This Week’s Highlights

“All Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) members, for their own geopolitical reasons, will eventually recognize the Taliban, if the latter fulfils its promise of containing the conflict within the Afghan borders,” writes Prof. Mariya Y. Omelicheva of the National War College. The SCO’s principle of “non-interference in domestic affairs” will keep its members from criticizing the Taliban and “the brutal nature of its political rule,” she writes.   

“The absence of U.S. troops and a friendly government in Afghanistan … opens up the possibility of new regional diplomatic partnerships and agendas,” writes Prof. Alexander Cooley, director of Columbia University's Harriman Institute. He urges U.S. policymakers to “drop their long-running reluctance” and begin regularly consulting with the CSTO and SCO “on security and humanitarian issues.”

Washington is unlikely to induce Moscow to “leave [its] bad marriage” with China, according to Prof. Sergey Radchenko of Johns Hopkins University. “Not only are the alternatives not particularly plausible … but Russia’s ‘marriage’ with China is really not half bad,” he writes. The relationship “provides political and economic dividends to both sides, regardless of their increasing power disparity.” What matters in the end, according to Radchenko, is “whether China is able or willing to use [the power disparity] for unilateral advantage over Russia. So far, it hasn’t—and even if it tried, it is far from clear that it would succeed.”

“U.S. policymakers have become so sanctions-happy that they have blinded themselves to the long-term costs of this tool,” writes Prof. Daniel W. Drezner of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. “To compete with the other great powers, the United States needs to remind the world that it is more than a one-trick pony.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s U.S. visit this week could “produce a major success for him and for U.S.-Ukraine relations,” writes Brookings’ Steven Pifer. Zelenskiy “should position himself to achieve such an outcome. That requires not overreaching by setting the bar impossibly high. And it means bringing a persuasive vision for how Kyiv will realize the ambitions of the Ukrainian people to become a prosperous democracy and a ‘normal’ European state.” Former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul writes that [among other issues], “Biden and Zelenskiy should also discuss the peace process for eastern Ukraine, including perhaps formal U.S. involvement in the moribund Normandy process between Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine. … In return, Zelenskiy should stop asking—for now—to sign a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP).”

NB: Next week’s Russia Analytical Report will appear on Tuesday, Sept. 7, instead of Monday, Sept. 6, because of the U.S. Labor Day holiday.

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

“As US nuclear exports decline, experts fear international safeguards will too,” Jessica Lovering and M. Granger Morgan, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 08.27.21. The authors, the co-founder of the Good Energy Collective and the Hamerschlag University Professor of Engineering at Carnegie Mellon University, write:

• “Over the last decade, think tank reports ... have sounded alarms; these organizations have argued that declining US commercial nuclear exports are eroding the ability of the United States to play a major role in maintaining adequate international safeguards against the diversion of nuclear materials. Historically, the United States was the dominant exporter of nuclear technology, and those exports came with a lot of safety, security and nonproliferation strings attached. Now that Russia is and soon China will be the leading exporters of nuclear technologies, a growing number of experts are worried about the international security knock-on effects in these emerging markets.”
• “While it is unlikely that the United States will add significant new nuclear capacity in the next few decades, the international market may. A Third Way and Energy for Growth Hub study projected that global electricity demand would double by 2050 … Much of that growth is projected to be in countries that are interested in hosting their first nuclear power plant by 2030 … Russia and China see this market and are preparing to supply newcomer countries. Most aspiring nuclear newcomer countries already have nuclear cooperation agreements in place with Russia, China, or both—but not with the United States.”
• “While revitalizing nuclear power has often been linked to national security, several experts in the national security space have told us that they are skeptical about calls for the United States to regain dominance in the global nuclear market. … They argue that there are more direct pathways for positive U.S. influence in global nuclear security regimes that do not rely on commercial exports. Experts we convened judged two of those pathways—the creation of a U.S.-South Korea consortium to build new power projects and progress on addressing the problem of US domestic nuclear waste—to be both effective at strengthening U.S. influence and feasible policies to implement.”

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“North Korea’s Nuclear Family: How the Kims Got the Bomb and Why They Won’t Give It Up,” Sue Mi Terry, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2021. The author, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, writes:

• “Th[e] strategy [toward North Korea]—combining information operations and a human rights campaign—would echo the Western policies that once contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Kim is entering his second decade in power, but with swirling rumors about his health and a persistently dire economic outlook, no one knows how stable his rule really is.”
• “Whatever the regime's immediate future, its long-term prospects are bleak unless it carries out genuine economic reforms, but reforms might engender political instability of their own. Against that background, an information and human rights campaign would not yield any quick results on the nuclear front, but it might plant the seeds of a more enduring shift.”
• “Only when North Korea becomes more accountable and responsive to its own people will there be any chance for meaningful progress toward denuclearization. A transformed regime under a future leader might perceive less of a need to develop nuclear deterrent capabilities and pose less of a threat to its own people or its neighbors.”
• “Absent such a regime change or transformation—highly unlikely but not impossible—the only other durable solution to the nuclear crisis is the country's reunification under the democratically elected, pro-Western government in Seoul. Even if a unified, democratic Korea decided to keep a nuclear arsenal, it would still not pose the kind of threat that the world currently faces from the tyrannical regime in Pyongyang. Ultimately, the North Korean nuclear crisis is a reflection of North Korea's government. Until that regime either dramatically reforms itself or collapses, the nuclear threat will remain.”

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Great Power Rivalry/New Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“The Real Reason U.S. Allies Are Upset About Afghanistan ,” Stephen M. Walt, Foreign Policy, 08.27.21. The author, the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, writes:

• “If Europe’s political elites were as worried about Russia’s military power and political meddling as they often claim to be, then one might expect them to be pleased that the United States is finally extricating itself from the Afghan quagmire and will have more resources (and time) to devote to helping protect Europe. … Instead, they are treating this unhappy event as though it were the Battle of France in 1940.”
• “I suspect that many European concerns stem from their uncomfortable awareness that they aren’t as important to the United States as they used to be. Please note: I am not saying that America’s European allies are of no value, nor that they couldn’t be of considerable value to the United States in the future. I’m merely pointing out that Europe’s relative importance has declined sharply since the Soviet Union broke up. … Donald Trump was the first president to openly articulate these ideas, and now European elites fear that maybe this wasn’t just an aberration.”
• “Moreover … the real driving force behind deep U.S. involvement in European security issues has always been the balance of power. … When push comes to shove, the nations of Europe turn out to be less committed to the universal ideals and eager to protect their particular national characters and ways of life.”
• “I suspect that much of the agonizing we are currently witnessing will dissipate once most foreigners and Afghans most at risk have been evacuated. Although there won’t be a happy ending to this story any time soon, I also hope the United States and others will do what they can to encourage less bad outcomes than one might anticipate. Even so, there is a downside to everyone involved in this 20-year enterprise turning the page and moving on. That downside, of course, is that we’ll once again fail to learn any useful lessons from the experience.”

“The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Afghanistan: Old Fears, Old Barriers to Counterterrorism Cooperation,” Mariya Y. Omelicheva, Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), 08.26.21. The author, a professor of strategy at the National War College, writes:

• “Washington’s pullout has … raised questions about who will fill the power vacuum in Afghanistan and keep terrorism and insurgency at bay in Central Asia. … [O]ne regional grouping—the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)—has been eyed to play a bigger role in coordinating its members’ responses.”
• “The prospects for deeper counterterrorism cooperation under the auspices of the SCO will be, however, dampened by divergent interests and deep-seated mistrust among its members.”
• “First, despite the common interest in addressing the cross-border threats emanating from Afghanistan, the SCO members have pursued varied political goals through this organization. … Second, in Moscow’s geopolitical imagination, Central Asia is still viewed as Russia’s ‘soft underbelly.’ Therefore, Russia has sought to demonstrate to other regional players, including China, that it continues to serve as the only viable guarantor of security in the region. … Third, the international consequences of the Taliban rule remain uncertain. … If the Taliban fulfills its promise of not abetting international terrorism, the exigency for enhanced counterterrorism cooperation will peter out.”
• “Despite the necessary prerequisites to serve as a vehicle for coordinating multilateral responses to the unfolding situation in Afghanistan, the SCO has been crippled by divergent national interests and mistrust among members. All SCO members, for their own geopolitical reasons, will eventually recognize the Taliban, if the latter fulfils its promise of containing the conflict within the Afghan borders. The SCO foundational principle of ‘non-interference in domestic affairs’ will shield the Taliban from criticisms by its members regarding the brutal nature of its political rule. Yet, the Taliban’s renewed repression of the Afghan people will only sharpen grievances within the population, becoming a powerful source of violent resistance and terrorist recruitment for years to come.”

“A Post-American Central Asia: How the Region Is Adapting to the U.S. Defeat in Afghanistan,” Alexander Cooley, Foreign Affairs, 08.23.21. The author, the Claire Tow Professor of Political Science at Barnard College and Director of Columbia University's Harriman Institute, writes:

• “Washington’s withdrawal [from Afghanistan] and failure to build a legitimate Afghan state will inevitably fuel the narrative of U.S. decline and great-power competition. The countries that now retain embassies in Kabul, including China, Iran and Russia, are among the United States’ greatest adversaries. These states, however, must now confront the practical challenges of providing security guarantees, developing economic networks and pushing for a durable political transition. The United States will therefore still wield important international leverage, including controlling access to the dollars required to avoid a prolonged bank run and sorely needed external financing from the International Monetary Fund. U.S. officials, for instance, can push for international donors to condition aid and reconstruction funding on an inclusive political transition and basic human rights benchmarks.”
• “The absence of U.S. troops and a friendly government in Afghanistan also opens up the possibility of new regional diplomatic partnerships and agendas. U.S. officials could make Afghanistan’s security one of a bundle of issues in future bilateral negotiations with Pakistan and use the topic to broaden the agenda of Washington’s regular C5+1 dialogue with Central Asian states. U.S. policymakers can also drop their long-running reluctance to engage with the CSTO and the SCO on the grounds that they are mere ‘talk shops’ and begin regularly consulting with these groups on security and humanitarian issues.”
• “Although U.S. troops may be leaving, Washington can still remain an important part of Afghanistan’s and Central Asia’s future. Freed from the political sensitivities of dealing with a client government, U.S. policymakers might finally be able to deal with the region in a more evenhanded fashion, including by aggressively pursuing an anticorruption agenda focused on former senior Afghan officials who embezzled foreign funds. The era of U.S. military intervention in Central Asia may be over, but that does not mean that Washington’s influence must disappear, as well.”

“Can Central Asia Help Russia Cajole the Taliban?” John Ruehl, The National Interest, 08.24.21. The author, a contributing editor at “Strategic Policy,” writes:

• “Despite the rapid fall of U.S.-trained Afghan forces, parts of the country are showing pockets of resistance to the Taliban—particularly in its Tajik-heavy north. Any Russian efforts to protect ethnic Tajiks or Russian citizens in this region would draw on similar justifications used in the 2008 Russia-Georgia War; this time potentially aided by a multinational force. Russia’s naval dominance in the Caspian Sea and its ability to strike Afghanistan from its waters have also increased its military edge in the land-locked country. Afghan instability could also influence Uzbekistan to rejoin the CSTO alliance after it left in 2012.”
• “Though hundreds of miles distant, Russia’s military strength and connection to Afghanistan through Central Asia suggest a powerful role in Afghanistan’s future affairs. But the Kremlin’s ambitions will be complicated by China’s economic power, Iranian and Pakistani cultural influence, and the entrenched presence of the Taliban. And if Russia’s Afghan strategy falters, its regional rivals will naturally look towards Central Asia—this time without the distraction of their common U.S. adversary.”

“After Afghanistan, will Russia misjudge America?" William Courtney, The Hill, 08.26.21. The author, an adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation, writes:

• “[A]s the U.S. withdraws from Afghanistan, might Russia see the U.S. as defeated and vulnerable to pressure? This could be an error. … [C]onsider three past U.S. adversities: the Bay of Pigs and Berlin Wall, Vietnam and Iran’s seizure of U.S. diplomats and the failed rescue attempt.”
• “In 1961, America faced a triple threat from the Soviet world. In April, the new Kennedy administration botched an amphibious assault at Cuba’s Bay of Pigs aimed at overthrowing Fidel Castro’s regime. At a June summit … with President Kennedy, Premier Nikita Khrushchev found him to be ‘inexperienced, even immature.’ In August, East Germany began constructing a wall in Berlin …These events could have inclined the Kremlin in 1963 secretly to dispatch nuclear arms to Cuba.”
• “More than 58,000 Americans were killed in the Vietnam War, 20 times more than in Afghanistan. … Nixon ended America’s combat role in 1973. South Vietnam fell in 1975. Perhaps emboldened by the rout, the USSR expanded its international ambitions. It backed a Marxist takeover of Angola in 1975 and Ethiopia in its war against Somalia in 1978. Going for broke, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Moscow doubtless celebrated America’s loss in revolutionary Iran of intelligence assets directed against the USSR.”
• “In November 1979 in Iran, militants overran the U.S. embassy and seized hostages. The U.S. reacted modestly by halting imports of oil from Iran and freezing its assets in America. In April 1980, the U.S. mounted a bold but inept rescue attempt … After 444 days … Iran released the 52 hostages in exchange for the return of its seized assets. … As in the previous two crises, U.S. recovery took time but was lasting. The Iranian humiliation boosted public support for Reagan’s huge military buildup. Far-reaching defense reforms, reinforced by the historic 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, bolstered joint military capabilities.”
• “The Kremlin might reflect on these examples to gain insight into how the U.S. might respond to its Afghanistan reverse.”

“Crowded Skies and Turbulent Seas: Assessing the Full Scope of NATO-Russian Military Incidents,” Ralph Clem and Ray Finch, War on the Rocks, 08.19.21. The authors, a senior fellow at the Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs at Florida International University and a Eurasian military analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, write:

• “NATO and Russia are engaged in an ongoing geopolitical drama, one in which the actors are willing and perhaps driven to increase the tempo and expand the arena in which it plays out. This makes dangerous military interactions, both at sea and in the air, much more commonplace and virtually guarantees more of the same all along the NATO-Russian frontier.”
• “One of the authors, in an earlier piece in this forum, argued that deconfliction and risk reduction measures should be a high priority for national security policymakers. Seemingly mundane steps like sharing flight and maritime routing and employing transponders could reduce the uncertainty inherent in no-notice encounters. The alliance and Russia should expand the agenda for the strategic stability dialogue that began in Geneva in July to include such deconfliction protocols for ongoing military activities, with an aim to reduce the risk inherent in the trends we have described here. Otherwise, the law of unintended consequences may be proven once again.”

“Strategies of Restraint: Remaking America’s Broken Foreign Policy,” Emma Ashford, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2021. The author, a senior fellow at the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, writes:

• “One of the most important things that restrainers bring to the table is the notion of moderation and pragmatism. Restrainers are some of the loudest voices arguing that the United States should resist grand crusades and transformational goals in foreign policy … It will be tempting for restrainers on either side of the internal divides to shun calls for consensus and work instead with their external opponents in the foreign policy debate on the more limited areas where they align.”
• “Offshore balancers might choose to work with America firsters on reining in democracy promotion and nation building. … Progressives might make common cause with liberal internationalists on fighting kleptocracy or bolstering the role of multilateralism and diplomacy.”
• “Although this might indeed be a viable path forward … it also carries significant risks. … Chief among these is the risk that this approach will solve smaller, surface-level problems with current U.S. foreign policy while leaving the biggest problems untouched. … Likewise, getting European and Asian allies to pay up without shedding U.S. commitments to defend nontreaty allies would be more prudent financially than the current policy, but no more strategically sound.”
• “Restrainers should be wary of partnerships that require them to compromise on core principles. Progressives who push for Ukraine's membership in NATO as a pro-democracy step are liable to find their antiwar goals undermined in the long run by Russian military action, as they did in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. … Offshore balancers who partner with hawkish unilateralists to contain China may find themselves pulled into a far riskier approach than they intended.”
• “Ultimately, restrainers will find it better to stick together and cooperate as a transpartisan bloc. This will require compromise, in which the coalition hammers out differences internally to advance a shared vision of a less militaristic and more restrained U.S. foreign policy.”

“The Center Cannot Hold: Will a Divided World Survive Common Threats?” Thomas Wright, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2021. The author, director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution, writes:

• “The debate over whether great-power competition or transnational threats pose the greater danger to the United States is a false one. Look back at strategic assessments from ten years ago on China and Russia, on the one hand, and those on pandemics and climate change, on the other, and it is clear that Washington is experiencing near-worst-case scenarios on both. Great-power rivalry has not yet sparked a hot war but appears to be on the brink of sparking a cold one. Meanwhile, the worst pandemic in a century is not yet over, and the climate crisis is only accelerating.”
• “What COVID-19 has made powerfully clear is that this is an age of transnational threats and great-power competition—one in which the two phenomena exacerbate each other.
• Pandemics are not the only transnational threat that promises to intensify great-power rivalry and diminish the prospects for much-needed cooperation. Climate change could do the same … Rather than unite the world around a common purpose, climate change is likely to deepen competition between major powers, especially as the transition away from fossil fuels creates economic winners and losers.”
• “Two separate constellations of powers are steadily emerging, one largely democratic and led by the United States and the other authoritarian and led by China. These constellations are interdependent but riven by distrust and rivalry. Cooperation across this divide should always be the first choice in times of shared crisis, but as the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated, the U.S.-led constellation must always have a backup plan. It did not have one in 2020. It needs one for the next crisis.”

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

"Driving a Wedge Between China and Russia Won’t Work," Sergey Radchenko, War on the Rocks, 08.24.21. The author, the Wilson E. Schmidt Distinguished Professor at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, writes:

• “Fifty years after Henry Kissinger’s game-changing secret visit to China … there is no shortage of new would-be Kissingers. Important voices have called for a readjustment of America’s confrontational approach to Russia in a bid to play Moscow as a card against Beijing.”
• “The argument hinges on a seeming power disparity between a declining Russia and its ambitious and much more powerful neighbor. Stephen Blank argues that this ‘ever-greater disparity … may, in time, allow the [United States] and its allies to exploit Russian feelings of resentment and resistance to subordination.’ If only the United States found a way to fuel Russia’s fears of China to the point where it might, as Charles A. Kupchan recently put it, ‘leave a bad marriage.’”
• “The proposed U.S. approach to the Sino-Russian relationship rests on the assumption that Russia resents its junior position … and that such resentment … can be profitably exploited.”
• “The assumption that the United States can drive a wedge between China and Russia is flawed. Unlike in the past, the Sino-Russian relationship is not hierarchical and does not require Russia’s unquestioning deference to China’s wishes. … China and Russia work hard to avoid frictions, both because they have no desire to see these frictions exploited by third parties and because they understand … that they are destined to be neighbors.”
• “Russia’s ‘marriage’ with China is really not half bad. … It is a relationship that provides political and economic dividends to both sides, regardless of their increasing power disparity. For what matters in the end is not the power disparity between the two partners but whether China is able or willing to use it for unilateral advantage over Russia.”
• “U.S. relations with Russia are important on their terms, regardless of what happens or fails to happen between Moscow and Beijing. … Whether Washington chooses engagement or containment … to cope with Russia, it is a policy that should be pursued to achieve specific objectives and not because it might have instrumental consequences for the future of the Sino-American relationship.”

“Beijing’s American Hustle. How Chinese Grand Strategy Exploits U.S. Power,” Matt Pottinger, Foreign Affairs , September/October 2021. The author, senior adviser at the Marathon Initiative and U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser from 2019 to 2021, writes:

• “The CCP has made perfectly clear its desire for global preeminence, and officials in Washington have finally stopped pretending otherwise. Americans, Europeans and people the world over are now increasingly clear-eyed about Beijing’s intentions and the sources of its hostile behavior. Elected leaders must now take the next step: applying their tough new line not just to Beijing but also to elite institutions in their own societies that need to join the fight against the CCP. Because companies are economic actors, not political ones, it is the government’s responsibility to establish guidelines for engaging with adversaries. With strict new parameters, Washington can level the playing field for all U.S. firms—refreshing their commitment to the United States’ 245-year-old experiment with democracy instead of bowing to the Chinese government’s experiment with neo-totalitarianism. Without such guidelines, however, U.S. firms, money, and institutions will continue to be coerced into serving Beijing’s ends instead of democratic principles.”

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms control:

“Letter: China rejects calls to join nuclear disarmament talks,” Zeng Rong, Financial Times, 08.24.21. The author, spokesperson for the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in London, writes:

• “As the two countries with the largest and most advanced nuclear arsenals in the world, the U.S. and Russia bear primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament, and should earnestly implement existing treaties and further drastically and substantively reduce their nuclear stockpile, so as to enable other nuclear states to join multilateral negotiations towards the goal of complete nuclear disarmament.”
• “However, recent years have seen the U.S. investing heavily in upgrading its ‘nuclear triad,’ developing low-yield nuclear weapons, lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons and advancing the deployment of missile defense systems. These actions have severely undermined global strategic stability. Furthermore, some people in the U.S. have been playing up ‘China’s military and nuclear threat’ and a ‘nuclear arms race between the U.S., Russia and China,’ hyping the so-called ‘trilateral arms control negotiation’ to divert attention, shirk its own responsibility for nuclear disarmament and seek military supremacy. China is firmly against this. Given the huge gap between the nuclear arsenals of China and those of the U.S. and Russia, it is unfair, unreasonable and impractical to ask China to join any trilateral arms control negotiation. China will not participate in such negotiation and will never accept any coercion or blackmail.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

“Russia’s Drive to Replace Foreign Technology Is Slowly Working," Andrei Soldatov, The Moscow Times, 08.26.21. The author, a Russian investigative journalist, writes:

• “The relentless Russian offensive against global online platforms doesn’t show any sign of slowing down. That poses a question: Is Russia preparing to get rid of global platforms by the end of the year?”
• “Such a development now seems highly likely, given the scale of the Russian import substitution effort in technology — a campaign which is much more important than learning how to produce Russian parmesan in the Moscow suburbs.”
• “Only three years ago it had looked like a very distant and, frankly, hardly achievable objective.”
• “At a tech conference in August 2019, the chief software engineer at one of the biggest Russian information security companies joked that they didn’t want to “miss the fun” of the panel on software import substitution. To them, the idea was little more than a not-so-clever joke. ‘That they put a Russian stamp on the box doesn’t mean that what’s inside is actually being made in the country.’”
• “The impact of this large-scale effort is already visible. Last week the Skolkovo innovation center proudly reported the results of its research on the usage of credit cards in Russia. The national Mir card — operated by the Russian National Card Payment System and launched as a counter Western sanctions measure — has overtaken Visa and Mastercard as the top card provider in the country, being used by 42% of Russians. While many Mir clients were not offered a choice — they were given cards as part of their pension packages — its popularity is a reality.”
• “The methods the Kremlin is employing to force Russians to adopt Russian-made technology might be primitive, but they are effective, and the government is making steady progress in dragging people into a domestic digital bubble, with very visible borders.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“The United States of Sanctions: The Use and Abuse of Economic Coercion,” Daniel W. Drezner, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2021. The author, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, writes:

• “Sanctions cannot and will not go away anytime soon. Other great powers, such as China and Russia, are becoming increasingly active sanctioners. China has used an array of informal measures to punish Japan, Norway, South Korea, and even the National Basketball Association over the past decade; Russia sanctioned former Soviet republics to deter them from joining an EU initiative in eastern Europe. Aspiring great powers, such as Saudi Arabia, have also tried their hand at economic coercion. There will be more sanctions in the future, not fewer.”
• “But that doesn't mean the United States has to be part of the problem. Even the countries now discovering sanctions still rely on them for only a fraction of their foreign policy goals; they also sign trade deals, engage in cultural diplomacy, and dole out foreign aid to win friends and influence countries. So did the United States once. Washington needs to exercise the policy muscles it has let atrophy, lest a statecraft gap emerge between it and other governments. U.S. policymakers have become so sanctions-happy that they have blinded themselves to the long-term costs of this tool. To compete with the other great powers, the United States needs to remind the world that it is more than a one-trick pony.”

“New-Generation Warfare and the Fringe Right: How Russian Interference Impacts Right-Wing Extremism in the US,” Brianna Philpot, Jordan Center, August 2021. The author, editorial assistant for All the Russias, writes:

• “The events of Jan. 6 demonstrated the power of disinformation, conspiracy theories and violent extremists working in concert. The fallout from the riot derailed U.S. governmental activity for months as lawmakers contended with an unprecedented impeachment trial on top of a transition to a new administration.”
• “It would be a mistake to attribute the events of the last four years, including the Capitol riot, to Russian interference. At the same time, fissures around issues as diverse as racial justice, vaccines, and immigration are fraught with the potential for further exploitation. Russian disinformation is already very effective at eliciting strong emotional responses from its targets. It’s too early to tell what long term effects—if any—these interference campaigns will have on U.S. democracy. But the growing threat of far-right violence is an opportunity that Russia won’t miss and a danger that the U.S. can’t afford to ignore.”

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

"Russia’s latest crackdown on dissent is much more sweeping than ever before," Maria Snegovaya, The Washington Post, 08.25.21. The author, a postdoctoral fellow in political science at Virginia Tech, and a visiting scholar at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University, writes:

• “Russians—and longtime Russia watchers—have grown accustomed to political repression campaigns the government of Vladimir Putin has regularly launched over the past 20 years. But the situation in 2021, in the lead-up to parliamentary elections Sept. 19, appears quite different. … In the past, the Russian government would target specific organizations or individuals … In the past year, however, the Kremlin has now attacked journalists, lawyers, activists and opposition politicians—targeting virtually all segments of Russia’s civil society.”
• “The recent crackdown started after the alleged poisoning of Russia’s opposition leader Alexei Navalny … As Navalny recovered in a German hospital, Russia’s parliament passed tougher rules for pickets and rallies—but also created operational obstacles for nonprofits, the media and foreign Internet platforms.”
• “By summer, another set of laws made interactions difficult with organizations the Kremlin identified as ‘foreign agents’ or ‘undesirable.’ The government put individual journalists, along with independent media outlets … on the foreign agents list—curtailing their access to funding.”
• “Many observers point to the September 2021 Duma elections as the main reason for Russia’s unprecedented crackdown. To be sure, the declining popularity of Putin’s United Russia party … could threaten the government’s ability to sustain a legislative majority.”
• “Indeed, the Kremlin’s main targets this year are forces similar to those driving the Belarus protests: the Internet, independent media, oppositional forces operating outside of the official political establishment—as well as educational institutions the government considers ‘liberal’ and pro-Western.”
• “These developments, coupled with the continued crackdowns in recent months, seem to have provided Kremlin elites with a sense of invincibility. But if Russia’s current repressive wave is not primarily driven by the leadership’s fear of losing elections, the crackdowns are unlikely to end in September. A more pessimistic view is that Putin’s regime is transforming into an increasingly repressive Belarus-style autocracy, suggesting that independent and nongovernmental groups in Russia may be in line for closer government scrutiny—and rough times ahead.”

“The Kremlin's old methods of rigging elections aren't working like they used to,” Vladimir Kara-Murza, The Washington Post, 08.30.21. The author, a Global Opinions contributor for the news outlet, writes:

• “Russia's parliamentary election, which starts on Sept. 17, is still three weeks away. But the number of opposition candidates who have made it onto the ballot—already scarce to begin with—is shrinking by the day.”
• “The problem for the Kremlin is that the old methods are becoming less effective. Fatigue with Putin's two-decade rule is growing markedly, especially among younger people in big cities. Recent polls—not only by independent pollsters but by government agencies as well—show Putin's party, United Russia, down in the 20s. Even direct cash payoffs to pensioners announced by Putin—a blatant attempt to bribe voters—are unlikely to improve the ruling party's fortunes.”
• “Speaking at a news conference after a farewell visit by German Chancellor Angela Merkel this month—and yet again rejecting her call for Navalny's release—Putin remarked that ‘we don't want any more revolutions’ and that ‘Russia already hit its limit for revolutions in the 20th century.’ If one uses history as reference, it would be a good idea to know it. All the revolutions Putin was referring to—in 1905, 1917 and 1991—happened because society lacked normal democratic means to influence state policy, or even have its voice heard. If Putin thinks that by rendering elections meaningless he will stave off another revolution, he is in for a surprise”

“Elections Aren’t Getting Any Easier For the Kremlin,” Clara Ferreira Marques, Bloomberg/The Washington Post, 08.24.21. The author, a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, writes:

• “‘We are Team Putin. We are United Russia,’ read the backdrop to a gathering organized by the pro-Kremlin party earlier this month. September’s parliamentary elections are edging closer, and the bloc has reached for its trump card.”
• “Vladimir Putin does not officially lead United Russia and usually takes pains to stand apart from the parliamentary fray. But these are not usual times. The regime, tired and under strain, has an eye on the presidential election in 2024. It urgently needs the ruling party to narrow the yawning gap between its unimpressive popularity ratings and the votes required to secure a supermajority in the Duma, crucial for any constitutional tinkering in advance of that vote. United Russia’s support stands at around 27%, pedestrian especially for a party with vast administrative resources at its disposal, while trust in Putin tops 60%.”
• “Crucially, the party has to manage that differential in the face of growing political apathy and distrust in institutions, plus the reality of squeezed household incomes, higher prices and a pandemic that has been killing near-record numbers of Russians daily. Trickiest of all, it needs to succeed without overdoing the perception of electoral meddling, for fear of restarting protests.”
• “Another open question is the impact of Navalny’s call for Russians to vote tactically against official candidates, even without his organization directing the effort. It will certainly be far tougher to score significant wins, especially outside Moscow and St Petersburg. If there is any hint of success, moreover, the government will simply raise the volume on warnings of foreign meddling. It’s a tried-and-tested means of smearing the opposition—and yet another sign of a regime that’s run out of imagination.” 

“The Kremlin Is Coming for Media One By One—and Society Is Helpless to Stop It,” Ilya Klishin, The Moscow Times, 08.24.21. The author, the former digital director of the New York-based Russian-language RTVI channel, writes:

• “With less than one month before State Duma elections, the authorities are subjecting Russia’s few remaining independent media outlets to successive waves of repression, labeling some as foreign agents and others as undesirable organizations. To make matters worse, there seems to be no logic as to why or when an outlet is labeled a foreign agent.”
• “Even before the current crackdown, and especially during the last 5-10 years, the number of independent outlets was already dwindling, with the exception of a small, flourishing niche of online projects—particularly those dealing with investigations. On the other hand, the authorities now seem to be playing ‘eenie-meenie-miney-mo’ as they decide whom to target next. For example, few expected that the Dozhd TV channel would be included on the list of foreign agents.”
• “The fact that the authorities ‘came for’ Dozhd once again upset the rules of the game—or more precisely, served as a reminder that there are no rules, and that everyone can fall victim, and probably will eventually. And even if they didn’t come for you today, you should definitely fear that they might tomorrow—even if you thought you were safe because you attend official receptions and rub elbows with influential Kremlin insiders.”
• “During Stalin’s reign, people probably whispered in their kitchens in the same way about who would be taken away next. Some might think it’s a good thing we have social networks and not just kitchens, but as it turns out, social networks don’t protect us much from repression. And it doesn’t even seem awkward or farfetched anymore to draw parallels with the Stalinist terror of the 1930s. After all, with whom and with what else can we compare victims discussing who will be next?”

“Russian Journalists Meet a Crackdown With Dark Humor, and Subscribers,” Ben Smith, The New York Times, 08.24.21. The author, media columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “The ‘foreign agent’ designation has practical consequences, including effectively driving away business partners. It also forces journalists to attach the 24-word disclaimer to their work, even their personal social media posts. And it comes with echoes of a dark, Stalinist past.”
• “‘This immediately transfers you into the 1930s,’ said Ivan Kolpakov, the editor in chief of the news site Meduza, whose audience of more than 10 million a month has made it the fattest target of the crackdown. ‘Yesterday you were a respectable journalist from the most popular independent media outlet. Today you are a marginal person. It means that a lot of doors that were open immediately close down right in front of your face.’”
• “While most of the pressure on journalists in Russia seems to stem from the government’s fear of Mr. Navalny, the imprisoned activist, in advance of next month’s parliamentary elections, the American investigations of Russian influence on the Trump administration also offered a useful pretext. On the ground, however, the main effect has been to make it harder for Russians to see their own country clearly, and for journalists to report on it—or even remain there.”

“Fact-Check: Has Russia’s GDP Per Capita Really Dropped By 30% Since 2013?” RM Staff, Russia Matters, 08.25.21. The Russia Matters staff writes:

• “Writing about the Russian state’s increasing repressiveness in FT Magazine on March 14, 2021, FT’s then Moscow bureau chief, Henry Foy, mentions almost in passing that Russia’s ‘GDP per capita is 30 per cent lower than in 2013.’ The claim … surprised us since neither Russia’s total GDP nor its population has changed so drastically in the years in question. Because the author did not specify the source of his estimate, the method by which it was calculated or the year to which he was comparing Russia’s GDP of 2013, we decided to (1) pick 2020 as the last full year for which measurements of GDP were available at the time the claim was made and (2) check measurements of GDP in 2013 and 2020 in the databases of two reputable international financial institutions, the World Bank and the IMF, as well as Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat).”
• “Of the IMF’s five metrics of GDP per capita, only one showed a decrease anywhere near 30% from 2013 to 2020—namely, GDP per capita in current U.S. dollars, which does not adjust either for inflation or for purchasing power and registered a decline of 37.4% … In contrast, two other IMF estimates of changes in GDP per capita showed a decline of merely 1.8%—calculated in inflation-adjusted rubles and in international dollars fixed at their 2017 value and adjusted for purchasing power parity … The remaining two metrics of GDP per capita—current prices in rubles and in international dollars adjusted for purchasing power—showed growth.”
• “In short, by not providing details about the data cited, the FT’s claim may be misconstrued as an indication that Russia’s economy has shrunk by 30% since 2013—a conclusion that none of the available data support.”

“Russia cultivates alternatives to Western financial firms abroad, though, their homegrown firms are minnows," The Economist, 08.28.21.

• “Central to [Russia’s payment sovereignty] plan is a homemade rival to Visa and Mastercard. The central bank set up a payments system (nspk) with its own card, named Mir (‘world,’ or ‘peace,’ in Russian). Legislators passed a law forcing Visa and Mastercard, in effect, to have their payments processed at a clearing-house owned by the Russian payments system. In 2019 the nspk made 11.9 billion rubles ($160 million), or three-quarters of its revenue, from charging clearing fees to foreign card brands. These proceeds have allowed it to lower Mir’s commission rate to 0.8%, well below the typical credit-card interchange fee of 1.2-2% in Russia.”
• “Pensioners and civil servants are required to receive their incomes on a Mir card. Businesses must accept payments from it. Seven years after its launch Mir accounts for 30% of cards issued in Russia (and 24% of total transaction value). Last month it had about 100 million cards in circulation. On July 20th Mir announced that it was connected to Apple Pay—a big deal, given that mobile phones make up 60% of contactless payments in Russia.”
• “Outside of Russia, though, Mir does not fulfil its worldly ambitions. Most banks abroad do not accept it (Turkey, the most popular tourist spot for Russians, is an exception). Efforts to produce a version of the card co-badged with Mastercard’s Maestro brand, which would see it accepted more widely, have not solved the problem. Similar obstacles abound for another central-bank creation, spfs, the analogue for swift. It manages just a fifth of the domestic traffic that swift handles. And only a measly 12 foreign banks, including ones based in Belarus and Kazakhstan, are linked up (compared with 11,000 worldwide for swift), making it all but useless for foreign transactions. Banks must bear the costs of adopting spfs, but have little incentive to do so while swift still works.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

National security, law-enforcement and justice:

“The Curious Omission in Russia’s New Security Strategy: It doesn’t mention ‘cyber’—and that tells us a few things,” David Shedd and Ivana Stradner, Defense One, 08.25.21. The authors, respectively a visiting fellow at the Heritage Foundation/former acting Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, write:

• “After spending most of 2021 unleashing cyberattacks on a range of Western nations, Russia recently released its new National Security Strategy, or NSS, a consequential document in which the word ‘cyber’ is conspicuously absent. The omission is not a matter of translation—it’s strategic. It is high time U.S. policymakers began to understand what Russia’s curious word choice reveals about its cyber schemes.”
• “Russia’s goals for digital conflict are much broader than shutting down pipelines and stealing data. Kremlin officials also want to influence the minds and ultimately the behavior of their adversaries. Instead of the term ‘cyber security,’ (кибербезопасность) the NSS speaks of ‘information security.’ (информационная безопасность) This may seem like a semantic difference, but it is intentional and consequential in the language of the Kremlin.” 
• “American policymakers need to recognize that one of the Kremlin’s goals include being a cyber superpower. The failure to credibly deter Russia’s information operations will also have detrimental effects on the ability of the U.S. to deter Chinese information operations. If our resolve is perceived as insufficient, technical and psychological attacks will only continue to proliferate.”
• “The Kremlin does not limit itself to hacking our computers—it also wants to hack our minds with the goal of disrupting our democracy, polarizing society, sowing fear and doubt. As the Biden administration continues to negotiate with Russia on ending cyber-attacks, it is imperative that the U.S. also adopt a holistic approach to information security in which both the Russian technical and cognitive components need to be addressed. The U.S. cannot afford to move forward with a strategy that only recognizes the ‘cyber’ side of Russian malign activities. A holistic strategy by Russia calls for a holistic American response. Now is the time for a realistic and comprehensive approach to Russian information tactics and capabilities.” 

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

"The Message of Merkel’s Last Official Visits to Russia and Ukraine," Gwendolyn Sasse, Carnegie Europe, 08.26.21. The author, a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe, writes:

• “Shortly before the end of her term in office, German Chancellor Angela Merkel made a conscious choice to schedule separate trips to Moscow and Kyiv in quick succession.”
• “The signal she sent to both capitals but also to her potential successors currently competing in the German election is that both Ukraine and Russia have been and need to remain a priority in German and EU foreign policy.”
• “Merkel’s trips to Moscow and Kyiv have underlined the inherent contradictions in Germany’s policy on Russia and Ukraine. Prioritizing bilateral economic relations with Russia at the expense of EU energy and climate policies and Central and Eastern European security interests reduces the sanctions regime against Russia and assistance to Ukraine to half measures.”
• “Nevertheless, at the moment it is hard to imagine that any of the three main contenders for the post of German chancellor—Christian Democrat leader Armin Laschet, the Social Democrat Olaf Scholz, or the Greens’ leader Annalena Baerbock—would exhibit the same level of interest, commitment, or clout in their respective relations with Kyiv and Moscow.”
• “This is the most powerful message of Merkel’s two trips—to Germany and to the EU as a whole.”

“Saudi Arabia is trying to make America jealous with its budding Russia ties,” Mark N. Katz, The Atlantic Council, 08.27.21. The author, a professor of government and politics at George Mason University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, writes:

• “Several Western and Arab media sources have reported that the Saudi Deputy Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman signed a “military cooperation agreement” on August 24 with one of his Russian counterparts at the seventh annual International Military-Technical Forum—an arms expo—near the capital Moscow.”
• “Ultimately, the signing of the Saudi-Russian military cooperation agreement may be an effort by Riyadh to change Washington’s behavior. At a time when the Saudis and other Gulf Arabs fear that the US commitment to them may be waning due to what they fear is decreased US interest in the region, they know that Russian-American relations are tense. The Saudis may calculate that being seen to cooperate with America’s rival Russia may induce the US to step up its commitment and reduce its criticism of the Kingdom.”
• “Further, the Saudis must be well aware that Russia is hardly a replacement for America as a security guarantor—something that the recently announced China-Iran-Russia naval exercises in the Gulf can only reinforce. This is just one more example of Russia’s ongoing military cooperation with Iran, which includes Russian-Iranian cooperation in Syria and Russian arms sales to Tehran, that the Saudis and other Gulf Arabs find concerning.”
• “For Riyadh, ... the goal may be to make Washington a little bit jealous over its budding ties with Moscow while not upsetting the US too much. Moscow, of course, would be quite pleased if its ties with Riyadh upset Washington just as Russian ties with Ankara have done. Moscow’s ongoing relationship with Tehran—which Russia will not give up for the sake of improved relations with the Kingdom—is likely to induce Riyadh to keep its improving ties with Moscow within bounds.”

Ukraine:

“Ukraine Feels the Chill of Biden’s Foreign Policy,” Roman Olearchyk, Financial Times, 08.30.21. The author, a Ukraine correspondent for the Financial Times, writes:

• “Ukraine has fought an eight-year war against Russia and Russian-backed militants in the Donbass region. Yet even before the chaotic pullout from Kabul, alarm was spreading in Kyiv over fears U.S. president Joe Biden wanted to focus more on other foreign policy issues, especially rivalry with China. The first warning sign for Kyiv came this spring when Washington, without prior notice, waived further U.S. sanctions on Nord Stream 2.”
• “Afghanistan and Ukraine pose completely different security considerations for Washington, given its military support for Kyiv is limited to about $300 million annually since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. Days ahead of Zelenskiy’s visit, the White House announced an additional $60 million in military assistance to Ukraine for this year. Even so, in both Kyiv and Moscow, the precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan suggests a wavering commitment to its allies.”
• “Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of Russia’s security council, predicted in August that Washington would abandon Ukraine’s pro-western leadership, as it had the Afghan government. ‘Was the ousted pro-American regime in Kabul saved by the fact that Afghanistan had the status of a principal U.S. ally outside NATO?’ Patrushev said to Russia’s Izvestia newspaper. ‘A similar situation awaits supporters of the American choice in Ukraine.’”
• “[One] person familiar with U.S.-Ukrainian diplomacy said ‘the message from Ukraine is don’t turn us into Afghanistan, don’t throw us under the bus . . . I think the Americans haven’t been listening.”’
• “People familiar with Zelenskiy’s White House visit said the Ukrainian leader would press for a large increase in military aid and for U.S.-guaranteed bond issues to help rebuild its infrastructure and reboot its economy.”

“President Zelenskiy comes to Washington,” Steven Pifer, Brookings Institution, 08.25.21. The author, a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes:

• “Aug. 31 will be Zelenskiy’s first time to the White House, even though Trump offered him such a visit more than two years ago. … When it comes to Ukraine, Biden gets it. The discussions between the presidents will undoubtedly focus on the two central challenges facing Kyiv.”
• “First, the conflict that Russia has inflicted on Ukraine since 2014, which has claimed some 14,000 lives. Zelenskiy can expect a strong reiteration of American support for Ukraine, including for non-recognition of Moscow’s illegal seizure of Crimea and for a settlement in Donbass that restores Ukrainian sovereignty.”
• “The second central challenge facing Kyiv is putting in place the critical mass of reforms that will allow Ukraine’s economy to accelerate growth and realize its full potential, including encouraging open competition, strengthening the rule of law, curbing the outsized political and economic influence of the oligarchs, and beating back corruption.”
• “Zelenskiy’s U.S. visit can produce a major success for him and for U.S.-Ukraine relations. He should position himself to achieve such an outcome. That requires not overreaching by setting the bar impossibly high. And it means bringing a persuasive vision for how Kyiv will realize the ambitions of the Ukrainian people to become a prosperous democracy and a ‘normal’ European state.”

“The U.S. and Ukraine need to reboot their relationship. Here's how they can do it,” Michael McFaul, The Washington Post, 08.30.21. The author, former U.S. ambassador to Russia and director of Stanford’s Spogli Institute for International Studies, writes:

• “In the global struggle between democracy and dictatorship, and the fight for a peaceful Europe, Ukraine is on the front lines—not unlike West Germany during the Cold War. During the 20th century, the United States had to demonstrate extraordinary resolve in defending the democracy and security of our friends in West Berlin and West Germany from Soviet aggression. The same is now required in a divided Ukraine. As President Biden prepares for his meeting with his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, on Sept. 1, he would do well to keep this in mind.”
  • “Still at war with Russia … Ukraine faces abnormal threats to its sovereignty and democracy. Biden and Zelenskiy should acknowledge these extraordinary circumstances and then build a special and joint commitment to tackling them.”
  • “On defense, the leaders need to recast their security relations as mutually beneficial. Ukraine's 200,000-strong active soldiers, several hundreds of tanks and armed vehicles, and robust intelligence presence help to deter Putin's belligerent actions against Europe more effectively than most NATO allies. “
  • “Biden and Zelenskiy should also discuss the peace process for eastern Ukraine, including perhaps formal U.S. involvement in the moribund Normandy process … But self-defense for Ukraine must be the focus right now.”
  • “In return, Zelenskiy should stop asking—for now—to sign a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP).”
  • “U.S. officials must stop lecturing the Ukrainians so publicly on corruption.”
  • “The two presidents could also create a high-level panel of nongovernmental leaders … to press the case for reforms through a combination of ideas generation, cheerleading and tough love.”
• “Ukraine is not a normal country today. The Russian threat to European security and democracy is not normal … Biden should use his meeting with Zelenskiy next week to begin to create an extraordinary relationship with Ukraine.”

“Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy: Why Did the Kremlin Mass Its Forces Near Ukraine This Spring?” Rob Lee, Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), 08.23.21. The author, a fellow in FPRI's Eurasia Program and a PhD student at King’s College London’s War Studies Department, writes:

• “A better explanation is that the buildup [of Russian forces vis-à-vis Ukraine this past spring] was designed to deter the U.S. and NATO from crossing Russia’s red lines with a clear threat that Russia could respond by escalating the conflict in Ukraine. Ukraine is not the only place where Russia could push back against U.S. interests, but it was likely one area where the new presidential administration in Washington was not anticipating a potential crisis. Russia’s movement of forces also occurred before the NATO summit in June and offered a warning that Moscow would respond if Kyiv was offered an expedited path to NATO membership.”
• “One possible reason why Russia has chosen to rely on the threat of military force is that it likely sends a stronger signal to the U.S. and NATO. Offensive cyber actions in Ukraine certainly could be painful, but cyber activities designed to deter would not necessarily be publicly recognized. Depending on the severity of the attacks, the use of cyber as part of a compellence campaign likely would not be as concerning to the U.S. and NATO, though a more severe attack could lead to a U.S. cyber retaliation. In contrast, renewed fighting in Europe would place significant pressure on Washington and European leaders.”
• “Russia’s military show of force was very public and could achieve Russia’s goals without necessarily requiring escalation. Many of Russia’s foreign policy tools, such as economic statecraft, are comparatively weak, which is why Moscow increasingly relies on its military, one of its most capable tools. As Ruslan Pukov, the director of the Russian Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies think tank, stated, “we have no other tools to influence Kyiv except the threat of force and the use of force. The other diplomatic tools are really limited.”’

“In the Donbass, Russia’s Newest Citizens Prepare to Vote,” Konstantin Sorkin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 08.26.21. The author, an independent journalist based in Moscow, writes:

• “The upcoming Duma elections won’t be the first time that Moscow has involved the inhabitants of the self-proclaimed Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) in Russian domestic politics. The first attempt to make use of Donbass votes came during the nationwide vote on amending the Russian constitution last summer …  Back then, the number of voters was limited ...  Now the number of people in the Donbass in possession of Russian passports has risen to 600,000, warranting a more serious approach to voting.”
• “This .... doesn’t necessarily mean that Russia is preparing to officially invite the DNR and LNR to become parts of its federation ... but their participation in Russian domestic politics will help to score key propaganda points.”
• “Above all, allowing them to vote in the Duma elections will help Moscow to convince the inhabitants of the Donbass that it will not abandon them. And providing them with Russian passports ... will enable them to integrate into Russia, on an individual basis at the very least … The Kremlin is also interested in the people of the Donbass as additional reserves of loyal voters.”
• “Donbass has drifted further and further away from Ukraine. Economic ties have been severed, the media landscape is completely controlled by Moscow, and the region is populated by more and more people with Russian citizenship.”
• “Moscow, for its part, has not given up on reintegrating the Donbass into Ukraine ... but essentially sees the DNR and LNR as a useful buffer zone on its western border … With every Russian passport handed out there, and every vote cast in Russian elections, the chances of resolving the Donbas crisis in the way envisaged through the Minsk 2 agreement gets slimmer and slimmer.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Peace on Azerbaijan’s Terms Won’t End the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” Alex Galitsky, Foreign Policy, 08.24.21. The author, the communications director of the Armenian National Committee of America’s Western Region, writes:

• “In a recent Foreign Policy article, Robert M. Cutler argued Azerbaijan’s military assault on Nagorno-Karabakh last year achieved what the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Minsk Group couldn’t achieve after decades of ill-fated negotiations. Although Cutler is right to critique the Minsk Group’s inability to produce results, to suggest Azerbaijan’s so-called “military solution” has improved the prospects of long-term peace is a disturbing and dishonest proposition.”
• “Although Cutler perversely attributes the failure of the OSCE Minsk Group to Armenia’s intransigence, its real weakness was its inability to compel Azerbaijan to address the root of the conflict: the status of Nagorno-Karabakh.”
• “Although reducing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to a “territorial dispute” may be convenient, it is a fundamental misdiagnosis of the problem. Moreover, dismissing the Armenian people’s right to self-determination in the face of persecution and legitimizing Azerbaijan’s attempts to advance its position through ethnic cleansing is morally bankrupt.”