This Week's Highlights

The challenge facing Washington is to change the Kremlin’s broader strategic calculus by demonstrating that more cooperation with the West can help Russia redress the mounting vulnerabilities arising from its close partnership with China, writes Georgetown Professor Charles A. Kupchan. Washington’s first step should be to drop its ‘democracy versus autocracy’ framing of U.S. strategy, he writes. The United States and its allies should also help reduce Russia’s growing economic dependence on China, Kupchan argues, adding that the United States and its partners should think twice before introducing new sanctions and that in the longer term, the United States should help Russia transition to a knowledge economy. The United States [should] put China’s relationship with Russia back into play [to head] off Beijing’s potential efforts to construct a Sinocentric international system, he argues.

The viability of the Russia–China entente is, to a significant degree, based on mutual recognition of each other as equals, writes Artyom Lukin of the Far Eastern Federal University in Vladivostok. The post-Xi generation of the Chinese elite could well develop a superiority complex toward Russia and refuse to treat it as an equal partner, he writes, noting that Russia might accept the new role of a lesser ally or it might not. If Moscow, out of its great-power pride, insists on full political equality with China, that could rupture the Russia–China axis, Lukin argues. Among the four scenarios, which Lukin presents in his article, this one is probably the most dangerous because it involves the matters of status, rank and honor, always the core identity issues for Russia and hence highly emotional, according to this Russian researcher.

While it is true that Russia can use gas as political leverage, there will be limits to its ability to do so, writes Vuk Vuksanovic, a Ph.D. researcher in international relations at the London School of Economics. Moreover, Eastern Europe will have to learn to live with this project; this concession should be viewed as part of a bigger geopolitical process in which the United States and Germany try to avoid closing all doors to Russia and pushing it into China’s embrace, he writes.

Russia is seeking to exploit the change of government in Israel to assert some control over military operations against targets on the territory of its ally Syria, write Bloomberg reporters Henry Meyer and Gwen Ackerman. Meanwhile, Michael Peck writes for the National Interest that Russia doesn’t need to fight Israel to hurt Israel; indeed, an IDF official seemed less concerned about a physical clash between Israeli and Russian forces, and more concerned that Russia could choose to supply advanced weapons—such as anti-aircraft missiles—to Israeli enemies such as Syria and Iran.

Russia’s main green battle for now will be with Brussels, which is most advanced among global players in promoting both carbon taxation and cuts in hydrocarbon usage, writes Danila Bochkarev, associate researcher at the Institute of Political Science Louvain-Europe.  Russia’s leadership is starting to take that challenge seriously for this green revolution can deal a ‘unique’ blow to the Russian economy and may lead to formation of a new global elite within the next decade, Bochkarev cites President Vladimir Putin’s point man for sustainability, Anatoly Chubais, as saying.

It is unlikely that the upcoming Zapad-2021 exercise will serve as a Trojan horse exercise to set the stage for the Russian invasion of one of its neighbors, but it will be a significant exercise in size, scale, and duration, writes Rochan Consulting Director Konrad Muzyka. The exercise will confirm the special relationship between Russia and Belarus and the ability of the two militaries to conduct combat operations against a near-peer adversary across the entire spectrum of warfare—including peacekeeping missions and a nuclear strike; these are the very attention-grabbing parts of Zapad, he writes.

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Great Power rivalry/New Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Believe It or Not: U.S. Nuclear Declaratory Policy and Calculated Ambiguity,” Matthew Costlow, War on the rocks, 08.09.21.

• “Calculated ambiguity is best positioned among all the other alternative policies to provide U.S. and allied leaders the freedom of action necessary to respond to a growing range of threats. This freedom of action reinforces deterrence against America’s adversaries. Nuclear declaratory policy is far too consequential to become a vehicle for merely signaling U.S. good intentions on nonproliferation and disarmament—a job far more appropriate for U.S. arms control proposals and dialogue.”
• “Instead, U.S. officials should clearly articulate why U.S. nuclear declaratory policy is important not only for its deterrence and assurance effects, but also for the range of policy options it can provide that have the best chance of achieving U.S. political and military goals. The tension between when to clarify and when to be ambiguous about U.S. intentions will remain, but preemptively removing the ability to make particular deterrent threats continues to be unwise. The policy of calculated ambiguity may remove the ‘fine distinctions’ that Lord Balfour treasured, but for the purposes of deterring nuclear and non-nuclear threats, it is a ‘high policy’ worth keeping.”

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“The Right Way to Split China and Russia. Washington Should Help Moscow Leave a Bad Marriage,” Charles A. Kupchan, Foreign Affairs, 07.04.21. The author, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Professor of International Affairs in the School of Foreign Service and the Government Department at Georgetown University, writes:

• “[T]he challenge facing Washington is to change the Kremlin’s broader strategic calculus by demonstrating that more cooperation with the West can help Russia redress the mounting vulnerabilities arising from its close partnership with China.”
• “Washington’s first step should be to drop its ‘democracy versus autocracy’ framing of U.S. strategy. The United States and its ideological partners of course need to ensure that they can deliver for their citizens and outperform illiberal alternatives. But casting the contest in overtly ideological terms serves only to push Russia and China closer together.”
• “To be sure, Russia and the United States remain at odds on many fronts. But rather than settling for continued estrangement, Washington should try to find common ground with Moscow on a wide range of issues. … The United States and its allies should also help reduce Russia’s growing economic dependence on China. … Biden’s decision to effectively greenlight the controversial Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which will carry Russian gas to Germany, was a wise investment in encouraging deeper trade links between Russia and Europe.”
• “[T]he United States and its partners should think twice before introducing new sanctions and should lay out a clear set of steps that Russia can take to persuade Washington to scale back existing ones. … The United States and its partners should also indicate that they are prepared to help Russia combat climate change and transition its economy away from its dependence on fossil fuels. … In the longer term, the United States should help Russia transition to a knowledge economy—a step that Putin has never taken, to the clear detriment of his country.”
• “The United States should build on the conversation about strategic stability that Biden and Putin launched at their meeting in Geneva in June. ... The Arctic is another area where Washington can help Moscow see the strategic downsides of abetting Beijing’s growing ambitions.... Finally, Washington should encourage Moscow to help check China’s growing influence in developing areas. … The United States would be wise to invest in a long-term strategy to change that equation by helping put China’s relationship with Russia back into play. Doing so would be an important step toward building a pluralistic multipolar order and heading off Beijing’s potential efforts to construct a Sinocentric international system.”

"The Russia–China Entente and Its Future." Artyom Lukin, International Politics (Hague, Netherlands) 58, no. 3 (2021): 363-80. The author, an International Relations scholar at the Far Eastern Federal University in Vladivostok, writes:

• “Over the longer term, what happens to the Russia–China relationship should the forces currently binding them together weaken or disappear altogether? Several ideal-type scenarios can be drawn up to try to imagine the future of the Russia–China strategic relations over the horizon of seven to 10 years.” 
  • “Scenario 1. The continuation of the Sino-Russian entente: It is quite likely that, even seven or 10 years into the future, the forces that currently sustain the Moscow–Beijing axis will remain in place or could even intensify. Russia and China’s rivalry with the USA could grow more acute, while their illiberal autocracies would become even more entrenched.” 
  • “Scenario 2. Russia—US rapprochement: Even though Russian–American relations are presently at a very low point and unlikely to substantially recover any time soon, in the long term their normalization is not impossible. In fact, the USA will be under increasing structural pressure to make peace with Russia as China looms as by far the biggest threat to America’s positions in the international system.“ 
  • “Scenario 3. Russia and China’s political regimes part ways: It cannot be ruled out that post-Putin, Russia will transition from illiberal autocracy to a more liberal and democratic regime, more compatible with Western values.” 
  • “Scenario 4. China’s hubris: The viability of the Russia–China entente is, to a significant degree, based on mutual recognition of each other as equals. The post-Xi generation of the Chinese elite could well develop a superiority complex toward Russia and refuse to treat it as an equal partner. Russia might accept the new role of a lesser ally or it might not. … Among the four presented scenarios, this one is probably the most dangerous because it involves the matters of status, rank and honor, always the core identity issues for Russia and hence highly emotional.“
• “What can be predicted … is that Russia and China will be highly reluctant to be drawn into a hostile relationship. It is likely that the Russia–China relationship will continue to be guided by rationalism and pragmatism, but, of course, there is no guarantee it will stay that way forever.”

Arms control:

“It’s time to ban autonomous killer robots before they become a threat,” Stuart Russell, Financial Times, 08.05.21. The author, a computer science and engineering professor at the University of California, Berkeley, writes:

• “In July 2015, leading AI researchers signed an open letter calling for a ban on lethal autonomous weapons. Alas, six years later, discussions about a possible treaty at the UN in Geneva, which are in session right now, have stalled. Nations are—or pretend to be—incapable of understanding what autonomous weapons are or why they present a threat.”
• “Russia is not the only obstacle to a treaty. The UK and US also oppose formal negotiations. Their opposition seems especially senseless because both countries have internal prohibitions on autonomous weapons; they are, in effect, just insisting that other countries be allowed to deploy them. All three countries—and of course the entire world—have a lot to lose if and when mass-destruction capabilities proliferate to unreliable regimes and non-state actors.”
• “Some argue that a ban wouldn’t work, but there are many precedents for successful international action. The chemical and biological weapons conventions have largely eliminated two entire classes of WMDs; under the landmine treaty, 92 countries have destroyed their entire stocks (more than 55m mines); and the treaty on blinding laser weapons nipped another inhuman technology in the bud. As early as 1868, the St Petersburg Declaration banned bullets that explode inside the body.”
• “The Red Cross proposal for an immediate moratorium on autonomous anti-personnel weapons is an essential first step, because small anti-personnel weapons are the easiest to deploy in large numbers. A treaty should include agreements on weapon identification and tracking to prevent unattributable remote attacks, and on communication protocols to prevent accidental escalation and ensure that weapons can be recalled or disabled by their owners.”
• “As with the Chemical Weapons Convention, industry protocols can prevent large-scale diversion of civilian devices to illicit uses by criminals, terrorists and rogue states. All of this is the hard, boring work of allowing human beings to live their lives in relative security. Let it begin.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

“Putin Flexes His Muscles in Syria in Test of Israel’s New Leader,” Henry Meyer, Gwen Ackerman, Bloomberg, 08.03.21. The authors, reporters for Bloomberg, write:

• “Russia is seeking to exploit the change of government in Israel to assert some control over military operations against targets on the territory of its ally Syria. So far the Kremlin has kept the shift mostly rhetorical, unwilling to risk a military confrontation with Israel. But after years of tolerating Israeli strikes in Syria under former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Moscow is eager to do more to bolster Syrian President Bashar al-Assad with a new government in Jerusalem.”
  • “Russian President Vladimir Putin ‘isn’t bound by any previous understandings’ with Netanyahu, said Elena Suponina, a Moscow-based Middle East expert. Russia wants Israel to restrict its Syria strikes ‘and to coordinate the efforts against terror’ groups, she said.”
• “A more abrasive relationship could force Israel to change its strategy to prevent Iran from increasing its regional clout, or shift to alternative strike methods. It also risks inflaming political tensions between Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, who succeeded Netanyahu in June.”
• “There’s no sign Israeli missions are being impeded now. While the Defense Ministry in Moscow claimed Syria’s Russia-supplied air-defense systems thwarted three Israeli attacks in the past two weeks, Israel and others said that’s untrue.
• ‘This is about imitating pressure on Israel rather than any real steps though we could move in this direction,’ said Alexander Shumilin, a former Russian diplomat who heads the state-financed Europe-Middle East center in Moscow. ‘Still, there is no prospect of any serious confrontation with the Israelis.’”
• “Russia will have to tell Israel if it wants to end the informal accord and ‘the bottom line is that nothing has changed,’ said Zvi Magen, a former Israeli ambassador to Russia who’s now a senior researcher at The Institute for National Security Studies. ‘Russia knows that if it makes the change by force, Israel will react with force.’”

“Middle East Mayhem: Israel and Russia Could Be at War Within the Decade,” Michael Peck, National Interest, 08.06.21. The author, a contributing writer for the National Interest, writes:

• “Russia doesn’t need to fight Israel to hurt Israel. Indeed, the IDF official seemed less concerned about a physical clash between Israeli and Russian forces, and more concerned that Russia could choose to supply advanced weapons—such as anti-aircraft missiles—to Israeli enemies such as Syria and Iran. In the early 1970s, the Soviet Union supplied numerous air defense missiles and guns to Egypt and Syria, which inflicted heavy losses on Israeli planes in the 1973 October War. If it wants to, Russia can make Israeli air operations very expensive.”
• “As always with the Arab-Israeli (or Iranian-Israeli) conflict, the real danger isn’t the regional conflict, but how it might escalate. In the 1973 war, the Soviets threatened to send troops to Egypt unless Israel agreed to a cease-fire. The United States responded by going on nuclear alert. Were the Israelis and Russians to come to blows, or if Moscow were to seriously threaten military force against Israel, could the United States risk a grave loss of prestige by not intervening to back its longtime ally? Could Russia—whose Syrian intervention is a proud symbol of its reborn military muscle and great power status—not retaliate for another downed Russian plane or a dead Russian soldier?”

Cyber security:

• No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

“‘Green Burden’: How Global Climate Policies Could Impact Russia,” Danila Bochkarev, Russia Matters, 08.04.21. The author, an associate researcher at the Institute of Political Science Louvain-Europe, writes:

• “The European Union, Russia’s largest trading partner, recently proposed a major new carbon tax that could cost Russia’s economy hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars. This is just the most immediate of the risks to energy exporters emanating from key global players’ pledges to become carbon-neutral by 2050-2060—pledges made not just by the EU but by China and the United States, as well. The related ‘green’ policies will have a major impact on energy markets, and Russia—whose budget relies heavily on oil and gas exports—is likely to be among the hardest hit. The switch to a low-carbon energy mix worldwide could slow down demand for hydrocarbons as soon as the next 10-20 years,1 which, in turn, would reduce revenue to Moscow’s coffers.”
• “The most immediate challenge for Russia’s carbon-intensive exporters will likely come from the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, or CBAM, proposed by the European Commission on July 14—a de facto tax on half a dozen imports that emit large amounts of CO2 during production and/or extraction: iron and steel, cement, fertilizer, aluminum and electricity. ....Recent estimates by Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development valued the Russian exports affected by CBAM at $7.6 billion. According to one analysis, the annual losses of Russia’s aluminum and steel producers under the new taxation mechanism could reach $355 million and $300 million, respectively.”
• “Gradually, Russia is adjusting its policies to better absorb the impact of these changes. Its main battle for now will be with Brussels, which is most advanced among global players in promoting both carbon taxation and cuts in hydrocarbon usage. But there are signs that Russia’s leadership is starting to take the challenge seriously at a more strategic level: In addition to modeling various scenarios, the government has reportedly created working groups to explore ways Russia could adapt to the so-called global energy transition. This green revolution will deal a ‘unique’ blow to the Russian economy and may lead to a global regrouping of countries and the formation of a new global elite within the next decade, according to comments attributed to President Vladimir Putin’s point man for sustainability, Anatoly Chubais.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Washington is still shying away from punishing Putin’s closest cronies. Why?” Vladimir Kara-Murza, The Washington Post, 08.05.21.

• “Few topics rattle the Kremlin quite as much as Western sanctions targeting its officials and oligarchs. For all its nationalistic posturing, the regime of Vladimir Putin—as corrupt as it is authoritarian—depends on maintaining access to Western countries, banks and financial markets for its key cronies.”
• “It is hardly a secret that some of the most prized real estate in New York City, London and Miami is owned by those with Kremlin connections. … It is no surprise, then, that international efforts to bring accountability for human rights abusers through targeted visa bans and asset freezes elicit furious reactions from Russian officials. Kremlin countermeasures against those who advocate such sanctions have ranged from bogus Interpol warrants to poisoning by chemical weapons.”
• “This week, calls for targeted international sanctions by Russian citizens was publicly equated with ‘treason’ by no less than Sergei Naryshkin, the head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service and a close Putin confidant. ‘This is betrayal of one’s country and one’s people,’ Naryshkin declared. It is a long-standing habit of authoritarian regimes to equate themselves with the countries they misrule.”
• “The Biden administration has designated countering corruption ‘a core United States national security interest’ and has taken steps to target individuals in places ranging from Ukraine to Namibia. At the same time, it has shown a surprising reluctance to use sanctions where they would work most effectively.”
• “Targeted sanctions provide personal accountability for those who break the rules of civilized society at home while enjoying its benefits abroad. … [T]he blacklisting of abusers will end the perverse spectacle of Western democracies in effect enabling regimes that trample on the very values the West claims to hold dear. Boris Nemtsov, the Russian opposition leader who was slain in front of the Kremlin in 2015, called the Magnitsky Act ‘the most pro-Russian law in the history of any foreign parliament’ as it ‘finally ends the impunity for those who violate the rights and steal the money of Russian citizens.’ Western policymakers have a powerful and effective tool at their disposal. It is time they began using it properly.”

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Russia’s Vaccine Diplomacy Is Mostly Smoke and Mirrors,” Grace Kier, Paul Stronski, Carnegie Endowement for International Peace (CEIP), 08.04.21. The authors, respectively junior and senior fellows with the CEIP Russia and Eurasia Program, write:

• “In August 2020, Russian officials hailed the launch of the Sputnik V COVID-19 vaccine as a major victory for Russian science, innovation, and diplomacy. … Twelve months later, Sputnik V has failed to live up to the hype, and its developers at the state-run Gamaleya Institute in Moscow and the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), the country’s sovereign wealth fund, are growing uncomfortable under global scrutiny.”
• “Data published in the UK medical journal The Lancet indicate that the Sputnik V vaccine is safe, boosts survival rates of people infected, and slows transmission of the deadly disease. However, lingering questions about data discrepancies and the lack of transparency caused an international group of scientists to question the findings in an open letter to the journal. Part of the problem is that the Gamaleya Institute rushed through clinical trials to get it on the market before all others, raising questions about the vaccine’s safety and slowing important regulatory approvals from the EU and the WHO.”
• “The RDIF also misplayed global marketing of the vaccine. Distribution in Russia and neighboring countries as well as exporting of the vaccine have been hampered by production problems and a failure to manage global supply chains. International sales and distribution are increasingly overshadowed by reports of inflated prices and corruption allegations.”
• “Russia’s COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy has fallen far short of its original goals and has disappointed global public health officials eager for alternatives to the mRNA vaccines that are difficult to produce and store. Although Russian officials initially suggested the Sputnik V vaccine would be a key part of the global solution to the pandemic, Moscow has made only minimal contributions to the COVAX program… [and] the RDIF is also having trouble fulfilling its commercial contracts for the vaccine.”
• “The distribution of Sputnik V is increasingly looking like an opportunity for personal enrichment and patronage for Kremlin insiders and middlemen. Instead of bolstering Russia’s image and its reputation for innovation, corrupt deals like those offered to Kenya or Ghana and the failure to deliver on its contract requirements in Argentina tarnish the image of Russian science and industry. Sputnik V is proving to be another example of Russia’s ambitions exceeding its capabilities.”

“Is Russia Cementing an Olympic Win?” Vitaly Gorokhov and Peter Rutland, The Moscow Times, 08.02.21. The authors, respectively a lecturer at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration in St. Petersburg and a professor of Government at Wesleyan University, write:

• “Russia is emerging as a winner in the Tokyo Olympics despite the efforts of the International Olympic Committee to hold the country accountable for the systematic doping that took place during the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics.”
• “In Tokyo, 330 athletes are competing as the ‘Russian Olympic Committee’ (ROC). They are forbidden to sing the Russian national anthem or display the national flag—though they are allowed to wear uniforms with the flag’s colors of red, white and blue. The ROC was limited to just 10 athletes in track and field and two weightlifters: sports which have been at the epicenter of doping.”
• “Far from being remorseful, Russia has seized on the ban as just the latest in a long line of Western efforts to denigrate the country, noting that the Soviet Union was not allowed to join the Olympics until 1952. Russian media praise the ingenuity of officials for working around the ban and the heroism of their athletes triumphing in the face of adversity.”
• “The ROC athletes can expect a heroes’ welcome on their return to Russia. They will be treated as a winning team. A team named Russia.”

Defense and aerospace:

“Russia Goes to War: Exercises, Signaling, War Scares, and Military Confrontations,” Konrad Muzyka, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 07.28.21. The author, an independent defense analyst and director of Rochan Consulting, writes:

• “It is unlikely that the upcoming Zapad-2021 exercise will serve as a Trojan horse exercise to set the stage for the Russian invasion of one of its neighbors, but it will be a significant exercise in size, scale, and duration. The exercise will confirm the special relationship between Russia and Belarus and the ability of the two militaries to conduct combat operations against a near-peer adversary across the entire spectrum of warfare—including peacekeeping missions and a nuclear strike. These are the very attention-grabbing parts of Zapad.”
• “Yet the most important but less publicized aspects will occur before and after the active phase of the drill. In June, Russia and Belarus began to organize multiple exercises including logistics, mobility, air defense, electronic warfare, and command and control. An additional district-level readiness exercise is also possible. These exercises will serve signaling purposes and score domestic propaganda points that will seek to achieve domestic public relations goals. In late July, Russia started deploying elements of its 1st Guards Tank Army to Belarus, confirming the start of strategic redeployment of forces for Zapad. In this context, Zapad does not start and end during its active phase. Drills and exercises held pre-Zapad are an integral, if not more important part than the actual active phase of the exercise. They will show how Russia plans to force generate new units, deploy them, and cooperate with Belarus to attack and defeat NATO. There will be much to learn post-exercise.”

“Why Russia Is Not An Aircraft Carrier Power,” Robert Farley, National Interest, 08.03.21. The author, a visiting professor at the United States Army War College, writes:

• “The aviation capability of the Russian navy is dangling by a thread. Kuznetsov is old and in poor condition, and no carrier is even close to be laid down. The Russian surface fleet has not received a great deal of attention in the latest military modernization plans, and the Russian shipbuilding industry has not constructed a warship the size and sophistication of Kuzentsov since… well, Kuznetsov.”
• “That said, the Kremlin seems to view aircraft carriers as an important contributor to national prestige. The Russian navy took great pains to get Kuznetsov into position to support operations in Syria, and despite the embarrassment associated with that, has now pushed the carrier into a major refit. If the Kremlin determines that it needs a carrier to keep pace with France, Britain, China and India, it will need to begin seriously considering how to build or acquire such a ship. It is not inconceivable that Moscow may consider ordering a carrier from Chinese yards in the future, however profound a reversal that might seem. Otherwise, Russia needs to start solidifying its construction timelines soon.”

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:      

“Eastern Europe Will Have to Learn to Live with Nord Stream 2,” Vuk Vuksanovic, The National Interest. 08.08.21. The author, a PhD researcher, associate of LSE IDEAS and a researcher at the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP), writes:

• “While it is true that Russia can use gas as political leverage, there will be limits to its ability to do so. Moreover, Eastern Europe will have to learn to live with this project. This concession should be viewed as part of a bigger geopolitical process in which the United States and Germany try to avoid closing all doors to Russia and pushing it into China’s embrace.”
• “The West-Russia rapprochement will not happen overnight, for among other reasons, because of the weariness of Eastern Europe towards this move, and because relations with the United States are full of open questions. However, approving Nord Stream 2 was a way of not burning all the bridges with Russia and creating a window of opportunity for rapprochement in the future to ensure that Russia does not permanently end up in China’s embrace. However, this will take a long time, patience, and strategic thinking.  A goodwill gesture on Nord Stream 2 is just one small piece of the puzzle. Eastern Europe will not be happy, but that’s the way it is.”

“Can Russia and Poland Ever Overcome Their Historical Differences?” Maxim Samorukov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 08.06.21. The author, a fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center and deputy editor of Carnegie.ru, writes:

• “Whereas Poland sees its sufferings in World War II as evidence of its righteousness and nobility, Russia espouses a cult of victory: a victory achieved at great cost, and powerful proof that Russia can overcome all difficulties and win against all odds.”
• “Still, the ultimate conclusions drawn by Poles and Russians are similar. Both nations see their role in World War II as exceptional and as one that still entitles them to special treatment by the rest of the world.”
• “The Polish and Russian views of their mutual history, particularly the history of World War II, are incompatible … However, this does not doom Warsaw and Moscow to eternal estrangement. The German-Polish historical dialogue and Russia’s relations with other Central and Eastern European states show that limited positive results are possible.”
• “To start with, history should not be the only topic of bilateral relations, as it currently is for Russia and Poland. The two countries still have an extensive infrastructure of bilateral relations … Russia also has differences with other European states, like Hungary and Serbia … in their historical interpretation of World War II events. These differences have not dominated Russia’s relations with those countries … Another lesson from the German-Polish experience is that focusing on targeted objectives can be more productive than attempting ambitious but hopeless national dialogue “
• “Finally, Poland and Russia could greatly rehabilitate their relations if each more often ignored the interpretations of their mutual history the other uses for domestic consumption, and stopped fixating on each other’s television talk shows and statements by mid-ranking politicians. Polish society will not accept the Russian interpretation of World War II and vice versa, so the two nations should stop trying to force their revisions onto each other and jeopardizing their relations over every historical bone of contention.”

Ukraine:

• No significant developments.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Can Russia and China Edge the United States Out of Kazakhstan?” Temur Umarov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 08.03.21. The author, a research consultant at Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “In maintaining consistently good relations with Russia, China, and the United States all at the same time, Kazakhstan is performing a unique diplomatic balancing act. Yet as the confrontation worsens between the global powers, it’s becoming increasingly difficult for Kazakhstan to maintain that geopolitical balance without getting drawn into the fray.”
• “For the United States, Kazakhstan is its only partner in Central Asia that has an interest in a U.S. presence, and whose decisions aren’t constantly changing in pursuit of short-term advantages, like Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan under its former president Islam Karimov.”
• “This balancing act is at the heart of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy strategy, and any attempts from the outside to overturn it would encounter fierce opposition. This course of action is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, despite the ongoing transition of power. Indeed, Kazakhstan’s second president is the living embodiment of that course: Tokayev is a Sinologist who studied at the prestigious Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), and who forged his diplomatic career at the United Nations.”

“Alexander Lukashenko’s Belarus is a full-blown rogue regime,” Financial Times Editorial Board, Financial Times, 08.03.21. The editorial board writes:

• “Up to 35,000 Belarusians have since been arrested. Allegations of torture are rife. Many young people are emigrating.”
• “The opposition clampdown betrays mounting paranoia on Lukashenko’s part. Critics say western sanctions only drive him into Russian president Vladimir Putin’s arms, while leaving Belarusians worse off. But Lukashenko has spent years playing Brussels off against Moscow, while only tightening his hold on power. Western countries can no longer tolerate his mistreatment of his own people and flouting of the law, at home and abroad. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who many Belarusians believe was the real winner of last year’s election, has spent recent days urging Washington and London to tighten sanctions.”
• “They should pay heed. The EU is to be commended for going further than the US and the UK in imposing sanctions not just on individuals, but sectoral measures that ban imports of Belarusian oil products and potash sales — among the country’s most lucrative exports. It also restricted issuance in the EU of new debt with a longer than 90-day maturity for the Minsk government and some state-controlled groups.”
• “But several loopholes which limit the effect of the EU potash ban need to be removed. As they did over Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, the US and UK should also impose sectoral measures on Belarus. Three decades after the Berlin Wall fell, the Belarus regime looks like a historical anomaly. Its people deserve western solidarity in pressing Lukashenko finally to heed the message voters sent him a year ago.”

“The 44-Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh Turkish Drone Success or Operational Art?” Edward J. Erickson, Military Review, August 2021. The author, a retired U.S. army officer, writes:

• “In addition to Turkey, Azerbaijan receives significant military assistance from Israel, which established diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan in 1992. ... In 2012, Azerbaijan purchased $1.6 billion worth of weapons from Israel Aerospace Industries.14 The Azerbaijanis followed up in 2016 with an additional $5 billion and in 2017 with another $127 million; most of this went to purchase unmanned aircraft (UAs) and satellite technology Moreover, the Israelis have helped equip Azerbaijan’s Special Forces, installed security systems in Azerbaijani airports, and upgraded tanks and armored vehicles. Even for energy-rich Azerbaijan, the partnership is expensive, but it resulted in the acquisition of very modern military capabilities.” 
• “The United States has also maintained a durable security assistance program with Azerbaijan that brought considerable numbers of Azerbaijani officers and NCOs to the United States for training, while their Armenian counterparts were trained in Russia. In 2019, U.S. security assistance funding to Azerbaijan amounted to over $100 million, while Armenia received around $4.2 million. The ‘value-added’ of western Turkish, Israeli, and American military assistance in comparison with Russian military assistance cannot be understated.”

“The return of Azerbaijani irredentism,” Laurence Broers, Eurasianet, 08.05.21. The author, the Caucasus program director at Conciliation Resources, writes:

• “Baku is seeking to avoid repeating Yerevan’s experience in the 1990s, when the militarily victorious side – then Armenia – was unable to consolidate victory into a favorable peace from a position of strength. With Armenia still militarily and politically in disarray, and the OSCE’s Minsk Group still marginalized, there will never be a better time than now for Baku to impose its vision of peace.”
• “Azerbaijan’s vision of peace, however, precludes a comprehensive treatment of the issues contested by Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Calls to negotiate, accompanied at the same time by applications of coercive pressure, indicate that Baku wishes to determine not only the shape of the table … but also the agenda. Crucial for Azerbaijan is that the issue of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh … be taken off the table, and that Baku exercise unmediated control over the entire territory.”
• “These developments provide the backdrop to a set of Azerbaijani territorial claims that have been articulated with increasing intensity since May. These focus first on pockets of Armenia’s territory in areas along the international border between the two states … Another set of claims concerns a number of Soviet-era exclaves … which were de facto incorporated into the surrounding state during conflict in the 1990s.”
• “Azerbaijan’s claim-laying on Zangezur is first and foremost a bargaining strategy to induce Armenia to renounce its role in the fate of Armenians living in Karabakh … Without the irredentism, what is left is the conflict’s secessionist aspect … namely, the future relationship between Karabakh Armenians and the Azerbaijani state … Azerbaijan’s revival of Zangezur seems to anticipate this by leveraging a mirroring set of claims, preserving the spotlight on inter-state rather than majority-minority relations and keeping irredentism, rather than self-determination, in play as the focal point of the conflict.”

“The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in a Global South Perspective,” Jason E. Strakes, PONARS, 08.05.21. The author, co-founder and research and publications coordinator of the Center for Foreign Policy and Security Studies, writes:

• “Among the ‘lessons learned’ of the 44-day war is that both parties ultimately rejected Western liberal conceptions of conflict resolution, in which the normative and security concerns of all stakeholders must be recognized, and the resort to military force is the least desirable option. In the first case, the ambitions of radical modernizers in the Pashinyan administration since the 2018 Velvet Revolution to transform Armenian society in the image of Switzerland failed to override the popular association of Artsakh with their national identity. In the second, the notion of Azerbaijan’s ‘pro-Western’ and ‘Euro-Atlantic’ orientation touted over past decades by foreign commentators, think-tank experts, and the foreign service cadre alike has given way to the autonomy and self-reliance in achieving national goals.”
• “Perhaps then a more effective framework for explaining the unforeseen outcome in Nagorno-Karabakh would refer to the fundamental linkage between ethnicity, possession of territory, and statehood more reflective of the experiences of the Global South, rather than the interests of the major powers or attempts at reconstructing bipolarity in the South Caucasus.”