This Week’s Highlights

• David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Center for the National Interest Vice President George Beebe argue for considerable caution when it comes to assessing Russian actions and intentions toward the 2020 elections. That Russian interference is aimed at securing the victory or defeat of any particular candidate or party is an unproven hypothesis at best, they write, and the Kremlin cannot fail to realize that any significant pro-Trump meddling would be exposed and would hurt rather than help his electoral prospects. In the 2020 campaign so far, write Financial Times’ Courtney Weaver and Hannah Murphy, there has only been one report published by Facebook attributing falsified pro-Sanders online postings to a Russian source.
• Given the range of forces arrayed against Volodymyr Zelenskiy and the lack of support from abroad, he should pursue whichever strategy for peace in the Donbass that he believes can best secure sovereignty, even at the expense of territorial integrity, write Thomas Graham and Joseph Haberman of the Council on Foreign Relations.
• From an alliance perspective, there are a handful of actions that might ease tensions in Syria and avoid an open conflict triggering Article 5, writes James Stavridis, former supreme allied commander of NATO. NATO can provide “deconfliction” between Russian and Turkish forces by providing high-level intelligence about Russian troop deployments and intentions; it can technically assist Turkey with developing preventative protocols to avoid combat with Russia; and, most important perhaps, the U.S. must let Moscow know in no uncertain terms that the consequences of combat operations against Turkish troops would include further sanctions and greater military support for Turkey in accordance with the NATO treaty.
• It’s fitting that Putin’s battlefield of choice is the Internet, writes David Von Drehle. In geopolitics, as in business, digital communications have upended the distribution of power. When everyone is a potential broadcaster and information spreads instantly, it’s much easier to tear stuff down than to build it up. Putin is a disrupter; he seeks to break the West’s monopoly, according to Drehle.
• The twin U.S. policies of sanctioning Russia and pursuing a trade war with China have pushed the two countries closer together, writes Prof. Angela Stent. Washington could promote closer ties to Russia by lifting sanctions, extending the New START treaty and even modifying its stance on the Ukraine conflict. But it is unlikely that this would lead Russia to distance itself from China, Stent argues.
• Long-lasting chief executives often fall into the traps of conservatism, lethargy and routine, alongside building a coterie of admiring and loyal—but otherwise useless—advisers around them, writes Henry Foy of the Financial Times. Shuffling ministers is one thing, but replacing those in control of Russia’s largest corporate purse strings would send a far stronger message that business as usual is no longer acceptable, he argues.

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

“Past US Involvement Improved Russian Nuclear Material Security, but Little Is Known About Current Conditions,” U.S. Government Accountability Office, February 2020: In this report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, the U.S. GAO writes:

• “Over more than two decades starting in the early 1990s, the Department of Energy (DOE) and its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) completed many of their planned efforts to improve nuclear material security in Russia … These efforts … included a range of projects to upgrade security at dozens of Russian nuclear material sites, such as the installation of modern perimeter fencing, surveillance cameras and equipment to track and account for nuclear material.”
• “However, not all planned upgrades were completed before cooperation ended in late 2014. NNSA also completed many—but not all—of its planned efforts to help Russia support its national-level security infrastructure … [B]y the time cooperation ended, Russian sites had generally improved their ability to sustain their MPC&A [material protection, control and accounting] systems, but … concerns remained.”
• “[T]here is little specific information about the current state of security at Russian nuclear material sites … However, stakeholders said there is some information on national-level efforts. … Russia has improved regulations for some MPC&A practices, and there are signs that Russian sites receive funding for nuclear material security, though it is unlikely that Russian funding is sufficient to account for the loss of U.S. financial support.”
• “Experts stated that it is likely that Russian sites have maintained nuclear material security systems to protect against threats from outsiders, but it is unlikely that sites are adequately protecting against the threat from insiders.
• “[T]here may be opportunities for limited future cooperation between the two countries to help improve Russian nuclear material security. … However, any potential cooperation faces considerable challenges … cooperation is challenged by current U.S. law, which generally prohibits NNSA from funding nuclear security activities in Russia; by Russian antagonism toward U.S. proposals to improve nuclear material security internationally; and by Russian conditions for cooperation that the United States has not been willing to meet.”

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

New Cold War/saber rattling:

• No significant developments.

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant developments.

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms control:

“Extend a Nuclear Arms Treaty,” Andrei Kozyrev, New York Times, 03.01.20: The author, a former Russian foreign minister, writes:

• “Madeleine Albright and Igor Ivanov attribute challenges in U.S.-Russian relations to ‘the political climates in Washington and Moscow’ and call for extension of the New START treaty. While President Trump’s foreign policy is flawed in many ways, it cannot be put on the same scale as the Kremlin’s aggressive strategy.”
• “The decision to extend the New START treaty should be conditioned on a thorough assessment of the ongoing military buildup, especially in Russia, and be free from wishful thinking about the Kremlin’s behavior or the interests of the reality show in Washington.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

“Turkey Is a Mediocre NATO Ally, But Russia Is Enemy No. 1,” James Stavridis, Bloomberg, 02.28.20: The author, former supreme allied commander of NATO, writes:

• “Turkey and Syria seem headed into a war. In the Syrian city of Idlib, at least 33 Turkish soldiers have been killed by Syrian shelling—with assistance from Russia—and 18 Syrians were then killed in retaliatory strikes.”
• “Turkey has been opposed to Assad and aligned with some of the rebel forces for years; hence its deploying troops to Idlib. Like Putin, Erdogan is pursuing a larger strategy in the region. … Erdogan has hardly been an ideal ally recently … Still, the potential of a military collision between Russia and Turkey is of far greater concern for the NATO alliance. If the two nations’ troops end up in direct combat, Erdogan could call on the rest of NATO for assistance against a military great power.”
• “This time, with significant land forces in close proximity and active combat underway, the chances of a miscalculation are far higher. … From an alliance perspective, there are a handful of actions that might ease tensions and avoid an open conflict triggering Article 5 … The top NATO brass and Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg need to meet with their Turkish counterparts and make the case for doing everything to avoid Russian forces on the battlefield.”
• “NATO can provide … ‘deconfliction’ between Russian and Turkish forces by providing high-level intelligence about Russian troop deployments and intentions. It can also technically assist Turkey with developing preventative protocols to avoid combat with Russia. … Most important perhaps, the U.S. must let Moscow know in no uncertain terms that the consequences of combat operations against Turkish troops would include further sanctions and greater military support for Turkey in accordance with the NATO treaty.”
• “Clearly, there needs to be a global response to the violence in Idlib … [T]hings would get immeasurably worse for everyone in the case of a full-blown NATO-Russia confrontation. Without nuanced U.S. and NATO efforts to both rein in and protect the interests of their fractious Turkish ally, that isn’t an unthinkable result.”

Cyber security:

• No significant developments.

Elections interference:

“Election Mirage: Why Claims of Russian Meddling Should Be Questioned,” David B. Rivkin, Jr. and George Beebe, The National Interest, 02.28.20: The authors, a constitutional lawyer and the vice president and director of studies at the Center for the National Interest, write:

• “[I]f press reports are accurate, the briefer [who informed the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that Russia is interfering in the 2020 election] cited no direct evidence of meddling on Trump’s behalf or of Russia’s broader intentions regarding U.S. presidential elections. Rather, the case was apparently based on inferences … Such inferences were evidently reinforced by an assessment, lacking in analytical merit but redolent with politics, that the Kremlin would somehow naturally favor Trump over other 2020 presidential candidates.”
• “Should intelligence overseers in Congress, the White House and media subject the judgments of professional analysts to tough scrutiny? History says yes. … The difficulty in grasping intentions is particularly acute when it comes to foreign influence operations. … [G]iven the past record of intelligence failures … the notion that the judgments of the Intelligence Community about Russian intentions virtually delivered in real-time today should be accepted without skepticism is nothing short of risible.”
• “There is no doubt that Russians are continuing to post digital news and social media content aimed at American audiences. It is also clear that Russian hackers have targeted American electoral databases and vote-counting systems in the past. What is less clear are the motivations that lie behind this activity.”
• “That it is aimed at securing the victory or defeat of any particular candidate or party is an unproven hypothesis at best. The Kremlin cannot fail to realize that any significant pro-Trump meddling would be exposed and would hurt rather than help his electoral prospects.”
• “All of this argues for considerable caution when it comes to assessing Russian actions and intentions toward the 2020 elections. … [W]hat we do know suggests that the IC has not demonstrated sufficient analytic caution or political acumen in addressing this important subject. … The winner in this deepening struggle between the White House and the intelligence world is not yet clear. But the loser is already evident: American national security.”

“Sanders Hints the ‘Bernie Bros’ Could Be Russian Bots,” Courtney Weaver and Hannah Murphy, Financial Times, 02.28.20: The authors, correspondents for the news outlet, write;

• “When confronted by accusations his followers were waging an ugly campaign online against fellow Democrats who questioned his policies, Bernie Sanders suggested someone other than his fans may be behind the attacks: the Kremlin. The Vermont senator’s allegation has been bolstered by reports that US officials briefed him on Russian attempts to help his campaign. … Sanders has publicly disavowed such efforts.”
• “Mr. Sanders’ rivals insist there is evidence that the bad behavior is more than just a Russian plot and is being carried out by over-enthusiastic activists who should be reined in by the Sanders campaign. … Thus far during the 2020 campaign, there has only been one report published by Facebook attributing falsified pro-Sanders online postings to a Russian source. That fairly small campaign … involved some fake accounts posing as Sanders supporters, others as Trump supporters. However, a report by research group Graphika suggested that what these accounts had in common was that they were aimed at former vice-president Joe Biden, … known for his anti-Russian foreign policy stance.”
• “Since October Facebook has reviewed reports made by an independent researcher of Russian pro-Sanders content, but was unable to substantiate them. Otherwise, both Facebook and Twitter have said they had not found any evidence of Russia-backed pro-Bernie disinformation, and had not been briefed by U.S. officials on any such campaigns.”
• “Should Mr. Sanders become the Democratic nominee, his legitimacy could also be called into question, just as Mr. Trump’s has been. ‘Now you have two candidates—potentially Bernie moves on and becomes the Democratic nominee—who are both tarnished by this,” said [Alina] Polyakova, [president and chief executive of the Center for European Policy Analysis]. ‘From the Russian perspective, this is great because you have two candidates that could be framed as being illegitimate because the Russians have—quote, unquote—helped them be elected,’ she said.”

“Foreign Interference Starts at Home,” Hans Kundnani, Foreign Policy, 02.24.20: The author, a senior research fellow at Chatham House, writes:

• “Despite the foreign-policy establishment’s newfound interest in democracy within the West, the focus of nearly all of these projects is on ‘foreign interference’ in Western democracies and on the role of digital technology—particularly social media—in undermining them. Many of the new democracy projects are about the nexus of ‘foreign interference’ and technology.”
• “[T]his focus tends to externalize an internal problem and has produced a flawed and frustrating debate among foreign-policy think tanks about the crisis, which suggests that our democracies were in great shape before the Chinese and Russians and social media ruined everything.”
• “It isn’t so much that these projects are wrong in their claims about what the Chinese and Russians are doing and why—though democracy hawks are often a bit forgetful, or in denial, about the way in which the West itself developed many of the techniques that China and Russia are now adapting and updating, albeit for different purposes. … What China and Russia are currently doing can be thought of as ‘authoritarianism promotion,’ a response to Western ‘democracy promotion.’”
• “Foreign-policy analysts talk endlessly about how China and Russia seek to exploit and exacerbate divisions in Western societies, but say almost nothing about where these divisions come from. Instead of engaging in difficult questions about the causes of the crisis, democracy hawks reduce it to a problem of ‘populism’ supported by authoritarian states.”
• “In particular, [democracy hawks] do not seem interested in thinking about why our societies are so vulnerable to Chinese and Russian ‘interference.’ Rather than figuring out how to make our democracies stronger, it is as if they just want to use ‘democracy’ as a tool in the strategic competition with China and Russia. … if we are serious about “defending,” “protecting,” or “securing” democracy, we need to go beyond foreign policy.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Vladimir Putin’s Virus: How the Russian president has infected our national trust,” David Von Drehle, The Washington Post, 03.02.20: The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “This fever of mistrust is the desired symptom of a powerful virus … that Russia has planted in the operating system of American democracy. At little cost and with surprising ease, Vladimir Putin and his government have exploited partisanship and social media to serve Russia’s long-term goal of weakening the West by encouraging disorder and disunity. … [T]he very existence of a Russian chaos project has itself become a partisan wedge.”
• “Millions of us are unsure whether elections will be free and fair, whether the news we consume is real or fake, whether our foreign policy serves national or personal interests. This is a massive victory for America’s enemies. A climate of mutual suspicion at home erodes our ability to affect events abroad. … Putin has watered this invasive species for much of the past decade. Seizing opportunities on the lawless frontiers of social media, the Russian leader has stoked division, spread disinformation, fanned conspiracy theories and generally mind-gamed the American system.”
• “Russia succeeded once before in turning America on itself. At the start of the atomic age, the discovery that some Americans with access to nuclear secrets were Russian spies helped set off a wild hunt for communists in the federal government—a fever of mistrust known as McCarthyism.”
• “It’s fitting that Putin’s battlefield of choice is the Internet. In geopolitics, as in business, digital communications have upended the distribution of power. When everyone is a potential broadcaster and information spreads instantly, it’s much easier to tear stuff down than to build it up. Putin is a disrupter; he seeks to break the West’s monopoly.”
• “As we launch fully into the competition over who will lead the nation for the next four years, we have to ask ourselves whether we’re going to resist Putin’s game or play it for him. Will we believe the worst about one another? Will we amplify the anger? Will we deepen the rifts and aggravate the fault lines? Will we finish Putin’s gambit all by ourselves?”

“Putin Would Hate President Bernie Sanders,” Michelle Goldberg, New York Times, 02.24.20: The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “On [Feb. 21], The Washington Post reported that U.S. officials had briefed Bernie Sanders that Russia was trying to boost his fortunes in the Democratic primary fight, as it did in 2016. … Russia’s investment in Donald Trump has paid off handsomely, and the country’s leaders evidently believe, just as many American pundits do, that Sanders would be Trump’s weakest opponent … But if … Sanders becomes president, Putin may live to regret what his country did to build support for him.”
• “Sanders has gone further than several of his rivals in defining his foreign policy in opposition to plundering autocrats. … [A]t times Sanders has been embarrassingly credulous about communist regimes. But Russia hasn’t been communist in decades, and it is Trump, not Sanders, who fawns over Putin and other despots … Sanders, by contrast, believes that American foreign policy should be oriented around expanding democracy in the face of what he called ‘a new authoritarian axis.’”
• “Under Trump, the U.S. has abandoned the pretense of backing democracy and human rights, meaning there are no longer any great powers that even pretend to put morality at the center of foreign affairs. … If Sanders was elected president, that could change. His unlikely ascendance would be a blow against the corrosive cynicism in which authoritarianism thrives. … If enough Americans unite across racial lines to replace Trump with a Jewish socialist, it might mean that our country is figuring out how to transcend the illiberalism of our age. I still find it difficult to believe that Sanders can pull it off. But if he does, Putin won’t be pleased for long.”

“Why Does Congress Not Care About Normalizing Relations With Russia?,” Daniel Shapiro and Arthur Martirosyan, Russia Matters, 02.26.20: The authors, a graduate student at Harvard University and a senior consultant with CMPartners, write:

• “[E]ven when relations between Washington and post-Soviet Moscow were relatively good, one of the factors that made executive-level attempts at further improvements unsustainable was skepticism, or sometimes outright hostility, on the part of the U.S. Congress. Whether under the Clinton, Bush, Obama or Trump administrations, Capitol Hill has shown a persistent ‘reticence toward normalizing relations with Russia.’”
• “An obvious question seems to be why—considering that Russia is a rival whose arsenal could annihilate America within hours—do the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives seem to have no stake in normalizing the bilateral relationship? This article attempts to parse some of the major reasons for this.”
• “Based on our research, in addition to the aforementioned U.S. grievances (over Russia’s meddling in the 2016 presidential race, intervention in Ukraine and other issues), these reasons include: complacency in Congress about the risk of a ‘hot’ war with Russia … the tremendous lobbying power on Capitol Hill of the U.S. military-industrial sector, which sees Russia as both a geopolitical adversary and an economic competitor; generally weak U.S.-Russian economic ties … lawmakers’ doubts about President Donald Trump’s relationship with Russia, as well as their skepticism toward Moscow dating back to Cold War days; the lack of any meaningful Russia caucus in Congress, while other ethnopolitical lobbies in the U.S. have fought against improved relations with Russia; and the Kremlin’s own seeming struggle to figure out how to engage effectively with lawmakers on Capitol Hill.”

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Putin Needs to Shake Up the CEOs Who Run Russia’s Economy,” Henry Foy, Financial Times, 02.26.20: The author, Moscow bureau chief for the news outlet, writes:

• “When Vladimir Putin resolved last month to take action aimed at kick-starting lackluster gross domestic product growth in Russia, he did what most national leaders do: he sacked a few politicians and reshuffled the ranks of those who, at least in theory, manage the country’s $1.6 trillion economy.”
• “Shaking up the cozy cabal of men appointed to run Russia’s biggest state-controlled companies would have sent a stronger signal of intent. Through state-owned funds and the central bank, Russia’s government controls four of the country’s five biggest companies, and dozens more of the largest employers, investors and lenders. It is practically impossible to live in Russia and not be a customer, client or creditor of the state-owned giants that dominate the key sectors of the economy. 
• “[T]he men … who run these companies and their colossal balance sheets typically boast tenures to rival popes, let alone ministers. Alexei Miller, chief executive of gas producer Gazprom, … has been in that post for 19 years. … Igor Sechin has run Rosneft … since 2012. Aeroflot … has been headed by Vitaly Savelyev since 2009. Russia’s two top banks, Sberbank and VTB, have been run by the same men for a cumulative 31 years.”
• “Personnel changes, especially at the very top of companies, are rarely useful simply for the sake of change, and new blood does not always mean new strategies, or indeed improved strategies. But long-lasting chief executives often fall into the traps of conservatism, lethargy and routine, alongside building a coterie of admiring and loyal—but otherwise useless—advisers around them.”
• “Shuffling ministers is one thing, but replacing those in control of the largest corporate purse strings would send a far stronger message that business as usual is no longer acceptable.”

“Coronavirus Is Dashing Putin’s Big Plan to Revive Russian Growth,” Natasha Doff, Bloomberg, 03.02.20: The author, an editor for the news outlet, writes:

• “Russian President Vladimir Putin was counting on his new government to lead an economic revival this year to boost his flagging popularity ratings. The global spread of coronavirus may be about to upend his carefully constructed plan.”
• “Oil prices plummeted the most in more than a decade last week and the ruble dropped. Russia’s biggest trading partners, China and the European Union, are facing slowdowns or even recession. Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said that the country is bleeding about 1 billion rubles ($15.3 million) a day in losses from its trade with China.”
• “Five years of austerity and reserve-building mean that Russia still easily has enough money to cover the planned spending even if oil prices keep falling, but the risk is that any impact on growth will be more than offset by the global trade slowdown.”
• “Putin is under pressure to boost living standards … He appointed a new cabinet in January and laid out a plan to boost spending by about 1.3 percent of gross domestic product this year, hoping to finally boost growth solidly above 2 percent. Instead, the stimulus may end up simply taking the edge off a bigger downturn triggered by the global slowdown.”

“Thousands Rally in Moscow Against Putin’s Plans to Revamp Political Power in Russia,” Ann Simons, Wall Street Journal, 02.29.20: The author, Moscow bureau chief for the news outlet, writes:

• “Thousands of people attended a rally in the Russian capital to commemorate a slain opposition leader in a rebuke to what they see as Vladimir Putin’s plans to stay in power once his final term as president expires. Saturday’s [Feb. 29] march was the biggest opposition gathering since Mr. Putin’s announced proposals to dilute the power of the president and boost the role of the State Council, a supervisory body that he already heads. If he succeeds in getting the council listed as an arm of the executive branch, then it is potentially a way for Mr. Putin to retain control and guide policy was his term as president expires in 2024.”
• “Saturdays’ demonstration, while ostensibly a rally to mark the murder in 2015 of Boris Nemtsov, one of Mr. Putin’s most vocal critics, was a sign that the Russian president is facing at least some opposition against his latest maneuver. More than 48,700 people have so far signed an online petition against ‘a constitutional coup and usurpation of power.’”
• “A national referendum on the constitutional changes is scheduled for April 22. The amendments will include proposals to improve social policy and public administration. Voters will be asked to approve the revised constitution as a whole, rather than endorsing individual amendments, meaning they would only see the new social policy if they vote for all the other changes, including those altering the power and the structure of the government.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant developments.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“With Friends Like These: The Kremlin’s Far-Right and Populist Connections in Italy and Austria,” Andrew S. Weiss, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 02.27.20: The author, he James Family Chair and vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes:

• “Russian foreign policy across Europe is multidimensional and multifaceted. Yet the Kremlin’s relationships with Italy and Austria shine a spotlight on how Europe’s domestic troubles have opened many doors for the Kremlin. At the same time, Moscow’s deep political, economic and cultural ties to Rome and Vienna … stretch back to the Cold War era.”
• “The Kremlin has long capitalized on well-established and reliable ways of cultivating pro-Russian Italian and Austrian elites, even though Italy and Austria remain firmly planted in the West. The rise of far-right and populist parties in both countries has created additional openings for Moscow to exploit based on their pro-Russian rhetoric, suspicion of Brussels and signs of corruption. Yet, in brief experiments with power, recent Italian and Austrian governments that included far-right and populist parties demonstrated the limits of what Moscow can gain in Europe, at least for now. A better understanding of these limits can help Western policymakers and analysts avoid misperceiving or overexaggerating the extent of Russian inroads and frame more effective policy responses.”
• “Russia’s relationships with Italy and Austria can create challenges for Washington, especially in a newly proclaimed era of great power competition. Neither country will see eye to eye with the United States on how to deal with Russia, and Moscow will be happy to emphasize and exploit any differences that emerge. But understanding Moscow’s wants, its ability to appeal to Rome and Vienna, and the limits of Russian influence can help Washington deal with differences in a measured, strategic way. … Three guiding principles should shape how the United States views Italy and Austria’s relations with Russia: Do no harm … Be realistic and focus on what matters … Keep the far-right in perspective.”

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

“Russia and China: Axis of Revisionists?” Angela Stent, Brookings Institution, February 2020: The author, director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies and a professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University, writes:

• “The China-Russia relationship has become an increasingly robust, pragmatic strategic partnership since 2014, in part because the United States is pursuing policies that have driven the two countries closer together. … China and Russia are revisionist powers in as much as they share a commitment to creating a ‘post-West’ global order which takes their interests into account and is conducive to authoritarian rule.”
• “China is economically more important to Russia than vice versa and is Russia’s number one trading partner and the second-largest purchaser of Russian military hardware. The new Power of Siberia gas pipeline will increase their energy interdependence. Sino-Russian cooperation in the military and high-tech fields is also growing. Their joint military exercises and air patrols, as well as joint work on artificial intelligence and biotechnology pose challenges to the United States.”
• “There are significant asymmetries in the relationship, and mutual mistrust remains, especially in Russia’s rapidly depopulating Far East, where Chinese traders and entrepreneurs are abundant. Nevertheless, Russia appears to have accepted its role as a junior partner to China. This is in part because China, unlike the United States, is not perceived to represent a threat to Putin’s rule.”
• “Those who believe that Russia would be willing to distance itself from China and align itself with Washington against Beijing underestimate the extent to which China’s unequivocal support of Russia’s domestic system is an existential issue for the Putin regime.”
• “[T]he twin U.S. policies of sanctioning Russia and pursuing a trade war with China have pushed the two countries closer together. Washington could promote closer ties to Russia by lifting sanctions, extending the New START treaty and even modifying its stance on the Ukraine conflict. But it is unlikely that this would lead Russia to distance itself from China.”

Ukraine:

“The Price of Peace in the Donbass,” Thomas Graham and Joseph Haberman, Foreign Affairs, 02.25.20: The authors, a distinguished fellow and a research associate for Russia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, write:

• “Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has staked his presidency on ending the war against Moscow-backed insurgents in the Donbass … in a manner that will not break his country apart or invite further Russian interference. … Under the terms of the Minsk agreement, … a settlement that both preserves Ukraine’s sovereignty and restores its territorial integrity is near impossible.”
• “The [Minsk] agreement grants the two self-declared separatist republics in the Donbass a constitutionally guaranteed ‘special status’ … cementing these areas’ position as separate from the rest of the country. … [T]he agreement stipulates that the breakaway regions will hold local elections before the central government regains control of Ukraine’s eastern border with Russia. … Malign forces within Ukraine, beholden to a belligerent neighbor, would remain capable of exploiting its divisions to undermine the country’s sovereignty and subvert its efforts to build a modern liberal state.”
• “Zelenskiy has tried to head off this eventuality by introducing legislation of his own on decentralization. … [T]o ensure the integrity of local elections in the Donbass, Zelenskiy has demanded that they be conducted only after Kyiv regains control of its border and Russian forces have withdrawn. Unfortunately, Zelenskiy’s effort … has been thwarted by Russian intransigence and Western fecklessness.”
• “Zelenskiy will have to consider alternatives. … The first is a grand bargain: a comprehensive settlement with Russia that extends beyond the Donbass to include other elements of the larger Ukraine crisis, such as Crimea. Another approach would be to disengage altogether from efforts to reestablish sovereignty over the Donbass. Each of these strategies has its own advantages and drawbacks.
• “[G]iven the range of forces arrayed against [Zelenskiy] and the lack of support from abroad, he should pursue whichever strategy he believes can best secure sovereignty, even at the expense of territorial integrity.” 

“The End of Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s Honeymoon,” Adrian Karatnycky and Alexander J. Motyl, Foreign Policy, 02.26.20: The authors, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark, write:

• “Despite continued foreign and domestic enthusiasm over Ukraine’s new direction, Zelenskiy is now facing a grim reality: Dramatic change in Ukraine is difficult, yet public expectations are high. As the new president struggles to deliver on promises of radical change made during his campaign, confidence in his government is beginning to erode.”
• “To be sure, Zelenskiy has already launched reforms that used to be unthinkable in Ukraine. … But despite these accomplishments, many of the promises on which Zelenskiy ran are encountering resistance. Ukraine needs a thorough overhaul of its legal system if it wants to tackle endemic corruption—yet it remains to be seen whether mass firings in the prosecutor’s office and changes in the security services will help. … The economy also hasn’t improved.
• “What’s more, a major source of Zelenskiy’s popularity was his promise to do whatever it takes to secure a peace deal with Russia. That promise, however, is coming up against Russian President Vladimir Putin’s unacceptable demand that Ukraine surrender part of its sovereignty over the Donbass, which would perpetuate de facto Russian control over the region.”
• “To avoid derailing his presidency, Zelensky therefore needs to quickly refocus. First, he has to secure his power base in parliament to pass critical legislation. … Second, Zelensky should pivot on his promise to end the war with Russia and its separatist allies as soon as possible. … Third, despite continued moderate economic growth, Ukraine needs a game-changer to recharge and accelerate its economy.”
• “Zelensky’s chances, should he seize them, are still good. Despite his administration’s missteps and attacks from his enemies, he can still count on broad support among Ukrainians. His approval rating, while down from 74 percent a few months ago, was still at a decent 49 percent in February.”

“Ukraine’s Recovery Is a Headache for Putin,” Editorial Board, Financial Times, 02.27.20: The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Guided by its reformist president and parliament, Ukraine is emerging from the downturn that followed its revolution and Russia’s military intervention almost exactly six years ago. Some experts believe it has the best chance in years of an economic take-off.”
• “Kyiv last month placed €1.25 billion of debt at an interest rate of just 4.37 percent — about half what it cost Ukraine to borrow a year or so ago. Helped by a 17 percent gain in the currency, the hryvnia, last year, foreign reserves in January reached their highest since 2012. Public debt has fallen from 81 percent of output in 2016 to 51 percent.”
• “Two potential risks loom. One … is that the corrupting hold of Ukraine’s powerful oligarchs on the political class again derails reform. … The bigger risk comes from a vengeful Kremlin. Watching Ukraine grow faster than Russia … after it replaced its leaders in free elections last year is uncomfortable for Vladimir Putin … Without peace in east Ukraine on terms Kyiv can accept, the recent rise in fighting is a reminder of the levers Moscow can still pull.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant developments.