This Week’s Highlights

• For the first time in history, the rest of the world views the United States not with respect, contempt, fear or even bewilderment, but pity, write CSIS’s Judyth Twigg and J. Stephen Morrison. “After all our handwringing about Putin’s deliberate attempts to weaken our basic institutions, to exacerbate existing cleavages in our society, to subvert our global standing, who would have thought we would end up doing it to ourselves? The U.S. and Russian pandemic response, side-by-side: a grim comparison with uncomfortable implications for the American position in a post-pandemic world,” the two authors conclude.
• Sociological research conducted by Professors Gerard Toal, John O’Loughlin and Kristin M. Bakke reveals that Belarusians have their own distinctive sense of identity, and also important internal differences, especially generational, over the past, present and future. Belarus is nobody's client state, they write. While remaining culturally close to Russia, the country remains open to the West but does not want to join NATO, according to Toal and his co-authors’ analysis of recent polling they commissioned in Belarus.
• If any credit is due the regime in Minsk, it is for managing the balance between the two centers of gravity, writes Carnegie’s Eugene Rumer. Maintaining that balance is in everyone’s interest. Thinking that the Kremlin would calmly accept a geopolitical reorientation of Belarus is wishful thinking, according to Rumer, and a future leader of Belarus will have to maintain good relations with the Kremlin and pay a certain amount of deference to its sensitivities and sensibilities. To attempt a different course would be unrealistic dangerous, and run counter to the attitudes of the Belarusian public. Friends of Belarus need to recognize that, according to Rumer.
• In his commentary on the suspected poisoning of Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny, Prof. Mark Galeotti describes the incident as one of the lethal side-effects of Russia’s “adhocracy.” Putin’s system is a substantially de-institutionalized one, in which the president’s favor is the main asset everyone wants to earn, and formal roles and responsibilities matter less than how one can be of use today, according to Galeotti. “A state that kills is a terrible thing, but its red lines can generally be observed and it can ultimately be held to account, Galeotti writes, but a state that permits a whole range of actors and interests to kill with impunity is an even more uncomfortable thing, as the red lines may be invisible, intersecting and mobile, and the challenge of accountability is even greater,” he concludes.

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

New Cold War/saber rattling:

• No significant developments.

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant developments.

Impact of the pandemic:

“Trump and Putin's Pandemic Duet: Trump's America Is Far More out of Tune,” Judyth Twigg and J. Stephen Morrison, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 08.21.20: The authors, a non-resident senior associate and the senior vice president of CSIS, write:

• “Russian President Vladimir Putin and President Donald Trump share a playbook that has led each country into deep turmoil. But Trump has also travelled well beyond the commonalities … As a consequence, the scale, scope and velocity of the U.S. outbreak far outstrips Russia’s (and the rest of the world’s).”
• “No city or province in Russia is now experiencing a runaway resurgent outbreak as extreme as what has been seen since July in the American South and Southwest, and now increasingly in the Midwest. … Even if Russia’s numbers are fudged by a factor of two or three … the U.S. death toll is still an order of magnitude higher than Russia’s.”
• “Most Russian regions have retained and extended a reasonable set of public health measures designed to curb spread of the virus. … In the United States, the virus has had free rein to exploit weak local public health infrastructure.”
• “Even Putin is not willing to deny the logic behind basic precautions against spread of the virus. … Nobody in leadership positions in Russia is wielding face masks as a political weapon. … Putin still hews to the rule that authoritarian states ultimately have to deliver results. In the context of a global pandemic, that means he is beholden to the imperatives of fact and science and is consciously reliant on the state instruments of public health. In the United States, by contrast, Trump and his allies continue to insist that everything is normal.”
• “For the first time in history, the rest of the world views the United States not with respect, contempt, fear or even bewilderment, but pity. After all our handwringing about Putin’s deliberate attempts to weaken our basic institutions, to exacerbate existing cleavages in our society, to subvert our global standing, who would have thought we would end up doing it to ourselves? The U.S. and Russian pandemic response, side-by-side: a grim comparison with uncomfortable implications for the American position in a post-pandemic world.”

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms control:

“New START: Why An Extension Is In America's National Interest,” Zack Brown, The National Interest, 08.19.20: The author, a policy associate at Ploughshares Fund, writes:

• “Failing to renew the New START arms control treaty with Russia ‘is not a wise direction of travel,’ said Rose Gottemoeller, a former Deputy Secretary General of NATO who ranked as one of President Barack Obama’s top nuclear security experts.”
• “‘If suddenly New START goes away and the Russians race ahead, we will not have a predictable environment in which to conduct that modernization,’ Gottemoeller pointed out. ‘We will be chasing them. And we may end up spending a good deal more than the $1 trillion-plus that we’re looking at now.’”
• “‘So, not only could they outrun us in warhead numbers pretty quickly,’ said Gottemoeller, ‘but they could outrun us in missile numbers pretty quickly if New START went away.’”
• “Neither does the China angle hold much water … ‘The United States and Russia both have roughly four thousand warheads. And China, by various counts, has between three and five hundred. So, the US and Russia have about ten times the number of warheads that China has.’ Given this gap, she suggested, Beijing’s reluctance to come to the arms limitations table is understandable. And it’s certainly not the kind of danger that’s worth killing New START over.”
• “Instead, said Gottemoeller, Washington should take Moscow up on the offer to extend the treaty, a prospect she granted may be more likely under a Joe Biden administration should President Donald Trump lose the election this fall.”

“Can Russia Be Trusted on International Security Pacts?” Peter Brookes, The National Interest, 08.20.20: The author, a Heritage Foundation senior fellow and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense, writes:

• “There are plenty of reasons to question Russia’s willingness to meet its obligations in the arms control and CSBM arena.”
• “As such, Washington should proceed with caution, firmly basing any future U.S.–Russian security agreements on American national interests and not merely a desire for engagement. Any agreement must make America more secure.”
• “It should also ensure Russia understands that pact non-performance has consequences. Washington mustn’t allow Russia to violate security agreements with impunity; permitting that would only beget more bad behavior.”
• “Washington should also launch a robust information campaign about Russia and arms control that engages key constituencies, including the Congress, the U.S. public, allies, partners and friends.”
• “Lastly, it should also push allies, friends and partners to use their influence to press Russia to comply—or come back into compliance—with existing arms control and CSBM agreements. Many beyond Washington are certainly affected by Russia’s bad behavior.”

Counter-terrorism:

“The Terrorist Threat Is Not Finished,” Russell E. Travers, Foreign Affairs, 08.21.20: The author, the former acting director of the National Counterterrorism Center, writes:

• “With every year that the 9/11 attacks recede into the past, it seems easier for the United States to move on from terrorism. … Since that tragic day, there has been not one successful, externally directed, large-scale terrorist attack on Americans.”
• “But it is important to remember that none of this happened by chance. … [T]he United States’ post-9/11 counterterrorism effort has been nothing short of extraordinary. … Americans should think twice before undoing any of this. The terrorist threat is more diverse and diffuse than ever.” 
• “For several years, the Islamist variety ranked at the top of the U.S. counterterrorism agenda. … But once ISIS lost its caliphate, some of its luster wore off. … Over the last several years, however, the United States has seen a resurgence of non-Islamist leaderless terrorism. … [T]he greatest cause for concern is white supremacist violence.”
• “[E]arly-stage prevention—of both Islamist and non-Islamist attacks—remains the weakest part of the counterterrorism agenda. … Arresting and killing ever more terrorists is not a practical solution to the problem. Nor does the fervor seem likely to simply burn itself out. The United States needs to stop terrorists attacks well before they are executed.”
• “The COVID-19 pandemic has provided a stark reminder that the United States must prepare for a wide range of national security threats. … [T]he United States must build resilience. But the country must also make a sober calculation of risk. … Washington will need to find a way to pursue its interests overseas without making terrorism worse.”

Conflict in Syria:

“Oil Could Keep US in the Middle East for a Very Long Time,” Stephen Kinzer, The Boston Globe, 08.23.20: The author, a senior fellow at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University, writes:

• “During an almost casual exchange at a Senate hearing last month, the Trump administration revealed something historic: It has awarded a contract to an American company, Delta Crescent Energy, to begin extracting oil from Syria. ... Yet the deal is barely about oil. It is a fiendishly clever maneuver aimed at anchoring American troops in Syria for a long time.”
• “The contract grants an oil concession inside a strip of northern Syria that stretches along most of the country's 600-mile border with Turkey. A militia run by Syrian Kurds officially controls that strip, but it would have trouble holding off the Syrian army without American military support. The Syrian government already has declared that any attempt to ‘steal Syria's oil under the sponsorship and support of the American administration’ is ‘null and void and has no legal basis.’ So this deal sets the stage for long-term conflict between the United States and Syria.”
• “Our original goal in Syria, deposing President Bashar Assad, has become unrealistic. Recognizing this, the United States is moving to Plan B: Dismember the country. Both the Obama and Trump administrations have sought to destabilize Syria.”
• “Today fewer than 1,000 American soldiers are deployed in Syria. The stated rationales for keeping them there shift like desert sands, from fighting militants to countering Russia to defending Israel to protecting beleaguered civilians. Behind them all lies the view that the United States must remain militarily dominant in the Middle East. Yet by coldly realist standards, the United States has no strategic interest in Syria. Placing an American company in the heart of contested Syrian territory could give us one. If this deal is allowed to stand, it could prove to be geopolitical quicksand that will keep us trapped in Syria for years to come.”

Cyber security:

• No significant developments.

Elections interference:

“The Trump Campaign Accepted Russian Help to Win in 2016. Case Closed,” Editorial Board, New York Times, 08.19.20: The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “A bipartisan report released Tuesday [Aug. 18] by the Republican-controlled Senate Intelligence Committee cuts through the chaff. The simplicity of the scheme has always been staring us in the face: Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign sought and maintained close contacts with Russian government officials who were helping him get elected. The Trump campaign accepted their offers of help. The campaign secretly provided Russian officials with key polling data. The campaign coordinated the timing of the release of stolen information to hurt Hillary Clinton’s campaign.”
• “The Senate committee’s report isn’t telling this story for the first time, of course. (Was it only a year ago that Robert Mueller testified before Congress about his own damning, comprehensive investigation?) But it is the first to do so with the assent of Senate Republicans, who have mostly ignored the gravity of the Trump camp’s actions or actively worked to cast doubt about the demonstrable facts in the case.”
• “There’s no way to sugarcoat it. In less than three months, the American people could re-elect a man who received a foreign government’s help to win one election and has shown neither remorse nor reservations about doing so again.”

“Hard Evidence at Last That Shreds Trump's Lies About a Russia 'Hoax',” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 08.21.20: The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “As Democrats accelerate their drive to defeat President Trump in November, they have a potent new weapon in a report by a Republican-led Senate committee that chronicles the ‘grave counterintelligence threat’ posed by the extensive contacts between Trump's former campaign chairman and a Russian intelligence operative.”
• “The final volume of the report by the Senate Intelligence Committee's Russia investigation arrives late in the game. Still, it offers the detailed accounting of how Russian spies worked with the Trump team that former special counsel Robert S. Mueller III should have given the country last year. It offers raw material for the wide-ranging impeachment inquiry that the House of Representatives should have conducted.”
• “‘Facts are stubborn things,’ said John Adams, our second president. And the facts of the Trump team's interactions with Russian intelligence are clearly documented here. As the Senate report stresses, this is a counterintelligence problem—a matter of combating Russian spies. The bipartisan report has revealed this story in extraordinary new detail: Read it and weep.”

“Exposing Putin's Hidden Riches Won't Stop Russia's Election Meddling,” Lincoln Pigman, Russia Matters, 08.19.20: The author, a research fellow at the Foreign Policy Center, writes:

• “Washington still lacks a realistic plan for deterring Moscow from election interference, even after multiple rounds of trial and error. … One approach that seems to have won more than a few supporters in Washington would have the United States take the fight to Russian President Vladimir Putin by determining the true size and origins of his wealth and, should it prove suspiciously large or appear ill-gotten, threatening to reveal or revealing it.”
• “The idea’s logic is straightforward. Thanks to journalists as well as Russian opposition figures … there is much documentation of the excesses of top Russian officials … If their lavish lifestyles are any indication, Putin surely lives on more than just his presidential salary. … The result they [advocates of this idea] envision is a win–win situation for the United States: either Putin prioritizes his political survival and ends his efforts to subvert American democracy or he pays a significant political price at home for his continued interference in American elections. … However, their optimism betrays a lack of understanding of Russia’s internal dynamics.”
• “The most obvious obstacle to the effect they desire is Russians’ acute awareness of the extent of state corruption. … In addition, if released by, or seen to be coming from, the U.S. government, such information would probably face a credibility issue. … Exposing Putin’s hidden riches may feel good, but, in my view, the material consequences outlined above would do little to advance U.S. interests.”
• “As for the endeavor of countering election meddling, it must be part of a broader effort to counter foreign interference in U.S. elections, a challenge that is not specific to Russia. What the United States ideally needs is a response that deters not only Russia but also Iran and possibly China, all while the country builds resilience to such interventions.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant developments.

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Russia’s Murderous Adhocracy,” Mark Galeotti , The Moscow Times, 08.22.20: The author, a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute and an honorary professor at the UCL School of Slavonic & East European Studies, writes:

• “At the time of writing, Alexei Navalny is still fighting for his life, after apparently being poisoned as he left Tomsk. For many, this must have been a ‘Kremlin hit,’ but the uncomfortable truth is that under Vladimir Putin, political murder is no longer a monopoly of the state.”
• “It is certainly not impossible that the Kremlin was to blame. … However, Navalny’s own claim—that he was alive because he was more of a problem for the regime dead—probably still holds true. Besides which, the state seems to have been caught off guard.”
• “This is one of the lethal side-effects of ‘adhocracy.’ Putin’s system is a substantially de-institutionalized one. … The boss largely doesn’t micromanage, but rather sets broad objectives and hints at what kinds of things he would like to see.”
• “A state that kills is a terrible thing, but its red lines can generally be observed and it can ultimately be held to account. But a state that permits a whole range of actors and interests to kill with impunity is an even more uncomfortable thing, as the red lines may be invisible, intersecting and mobile, and the challenge of accountability is even greater.”

“The World Must Pay Attention to the Suspected Poisoning of Alexei Navalny. My Own Case Shows Why,” Vladimir Kara-Murza, The Washington Post, 08.21.20: The author, a Russian democracy activist, author, filmmaker, chairman of the Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom and vice president of the Free Russia Foundation, writes:

• “It’s scary to not be able to breathe. That was the first thing I felt, both times the poisoning symptoms began to set in. Both times were in Moscow—the first, on May 26, 2015; the second, on Feb. 2, 2017. My chest was expanding, all the normal physical motions were there—but it felt as if I were suffocating.”
• “The official diagnosis from the hospital was ‘toxic action by un undefined substance’—meaning, in plain language, poisoning by an unknown source. … Both times, doctors told my wife I had about a 5 percent chance to live. I did, thanks to the amazing Russian doctors, and am deeply grateful to be able to write these words. But this Thursday, I relived a horrific ‘groundhog day’ at hearing the news of Alexei Navalny’s suspected poisoning in Siberia.”
• “Time after time, people who crossed the Kremlin’s path have fallen victim to mysterious poisoning attacks: opposition politicians and independent journalists, Russians and foreigners, on our own soil and abroad.”
• “Apart from its sadism—excruciating pain and, in case of survival, lasting health effects and a long and difficult road to rehabilitation—this method gives the authorities plausible deniability.”
• “It is important to keep international attention on his case. It is much easier to commit a crime in silence than in the spotlight; I am living testimony to that. … Once the immediate crisis passes, there should also be long-term consequences. … For now, in the West, there should be no more talk of new ‘resets’ with a regime that speaks with its opponents in the language of bullets and poison.”

“Russia’s Dark Culture of Political Violence. Suspected Poisoning of Alexei Navalny Points to an Atmosphere of Impunity,” Editorial Board, Financial Times, 08.20.20: The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Alexei Navalny, in a coma … after a suspected poisoning, joins a sickening roll call of those who have ended up dead or fighting for their lives. They range from opposition figures such as Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Kara-Murza to journalists such as Anna Politkovskaya—and there are many more. The apparent attempted murder of the opposition leader is another indictment of Russia’s culture of political violence.”
• “Where the Russian leadership is undoubtedly culpable is in allowing a culture of impunity around such violence. Sometimes those wielding the revolver or poison are jailed, but those who ordered killings are never found.”
• “Where evidence against state-linked figures seems overwhelming, the response is often a knowing smirk. … Foreign investors should not close their eyes.”
• “Many countries now have ‘Magnitsky’ laws permitting sanctions against human rights abusers that they should use against any officials implicated in an attack on Mr. Navalny. Leaders such as France’s Emmanuel Macron who have sought a ‘reset’ with Russia should also be wary. Dialogue on issues such as nuclear arms is necessary. But anyone seeking to engage should have no illusions about the nature of the system Mr. Putin has created.”

“A Russian Dissident Is Fighting for His Life. Where Is the US?” Michael McFaul, The Washington Post, 08.20.20: The former U.S. ambassador to Russia writes:

• “Navalny's heroic struggle is no different from what Gandhi, King, Mandela and Havel fought for. While Navalny has not succeeded, there should be no doubt that his cause is good and just.”
• “President Trump has enthusiastically embraced Putin and excused his villainous ways. To the best of my knowledge, Trump has never praised, let alone met with, activists or opposition leaders in Russia, Ukraine or Belarus. On hearing of Navalny's hospitalization, all Trump could muster Thursday was ‘We haven't seen it yet, we're looking at it, and Mike [Pompeo]'s going to be reporting to me soon.’ Not a word of concern, let alone outrage. In the clear divide between good and evil in Russia, Trump is on the wrong side.”
• “American indifference to evil has consequences. It emboldens the villains and weakens the heroes. But sometimes presidents must say and do things—for example, to impose sanctions on Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko for stealing an election, to criticize Putin for aiding the Taliban, to signal solidarity with Navalny and offer assistance as European leaders have—not because these actions might be effective, but because they are right. In a world divided by good and evil, it's time for America to get back on the right side.”

“Why Would Vladimir Putin Want to Get Rid of Aleksei Navalny Now?” Oleg Kashin, The New York Times, 08.21.20: The author, a Russian journalist and writer, writes:

• “The eagerness with which the pro-Kremlin press is denying it being an attack suggests the authorities are interested in concealing the true perpetrators. This can be read as a public confession that Mr. Navalny was indeed poisoned by people working for the government.”
• “As in the case of Sergei Skripal, a Russian intelligence officer who defected to Britain and was poisoned with a nerve agent in 2018, the authorities will now surely cover their tracks so noisily and clumsily that they will leave no doubt of their involvement. There is really no version of the story that doesn’t involve the Kremlin. After all, the Putin era of Russian politics has been governed by the laws of a secret service operation.”
• “Mr. Navalny has truly held an important place in the political system for many years with his unique monopoly over the segment of the opposition that refuses to compromise with the Kremlin. But the new reality of Mr. Putin’s lifelong rule demands new conditions. A critic of the regime must now acknowledge that he is not risking a seat in Parliament or even his freedom—but his very life. The problem is that the system in which you’re either for Mr. Putin or you die seems much more unstable than what came before it. Political terror precludes the possibility of political stability. The person least comfortable in a Navalny-free Russia is bound to be Mr. Putin himself.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant developments.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“The Role of Russian Private Military Contractors in Africa,” Anna Borshchevskaya, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 08.21.20: The author, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute, writes:

• “It is no secret that Moscow is increasingly utilizing so-called “private military contractors” (PMCs) to pursue foreign policy objectives across the globe, especially in the Middle East and Africa. What has received less attention is that Moscow’s deployment of PMCs follows a pattern: The Kremlin is exploiting a loophole in international law by securing agreements that allow contractors to provide local assistance. The problem is, however, Russian PMCs are not simply contractors.”
• “A similar scenario has played out in Libya, Sudan, Central African Republic (CAR), and Madagascar. First, these governments hold official senior discussions with Moscow and agree on simplified post-visits. The country then provides Russia with port or airfield access. Next, the two agree that Moscow will provide some form of local assistance, creating a legitimate reason for ‘private contractors’ to come to a county, for example, to help with natural resource extraction or provide security. This is the loophole—technically there is nothing prohibiting Moscow from making these arrangements. The next logical step is a Russian navy or air force visit, which further solidifies the official Russian presence.”
• “Russian’s growing presence in Africa—and its use of PMCs—should be a cause for concern in the United States. The way in which Russia has utilized PMCs in CAR, Sudan and Libya demonstrates one aspect of its developing strategy not just in Africa, but also in Syria, Ukraine and Venezuela. This perhaps is the broader implication with Russian PMCs: they serve as a useful tool to chip away at the U.S.-led global order by eroding the norms of behavior when Moscow knows that it cannot confront the United States directly. As policymakers think of great power competition with Russia and China, this is something that they cannot ignore.”

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

“The Coming Russian-Chinese Clash,” John Herbst, The National Interest, 08.21.20: The author, the director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and Uzbekistan, writes:

• “The emerging Sino-Russian entente has rightly received a great deal of attention, but observers have missed the limitations to this entente. … The Chinese-Russian temporary alignment of interests is unlikely to overcome the fundamentals of geopolitics.”
• “The places to watch are the Chinese-Russian border and Central Asia. … Tensions are likely to result from overreach by China. The rupture will come when the Kremlin recognizes that China is a greater challenge to its strategic interests than the United States and its allies, who simply want Moscow to cease its aggression.”
• “The Chinese … will try to partner with Moscow against Washington, and when that is no longer necessary, they will raise the profile of their territorial claims in the Russian Far East. … Economic competition is also likely to be a friction point. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) poses a threat to Moscow’s Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), but so far the two powers have managed to deconflict their respective projects.”
• “But more striking are Beijing’s two recent steps designed to enhance its position in Central Asia. … Last month Chinese historian Chol Yao Lu wrote an article called ‘Tajikistan initiated the transfer to China of its land and the lost mountains of Pamir were returned to their true master.’ … In April, an article appeared on the prominent Chinese website Sohu.com with the provocative title ‘Why Kazakhstan is eager to return to China.’ The article claimed that the territory of Kazakhstan has historically been under Chinese control and that the leaders of many tribes there had pledged allegiance to China.”
• “None of this means that a Russian-Chinese break is imminent, but Beijing is taking small steps now that it will build on to advance its interests against Russia when the time comes.”

Ukraine:

“Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Ukraine: An Opportunity for Gender-Sensitive Policymaking?” Kateryna Busol, Chatham House, 08.18.20: The author, a Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow at the Russia and Eurasia Program at Chatham House, writes:

• “According to the UN … and the International Criminal Court, … conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) is quite prevalent in hostilities-affected eastern Ukraine. Both sexes are subjected to sexualized torture, rape, forced nudity, prolonged detention in unsanitary conditions with members of the other sex and threats of sexual violence towards detainees or their relatives to force confessions. Men are castrated. Women additionally suffer from sexual slavery, enforced and survival prostitution, and other forms of sexual abuse. Women are more exposed to CRSV: in the hostilities-affected area, every third woman has experienced or witnessed CRSV as opposed to every fourth man.”
• “The failure to address CRSV and its different stigmas for both sexes mirrors the general lack of sustainable gender lenses in Ukraine's policymaking. It is no coincidence that a June 2020 proposal for gender parity in political parties coincided with another spike of sexist remarks by top officials. While women get access to more positions in the army, sexual harassment in the military is investigated slowly. Despite all the impressive female professionals, no woman made it to the first four-member consultative civic group in the Minsk process. Such lack of diversity sends an unfortunate message that women are not important for Ukraine’s peace process.”
• “CRSV against either sex won’t be addressed properly until both sexes contribute with their talents and their grievances to all pillars of Ukraine’s state governance and strategy. Ukraine should look to engage professional women—and there are plenty—to join its public service not just in numbers, but as the indispensable equal voices of a powerful choir.”

Belarus:

“What's Driving the Belarus Protests?” Gerard Toal, John O'Loughlin and Kristin M. Bakke, The Washington Post, 08.21.20: The authors of the article write:

• “Our nationally representative poll in Belarus, fielded in early 2020 before the coronavirus pandemic, offers some critical insights. … A slight majority of respondents (51.8 percent) felt that things in Belarus were moving in the wrong direction. … We asked respondents to tell us the three biggest problems facing the country. All were economic.”
• “When asked which political system is best, only 31.9 percent said the Soviet system. A nearly identical number (31.8 percent) named the democratic political systems in the West. Only 14.5 percent said the current political system in Belarus, while 13.9 percent said the current system in Russia. Crucially, 52 percent of those 18 to 40 prefer the Western democratic system, while 56 percent of the over-60 cohort prefer the Soviet one.”
• “Overall, Belarusians in early 2020 appear content with their country's slightly pro-Russian geopolitical position. … Nearly half are in favor of good relations with NATO, though a clear majority do not want to join the alliance.”
• “Our survey asked Belarusians whether they agreed with the statement that Ukraine's Euromaidan revolution was a positive development for Ukraine. Nearly two-thirds of Belarusians disagreed.”
• “What our research reveals is fairly consistent with what academic research reveals about Belarus. Belarusians have their own distinctive sense of identity, and also important internal differences, especially generational, over the past, present and future. Belarus is nobody's client state. While remaining culturally close to Russia, the country remains open to the West but does not want to join NATO. Discontent has been building for some time and different constituencies are now aroused in opposition to Lukashenko—but what happens next remains an open question.”

“Turmoil in Belarus: Looking Beyond the Horizon,” Eugene Rumer, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 08.17.20: The author, a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, writes:

• “Governments on both sides of the Atlantic are at a loss as to what to do other than follow their Pavlovian reflexes … and endorse democracy and threaten sanctions.”
• “Neither will advance democracy in Belarus, put an end to police brutality, or deter Russian President Vladimir Putin from sending his troops to Belarus to save its crumbling dictatorship—should he decide to do so. What is needed as a first step before acting is a sober assessment of the situation in Belarus … and what awaits it over the coming weeks, maybe months, and what its friends can do to help.”
• “It is a safe bet that on President Donald Trump’s watch, the United States can be counted out as a constructive force in this situation. … That leaves Europe. It too is weakened by internal divisions and the lasting consequences of the pandemic. But it cannot turn a blind eye to events in Belarus.”
• “If any credit is due the regime in Minsk, it is for managing the balance between the two centers of gravity. Maintaining that balance is in everyone’s interest. Thinking that the Kremlin would calmly accept a geopolitical reorientation of Belarus is wishful thinking.”
• “Regardless of who emerges from the crisis as the country’s leader, he or she will face a daunting set of challenges. Putin is not in the business of charity, and he will demand a stiff price for keeping the subsidies flowing. Moreover, any future leader of Belarus will have to maintain good relations with the Kremlin and pay a certain amount of deference to its sensitivities and sensibilities. To attempt a different course would be unrealistic, dangerous, and run counter to the attitudes of the Belarusian public.”

“Belarus’s Protests Aren’t Particularly Anti-Putin,” Rajan Menon, Foreign Policy, 08.19.20: The author, the Anne and Bernard Spitzer professor of international relations at the Powell School at the City College of New York, writes:

• “Putin and his government have a lot at stake in Belarus, which is why some experts have wondered (reasonably) whether Belarus in 2020 would beget a crisis akin to Ukraine in 2014. But this is very unlikely. The circumstances underlying the two uprisings are utterly different.”
• “For starters, the Belarus protesters aren’t driven by a desire to break free of Russian control, which, in any event, the wily Lukashenko proved pretty adept at avoiding. Lukashenko is reviled, no doubt, but not because he is regarded in the country as Moscow’s man, as Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was in 2014.”
• “Nor are the intrepid protesters who have taken to the streets in Belarus animated primarily by dreams of joining the European Union and NATO, and the anti-Russian sentiments evident among some of the groups that were part of the protests on Kyiv’s Maidan have been notably absent on the streets of Minsk.”
• “Moreover, because Russian is far more widely used in Belarus than Belarusian—like Russian, Belarusian has the status of an official language, but less than a quarter of the population speaks it day to day—the linguistic and cultural divide between Russia and parts of Ukraine, particularly its western regions, aren’t present either. In short, Putin need not really fear the installation of an anti-Russian regime.”
• “Still, Moscow does have good reason to worry that the ripple effects of the protests in Belarus could reach into Russia. But not only would an intervention not solve that particular problem, it would actually make it worse.”

“Belarus Needs to Learn From Russia’s Flawed Privatization,” Konstantin Sonin, The Moscow Times/VTimes, 08.18.20: The author, a professor at the University of Chicago and the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, writes:

• “Although the Belarusian (ex) president Alexander Lukashenko, who, based on general evidence lost the elections on Aug. 9, has still not stepped down, a change in power seems likely.”
• “The main reform which can and should be carried out quickly is the restoration of a normal entrepreneurial climate. … Any change in power will include reforms of law-enforcement agencies, from firing and taking to court the criminals who organized and carried out the beating of peaceful citizens on Aug. 10 and 11 to narrowing the powers of security officials and cutting personnel and budgets.”
• “Nothing is preventing Belarus from repeating the ‘Israeli miracle’ of the 21st century, when an influx of educated immigrants in the previous decade, the development of new technologies allowing remote work and the efforts of the government to create a secure atmosphere formed the foundation for two decades of frenzied growth in IT.”
• “Improving the entrepreneurial climate in Belarus ‘instantly’ means a purge and reform of the security agencies, and this can be done relatively quickly. … For deep economic reforms to work, a strong, professional state is needed.”
• “The Russian privatization of the early 1990s ultimately increased the efficiency of enterprises and the economy as a whole, but the majority of Russians didn’t feel this — and as a result supported a policy of nationalization. Belarus’ reformers need to take into account the lessons of privatization in Russia and other countries. In reforming the law-enforcement agencies, it needs to be remembered that for successful privatization you need a strong, professional state.”

“Dictator’s Dilemma: Why Lukashenko Is Still Clinging On,” Andrei Kolesnikov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 08.22.20: The author, a senior fellow and the chair of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “The social structure of Russia, with its oil and gas oligarchy that lives off (for now) enormous economic rent, is not very similar to that of Belarus. But politically, both Russia and Belarus are post-Soviet patronal autocracies whose economies are based on state capitalism (or commercialized socialism). And their various social strata are unified by autocrat fatigue—for various reasons, but with the same consequences: a large degree of resentment. For precisely this reason, the Kremlin should be watching neighboring Belarus very closely, and once again weighing up all the pros and cons of the two different options out of the dictator’s dilemma.”

“Putin Prepares for a Controlled Succession in Belarus,” Henry Foy and Max Seddon, Financial Times, 08.20.20: Foy, the Financial Times’ Moscow bureau chief, and Seddon, a Financial Times Moscow correspondent, write:

• “’The main thing for Russia is to maintain friendly relations with Belarus and not intervene,’ a person close to the Kremlin said. ‘There’s no east-west divide and no aggressive nationalism like in Ukraine.’”
• “Andrey Kortunov, head of the Russian International Affairs Council, a state-backed think-tank, said that the Kremlin would probably seek to replicate the Armenian revolution of 2018, when the post-Soviet state overthrew its longtime president who was replaced by the protest leader who retained the country’s pro-Russian policies.”
• “But while Mr. Putin may be willing to accept a democratic neighbor and a pause to his integration plans in exchange for no change to Minsk’s reliance on Moscow, the long-term impacts for the Kremlin could be deep. ‘Belarus will become a major existential crisis for Russia,’ said Mr. Kortunov. ‘With democracy, you may have a pro-Russian government [in Minsk] one day and a less friendly one the next.’”

“Belarus Sheds the Carapace of Dictatorship,” Tony Barber, Financial Times, 08.18.20: The author, Europe editor and associate editor at the Financial Times, writes:

• “The street demonstrations in Kyiv became militarized in response to the Yanukovych regime’s use of violence, and they were driven partly by a desire to align Ukraine’s future with the EU and even NATO. President Vladimir Putin of Russia retaliated by annexing the Crimean peninsula and stirring up a separatist conflict in eastern Ukraine.”
• “None of this applies in the case of Belarus. The protests are not pro-western or anti-Russian. They are pro-civic rights, pro-truth and anti-Lukashenko. To judge from Russian state media reports on the events in Belarus, the Kremlin is under no illusion about the collapse of Mr. Lukashenko’s political legitimacy.”
• “Military intervention on his behalf would be a waste of Russian effort and prestige. A smarter response would be to allow a repeat of the events of 2018 in Armenia. There, a popular revolution brought to power Nikol Pashinyan, who as prime minister has restored democratic processes but carefully avoided antagonizing the Kremlin.”
• “Western governments have limited leverage over events in Belarus. There is no need to try to fold the country into western alliance systems. But they can and should make clear their support for a political transition that rids Belarus of Mr. Lukashenko and allows a freely elected government to take office.”
• “For Belarus, at long last, is shedding the carapace of dictatorship.”

“Russia’s Military Maneuvers at the Belarus Border—a Message to the West,” Gustav Gressel, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 08.18.20: The author, a senior policy fellow with the Wider Europe Program at the European Council on Foreign Relations' Berlin office, writes:

• “Lukashenka has already called on Vladimir Putin to intervene, and has ordered Belarus’s best military units to move from the Russian to the Polish border in order to frame the protests as a form of NATO hybrid intervention.”
• “Given that the loyalties of the Belarusian armed forces are still unclear at this moment, and the fact that Russia can likely read all the signals and communications of its close Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) ally, a military intervention is certainly possible. But is it likely?”
• “Russia’s military maneuvers are—for the time being—a show of force and a signal of intimidation. Firstly, of course to the West, to deter it from intervening. But equally importantly they are a signal to the Belarusian opposition to say that any post-revolutionary government would need to respect Moscow’s geopolitical red lines.”

“Belarusians Can Learn a Lot From Armenia’s Velvet Revolution,” Anna Ohanyan, Wilson Center/Al Jazeera, 08.21.20: The author, a professor of political science and international relations at Stonehill College, writes:

• “Three key lessons emerged from Armenia’s successful democratic breakthrough in Russia’s orbit.”
• “First, the protesters in Armenia worked hard to keep the protests deeply local. They resisted attempts by the ruling forces to frame the protests as another ‘color revolution,’ which would have delegitimized the protests as ones orchestrated by the West.”
• “Second, Armenia’s protest leader, a member of a parliament at the time and now the prime minister, signaled early, clearly, and consistently, that the movement, if successful, would not lead to a foreign policy U-turn away from Russia.”
• “Third, the leader of Armenia’s opposition movement, himself a parliamentarian, negotiated with the incumbent forces both informally and individually, as well as institutionally within the parliament. The movement unfolded within an imperfect but nevertheless formal constitutional order, generating much-needed stability and legitimacy to the campaign to increase numbers in the street—a key marker of successful disobedience campaigns everywhere.”

“Belarus Should Remind Us to Believe in Freedom's Power,” Timothy Garton Ash, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)/The Guardian, 08.24.20: The author, a professor of European Studies at Oxford University and an European Council on Foreign Relations member, writes:

• “I personally would love Belarus to become a liberal democracy, secure inside both the European Union and NATO, like its Baltic neighbors. But that will not happen any time soon, mainly because Russian President Vladimir Putin won’t let it, but also because there is currently no majority for it in the country itself. The Belarussian opposition wisely insists this is not a geopolitical struggle between Russia and the West.”

“Democratic Uprising in Belarus,” Editorial Board, The Wall Street Journal, 08.17.20: The authors of the report write:

• “Imminent military action appears unlikely, but the U.S. and Europe should make clear it would mean more economic and diplomatic isolation for Russia. The best way to serve Western interests is to support open elections. The people will remember.”

“Time for toughness on Belarus,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 08.17.20: The authors of the report write:

• “The popular revolt in Belarus should result in the peaceful transfer of power to those who won the election, led by opposition candidate Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, followed by releasing political prisoners, lifting all restraints on free expression and holding truly free and fair elections.”

“Is Belarus Destined to Become the Next Crimea?” James Jay Carafano and Kiron K. Skinner, The National Interest, 08.21.20: Carafano, a vice president at the Heritage Foundation, and Skinner, a former director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State, write:

• “President Trump can shine here, but making it crystal clear that the problems of Belarus should be resolved by the Belarusians, not by Russia or any other outsiders. The people of the country must be left free to figure out their own future.”
• “Trump should also make clear that: Russian interference will cost Putin; we and our allies will never accept a coerced Belarusian ‘Union’ with Russia; nor will we recognize any puppet Belarusian government propped up by foreign military forces.”
• “The current crisis in Belarus is yet another reminder that freedom never comes free. To gain it, and to preserve it, it is necessary to stand up to bullies and tyrants. America can and should lead countries already enjoying freedom to help those who so desperately seek it in the streets of Belarus.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant developments.