This Week’s Highlights

• Russia has four basic options when it comes to Belarus, according to Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. First, he writes, a Russian military intervention in Belarus to stabilize its ally: this should be avoided at all costs because of the inevitable disastrous consequences. The second option is to do nothing and allow Lukashenko to fall, hoping that whoever comes after him will take account of Belarus’ close ties with Russia, including in the economic sphere: too risky, Trenin writes. Third is to capitalize on Lukashenko’s shattered relations with the West and envelop him in a tight embrace: counterproductive. The fourth option is to look beyond Lukashenko and manage a transfer of power in Minsk. A Russian military intervention is unlikely as long as Putin believes whoever would be running Belarus in the near future will remain committed to keeping this country in Russian-led integration projects, according to Simon Saradzhyan.
•  Meanwhile, Henry Foy for the Financial Times writes that analysts say a compromise deal with the opposition that leaves a weakened Lukashenko and a mollified populace is Moscow’s preferred outcome despite how unlikely that may appear, given his brutal response to the protests so far. 
• Joint technical studies, transparent decision-making, and expert-level discussions on missile defense can be the subject of U.S.-Chinese-Russian trilateral arms control talks, writes Tong Zhao of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy. Russia shares the same concern with China about U.S. missile defense and has more experience than China in negotiating with the United States. With Moscow on its side, Zhao writes, Beijing may feel more comfortable with starting an arms control discussion with Washington.  
• In the years to come, Chinese and Russian scientific and technological cooperation will likely continue to deepen and progress, write Samuel Bendett of the Center for Naval Analyses and Elsa Kania of the Center for a New American Security. For the United States, and for its allies and partners, a closer Russian-Chinese partnership could threaten national interests and security. U.S. attempts to isolate and constrain the progress of China and Russia in dual-use and military-relevant technologies, through measures such as export controls and sanctions, could be undermined by this partnership, according to Bendett and Kania.   
• Prof. Nikolas K. Gvosdev writes that he was not surprised when reports emerged of Russia-connected hacks and cyber intrusions into the data systems of Western firms and institutions pursuing research into vaccines and treatments. As with Soviet espionage directed at the Manhattan project, Gvosdev writes, Russian efforts in this regard seem to have been designed to identify dead-ends so that valuable time and resources could be devoted to more promising efforts. Meanwhile, Henry Foy of the Financial Times writes that disbelief that Russian researchers are capable of outdoing Western drug companies in developing a COVID-19 vaccine may be rooted more in geopolitics than science.   

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

New Cold War/saber rattling:

• No significant developments.

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant developments.

Impact of the pandemic:

“West’s Response to Russian Vaccine Owes as Much to Geopolitics as Science,” Henry Foy, Financial Times, 08.13.20: The author, Moscow bureau chief for the news outlet, writes:

• “In 1768, Russian empress Catherine the Great volunteered to be inoculated against smallpox in an effort to show her subjects that the emerging medical technique was safe. It was with a similar aim in mind that President Vladimir Putin revealed on Tuesday [Aug. 11] that his daughter had been part of human trials for Russia’s COVID-19 vaccine, Sputnik V. That detail came as Mr. Putin announced that Russia had granted the vaccine regulatory approval for public use, beating every other country to the milestone. There is just one catch: the drug is still in the testing phase. In a few weeks, thousands of Russians will start being vaccinated with what is in effect still an experiment.”
• “Criticism of Moscow’s rushed approval is justified. While researchers in the U.S., U.K. and China working on rival vaccines are also bending long-established regulations to speed up their work, Russia has torn them up completely. The vaccine had yet to begin phase three clinical trials—a critical benchmark that often sees drugs tested on thousands of people for more than a year.”
• “But disbelief that Russian researchers are capable of outdoing Western drug companies may be rooted more in geopolitics than science. While Russia is not a pharmaceutical powerhouse and is a net importer of medicines, Moscow’s Gamalaya Research Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology, which developed the vaccine, has worked with adenoviruses since the 1980s, and based Sputnik V on its own internationally approved Ebola vaccine.”

“Sputnik V: The Geopolitics Surrounding Russia's Coronavirus Vaccine,” Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The National Interest, 08.13.20: The author, a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, writes:

• “I was not surprised when reports emerged of Russia-connected hacks and cyber intrusions into the data systems of Western firms and institutions pursuing research into vaccines and treatments. As with Soviet espionage directed at the Manhattan project, Russian efforts in this regard seem to have been designed to identify dead-ends so that valuable time and resources could be devoted to more promising efforts.”
• “The announcement of ‘Sputnik V’ (and the choice of nomenclature is deliberate—connecting this supposed achievement with the Soviet Union’s crowning accomplishment of opening humanity’s access to space) serves several political agendas. The first is to reassure Russia’s own population that the state is moving towards a solution—and is doing so without having to rely on outside help. … More practically, the Russian economy—and the patience of the Russian people—will not withstand another sustained period of lockdown.”
• “But it is the geopolitical usages of Sputnik V which interest me the most. Moscow has identified a coalition it wishes to confirm, develop and pay for the vaccine—and its preferred choice of partners is quite interesting. Kirill Dmitriev, who heads up the state-controlled Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), has noted that phase 3 clinical trials will be held in India, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Brazil and the Philippines. Also, Dmitriev expects that production of the vaccine will take place with financial partnerships and local manufacturing concerns in India, South Korea, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Cuba.”
• “This coronavirus vaccine bid is Russia’s effort to establish leadership of a middle group of nations who want to avoid the binary choice of Washington or Beijing—and is part of Putin’s efforts to retain a global leadership role for himself.”

Missile defense:

“Managing the Sino-American Dispute Over Missile Defense,” Tong Zhao, War on the Rocks, 08.11.20: The author, a senior fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, writes:

• “Worried that its [China’s nuclear] arsenal will at least double before 2029, Washington has threatened to spend Beijing ‘into oblivion’ unless it joins arms control talks. Senior U.S. officials even considered resuming nuclear testing to force China to the negotiation table.”
• “However, America’s coercive strategy has not worked and will not work. Instead, it will reinforce a view in China that arms control is a trap laid by White House officials to contain China and undermine its security. But Washington can convince Beijing otherwise if it includes missile defense in the discussion agenda.”
• “It is time for the two countries to launch a dedicated effort on this issue because missile defense generates more Chinese suspicion about the U.S. military’s strategic intentions toward China than anything else. … [I]f China and the United States are willing to examine how ambiguities in both countries’ capabilities and policies have caused unnecessary mutual suspicions, they could find a new path to manage this dispute and advance mutual security.”
• “Joint technical studies, transparent decision-making, and expert-level discussions on missile defense can also be the subject of U.S.-Chinese-Russian trilateral arms control talks. Russia shares the same concern with China about U.S. missile defense and has more experience than China in negotiating with the United States. With Moscow on its side, Beijing may feel more comfortable with starting an arms control discussion with Washington.”
• “The rapid deterioration of the U.S.-Chinese relationship highlights the urgency … for substantive engagement on longstanding security disputes. Worried about a race to the bottom, senior Chinese officials repeatedly declared that China is willing to talk about all issues of mutual concern with Washington through a series of dialogues. American officials have also called on China to join an arms control framework with the United States and Russia. But Washington offered little hint of the intended scale and scope of that framework and it is not clear what it wants Beijing to sign up to.” 

Nuclear arms control:

• No significant developments.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

• No significant developments.

Elections interference:

“The Kremlin’s Plot Against Democracy,” Alina Polyakova, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2020: The author, president and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis and an adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, writes:

• “As Putin positions himself to be Russia’s leader for life, undermining faith in democracy writ large is still very much in the Kremlin’s interest. … A big part of the risk is that Russia is no longer the sole danger. The lack of serious retaliation or long-lasting consequences for its behavior has effectively left the door open for others to follow Russia’s lead. To these newcomers, the Kremlin’s 2016 operation against the United States offers a handy step-by-step guide.
• “Future elections in the United States and other democracies will face an onslaught of disinformation and conspiracy theories emanating not just from Russia but also from China, Iran, Venezuela and beyond. … The Russian playbook has been copied by others, but it has also evolved, in large part thanks to Moscow’s own innovations. After social media companies got better at verifying accounts, for instance, Russia began looking for ways to roll out its campaigns without relying on fake online profiles.” 
• “A barrage of attacks, combined with the increasingly sophisticated methods used to avoid detection, could leave governments, social media companies and researchers scrambling to catch up. The United States is woefully underprepared for such a scenario, having done little to deter new attacks.
• It is late, but not too late, to shore up U.S. defenses in time for the November election. The focus should be Russia, given its status as the main originator and innovator of disinformation operations.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“The End of American Illusion. Trump and the World as It Is,” Nadia Schadlow, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2020: The author, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, writes:

• “As the administration’s first term draws to a close, Washington should take stock of the crumbling post–Cold War order and chart a path toward a more equitable and secure future. No matter who is U.S. president come January, American policymakers will need to adopt new ideas about the country’s role in the world and new thinking about rivals such as China and Russia.”
• “Although liberal internationalism encouraged interdependence and multilateralism, it also rested on a faith in Washington’s ability to indefinitely maintain the uncontested military superiority it enjoyed in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. In reality, U.S. military dominance is now challenged in virtually every domain. … China, Russia, and other states now have the ability to field antisatellite weapons systems. … Beijing and Moscow have developed so-called anti-access/area-denial weapons systems, which reduce Washington’s ability to project power in East Asia and Europe.”
• “Whoever occupies the White House in January will need to understand that today’s multidimensional rivalries will not end in conventional victories. More broadly, policymakers and strategists need to move past their emphasis on achieving particular end states. … Going forward, U.S. foreign policy success will hinge on a clear-eyed approach to cooperation. Rather than seeing cooperation with other countries as an end in itself, policymakers should recognize it as a means to crafting a stronger competitive strategy. They must also grasp that genuine cooperation requires reciprocity.”
• “In a world of great-power competition, economic inequality and dazzling technological capabilities, where ideologies as well as pathogens spread with viral ferocity, the stakes are too high and the consequences too dire to simply stick with what worked in the past and hope for the best. Trump recognized this reality earlier than many in the U.S. foreign policy community. Whoever follows him—be it in 2021 or 2025—will need to recognize it, as well.”

“Putin Is Reckless Because We Allow Him to Be,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 08.11.20: The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “How should the United States deal with Putin? George P. Shultz and William J. Perry, highly respected former secretaries of state and defense, respectively, joined more than 100 other prominent experts in endorsing an open letter, published by Politico, calling for a pragmatic, dispassionate attempt to rebuild relations with Moscow.”
• “Rethinking assumptions is often valuable in foreign policy. But in this case, the rethinking should begin with an embittered Kremlin, which seems to relish icons of the Cold War and unwisely keeps taunting the United States. Putin takes pleasure in jabbing his enemies but, over the long run, he is not going to win this fight.”

“Washington Should Not Talk Itself Into Accepting Moscow’s Aggression—Again,” Kurt Volker, Foreign Policy, 08.11.20: The author, former U.S. special representative for Ukraine and former U.S. ambassador to NATO, writes:

• “Most critics say U.S. President Donald Trump is too soft on Russia and unwilling to criticize it or Russian President Vladimir Putin—for example, on election interference, placing a bounty on the killing of U.S. soldiers, or continuing aggression in Ukraine. It is striking, therefore, to see a large number of experienced and respected U.S. foreign-policy experts criticize the administration’s approach to Russia as too hardline, calling instead in an open letter for a ‘rethink’ of U.S.-Russia policy.”
• “The fundamental fallacy in such an argument is to believe that U.S. policies drive Putin’s actions. They don’t. Authors of the open letter argue that we must deal with Russia ‘as it is.’ Indeed we must. Russia ‘as it is’ is an increasingly authoritarian state determined to act aggressively against its neighbors, extend its disruptive influence in the Middle East and Asia, and strategically weaken and divide Europe and NATO.”
• “By the end of each of the last few U.S. administrations, the presidents became convinced that pushing back against Russia was essential. Rather than rethinking that stance at the start of a new presidential term, it is time to recognize that Russia is aggressive for its own reasons. Instead of a reset, the West needs the patience to apply consistent and steady pressure against Russian aggression, and to support those in Russia and in neighboring states who seek freedom, democracy, and security. For once, it is time for Russia, not the West, to rethink its policy.”

“Joe Biden and Kamala Harris on Russia,” RM Staff, Russia Matters, 08.13.20: The Russia Matters staff writes:

• “Less than a week before the start of the Democratic National Convention, Joe Biden announced Sen. Kamala Harris of California as his vice-presidential running mate. The nomination is another first in Harris’s illustrative career. … As a senator, she has served on the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary, among others.”
• “Given her professional experience, Harris does not hesitate to weigh in on key U.S. domestic issues. But where does the first woman of color to be nominated for national office by a major political party stand on the important foreign policy issue of U.S.-Russian relations?”
• “As for Biden—who, when a vice president himself, made headlines by proclaiming the Obama administration’s intention to ‘press the reset button’ in U.S.-Russian relations—have there recently been any significant changes in his own views on Russia? Below is a sampling of Biden’s and Harris’s statements on what U.S. policies they advocate on key Russia-related issues, as well as their views on Russia itself, as expressed since U.S. President Donald Trump’s election in November 2016, not an exhaustive record.”

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“When Autocrats Reach Their Political Expiration Dates,” Andrei Kolesnikov, The Moscow Times, 08.11.20: The author, a senior fellow and the chair of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “Vladimir Putin’s congratulatory telegram to Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, despite its dry official tone, concealed a genuinely warm sentiment: the solidarity of one autocrat with another.”
• “The Kremlin barely recognizes that it has already lost Belarus, just like in 2014, when it lost Ukraine forever. It is lost in the sense that a substantial number of Belarusians do not want to exchange Lukashenko for Putin: this would just mean more of the same dismal political backwardness, economic underachievement and milking of the country’s GDP in broad daylight.”
• “Russians carry two persistent myths in their heads. One is that Ukraine is the worst country in the world, possibly almost as bad as the U.S. The other is that Belarus—with its calm, discipline and order—is a model for imitation, an untarnished version of Russia. The unprecedented protests, the appearance of new leaders and the awakening of society destroys this myth about Belarus.”
• “This doesn’t mean that protests along Belarusian lines are soon going to break out in Russia. … Unlike 1989, the “velvet” revolutions of 2020 will not lead to a change of regime. The movements lack the necessary mass support.”
• “Autocrats have reached their expiration dates. In a strange way this simple idea is becoming a unifying platform for civil society in Russia and Belarus. Civil societies are uniting faster than the two countries.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant developments.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant developments.

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

“The Resilience of Sino-Russian High-Tech Cooperation,” Samuel Bendett and Elsa Kania, War on the Rocks, 08.12.20: The authors, an analyst with the Center for Naval Analyses and an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, write:

• “The future of Sino-Russian scientific and technological cooperation is full of promise, or at least that is what senior officials from both countries claim in their portrayals of the partnership. There are already examples of apparent successes, such as the joint development of a fast-neutron reactor and collaboration on a wide-body long-range jet. At the same time, joint research and co-authorship between China and Russia has taken time to mature, largely due to practical obstacles, such as language barriers. … Not all aspects of technological engagements between China and Russia have been positive.”
• “In the years to come, Chinese and Russian scientific and technological cooperation will likely continue to deepen and progress. …for the United States, and for its allies and partners, a closer Russian-Chinese partnership could threaten national interests and security. U.S. attempts to isolate and constrain the progress of China and Russia in dual-use and military-relevant technologies, through measures such as export controls and sanctions, could be undermined by this partnership.”
• “The United States, along with allies, partners and concerned democracies worldwide, should mount a more coordinated response to Russian and Chinese promotion of alternative frameworks for technology governance on the world stage, which also demands progress on norms at home.”
• “At the same time, the U.S. government should explore options for limited and carefully calibrated scientific collaboration with both China and Russia. ..Today, there may be benefits for American diplomacy to include limited scientific engagement with China and Russia on subjects of mutual interest and concern, such as global public health.”

“Russia and China Playing Musical Chairs in Zero Gravity,” Jeffrey Edmonds, War on the Rocks, 08.14.20: The author, a research scientist and the Center for Naval Analyses, writes:

• “The Russian and Chinese governments have initiated a number of joint space-related ventures ranging from remote sensing of the earth’s surface to human exploration in space. Yet, there is little direct defense-related space cooperation, although activities such as sharing rocket and microelectronic technology could certainly benefit each country’s military capabilities.”
• “The constraints on Russian-Chinese cooperation in space stem from an inherent distrust and skepticism over the ultimate trajectory of the relationship and other matters, such as Chinese technology theft. Should Russia increase cooperation with China, perhaps through sharing rocket and other technology, it could see Chinese space capabilities eventually eclipse Russia’s own programs and contribute to unwanted, expanded Chinese military capabilities.”
• “However, should Russia continue to be reticent, it may watch China move ahead without any of the benefits of greater cooperation. Regardless of which direction Russia takes, Sino-Russian cooperation in space should remain a significant concern for defense planners.”

“Soviet Legacy as Soft Power: Chinese Reception of Russian Political and Cultural Influence,”  Marlene Laruelle and Wei (Josh) Luo, PONARS Eurasia, August 2020: The authors of the memo write:

• “Russia is seen by the Chinese regime and by the most nationalistic segments of the Chinese population as a mirror of both what China wants to avoid—the Soviet Union’s collapse—and what it wants to become—a display of muscular revival à la Putin that challenges Western liberal ideology and hegemony. However, some Russian cultural products are also consumed in China without an ideological footprint, but even they benefit from some Chinese nostalgia for the Sino-Soviet friendship (visible, for instance, in the growth of Red Tourism).”
• “Ultimately, although contemporary Russian musical influence in China is becoming less political, Chinese perceptions of Russian musical and cinematographic culture remain deeply tied to the two countries’ shared ideological affinity.”
• “Russia’s ability to develop multiple ideological languages, as well as to promote cultural products abroad, give it the theoretical possibility to develop a niche soft power and ideological influence that is neither U.S.-centered nor liberalism-based. Yet, it remains to be seen if this cultural production can be transformed into effective soft power, that is if Russia’s cultural strengths do contribute to securing the country’s international status.”

“We Need a Broad, Transpartisan Debate on How to Engage With China Before It's Too Late,” Katrina vanden Heuvel, The Washington Post, 08.11.20: The author, a columnist with The Washington Post, writes:

• “The cold war with China is on. In a bellicose speech last month, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo resuscitated the rhetoric of the 20th-century Cold War: ‘If we want to have a free 21st century and not the Chinese century of which Xi Jinping dreams, the old paradigm of blind engagement with China simply won't get it done,’ he said. ‘The free world must triumph over this new tyranny.’”
• “The Trump administration's 2017 National Security Strategy elevated China and Russia to primary national security threats. It labeled China a ‘revisionist’ power that seeks ‘to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests’ while ‘attempting to erode American security and prosperity.’ There is transpartisan support for confrontation with China, but the United States ought to consider alternatives to this posture before it is too late.”
• “Consensus about a cold war with China is congealing across the foreign policy ‘blob.’ The U.S. military and its industrial allies are already strategizing arms buildups to confront China. The Trump administration has bludgeoned Chinese technology companies, curtailed Chinese investments here, and even cut access for Chinese students and scholars studying in the United States. But it does all this without a coherent plan for rebuilding America. This is a recipe not for triumph but for calamity.”
• “Broad debate is vital to explore reasonable engagement with China and alternatives to a new cold war posture. Notice that China doesn't attempt to impose its model on the world. It is increasingly aggressive in forging economic ties and asserting its interests—including by filling the role vacated by the United States on the global stage amid the pandemic crises—but it isn't building military alliances. Its model attracts not because of ideology but because it succeeded in lifting citizens from abject poverty.”

Ukraine:

• No significant developments.

Belarus:

“No Good Options for Putin As Protests Rage in Belarus,” Henry Foy, Financial Times, 08.17.20: The author, the Moscow bureau chief at the Financial Times, writes:

• “Mr. Lukashenko’s summary of their [Lukashenko’s and Putin’s] conversations was direct. Mr. Putin, he said, had promised, under the terms of the integration agreement between the two countries, to provide ‘at our request, comprehensive [military] assistance to ensure the security of Belarus’ if threatened by external forces. … The Kremlin was less explicit. ‘The Russian side reaffirmed its readiness to render the necessary assistance to resolve the challenges facing Belarus,’ it said.”
• “Some western analysts who have long claimed that Mr. Putin could repeat his 2008 invasion of Georgia or 2014 invasion of Ukraine in another country, pointed to the statements as an indication that another Russian military deployment could be imminent. But most Kremlin watchers predict the Russian president will remain on the sidelines, while privately pressuring Mr. Lukashenko to find some way of defusing the crisis.”
• “The Kremlin’s statements contain ‘a lot about friendship between peoples, but not a word about support for the current Belarusian president,’ noted Artyom Shraibman, a Minsk-based political commentator. ‘The Kremlin has taken a wait-and-see attitude.’ … ‘In Belarus, the entire population is viewed as friendly [to Russia], so the loss of an allied ruler is not such a disastrous turn of events,’ wrote Alexander Baunov, senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center, in a recent analysis. ‘This is why the Belarusian protests against their own authorities . . . are not seen in Russia as anti-Russian or hostile.’”
• “Analysts say a compromise deal with the opposition that leaves a weakened Mr. Lukashenko and a mollified populace is Moscow’s preferred outcome, despite how unlikely that may appear, given his brutal response to the protests so far.”

“Will Russia Intervene Militarily in Belarus?” Simon Saradzhyan, Russia Matters, 08.17.20: The author, founding director of Russia Matters, writes:

• “When Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev pleaded with Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2010 to have either Russia or the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization intervene to nip a color revolution against him in the bud, the Kremlin ignored that plea. However, when  Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko made similar pleas this week, Putin … stated ‘preparedness to render necessary assistance in resolving the emerged problems on the basis of the treaty on establishment of the Union State, and, if needed via the Collective Treaty Organization,’ noting ‘external pressure’ on Minsk.”
• “These statements have led a number of Russia-watchers to proclaim Russia’s military intervention in Belarus is imminent or even underway. But is it? To answer this question, I suggest exploring whether two conditions, which I have earlier identified as necessary and sufficient for Russia’s military intervention, are present in the case of Belarus.”
• “Condition 1 is currently absent in Belarus as of Aug. 17. The opposition leaders have so far espoused no public desire to take Belarus into NATO. Nor is the opposition (as of Aug. 17) close to toppling Lukashenko, though signs reportedly emerged on Aug. 17 that Europe’s last dictator may eventually agree to yield power.”
• “Whether Condition 2 is present in Belarus as of Aug. 17 is unclear. On one hand, Russian power agencies have mobile units that can easily and rapidly be deployed in response to Lukashenko’s pleas for help … On the other hand, Putin knows he has other, less costly, but relatively effective ways to ensure Belarus remains oriented toward Russia … Should, however, (1) the leaders of Belarus’s opposition be found to have been harboring serious intentions to take Belarus to NATO; and (2) they come close to toppling Lukashenko rather than negotiating a transition of power, in the outcome of which Russia would hope to play a role, expect Putin to give serious consideration to a full-fledged military intervention.”

“Game Over for Lukashenko: the Kremlin’s Next Move,” Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 08.17.20: The author, the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “Several elements have … changed the picture. One was the Wagner incident: a bizarre operation in which the Belarusian KGB arrested thirty-three suspected Russian mercenaries eleven days before the vote and accused them of having come to Minsk to stir up trouble during the elections…Whatever trust had remained in Lukashenko in Moscow completely evaporated. … The second element was the perseverance of protesters in Minsk and across Belarus. … This in turn led to the third unanticipated result: the expansion of the protests beyond the usual crowd of young Europe-orientated urbanites to include older people.”
• “Lukashenko is on track for an inevitable and dishonorable exit. … The strategic position that Belarus occupies on the central axis between the European Union and Russia makes the succession to the person who has ruled the country with an iron fist for twenty-six years exceedingly important for both Moscow and the West.”
• “So, what should be done? … First, a Russian military intervention in Belarus to stabilize its ally: this should be avoided at all costs because of the inevitable disastrous consequences. The second option is to do nothing and allow Lukashenko to fall, hoping that whoever comes after him will take account of Belarus’ close ties with Russia, including in the economic sphere: too risky. … Third is to capitalize on Lukashenko’s shattered relations with the West and envelop him in a tight embrace: counterproductive. … The fourth option is to look beyond Lukashenko and manage a transfer of power in Minsk.”   
• “Managing the crisis in Belarus in a way that keeps that country a good neighbor and reliable partner for Russia may sound too modest … but it is better to give up illusions and save lives and money than to allow a close relative to turn into an implacable foe.”

“Belarus Protests Signal the Autumn of Lukashenko’s Regime,” Artyom Shraibman, Carnegie Moscow Center, 08.13.20: The author, a founder of the Minsk-based political consultancy Sense Analytics, writes:

• “Deprived of the support—or, at least, the silent loyalty—of the majority, and without the economic resources to win it back, the regime will rely more and more on the siloviki, or security services. Siloviki already head the government and presidential administration. Now, following the election, they won’t just determine Lukashenko’s worldview by preparing nearly all the reports on his table; they will also know that the regime owes its survival to them.”
• “This could become a prologue to reformatting the regime. The untouchable siloviki could gradually become irreplaceable, and then start to feel that beyond carrying out someone else’s orders, they have the right to a voice in the decision-making process.”
• “The Belarusian regime has less room to maneuver now than ever before. The public is angry; the economy has been in a state of stagnation for a decade already; reform seems risky; relations with the West look set to be frozen; and to get any support from Russia, Belarus will have to share its sovereignty. So now the most important thing for Lukashenko is money: because money buys time.”

“The Economics of Belarusians’ Revolt,” Martin Sandbu, Financial Times, 08.13.20: The author, the Financial Times’ European economic commentator, writes:

• “We do know that the choices of Lukashenko himself, members of his regime and the opposition take place … against a background of important economic facts and forces that structure Belarus’s political economy. First, while it may no longer be Europe’s last dictatorship given autocratic developments elsewhere, Belarus is certainly Europe’s last Soviet economy. … So far, many Belarusians have tolerated Lukashenko’s regime as better than what they see in Ukraine and Russia. But like in Poland in the 1980s, and more generally across the eastern bloc then, economic failure can make people give up on the regime.”
• “Second, one economic factor in particular is accelerating this. … Until recently, Belarus has been allowed to buy oil at the Russian domestic price, which is below global market levels because of an export tax. …  But that subsidy is now being phased out as a consequence of tax reforms by Moscow. … Sergei Guriev, a professor at Sciences Po in Paris and former chief economist of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, told me that the loss of revenue to Minsk’s budget from the full effect of the reforms could amount to 4 percent of Belarusian national income.”
• “Third, paradoxically enough, Belarus has also managed to nurture one highly modern sector: exports of IT services.”
• “Fourth, a digitally tuned-in population is just one illustration of the enormous economic potential Belarus could expect from reforms.”
• “Both Europe and the US now have the ability, through their Magnitsky-style laws, to target individually those orchestrating the crackdown. They should use it to try to limit the bloodshed in the short run, while making clear the benefits that await the country over time if it can find a way to liberalize both its politics and economics.”

“Belarus Crackdown Highlights EU’s Autocrat Problem,” Michael Peel, Financial Times, 08.11.20: The author, the Financial Times’ EU diplomatic correspondent, writes:

• “The post-election crackdown by Belarus’s president Alexander Lukashenko has thrown a spotlight on the EU’s growing difficulties in dealing firmly with the world’s autocrats. From Minsk to Cairo to Hong Kong, critics of the bloc say it is reluctant to take strong action, overly influenced by other political considerations and increasingly compromised by rights abuses and creeping authoritarianism within its own borders.”
• “The problem is particularly acute in the case of Mr. Lukashenko because his country borders the EU and is part of the bloc’s ‘eastern partnership’ of six nations close to Russia’s frontiers.”
• “The Belarus crisis crystallizes what some analysts see as a deeper conflict between the EU’s interests and values. The bloc lifted the sanctions as part of an effort to avoid driving Mr. Lukashenko into the arms of Russia. But such engagement with autocratic regimes can sit uneasily with the EU’s declaration that ‘universal, indivisible and interdependent’ human rights are ‘at the heart’ of its relations with ‘other countries and regions.’”
• “When Mr. Lukashenko became president in 1994, the EU had just 12 member states. …EU foreign ministers are due to hold an extraordinary meeting by teleconference on Friday at which Belarus will be on the agenda. Friday’s debate will test whether the now 27-strong bloc has found any way to help loosen the ever-tightening grip of leaders like him.”

“Belarus: No Easy Answers,” Malcolm Rifkind, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 08.14.20: The author, a distinguished fellow at RUSI, writes:

• “The reality is that he [Lukashenko] has not the slightest desire to become one of the Kremlin's provincial governors rather than the head of state of an independent country. On this question all his Western neighbors agree with him.”
• “My conclusion is not that the EU and the West should see Lukashenko as the lesser of two evils. That would not be tolerable. We must give political and diplomatic support to those fighting for freedom. But we must concentrate our pressure on warning Putin that he must, in no circumstances, interfere with and violate Belarus's independence. The international community was too passive in the immediate aftermath of Putin's ‘coup’ in Crimea. We must not make the same mistake again.”

“Between Neighbors: How Does Russia View the Election Aftermath in Belarus?” Sabine  Fisher, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 08.13.20: The author, a senior fellow in SWP’s Eastern Europe and Eurasia research division, writes:

• “The Russian political discourse pays very close attention to developments in Belarus, reflecting a persistent post-imperial lack of distance to its sovereign neighbors. Looking at the Russian discussion one might forget that there actually is a border between Russia and Belarus, much as was the case following the Ukrainian presidential election in 2019. Another reason for this closeness lies in the similarity of the political systems.”
• “The Russian state media tend to play down the significance of the events and push a geopolitical interpretation in which the protesters are a minority controlled by hostile Western actors.”
• “Russia’s independent media, on the other hand, seek to present a realistic picture, concentrating on developments within Belarus and Lukashenko’s loss of public legitimacy.”
• “Foreign policy analysts in Moscow do not believe that Tikhanovskaya can expect Western support: The European Union is divided, they note, weakened by COVID-19 and preoccupied with internal matters, while the United States is generally incapable of coherent foreign policy action. The regime will weather the storm, they believe, but emerge from it weakened. This in turn will increase Lukashenko’s dependency on Moscow.”
• “The EU cannot overlook the massive election fraud and the brutality of the security forces against unarmed demonstrators. It should back the demand for new elections, offer mediation and impose additional sanctions if the regime refuses to alter its current stance. But in the process it should do everything it can to preserve contacts within Belarusian society. Clear communication with Moscow is vital, both to float possible solutions and to lay out the costs of intervention. No need to fear a quarrel: the EU has been in a conflict with Russia for a long time already.”

“Why Belarus Is Not Ukraine,” Amy Mackinnon, Foreign Policy, 08.12.20: The author, a staff writer at Foreign Policy, writes:

• “Despite the similar, gruesome optics, the differences between the two uprisings [the 2014 Ukrainian revolution and the protests in Minsk] far outweigh their similarities, though the two countries may both be neighbors and former Soviet Republics. Those differences make it harder to look to Ukraine as a potential road map for how the events in Belarus may unfold.
• “For starters, Belarus is a lot more authoritarian than Ukraine was or is. … After the uprisings in 2014 that forced Yanukovych to flee to Russia, pro-Russian separatists in eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk staged independence referendums, going on to form proto-states highly dependent on Moscow’s muscle and financial backing. Belarus, in contrast, has little in the way of linguistic, religious or ethnic divides for foreign actors like Russia to exploit.”
• “Ukraine’s protesters had a clear goal. All that Belarusians have right now is anger and outrage. … A key distinction in Belarus is that the protests have no clear leader, said Artyom Shraibman, a founder of the Minsk-based political consultancy Sense Analytics. ‘This is more a protest of anger, than a conscious attempt at toppling the regime,’ he said.”
• “For all the differences between the two dramatic upheavals, there are some constants. Should Moscow decide to wade in, it has plenty of points of leverage—many of the same ones it has used against Ukraine—whether cutting off energy supplies, launching cyberattacks or exploiting Russian-language media in a place where the Russian language still predominates.”

“Belarus Is an Exceptional Case,” Nigel Gould-Davies, The Moscow Times, 08.17.20: The author, a senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and former British Ambassador to Belarus, writes:

• “We are reaching a tipping point. Watch how defections spread among groups whose loyalty, complicity and silence is essential for implementing the regime’s rule. Watch the military, it has not been directly involved in domestic repression before, nor is this part of its mission statement. If Lukashenko invokes martial law it will face a decisive choice. And watch Russia, which may try to control or stop change in some way. These are the key variables now.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant developments.