition technology to track opposition protesters to their homes and arrest them—a powerful new Kremlin tool to crush opposition. But when state security agents are suspected of murders or attacks on journalists and opposition activists, surveillance cameras have at times been switched off or ‘malfunction.’”
• “And the system is so leaky that surveillance data on individuals can be bought for a small sum on Russia's notorious black market in data, along with all kinds of other personal information. There is even a name for the clandestine cyber bazaar: probiv.”
• “Human rights lawyer Kirill Koroteyev said there were no effective checks on how law enforcement used facial recognition and surveillance cameras. ‘The system,’ he said, ‘is designed so that there is no way to question how the system operates.’”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant developments.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Turkey’s Tightrope Between Russia and the United States,” Dimitar Bechev, Carnegie Moscow Center, 04.14.21. The author, a research fellow at the Center for Slavic, Eurasian and East European Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, writes:

• “With no reset with the United States on the horizon, [Turkish President Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan has no choice other than to stay close to Russia. That is why the Kremlin is not overreacting to Turkey’s overtures to the West or its forays into the post-Soviet space. Despite the wins Ankara scored against Moscow in 2020, it remains the weaker party in the ‘cooperative rivalry’ the two have forged during the past decade.”
• “Russia retains strategic leverage, particularly in Syria, where millions of potential refugees live right next to the border with Turkey. Erdoğan is unlikely to take gambles of the sort he took in Nagorno-Karabakh at the risk of antagonizing Moscow. That was one of the main takeaways from his summit with Zelensky. Rather, he will press on with a multi-vector foreign policy balancing between the West, Russia, and—increasingly—China (hence the low-key Turkish response to the plight of the Uyghurs and other Turkic groups in China’s Xinjiang region). That is a state of affairs that should be perfectly comfortable for the Russian leadership.”

Ukraine:

“Russia-Ukraine War Alert: What’s Behind It and What Lies Ahead?,” Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 04.13.21. The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “The troops are not yet back at their bases, but the war alert along the Russo-Ukrainian border has passed. In fact, a war was never in the cards. Yet the alert, while it lasted, was profoundly disturbing. For the West, it highlighted the dangers of a large-scale direct clash between Russia and Ukraine. For Russia … it opened up the prospect of having to wage a real war against a large neighboring country. And for Ukraine, such a war might have been existential.”
• “It was Zelensky who moved first. … In February, Zelensky ordered troops (as part of the rotation process) and heavy weapons (as a show of force) to go near to the conflict zone in Donbass. … Even though Kyiv’s moves at that time were not preparations for a military offensive … the Kremlin decided to seize upon them to raise the stakes. Given the current state of Russian-U.S. relations, Moscow felt it had nothing to lose and something to gain by acting boldly and on a larger scale.”
• “Moscow was pursuing several objectives: To intimidate and deter Ukraine’s leaders … To send a message to the United States urging Washington to take better care of its wards, lest they get America itself into trouble; … To convince the Germans and the French that supporting everything that Ukraine says or does carries a cost for Europe. … To reassure the people of Donbass that Russia will not abandon them to the Ukrainian army.”
• “Perhaps the most important thing for the Russian leadership in this episode was to prevent the need to actually go to war against Ukraine in the future. … The passing of the war scare is not the same thing as de-escalation. The high level of tension in the region is now the new normal.”
• “Absent progress on the Minsk agreement and Normandy talks … diplomacy will be increasingly practiced … by means of sending messages through specific actions, like Russia’s current exploits on the Ukraine border. The only lifeline to peace left then will be direct contact between the Russian and U.S. military chiefs.”

“Will Russia Invade Ukraine (Again)?” Simon Saradzhyan, Defence-in-Depth, 04.14.21. The author, founding director of Russia Matters, writes:

• “While the concentration of Russian tactical battalion groups vis-à-vis Ukraine is hardly disputable, tentative results of my research into the Russian leadership’s past decisions regarding military interventions indicates that Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to order these combat units to conduct an offensive against Ukraine unless Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky makes the first military move on the Donbass chessboard.”
• “For Putin to issue such an order, a confluence of three conditions needs to be present. First, Putin has to see a clear, acute threat to one or more of Russia’s vital national interests as he sees them. Second, he has to have a reasonable hope that a military intervention would succeed in defending the threatened vital interests or advancing them. Third, Putin has either to have run out of options that do not involve the massive use of armed forces … or to lack the time needed to exercise such non-military options.”
• “I don’t believe that Putin … sees either the first or third of these conditions when he looks at Ukraine.”
• “The demonstrative, unconcealed massive movements of Russian military units along their country’s border with Ukraine are also meant to signal Russia’s resolve to Kyiv and its Western partners, to compel Zelensky to stop what the Kremlin sees as deliberate efforts to stall negotiations on the implementation of the Minsk-2 agreements and to increase pressure on Russia via the newly-established Crimean Platform … The Russian movements are also meant to deter the Ukrainian leadership … to refrain from using [their] forces for an actual attack on the separatists.”
• “However, the Kremlin’s intention to employ its military for signaling rather than for actual fighting doesn’t preclude scenarios in which an accident could drag Russia and Ukraine into a war. Accidental wars have erupted more than once in the history of humankind, and for Russia and Ukraine to reduce the probability of an unintended war, they both need to reverse their military build-ups vis-à-vis each other.”

“Is Ukraine Ready for the Next Russian Invasion? Mark Episkopos, The National Interest, 04.15.21. The author, a national security reporter for the news outlet, writes:

• “Though it remains exceedingly unlikely that Russia will try to occupy Kyiv, experts have cautioned of a Russian westward offensive centered around capturing much if not all of Ukraine’s Black Sea coast. This operation would presumably start at Mariupol and continue through Berdyansk; depending on the scale of Russian ambitions, the offensive could run all the way through the major Ukrainian port city of Odessa. Such a conflict would be entirely different from a quick-and-easy Russian annexation of Donbass.”
• “Despite being vastly outmatched and outnumbered in every relevant military category, Ukraine’s Armed Forces will likely marshal all their strength to bitterly resist Russia’s offensive. Even with its overwhelming military advantage, it will not be logistically simple for Russia to quickly establish full, uncontested control over such a long stretch of the coastal territory. Further still, Odessa is not Donetsk. Russia’s occupying forces cannot expect that they will be greeted as liberators in Ukraine’s southern coastal cities, and must prepare for the possibility of insurgencies followed by mass civilian casualties.”
• “Though it is clear that Kyiv cannot single-handedly win in any scenario involving a full-fledged Russian invasion, it can possibly prevent Russia from achieving a blitzkrieg-style outcome through persistent military and civilian resistance. This could buy the United States and EU enough time to formulate a coherent policy response, up to and including military intervention.” 

“Why Russians Aren't Sold on Donbass as Another Crimea,” Alexei Levinson, The Moscow Times, 04.13.21. The author, director of the socio-cultural research department of the Levada Center pollster, writes:

• “The fear of military conflict is plunging Russian public opinion into a state of doubt. What should be the desired result from the confrontation in the Donbass?”
• “A very relative majority of 28 percent of Russians continue to agree that the DNR and LNR should become an independent state, or states. Almost the same number—26 percent—see the regions’ future within Ukraine … A slightly smaller proportion—25 percent—think that the self-proclaimed republics should become part of Russia.”
• “It is very telling of today’s climate that a new category of comparable size has appeared among those surveyed. These are the 21 percent who were unable or unwilling to choose one of the previously described options for solving the ‘Donbass problem.’”
• “This year Russians were asked for the first time how things were likely to end in southeast Ukraine. The answers showed that Russians themselves do not expect their political preferences to become a reality.”
• “While 25 percent said they would like to see these regions incorporated into Russia, substantially fewer (19 percent) believe that this will actually happen. Even fewer (16 percent) believe that the DNR and LNR will return to the bosom of Ukraine … In this survey, the familiar third option was reformulated — ‘the DNR and LNR will exist as independent states, like Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.’ The mention of these precedents did not generate particular enthusiasm, however, with just 12 percent in favor of this scenario. … The most commonly selected response was ‘This confrontation will last for many years,’ with 32 percent choosing this option. … It appears that Russians see the solution to the ‘Donbass problem’ to be not solving it.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“What’s Behind the Refreeze in U.S.-Belarus Relations?” Dzianis Melyantsou, Carnegie Moscow Center, 04.15.21. The author, coordinator of the Belarusian Foreign Policy program at the Minsk Dialogue Council on International Relations, writes:

• “There are tough times ahead for U.S.-Belarusian relations. Unfreezing sanctions will lead to a new stage of the diplomatic crisis and a further toughening of rhetoric. It doesn’t look like Belarus has a particular role in the Biden administration’s strategy, and Washington will likely return to the practice of expressing support for democracy and human rights, but without committing to any concrete obligations, resources or actions.”
• “It goes without saying that U.S. sanctions won’t achieve their intended goals. They will only drive the wedge deeper between Washington and Minsk, and push the latter closer to Moscow.”
• “Much depends on how the situation in the broader region develops. The security of U.S. allies in Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic states) cannot be guaranteed without factoring in Belarus. Renewed hostilities in the Donbas and the return of Russia to being a priority for U.S. policy could reignite Washington’s strategic interest in Minsk and put the issue of more pragmatic cooperation with Lukashenko back on the table.”

“Joe Biden Must Recognize the Armenian Genocide,” Michael Rubin, Foreign Policy, 04.12.21. The author, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, writes:

• “All indications are that the Biden administration will recognize the Armenian genocide… On April 24, 2020, then-presidential candidate Joe Biden tweeted, ‘If elected, I pledge to support a resolution recognizing the Armenian Genocide and will make universal human rights a top priority.’ It appears his staff remains onboard with that commitment.” 
• “While acknowledging the Armenian genocide is both right and wise, Biden and [Secretary of State Antony] Blinken should go further. Genocide denial undermines long-term security and so Blinken might consider the erection of monuments to the Armenian genocide in both Ankara and Baku as the metric to determine if acknowledgment of genocide extends beyond rhetoric. … There are precedents for such monuments. Unlike Turkey and Azerbaijan that project images of multi-faith tolerance to Western visitors and invite the foreign press to small commemorations, Armenia hosts a Holocaust monument in its capital.” 
• “Biden and Blinken must … commit to ending the Section 907 waiver that effectively rewards Azerbaijan for its defiance of diplomacy. Blinken must also call out both Turkey and Azerbaijan for embracing and deploying Al Qaeda-linked mercenaries from Syria. The Trump administration downplayed diplomacy in the South Caucasus by appointing a Minsk Group co-chair who lacked the diplomatic rank of his Russian and French counterparts. Rather than simply appoint an ambassador, Blinken might designate an assistant secretary to incorporate the portfolio. Just as Kosovo emerged as an independent state to halt Serb ethnic cleansing …, so too might the United States propose a similar … model for the Artsakh Republic, the self-declared Armenian state… In the meantime, Blinken should station a diplomat permanently in Stepanakert.”
• “With dictators to both Armenia’s east and west, it is essential to recognize that the threat of a century ago continues to the present day. Empty rhetoric can carry a huge cost.”

“Azerbaijan fires info war salvo against Russia,” Joshua Kucera, Eurasianet, 04.18.21. The author, the Turkey/Caucasus editor at Eurasianet, writes:

• “Azerbaijan has launched a public campaign against Russia, with the government and other public figures lining up to air choreographed grievances. The pretext is clear: the alleged use of state-of-the-art Russian missiles against Azerbaijani targets in the waning days of last year’s war. But what’s less clear is what exactly Baku is trying to get out of Moscow as a result.”
• “A couple of other developments this week only added to the number of moving parts.”
  • “The first was Pashinyan’s announcement that Armenia was ‘conducting effective discussions with our Russian colleagues’ about setting up a second Russian military base in the country, in the southern Syunik region.”
  • “The second was a report in the Russian newspaper RBK about discussions around Azerbaijan participating in an upcoming meeting of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), the Russia-led trade bloc.”
• “Azerbaijan’s post-war behavior suggests that humiliation is precisely what it is trying to achieve, … revenge for 26 years of its own humiliation. It’s been pushing its advantage against on-its-heels Armenia, but it’s a riskier gambit to try against Russia.”