This Week’s Highlights

• Traditional arms control measures appear ill-suited to the cyber domain, according to Brookings’ Steven Pifer. Washington and Moscow might pledge not to interfere in the other side’s nuclear command, control and communication systems, Pifer writes, but neither could be certain the pledge was being observed. 
• Prof. James Goldgeier writes that any sustained improvement of relations between the United States and Russia would require one of two concessions: either the United States shelves its foundational support for democracy and formally recognizes a Russian-privileged sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union or the Russian president decides his interests are not threatened by greater democracy in the region or by having fully sovereign neighbors. Neither is likely to materialize in the near future, Goldgeier writes.     
• The purpose of Russia’s current military buildup near Ukraine is limited to demonstrating to Kyiv and Washington that Russia is prepared to respond with force to any military attempts to change the status quo in Donbass, according to Maxim Samorukov of the Carnegie Moscow Center. The ostentation with which the troops are being moved confirms that Russia is saber-rattling rather than contemplating a blitzkrieg, Samorukov writes, however, the absence of rational motives for a war does not preclude the crisis spiraling out of control accidentally.   
• The West should do more to dissuade Moscow from thoughts of a military adventure, writes Brookings’ Steven Pifer. U.S. and EU officials should agree on a list of additional sanctions to apply should Russia launch an attack, and Washington should consider supplying Kyiv with additional Javelin anti-armor missiles or other arms, according to Pifer. Among other things, Pifer writes, Putin should know that an attack on Ukraine would kill the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. 

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Great Power rivalry/New Cold War/saber rattling:

“The Real Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis: Newly uncovered Soviet sources show that the 1962 confrontation could easily have spiraled into nuclear war—a useful warning as we face a new arms race today,” Serhii Plokhy, Wall Street Journal, 04.09.21. The author, a professor of history at Harvard University, writes:

• “With Cold War-era arms control agreements gone, we are facing the first uncontrolled arms race since the 1960s. The nuclear competition of that era culminated in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, arguably the most dangerous moment not only of the Cold War but in world history.” 
• “The dominant narrative of the crisis has been that Kennedy won thanks to decisiveness and good judgment, and Khrushchev lost. But American, Soviet and Cuban sources that have become available in the last few decades put that idea in question.”
• “Only after the end of the Cold War did [Kennedy’s defense secretary Robert] McNamara learn that the Soviets had deployed tactical nuclear weapons to Cuba as well as ballistic missiles. There were more than 40,000 Soviet troops on the island … If Kennedy had ordered an attack on the missile sites from the air, or if Attorney General Robert Kennedy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had won support for their plan to invade Cuba, nuclear war would have become all but inevitable. McNamara retroactively estimated the probability at 99 percent.”
• “An American U-2 plane was shot down contrary to orders from Moscow, and only sheer luck prevented the firing of a Soviet nuclear-armed torpedo at American ships in the Caribbean: A Soviet signalman got stuck with his equipment in the hatch of a submarine, preventing a senior officer from getting inside and ordering the strike.”
• “The main lesson to be drawn from this more detailed story is that history cannot be reduced to the agony of decision-making in the White House. A nuclear crisis has many participants, all acting in a fog of mutual suspicions and misunderstandings, to say nothing of the simple lack of timely, reliable information. … If the Cuban missile crisis didn’t turn into a nuclear war it was partly thanks to pure luck. … We cannot wait for another nuclear confrontation on the same scale as the Cuban missile crisis to renew our commitment to the principles of nuclear arms control.”

“A Chance to Stop Syria and Russia From Using Chemical Weapons,” Anthony Ruggiero and Andrea Stricker, Foreign Policy, 04.08,21. The authors, a senior fellow and a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, write:

• “The battle for the future of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction is underway within an obscure but important international organization based in The Hague. The looming showdown at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) will determine whether the world returns to the norm of zero chemical weapons use or if countries follow Russia’s example of poisoning dissidents and Syria’s of gassing its own citizens.”
• “Washington now has an opportunity to assemble a coalition to enact penalties against Russia and Syria in order to deter future chemical weapons use. At the Conference of the States Parties later this month—a gathering of all 193 OPCW member states—the United States should lead efforts to formally suspend Damascus, an action that requires a two-thirds vote.”
• “On Russia, Washington should push for an OPCW investigation at the July Executive Council meeting and require Moscow to declare its ongoing chemical weapons program within 90 days, mirroring the council’s 90-day deadline for Syria to demonstrate compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.”
• “According to our analysis of past OPCW votes, countries that vote pro-Moscow or abstain in the Executive Council can also prevent Washington and its allies from reaching a two-thirds majority. … But even if the United States cannot corral the needed votes this time, pursuing these actions would force countries to be on the record regarding their failure to hold Russia and Syria accountable.”
• “If Moscow and Damascus won’t abide by the international chemical weapons rules they signed up to, states should move to suspend their OPCW voting rights. An OPCW without Syria and Russia might even be a good thing.”

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant developments.

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Arms control:

“Nuclear arms control in the 2020s. Key issues for the US and Russia,” Steven Pifer, Valdai Discussion Club/Brookings Institution, 04.08.21. The author, a nonresident senior fellow at Brookings, writes:

• “The first serious U.S.-Russian engagement on nuclear arms issues will likely occur in strategic stability talks. … Third-country nuclear forces such as China need to be factored in. … [T]he model should take account of missile defense, precision-guided conventional strike, space and cyber developments. … U.S.-Russian strategic stability should also address doctrine.”
• “The logical next step for the United States and Russia would entail negotiation of an agreement with an aggregate limit covering all their nuclear warheads. … Some arms control experts assess that an agreement limiting all nuclear weapons … is too ambitious and have suggested alternative approaches.”
• “Arms control may enter new territory in the 2020s on issues and types of weapons that, while not nuclear arms, still affect strategic stability. They could be discussed in U.S.-Russian strategic stability talks. If a mandate were agreed, they could be spun off into separate negotiations.”
• “One set of issues concerns missile defense. … [I]t would not seem difficult to craft an agreement covering strategic missile defenses such as the GMD system and Moscow missile defense system that would apply constraints but still leave the United States room for capabilities to defend against a North Korean ICBM attack. What would prove difficult would be the Washington politics, where Republicans oppose any limits on missile defense. … Another issue is precision-guided conventional strike weapons.”
• “As for the cyber domain, traditional arms control measures appear ill-suited. Washington and Moscow might pledge not to interfere in the other side’s nuclear command, control and communication systems, but neither could be certain the pledge was being observed.”

“This Would Be A Good Time for an Open Skies Treaty Overflight,” Michael Krepon, Arms Control Wonk, 04.12.21. The author, co-founder of the Stimson Center, writes:

• “Vladimir Putin is behaving badly again. He’s massing troops and equipment near Russia’s border with Ukraine, a border he previously breached in 2014. The last time he upped the ante, in December 2018, Washington demonstrated its solidarity with Kyiv by carrying out an ‘extraordinary,’ short-notice overflight allowed under the provisions of the Open Skies Treaty. Canadian, French, German, Romanian and British observers accompanied U.S. personnel, as permitted under the Treaty’s ride-sharing option.”
• “This would be a good time for another extraordinary overflight. Demonstrate U.S. leadership. Load up a brand-spanking new U.S. Open Skies Treaty plane with observers from six or so friends and allies. Demonstrate solidarity. You know the drill. Except that this is not going to happen. There are no new U.S. Open Skies planes and the Trump administration handed Putin the gratuitous gift of withdrawing from the Open Skies Treaty. Its announcement came seventeen months after the extraordinary overflight to demonstrate solidarity with Kyiv.”
• “A reversal would be legally complicated. ... What to do? The Biden administration will express solidarity with Kyiv in multiple ways. Cooperative overflights with strategic partners, allies and friends still belong in this toolkit, even if the flight plan isn’t over Russian territory. Here’s a thought: Find a plane, quickly. Equip it with sensors that can look far beyond the Ukrainian-Russian border and invite friends and allies to come along for the ride. Announce the flight plan before executing it. It’s not as good or as useful as an Open Skies Treaty overflight, but it’s one way to regain U.S. leadership and partially repair damage done by the Trump administration.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

“In the Wake of SolarWinds: Making and Breaking a Rules-Based Global Cyber Order,” Anatol Lieven, Russia Matters, 04.07.21. The author, a professor at Georgetown University in Qatar and a senior fellow of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft in Washington D.C., writes:

• “[A] recognition of the need to make careful distinctions between different categories of cyber operations, and to shun the use of emotive and misleading language about ‘attacks,’ should also be extended to the field of political influence via the internet. Using cyberspace to spread propaganda, influence political outcomes and reveal or invent damaging information is an extension of tactics that have been used in different ways for millennia—including by the U.S.”
• “[T]o be effective in constraining behavior, limiting disputes and maintaining peace, international conventions do have to be, to a reasonable extent, held and shared in common—and that applies to the U.S. as well as its rivals. Few things have been more damaging to U.S. and European hopes of a ‘rules-based global order’ than the perception that the U.S. both makes the rules and breaks them whenever it sees fit, including in cyberspace.”
• “According to the New York Times, the U.S. has also planted ‘malware’ in Russia’s energy grid in a way that appears to exceed what Russia has yet done against the U.S. … As a ‘deterrent’ against genuine Russian attacks on the U.S., this may perhaps make sense. But this is precisely why we must be very clear indeed about what really constitutes an attack … If the U.S. released such malware in response to a mere Russian cyber espionage operation, Russia would have every justification to turn to sabotage in its turn, creating a truly disastrous cycle of escalation.”
• “A degree of balance and objectivity is also required in the area of political operations on the net. The U.S. maintains an overt international propaganda apparatus that vastly exceeds in scope and effectiveness anything that Russia or China can manage.”
• “In an ideal world, all states would eschew these tactics. In the real world, they will have to live with each other’s behavior—irritated no doubt, but without overreacting. Cyberspace increases the opportunities for influence operations of all kind—but it does not change the basic equations involved.”

Elections interference:

• No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

“Reject Nord Stream 2 Once and for All; The pipeline puts Ukraine's national security at serious risk,” Oleksii Reznikov, Wall Street Journal, 04.08.21. The author, Ukraine's deputy prime minister for reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories, writes:

• “Russia's attitude toward Ukraine is again growing belligerent. The Minsk process to resolve the conflict is stalled, and foreign troops have yet to leave the Donbass, the Ukrainian region where fighting rages on. … Ukrainians therefore are bewildered by the continuing construction of the Baltic Sea pipeline, known as Nord Stream 2. … [T]he pipeline's completion will have entirely predictable consequences for our national security. Ukraine will be irreparably weakened as soon as Russia has a new direct gas link to Germany.”
• “With the Nord Stream 1 and Turk Stream pipelines already operational, Nord Stream 2 will complete the encirclement of Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic states, decoupling our energy security from Western Europe. Russia has tried to bully Ukraine by threatening gas cutoffs … But Moscow has always had to be careful—a large percentage of Russia's gas reaches Europe through Ukraine. If Nord Stream 2 is built, this consideration will be null and void.”
• “It would be unwise, if not reckless, for Europe to increase its dependence on Gazprom, Russia's state-owned energy company, and give Moscow direct control over which countries are supplied with gas and which can be cut off.”
• “Germany and Europe already have access to a massive gas-transit network spanning the Black and Baltic seas, Belarus and Ukraine. … [T]here is no commercial need for another pipeline. While Germany has little to gain, Ukraine stands to lose billions of dollars in transit revenue … Ukrainian soldiers will be putting their lives on the line if Russia decides to escalate the conflict in the Donbas after it no longer needs to consider the effect on gas exports.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“U.S.-Russian Relations Will Only Get Worse. Even Good Diplomacy Can’t Smooth a Clash of Interests,” James Goldgeier, Foreign Affairs, 04.06.21. The author, Robert Bosch Senior Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution and a professor of international relations at American University, writes:

• “Any sustained improvement of relations between the United States and Russia beyond progress on arms control (such as the recent extension of the New START treaty) would require one of two concessions: either the United States shelves its foundational support for democracy and formally recognizes a Russian-privileged sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union or the Russian president decides his interests are not threatened by greater democracy in the region or by having fully sovereign neighbors. Neither is likely to materialize in the near future.” 
• “As Biden begins his presidency, one aspect of U.S.-Russian relations is over: the high hopes for what an incoming U.S. president can achieve. The SolarWinds hack, Russian election interference, the conflict in Ukraine and the poisoning and arrest of the Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny are just some of the issues that will hinder any return to a more positive U.S.-Russian relationship. But ever since Putin first became president more than 20 years ago, the bigger issue has been the clashing ambitions that U.S. and Russian leaders have for the world and especially for Europe. Although it is possible that Trump would have bowed to Putin’s vision in a second term, Moscow’s and Washington’s conflicting visions will be on full display in the Biden years.”
• “Better relations with another country are never an end in themselves but rather a means to promote national interests, and for the moment, the United States and Russia define theirs very differently. Beyond exploring new arms control agreements to limit strategic nuclear weapons, the bilateral agenda for U.S.-Russian relations is likely to remain pretty thin for the foreseeable future.”

“The Pitfalls of Russia’s New Constitution,” Brian D. Taylor, Foreign Affairs, 04.12.21. The author, a professor of political science at Syracuse University, writes:

• “Arms control experts from Russia, Europe and the United States have proposed a joint plan to save Open Skies, beginning with a U.S. review of its withdrawal and a statement of intent to find a way to rejoin. It’s not clear if this will work, but the Biden administration should try. Russia would also support an effort to bring the United States back into the Iran nuclear deal; it has no interest in a nuclear-armed Iran.”
• “Longer term, the central arms control objective should be a follow-on treaty to New START. … Russia likes to work with the United States on arms control because it is the one area in which Moscow is equal to Washington and ahead of any other country. … A combination of containment and selective dialogue, however, is not enough. The Biden administration should also launch a concerted effort to reach out to the Russian people. … This societal engagement strategy should promote the prospect of better relations in a post-Putin era.”
• “Putin’s new constitution was meant to answer one of Russian politics’ biggest questions. Russia’s 2021 protests showed that changing the rules did not guarantee smooth sailing for Putin, including in 2024. Domestically, Putinism is adrift. Personalistic authoritarian regimes often collapse in surprising ways, whether through elite overthrows or mass uprisings.”
• “When the post-Putin era arrives, the United States should not assume that this necessarily heralds a democratic breakthrough. Historically, the end of a personalistic regime often leads to another authoritarian government. Still, nearly every leadership change in Russia and the Soviet Union over the last century has led to major shifts in domestic or foreign policy.”
• “By continually remaking the rules of the game for his own benefit, Putin has created an unstable domestic political order. The United States should work with Russia where it can and contain Russia where it cannot while building a basis for long-term engagement when change does come.”

“A window into Biden's foreign policy,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 04.08.21. The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “Asked how Biden could at once call Russian President Vladimir Putin a ‘killer’ and also work with him, [Secretary of State Antony] Blinken described a realpolitik approach. ‘The president is very clear-eyed about two things,’ he said. He needs ‘to hold Russia to account for any reckless or adversarial actions it takes’ while being open to ‘areas in which it may be in our mutual interest to work with Russia.’”
• “Blinken said he was ‘concerned’ about Putin's decision last month to move thousands of troops and heavy weapons to the Ukraine border. State Department officials fear that this is an effort to provoke the Ukrainians and test Washington—and that it could evolve into something much more dangerous. Officials praise the Ukrainian government for ‘admirable restraint’ and ‘not taking the bait,’ but the Russians apparently haven't stepped back. ‘The concern remains,’ Blinken said. ‘We're looking at it very carefully, 24/7.’”
• “Biden's approach to China is a similar mix of stressing U.S. interests and exploring areas of cooperation.”
• “Seeking a pragmatic balance between values and interests is a perennial concern of U.S. foreign policy. Biden's 21st-century understanding of the limits of U.S. military power, combined with a traditional emphasis on U.S. engagement, may differentiate him from predecessors Donald Trump and Barack Obama, who struggled with the same dilemma but had less experience.”

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Russia Is Ignoring Climate Change at Its Own Peril,” Ekaterina Moore, Carnegie Moscow Center, 04.07.21. The author, a fellow at the New York Center for Foreign Policy Affairs, writes:

• “Russia has no problem meeting the formal requirements stipulated by global agreements. Emissions reductions are calculated from a baseline of 1990, and the post-Soviet collapse of heavy industry means Russia can meet the requirements easily (the U.N. estimates that from 1990 to 2000, Russian emissions of greenhouse gases fell by 40 percent).”
• “Yet this formal implementation of obligations is unlikely to be enough for much longer. Today, Russia is one of the world’s top 10 emitters of greenhouse gases, accounting for about 5 percent of the world’s CO2 emissions. That’s twice as much per capita as the G20 average. And those calculations don’t take into account emissions from the oil, gas and coal that Russia exports to other countries.”
• “The scale of these emissions makes the Russian economy very vulnerable to Western environmental legislation, which could quickly get tougher with Biden in the White House. U.S. companies are preparing by accelerating research into carbon capture, but Russia lags far behind in this area. … Russia doesn’t even have its own system of monitoring emissions yet.”
• “The overall impression is that for now, neither Russian business nor the government or society understands the problem of climate change and why they should be doing anything about it. This lack of understanding could cost Russia dearly, not just in environmental terms, but also by becoming a new source of tension in relations with the West.”

“Mr. Putin's murder plot,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 04.09.21. The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Putin's regime is slowly but very intentionally murdering his leading political opponent, Alexei Navalny. Mr. Navalny, whom the Russian secret police unsuccessfully sought to kill last summer with a banned chemical weapon, is now being held in a prison camp known for its harsh conditions about 60 miles from Moscow. Since his arrival there in late February, he has been systematically deprived of sleep through hourly wakings and denied proper medical treatment for serious ailments, including herniated and bulging disks in his back and a respiratory ailment Mr. Navalny believes may be tuberculosis. Since last week, Mr. Navalny has been on a hunger strike to protest his treatment; his lawyers say his weight is down 30 pounds and is falling by two pounds a day.”
• “The United States and other Western governments have taken some steps to support Mr. Navalny, including sanctions against officials and entities involved in his poisoning and imprisonment. But if his life is to be saved, much stronger action is needed. Mr. Browder argues that the right targets are the 35 oligarchs whom Mr. Navalny himself has identified as the holders and protectors of Mr. Putin's massive private fortune. Start freezing assets and applying visa bans to those tycoons and their families, he advises, and keep going until Mr. Navalny is released. That sounds like a strategy that has a chance of working; if it doesn't, it will be a head start on what must be the consequences if the Kremlin's creeping murder plot goes forward.”

“My trial in Moscow this week was an exercise in absurdity,” Vladimir Kara-Murza, The Washington Post, 04.08.21. The author, a contributor to the news outlet and  a Russian democracy activist, writes:

• “This week, Moscow courts continued to hand out administrative sentences to participants of the recent forum of opposition lawmakers that was broken up by police. … The copy-pasted indictments by Moscow prosecutors claimed that the forum had been organized by a United Kingdom-based organization called the Open Russia Civic Movement, led by exiled former oil magnate and Putin opponent Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Except it wasn’t—and, in fact, could not have been, for the simple reason that no such organization ever existed.”
• “[O]n Tuesday [April 6] … accompanied by my lawyer Vadim Prokhorov … I was brought before Judge Natalia Shapovalova. Prokhorov and I made the obvious point that peaceful political activity by Russian citizens in Russia … cannot form a corpus delicti by definition. … Case closed, charges dismissed? Not in Putin’s Russia. And here is where the trial acquired a distinctly Kafkaesque feeling.”
• “[T]he judge denied every one of our motions … After several hours, Shapovalova arrived at her predetermined verdict: guilty. … Russian law gives me 10 days to appeal the decision to a higher court, and the ruling only comes into force after the appeal is heard—but I received a notification to pay the fine 15 minutes after leaving the court building.”
• “For a while, even under Putin, Russian authorities pretended to follow the law by finding quasi-legal pretexts to charge opposition figures … Such pretenses are no longer necessary. … Two or more convictions under this charge within a year turn a misdemeanor into a criminal offense and carry a penalty of up to six years in prison. It can also lead to disqualification from elected office—quite convenient for the Kremlin five months before the parliamentary election, with Putin’s party now down to 27 percent in the polls.”
• “No doubt our convictions will be refuted by the European Court of Human Rights once it hears the cases (not a quick process). … This gives us access to the only place we can find real justice, even it’s as far away as Strasbourg.”

Defense and aerospace:

“The Imperfect Equilibrium of Russian Civil–Military Relations,” Kirill Shamiev, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 04.12.21. The author, a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the Central European University and a junior research fellow at the Higher School of Economics, writes:

• “Russian civil–military relations are in an imperfect equilibrium. … On the one hand, the Russian military is professional and subject to unquestionable civilian control. It is not actively involved in politics, although the highly centralized power of the president ensures it is obedient to politicized civilian orders.”
• “On the other hand, the military as an institution occupies a special position in Russian national identity. It is an important source of political legitimacy; Russians value it for its ability both to provide security and to furnish an image of Russia as a great power.”
• “The existing civil–military divide creates an imbalanced perception of Russian military power. It also contributes to the miscalculation of military threats and a general acceptance of military assertiveness as a key element of Russian foreign policy. Accepting international practices of civilian control, rooted in all branches of government, should be an important element of efforts to bridge the civil–military divide and ensure military security in Russia and abroad.”

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant developments

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

“Sino-Russian rapprochement and Greater Eurasia: From geopolitical pole to international society?” Alexander Lukin and Dmitry Novikov, Journal of Eurasian Studies, April 2021. The authors, professors at the Higher School of Economics, write:

• “The geopolitical pressure that the United States is exerting on Russia and China cannot disappear overnight: it is advancing according to its own logic and has acquired an obvious inertia. Overcoming it will require considerable and sustained effort from all parties involved.”
• “It remains unlikely that the United States will fully abandon any attempt to dominate the global international system. In addition, even if the policies of the United States, as well as those of Russia and China were to change simultaneously, it apparently would not put an end to the idea of a Eurasian community and the initiatives that are bringing it into being.”
• “At the same time, the need to overcome the confrontation between the nominal poles of this new confrontation could lead European countries and the United States to become more actively involved.”
• “The example of the Euro-Atlantic community provides grounds for guarded optimism that a community [similar to the Euro-Atlantic community] could arise in Eurasia …The formation of a Eurasian community is a mega-trend. The Eurasian continent, so full of disagreements and smoldering conflicts … stands in need of a shared agenda and a common idea of development like the one that served as the basis of European integration. The geopolitical confrontation between the United States and two key Eurasian powers is the political driving force behind this idea.”
• “In the same way that European integration acquired its own raison d’être and continues after the end of the Cold War, the Eurasian community—if it takes shape and acquires a substantive agenda—has a chance to become a new, self-sustaining reality. It could contribute to the security of a vast part of the Eurasian continent and improve the lives of billions of people who live there.”

“China and Russia announced a joint pledge to push back against dollar hegemony,” Carla Norrlöf, The Washington Post, 04.09.21. The author, an associate professor at the University of Toronto, writes:

• “China and Russia doubled down on earlier pledges to upend the global reliance on the U.S. dollar, and the long-standing global financial system that enables the U.S. to strong-arm them.”
• “Will the Sino-Russian strategy succeed? My research suggests "dollar hegemony" is stable for many reasons, primarily due to the United States' financial centrality and ability to secure investments. The measures announced so far, such as de-dollarization, renminbi digitalization, and alternative financial settlement and messaging systems, are unlikely to kick the dollar to the curb. But the reaction from America's rivals underscores the limits of the dollar as a tool of deterrence.”
• “The long-term effect of China and Russia's measures could nonetheless be considerable. Even if China and Russia fail to offer better alternatives, the more dollar deterrence is used, the more countries will seek options that reduce their vulnerability to this foreign policy tool.”

Ukraine:

“Are Russia and Ukraine Sliding Into War?” Maxim Samorukov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 04.05.21. The author, a fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center and deputy editor of Carnegie.ru, writes:

• “The purpose of the current military buildup [by Russia] is limited to demonstrating to Kyiv and Washington that Russia is prepared to respond with force to any military attempts to change the status quo in Donbas. The ostentation with which the troops are being moved confirms that Russia is saber-rattling rather than contemplating a blitzkrieg.”
• “The absence of rational motives for a war does not preclude the crisis spiraling out of control accidentally. The tense atmosphere and casualties suffered by both sides increase the possibility that a misstep or rogue action at a local level could drag the two countries into a new military confrontation. A lack of restraint could invalidate all rational calculations: once unleashed, wars provide ample reasons to keep fighting.” 

“Joe Biden’s Ukraine Policy: A Repeat of George W. Bush in Georgia?” Ted Galen Carpenter, The National Interest, 04.05.21. The author, a senior fellow in security studies at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at The National Interest, writes:

• “The Biden administration is in grave danger of replicating George W. Bush’s disastrous policy of encouraging Georgia’s president, Mikheil Saakashvili, to believe that his country was a valued U.S. ally and that the United States and NATO would come to Georgia’s rescue if it became embroiled in an armed conflict with Russia.”   
• “There is now the risk of two unfortunate outcomes from this approach: one bad, and one horrendous.” 
• “The most likely outcome is a repetition of the Georgia episode, in which a country Washington encouraged to take a confrontational stand against Russia acts on an exaggerated assumption of U.S. backing, suffers a decisive military defeat and is humiliated, while U.S. leaders, for all their verbal posturing, prudently refrain from going to war. The United States would come away looking both feckless and irresponsible.” 
• “But one alternative outcome is even worse. There is a danger that the Biden administration concludes that it must honor the implicit commitment to Ukraine’s security and actually adopts a military response to an outbreak of fighting between Russian and Ukrainian forces. It would be the ultimate folly, since it could culminate in nuclear war, but given the intense level of hostility toward Moscow evident in the administration and much of Washington’s political elite, it is a possibility that can’t be ruled out.”

“War Clouds Over Russia And Ukraine? Ask Brussels. The U.S. needs to accept NATO membership for Ukraine is not worth war with Russia,” Doug Bandow, The American Conservative, 04.08.21. The author, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to U.S. President Ronald Reagan. writes:

• “What happened in Ukraine didn’t matter to America when the former was part of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union. It doesn’t matter now.”
• “Ukraine’s NATO advocates act as if membership is a decision for Kiev, asserting that Moscow should not be allowed to veto any country joining the anti-Russia alliance. True, but Washington should veto new members that make the U.S. less secure, as Ukraine would.”  

“Russians supported Putin's moves in Crimea in 2014. Here's what's different in 2021,” Timothy Frye, The Washington Post, 04.12.21. The author, a professor of foreign policy at Columbia University, writes:

• “Survey results suggest Russians are unenthusiastic even about bearing the costs of annexing Crimea. A summer 2019 poll found 16 percent of Russians were willing to bear significant costs, 26 percent were willing to bear some costs, and 36 percent were not at all willing.
• “Contrary to the common notion that Putin might engage in a diversionary war to bolster support, the Russian public probably would treat such a move with skepticism, forcing the Kremlin to work hard to sell it at home.”

“Kremlin saber-rattling in Ukraine: How the West should react,” Steven Pifer, Politico, 04.07.21. The author, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes:

• “The West should do more to dissuade Moscow from thoughts of a military adventure.”  
• “First, U.S. and EU officials should consult immediately and agree on a list of additional sanctions to apply should Russia launch an attack.”
• “U.S. officials, including the president, should talk to Moscow and warn of the damaging side-effects that would result if the Russian military strikes. In parallel, Washington should consider other steps to signal its seriousness, for example by supplying Kyiv with additional Javelin anti-armor missiles or other arms to bolster its defensive capabilities.”
• “Third, European leaders need to call the Ukrainian leadership with similar messages of support.”
• “Fourth, Europe’s leaders also should get on the phone to the Kremlin. … Among other things, he should know that an attack on Ukraine would kill the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.”

“Putin is testing Biden on Ukraine. Here's what will keep him in check,” Evelyn N. Farkas, The Washington Post, 04.11.21. The author, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, writes:

• “[T]here is more Biden can do using military assistance and the threat of additional sanctions.”
• “The U.S. government can turn its attention to improving Ukraine's air force, which was already outdated before Russian attacks on Ukrainian aircraft.”
• “Cutting off access to new capital for Russian state-owned funds and entities — or even more extreme, blocking Russia from using SWIFT, an international banking system used to transfer money among about 200 countries — would immediately cause economic and political distress to Putin and his cronies. Just threatening to do so would probably cause Putin to stay his hand in Ukraine.”
• “If a new offensive brought a united front of democracies and serious sanctions, it could spell the beginning of the end for Putin's rule.”

“Ukraine, Ask Yourself what Putin Wants,” Timothy Ash, bne IntelliNews, 04.09.21. The author, a senior strategist at BlueBay Asset Management, writes:

• “Why is Putin seemingly sabre rattling? I think there are various plausible explanations: First, this is just what Putin does. He likes keeping everyone on their toes and dialing up and down tensions is part of his tactical toolkit … Second, and kind of related to the first point, this might just be a test of the new Biden presidency.”
• “Third, this might be a response to Biden’s plan for a new alliance of Democracies - how better than for Putin to stir things up in Ukraine and expose the real differences in views between the U.S. and Europe on Ukraine but also things like Nord Stream 2 … Fourth, this might be aimed at heading off and moderating U.S. sanctions … Fifth, perhaps this is a response to recent changes in Ukrainian politics and Zelenskiy’s decision to sanction Putin’s ally Medvedchuk and to close various pro-Russian TV stations.”
• “Sixth, perhaps the water situation in Crimea is so bad that Russia is looking for an opportunity to take water supplies further into Ukraine … Seventh, maybe a quick win in Ukraine would play well domestically in Russian elections … Eighth—what if this is the big one?  I have long worried that the biggest risk here was of a final, defining conflict between Ukraine and Russia.”
• “Nine—maybe it’s a combination of one thru eight. Maybe he is thinking of going through the escalation gears and seeing where that gets him. His best-case scenario is eight, but maybe he could try a six and military options might open up along the way… In my mind we could be on the cusp of something really serious.”

“How Ukraine Lost Its Investment Paradise,” Oleksiy Honcharuk and Roman Waschuk, The National Interest, 04.09.21. The authors, the former prime minister of Ukraine and the former Canadian ambassador to Ukraine, write:

• “According to a survey carried out by the American Chamber of Commerce in March 2021, lack of rule of law (66 percent), corruption (54 percent), and lack of bold reform agenda (45 percent) were identified by business representatives as the top-three biggest obstacles to doing business in Ukraine.”
• “Each newly-elected Ukrainian president comes in with a promise to fight corruption, limit oligarchs’ influence, and reform the judicial system, which is the basis for any positive transformation. Volodymyr Zelenskiy was no exception. Today, two years after winning the presidency, Zelensky has had some sectoral successes (digitalization, land reform), but made very poor progress on the top three confidence-killers. 75 percent of Ukrainians do not trust their own courts and a tiny pool of tycoons still determine too much of the country’s reality.”
• “The most recent data speaks for itself: FDI flows into Ukraine’s economy decreased more than ten times, from $4.5 billion in 2019 to only $400 million in 2020. One may blame the COVID-19 pandemic and global turbulence. But the real reason is that Ukraine’s top echelon has been sliding back to corruption after short reboot attempts undertaken during fall 2019—winter 2020.”

Belarus:

“The faces of the repressed in Belarus,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 04.11.21. The members of The Washington Post’s editorial board write:

• “The[re] are … nearly 300 political prisoners in Belarus today as Mr. Lukashenko clings to power.”
• “The United States has sanctioned some 109 officials implicated in the repression, and has warned that unless prisoners are released, the United States will no longer allow transactions with nine Belarus petrochemical and other companies.”
• “Mr. Lukashenko is hoping that President Vladimir Putin of Russia will bail him out of his troubles; Russian oligarchs are eagerly eyeing Belarus potash assets. Congress last year passed a law providing that Russians can be sanctioned if complicit in Mr. Lukashenko's crackdown on the press or in human rights abuses.”
• “The Biden administration ought to consider using this authority if Mr. Lukashenko refuses to budge. The tyrant must make way for the legitimate president [Svetlana Tikhanovskaya].”  

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant developments.