Russia Analytical Report, Aug. 16-23, 2021
This Week’s Highlights
Numerous analysts warn that Russia’s willingness to engage with the Taliban, which both Moscow and Washington still classify as a terrorist group, is not risk-free. The Carnegie Moscow Center’s Alexander Baunov writes that it is “dangerous … to (even unwittingly) sympathize with the Taliban,” whose previous “administration in Afghanistan was the only government in the world to recognize the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria” as the region tried to break away from Russia, while former Russian diplomat Vladimir Frolov tells ABC News there is no guarantee the Taliban will “stabilize the country under their control and not engage in cross-border jihad.”
“That the U.S. government could not foresee—or, perhaps, refused to admit—that beleaguered Afghan forces would continue a long-standing practice of cutting deals with the Taliban illustrates precisely the same naivete with which America has prosecuted the Afghanistan war for years,” according to Anatol Lieven of the the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Lieven likewise notes that “the Soviet-backed Afghan state survived for three years after the Soviet withdrawal, and in fact outlasted the USSR itself—a telling commentary on the comparative decrepitude of the ‘state’ that the United States and its partners have attempted to create since 2001.”
As counterintuitive as it may sound, cyber weapons could offer “an opportunity to decrease global violence,” argues Cybèle C. Greenberg, a fellow with the New York Times editorial board: “Fighting digitally offers a unique opportunity: the continuation of politics by other means, without the physical invasion of a sovereign territory or the inevitable sacrifice of lives.” But this will be possible only if nations manage “to develop both treaties and unwritten customary laws” governing the use of cyber warfare.
Three European social scientists who have written a new book on anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny share their research via The Washington Post. “The current wave of repression marks a shift from the Kremlin’s earlier policy toward Navalny, and toward opposition more generally,” write Jan Matti Dollbaum, Morvan Lallouet and Ben Noble. “Russian authorities previously relied on their control of information to stifle criticism but are now using brute force more to stamp out political challenges and critical voices, including in the media.”
Though Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko’s confrontation with the West may suit the Kremlin’s purposes by weakening the EU and providing Russia with a strategic buffer, analysts say the close linkage between the two countries comes with potential political and economic costs for Moscow, writes Nastassia Astrasheuskaya of the Financial Times.
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security:
- No significant developments.
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:
- No significant developments.
Iran and its nuclear program:
- No significant developments.
Great power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:
“Lessons for Russia From the U.S. Leadership Crisis,” Alexander Baunov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 08.23.21. The author, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center and editor in chief of Carnegie.ru, writes:
- “U.S. President Joe Biden’s first speech following scenes of chaos and tragedy as the Taliban retook control of the Afghan capital Kabul contained some important implications for Russia.”
- “Both the Soviet and U.S. strategies of ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the Afghan people were similar, except that instead of the Soviet values of ‘socialism,’ ‘equality’ and ‘development,’ the U.S. buzzword was ‘democracy.’ Beyond the military action, the construction sites of schools and hospitals that rose up were strikingly similar, along with programs for thousands of students at universities, weapons for the armed forces and concerts, libraries and museums for the intelligentsia. But it’s hard to win over the hearts and minds of a foreign nation right when you’re losing those of your own people.”
- “Those who seek to turn any failure for the West into a victory for Russia are invariably also keen to occupy the vacated space on the map—and will, more often than not, find themselves on the brink of a similar debacle. … It would be cavalier and downright dangerous for Kremlin strategists to automatically assume a tactical defeat [for the U.S.] in one place will be repeated in all possible situations.”
- “It’s also dangerous when gloating over the defeat of a geopolitical rival to (even unwittingly) sympathize with the Taliban. … It’s worth remembering that the previous Taliban administration in Afghanistan was the only government in the world to recognize the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, as the breakaway Russian region styled itself under Shamil Basayev and Aslan Maskhadov.”
- “Now Russia will have to choose whether to continue on a good footing with the Taliban, or to support its traditional allies in the north of Afghanistan—Afghan Uzbeks and Tajiks, who are already showing the first signs of resistance—as it did in the 1990s. Even if this time Moscow tries a more balanced approach, the Taliban will always suspect Russia of acting against it in the north.”
“Why Afghan Forces So Quickly Laid Down Their Arms,” Anatol Lieven, Politico, 08.17.21. The author—a senior fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, author of “Pakistan: A Hard Country” and a former journalist who covered the war in Afghanistan—writes:
- “While the coming months and years will reveal what the U.S. government did and didn’t know about the state of Afghan security forces prior to U.S. withdrawal, the speed of the collapse was predictable. That the U.S. government could not foresee—or, perhaps, refused to admit—that beleaguered Afghan forces would continue a long-standing practice of cutting deals with the Taliban illustrates precisely the same naivete with which America has prosecuted the Afghanistan war for years.”
- “The central feature of the past several weeks in Afghanistan has not been fighting. It has been negotiations between the Taliban and Afghan forces, sometimes brokered by local elders. On Sunday [Aug. 15], the Washington Post reported ‘a breathtaking series of negotiated surrenders by government forces’ that resulted from more than a year of deal-making between the Taliban and rural leaders. In Afghanistan, kinship and tribal connections often take precedence over formal political loyalties, or at least create neutral spaces where people from opposite sides can meet and talk.”
- “The Soviet-backed Afghan state survived for three years after the Soviet withdrawal, and in fact outlasted the USSR itself—a telling commentary on the comparative decrepitude of the ‘state’ that the United States and its partners have attempted to create since 2001. ... But after the USSR collapsed and Soviet aid ended in December 1991, there was very little fighting. Government commanders, starting with Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum (who since 2001 has been on the American side, illustrating the fluidity of Afghan allegiances), either took their men over to the mujahedeen, fled or went home—and were allowed to do so by the victors. Kabul was captured intact by the mujahedeen in 1992, as it is being captured by the Taliban now.”
- “We can draw a clear line between this lack of understanding and the horrible degree of surprise at the events of the past several days. America didn’t predict this sudden collapse, but it could have and should have—an unfortunately fitting coda to a war effort that has been undermined from the start by a failure to study Afghan realities.”
“Why the Taliban Won. And What Washington Can Do About It Now,” Vanda Felbab-Brown, Foreign Affairs, 08.17.21. The author, director of the Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes:
- “The United States and other countries made plenty of mistakes in Afghanistan. Pakistan duplicitously enabled the Taliban. But the principal responsibility for this tragic end to 20 years of state-building efforts in Afghanistan lies squarely with the Afghan leadership. The Taliban’s victory is thus a cautionary tale about the difficulties of stabilization: Unless the United States exercises tough love toward its supposed partners, years of effort can go up in smoke in days.”
- “On the counterterrorism front, the news is not entirely grim. Although the Taliban are most unlikely to sever their links with al Qaeda, they will probably not permit international terrorist attacks to emanate from Afghan territory. Not only would the United States demand that but so would China, Iran and Russia. The Taliban will also continue to have strong incentives to battle the Islamic State … in Afghanistan.”
- “But other than that, what lies ahead is not a happy picture. An Iran-like internal political and social order may be the best that can be hoped for in Afghanistan. In this system, the Taliban’s supreme council, their ruling body of 20 or so leaders, would sit atop a layer of technocratic institutions carrying out the actual business of governance. In a very optimistic scenario, Afghanistan’s leaders would even permit some form of legislative and executive elections. Technocrats would hold certain posts, and minority groups would be given representation in the government’s administrative and decision-making structures. It’s also conceivable that the situation for women could be prevented from hitting rock bottom: The Taliban would continue to let women have access to health care, education and certain jobs.”
- “After two decades, 2,400 dead Americans and $1 trillion, this was hardly the outcome the United States hoped for in Afghanistan. But it was years in the making.”
“Nato allies urge rethink on alliance after Biden’s ‘unilateral’ Afghanistan exit,” Helen Warrell, Guy Chazan and Richard Milne, Financial Times, 08.17.21. The authors, correspondents for the newspaper, write:
- “European allies had hoped Joe Biden’s election to the U.S. presidency would bolster NATO’s relevance after Donald Trump’s acrimonious years. Washington’s messy withdrawal from Afghanistan is prompting a rethink.”
- “After the fall of Kabul, EU defense and security officials have been strikingly critical of the U.S. decision to send home its troops, arguing it has weakened NATO and raised questions about Europe’s security dependence on Washington. Their reaction marks a bitter end to the alliance’s longest-running mission, which shifted over two decades from combat to a training program involving 10,000 personnel from 36 countries by the time it ended.”
- “Ben Wallace, UK defense secretary, who appeared on the verge of tears … as he reckoned ‘some would not get back’ from the war-torn country. ‘It’s sad. Twenty years of sacrifice is what it is,’ he said.”
- “Asked … if NATO should move away from ‘nation-building,’ Merkel agreed: ‘The goals [of such deployments] should be made much narrower.’”
- “Armin Laschet, Germany’s conservative candidate to succeed chancellor Angela Merkel, … called the allied troop withdrawal ‘the greatest debacle that NATO has experienced since its foundation.’”
- “Lord George Robertson, who was NATO secretary-general on the day of the twin towers attack in New York, and who triggered the article five a few hours later, suggested the U.S. decision to withdraw even as other allies were mounting objections was damaging. ‘It weakens NATO because the principle of “in together, out together” seems to have been abandoned both by Donald Trump and by Joe Biden.’”
- “‘Afghanistan today is the umpteenth expression of NATO’s failed, supine policy,’ Ione Belarra, Podemos leader and Spain’s social policy minister, wrote on Twitter.”
- “Lilith Verstrynge, another leading Podemos official, argued that NATO’s failures provided all the more reason for Europe to move toward a more independent stance of its own, a stance pushed by French President Emmanuel Macron. ‘It is time to make a shift toward greater sovereignty and the defense of our own interests,’ she said.”
“The debacle in Afghanistan is the worst kind: Avoidable,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 08.17.21. The authors write:
- The current situation in Afghanistan “was avoidable. Conventional military triumph was not in the cards in Afghanistan, as Mr. Biden forcefully insisted in a speech to the nation Monday [Aug. 16], in which he blamed his predecessors and Afghanistan's political leaders for failures that set the stage for today's disaster. Contrary to his and others' cliches about ‘endless war,’ though, U.S. troops had not been in major ground operations, and had endured very modest casualties, since 2014.”
- “Biden statically measures the dollar costs of staying in Afghanistan. Yet there will be costs, potentially high ones, attached to a botched withdrawal, too. A small U.S. and allied military presence—capable of working with Afghan forces to deny power to the Taliban and its al- Qaeda terrorist allies, while diplomats and nongovernmental organizations nurtured a fledgling civil society—not only would have been affordable but also could have paid for itself in U.S. security and global credibility.”
- “Biden might have renegotiated the withdrawal deal his predecessor, Donald Trump, cut with the Taliban. Certainly the Taliban's repeated violations of that pact gave Mr. Biden a legitimate reason for doing so. A regional diplomatic push for a more sustainable political deal was outlined in February by the congressionally authorized Afghanistan Study Group.”
- “But even if you reject all of these arguments—as Mr. Biden did, claiming any presence would have led to more combat for U.S. troops—the pullout need not have degenerated into catastrophic spectacle. He could have planned to leave maintenance contractors, who kept the Afghan military's medevac helicopters and other crucial aircraft in flying shape, knowing that air support was critical to that army's ability and willingness to fight. He could have foreseen the need to maintain some presence until Americans and allies had left the country.”
- “The point of leaving Kabul is to save resources that may now be devoted to geopolitical struggles with Russia and China, Mr. Biden argued. Supposedly these rivals would have been delighted to see U.S. forces tied down indefinitely in Afghanistan. Maybe so; but then it is hard to imagine that they are not delighted today, as U.S. allies in Europe and Asia are dismayed, at the incompetent handling of the withdrawal.”
For more analysis of Russia’s relationship with the Taliban, see section on “Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with ‘far abroad’ countries” below.
China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?
“China and Russia poised to step into the Afghanistan gap,” James Kynge, Nastassia Astrasheuskaya and Sun Yu, Financial Times, 08.17.21. The authors, all reporters for the newspaper, write:
- “The Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan redraws Asia’s geopolitical map and hands China and Russia—two of America’s staunchest strategic rivals—an opportunity to project their power in the wake of Washington’s chaotic withdrawal, analysts in several countries said.”
- “Early indications suggested that China—potentially supported by Russia, Pakistan and some other governments—would adopt a very different approach [than the U.S.], according to diplomats and experts. Beijing was unlikely to deploy military force, seeking instead to use diplomatic and economic inducements to coax the Taliban onto a path of peaceful reconstruction.”
- “The most important priority [for China] was ensuring that Afghanistan did not become a ‘hotbed’ for terrorist forces that threatened China. Chief among such concerns were groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which is composed of Uyghur fighters opposing Chinese repression in the north-western Xinjiang frontier.”
- “China has also called on other regional actors such as Russia and Pakistan, with which Beijing maintains strong relations, for support. But the departure of the U.S. changed the strategic calculus so drastically that uncomfortable new accommodations must be made. With the U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Russia did not have to worry about securing the borders of its Central Asian allies. But now Moscow … is preparing to adopt a more activist stance.”
- According to Andrey Serenko, head of the Center of Contemporary Afghan Studies, “‘China has all the trump cards now. … So the Russian strategy regarding Afghanistan is now going to depend on China; it will adjust to China more and more. The older brother, Beijing, will play the first violin here.’”
Missile defense:
- No significant developments.
Nuclear arms control:
- No significant developments.
Counterterrorism:
“So Much for Easy Counterterror Ops. The President is coming up empty in his search to replace Afghan bases,” Editorial Board, The Wall Street Journal, 08.19.21. The news outlet's editorial board writes:
- “The Journal news scoop Thursday that Vladimir Putin said nyet to President Biden’s request for the U.S. to conduct counterterrorism operations from a base in Central Asia is another strike against Mr. Biden’s ill-thought Afghanistan withdrawal. Having abandoned multiple bases in Afghanistan, including Bagram near Kabul and one in Kandahar, the U.S. is now left scrambling for the antiterror ‘over-the-horizon capabilities’ that Mr. Biden has implied would be plentiful.”
- “So far Mr. Biden has been shut out. The U.S. used bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in the early years of the Afghan conflict, but those relationships ended as Russia and China pushed those countries not to cooperate with the U.S. Why did Mr. Biden think now would be different? A burst of Kremlin compassion?”
- "Mr. Putin apparently thinks that sticking it to the U.S. is more important than the risks of new terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan. He may not want to upset the Taliban government that Russia is soon likely to recognize as the legitimate rulers in Kabul. Ditto for our friends in Beijing."
- "Without nearby bases, the U.S. will have to conduct operations against al Qaeda, ISIS and other jihadists from Qatar or U.S. ships in the Persian Gulf region. The long flights mean that 60% or more of a drone’s flight time will be taken up with the trip, rather than surveillance over Afghan territory. If ships have to be deployed for Afghan duty, they won’t be available for deterrence in East Asia. As Seth Jones notes nearby, Mr. Biden needs a new counterterror plan."
Conflict in Syria:
- No significant developments
Cyber security:
“Could Cyberwar Make the World Safer?” Cybèle C. Greenberg, New York Times, 08.22.21. The author, a fellow with the newspaper’s editorial board, writes:
- “During the Cold War, the United States, China and Russia sat on stockpiles of world-ending weapons. Now, these same countries routinely employ an array of offensive cyberweapons, though not quite to their full … society-crippling potential. … [W]e are now at an important crossroads when it comes to determining just how far we are willing to take cyberwar. One possible avenue points to perilous conflict escalation between great powers… But an alternative perspective sees cyberwar as an opportunity to decrease global violence. … Fighting digitally offers a unique opportunity: the continuation of politics by other means, without the physical invasion of a sovereign territory or the inevitable sacrifice of lives.
- “Cyberattacks have helped nations achieve nuclear nonproliferation in a way that, in the past, would have required physical force and increased risk to personnel.” The author contrasts the 2007 Israeli strike against a suspected nuclear reactor in Syria, which reportedly may have killed 10 scientists, with “the U.S.-Israeli offensive cyber operation known as Stuxnet, which … achieved a similar objective … but from afar, with no human cost.”
- “What does responsible use of cyberweapons look like going forward? If cyberwar has the potential to channel conflict into a nonlethal form, now is the moment … to develop both treaties and unwritten customary laws governing its employment. Leaders in the technology sector such as Brad Smith, the president of Microsoft, and William Leigher, a retired Navy rear admiral and former cyber strategist at Raytheon, have repeatedly called for the creation of a digital Geneva Convention that would mandate restraint in the exercise of cyberweapons and prevent the sabotaging of civilian infrastructure.”
- “The Biden administration should continue to champion restraint and caution in the context of cyberwarfare. This means avoiding misattribution and curbing for-profit cybercrime. … A mechanism to keep open lines of communications between the U.S. and its adversaries after an attack could limit false accusations and prevent events from spiraling out of control.”
- “The much feared cyber-Pearl Harbor that’s so much fodder for cable news? ‘Chances are, we will never see such an event,’ said Dmitri Alperovitch, a co-founder of cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike… With proper controls and some rules of the road, cyberwar between nations may not be all that bad. Instead of endangering lives, it could actually help save them.”
Energy exports from CIS:
- See “Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors” section below.
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
- No significant developments
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
“A Strategy for Avoiding Two-Front War,” A. Wess Mitchell, The National Interest, 08.22.21. The author—a former assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs and co-founder of The Marathon Initiative, a think-tank dedicated to the study of great power competition—writes drawing on elements of a 2020 report he prepared for the Pentagon:
- “Avoiding a two-front war with China and Russia must rank among the foremost objectives of contemporary U.S. grand strategy. … Diplomacy in its highest form has historically been used for precisely this purpose, as an instrument for rearranging power in space and time to avoid fighting numerous enemies at once. This role—the sequencing of rivalries—should be the central preoccupation of American diplomacy today. Rather than trying to contain Russia and China simultaneously, the United States needs to find a way to stagger its contests with these two powers to ensure that it does not face both at the same time in a war.”
- “COVID-19 may present an unexpected opportunity. By widening the power disparity between China and Russia, the pandemic has heightened Russia’s economic dependency on China as a source of capital, markets and international political support. Paradoxically, the very fact of this deepening dependency is likely to increase Russian fear of becoming a sidecar to Beijing’s ambitions and create incentives for Moscow to reorient its foreign policy.”
- “The aim of American diplomacy—and the crux of our strategy for avoiding a two-front war—should be to sharpen Russia’s dilemma and render that country less menacing to ourselves on a faster timeline than China is able to realize its ambitious military potential as a great power. Rather than attempting to woo or court Russia into a conciliatory stance, we should present it with a combination of insuperable obstacles to westward expansion (including, if necessary, by inflicting a far more serious defeat than it has heretofore experienced in Ukraine) while presenting new opportunities for cooperation, investment and growth in Russia’s east. Simply put, the goal should be to alleviate America’s simultaneity problem by giving Russia incentives to be less of a European power—and more of an Asian one.”
- “A U.S. strategy along similar lines would not, of course, be risk-free. The current Russian leadership could simply pocket the benefits of Japanese investment in Vladivostok or arms sales to India and use these proceeds to fund aggression in the west. To work, the strategy would require the door to westward expansion to be slammed—hard. The worst of all worlds would be to open up opportunities for Russia in its east while going soft in the west. An effective pivot requires a fulcrum, and Ukraine is that fulcrum.”
II. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
“Why the prevailing doom and gloom view of Russia is wrong. Russia is more modernized and westernized today than it has ever been in the past 100 years,” Leonid Ragozin, al Jazeera, 08.15.21. The author, a freelance journalist based in Riga, writes:
- "The prevailing doom and gloom analysis of Russia tends to ignore the enormous progress the country and society have made in the past 30 years. The greatest paradox of Putin’s regime lies in the fact that despite deteriorating politics, the cultural and social tectonics went in the opposite direction from the political regime."
- "Simply put, Russia has never in the last 100 years been as westernized and modernized as it is now. It is true that without rampant corruption and with more prudent handling of oil and gas revenues, Russians could live infinitely better than they are living now. But the standard of living is comparable to that in poorer European Union countries and is still the best in the lived experience of Russians of all ages."
- "Russia is quite the opposite of a hopeless case. It has entered a volatile period because society has outgrown the regime offers, which used to be an organic one, and now wants change."
“Russia’s elections are an exercise in repression and empty ritual,” Tony Barber, Financial Times, 08.18.21. The author, Europe Editor for the news outlet, writes:
- "The purpose of next month’s Russian parliamentary elections is not to produce a government chosen by the people in a free and fair contest. Every Russian voter knows that. The outcome is preordained: a victory for President Vladimir Putin and the ruling United Russia party. Ultimately, it will be beside the point whether United Russia wins roughly three-quarters of the 450 seats in parliament, as in 2016, or falls short."
- "The lack of genuine competition will make the party’s victory an imperfect guide to Russian public opinion. A more important question is why, given that the logic of autocracy dictates the winner in advance, the Kremlin is making these elections the least free during Putin’s 21 years in power."
- "This mood is not the same as a yearning to be rid of Putin. As under tsarism or communism, Russia’s leader commands support simply because the system permits no rivals and no alternative symbol of national unity. But the Kremlin’s intensifying repressions are also a sign that, in its third decade, Putin’s system is becoming an exercise in paranoia, self-preservation and very little else."
"Alexei Navalny was poisoned one year ago. His fate tells us a lot about Putin’s Russia," Jan Matti Dollbaum, Morvan Lallouet and Ben Noble, The Washington Post, 08.20.21. The authors of the analysis write:
- "The current wave of [Russian] repression marks a shift from the Kremlin’s earlier policy toward Navalny, and toward opposition more generally. Russian authorities previously relied on their control of information to stifle criticism, but are now using brute force more to stamp out political challenges and critical voices, including in the media."
- "Why has the Kremlin become more aggressive? Here’s what our research reveals."
- "Putin is shifting toward ‘overt’ dictatorship."
- "Social scientists Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman developed the concept of 'informational autocracy.' Contrary to overt dictatorships, which rule by fear and repression, informational autocracies tend to use propaganda, not purges, to manage society, persuading the population of their competence and legitimacy."
- "Navalny returned as the ‘informational dissident.’"
- "Why did Navalny return to Russia, aware that he would probably be imprisoned for many years? It has been increasingly difficult for the political opposition to challenge Russian authorities via institutions like elections and parliaments. In light of this, Navalny has tried to produce glaring examples of the regime’s authoritarian nature."
- "The future looks bleak for Navalny — and for the Kremlin."
- "What’s the likely future of Navalny’s anti-corruption movement? Authorities have long thwarted efforts by Navalny’s team to register as a party, leaving the movement dependent on the leadership of one charismatic individual — Navalny himself. Navalny and his supporters also used regular protests to draw attention to corruption and inspire new followers, as we show through a series of interviews."
Defense and aerospace:
- No significant developments
Security, law-enforcement and justice:
- No significant developments
III. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:
“Russia signals it's ready to engage with Taliban, experts say,” Patrick Reevell, ABC News, 08.21.21. The author, a reporter for the media outlet, writes:
- “As Western diplomats scrambled to Kabul airport while the Taliban overran the city last weekend, Russia's embassy there remained demonstratively open and announced its diplomats would work as normal. It was a sign of how … Russia is now trying to smoothly transition to working with the militants in power … [a]lthough Russia has said it will not rush to recognize the group as Afghanistan's government.”
- “‘The Taliban movement currently controls virtually the entire territory of the country, including its capital. These are realities,’ Russian President Vladimir Putin said at a press conference… ‘And we should act based on these very realities, not allowing the Afghan state's breakup.’ … [T]his week Russia's top envoy overseeing its Afghanistan policy … compared the Taliban favorably to the former [American-backed] government.”
- “Russia has built solid contacts with the Taliban in the past few years… In July, a high-level Taliban delegation met with Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, even though Russia still formally designates the group a terrorist organization, as does the U.S. … Russia's overriding concern is that instability in Afghanistan not spread to its Central Asian neighbors Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and that it not again become a base for international terrorist groups to launch attacks.”
- “‘As for the domestic situation in Afghanistan, Russia fortunately has no interests there. … Russia can relax and limit its reactions to the security interests of the region,’” [said Fyodor Lukyanov, chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, which sometimes advises the Russian government]. … The problem, though, some analysts said, is whether the Taliban will have enough control in Afghanistan to continue to enforce the security guarantees sought by Moscow. ‘So far we have a propaganda coup to enjoy, but that may not last,’ said Vladimir Frolov, a former Russian diplomat.”
- “Russia's ideal scenario is that the Taliban now form an inclusive government with other … political groups, but that is viewed as unlikely by many analysts in Moscow. Instead, ‘drug trafficking and religious extremism will mushroom,’ journalist Kirill Krivosheev wrote.”
“Russia sees potential cooperation with Taliban, but also prepares for the worst,” Robyn Dixon, The Washington Post, 08.18.21. The author, the Post’s Russia bureau chief, writes:
- “Russia sees potential for a more influential role with the Taliban, while weighing risks of regional instability or extremism if Afghanistan slides back into civil war. But Moscow also has sent strong signals of its military might and strategic interest in the region.”
- “Russia has been running military exercises on Afghanistan’s borders in recent weeks and on Tuesday [Aug. 17] announced a month-long military exercise in Tajikistan, where Russia’s biggest base abroad is located. ‘Is Russia worried? Yes, of course. In the 1990s when the Taliban took over Kabul, it produced a destructive spillover to neighboring countries,’ said Fyodor Lukyanov, chairman of Russia’s Council on Foreign and Defense Policy.”
- “But Lukyanov said Russia’s military was better equipped to deal with potential threats than it was in the 1990s when the Taliban last ruled. He said Russia now keeps contact with all parties in Afghanistan, in contrast with the ’90s when it focused only on the Northern Alliance, which was fighting the Taliban.”
- “Some Russian analysts said Russia could pay a heavy price for the sudden uncertainty left behind by Washington’s nearly 20-year war. Elena Suponina, an analyst with the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, predicted the Taliban would not be able to ensure stability in Afghanistan. ‘First, the Taliban itself is quite fragmented and there is no clear, single command. Second, regional and other powers will continue playing on these internal differences,’ she said.”
Ukraine:
- No significant developments.
Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:
“Lukashenko’s ever closer Russian ties raise risks for Putin,” Nastassia Astrasheuskaya, Financial Times, 08.23.21. The author, a reporter for the newspaper, writes:
- After new Western economic sanctions against Belarus this month, President Alexander “Lukashenko turned again to Vladimir Putin, asking the Russian president for debt relief on a $1.5 billion loan… [W]hile that may have suited Putin so far, Minsk’s increasing dependence on Moscow comes with growing risks for the Kremlin.”
- “Lukashenko has referred to Putin as a partner, a friend and, most recently, a brother… Lukashenko’s confrontation with the West may suit Putin’s purposes in that it weakens the EU and buttresses Russia’s strategic position by providing Moscow with a buffer. But analysts say it comes with potential political and economic costs… Most immediately, Baltic states have warned that Belarus’s ‘weaponization’ of migration to the EU and imminent military exercises involving Russian and Belarusian troops could lead to a border ‘incident’ with NATO troops. Lukashenko even appears to relish that prospect.”
- “Then there is the risk to Putin if he continues to support Lukashenko only for the Belarusian president to totter and fall. Rising Belarusian protests could … spark internal unease in Russia and poison Moscow’s reputation among Lukashenko’s internal opponents and any eventual successor. … Mindful of the risks, Russia’s Foreign Ministry has … admitted the existence of ‘demand for certain political change’ in Belarusian society.”
- “Moscow [also] faces potential economic and financial costs from the sanctions placed on Belarus over the past year… Russia is Belarus’s biggest trading partner … and Russian companies have stakes in key Belarusian businesses, including … one of the country’s two oil-processing enterprises. Those ties may soon be strengthened when Belarus’s balance of payments position is bolstered by a $900 million payment from the IMF.”
- “Western sanctions—especially on sectors such as potash, Belarus’s biggest foreign currency earner—will … bite in Russia. ‘Any company working with Belarus’s state companies, banks, institutions … will automatically get on the U.S. sanctions list,’ said IHS’s [Alex] Kokcharov [principal country risk analyst in London]… ‘I can easily imagine … Russian companies preferring to fully stop economic activity with state counterparts in Belarus.’”