This Week’s Highlights:

• Talk of a new Cold War ignores how much the U.S. is still working with Russia on key global security concerns, write Michael O’Hanlon of Brookings and RAND’s Sean Zeigler. They also argue that bringing Ukraine and Georgia into NATO would be a mistake; instead, Eastern Europe needs a new security concept that would enhance security short of alliance membership.
• Tukey’s purchase of the S-400 from Russia is part of evidence indicating that in the long run, Erdogan and the ruling AKP are betting that a neutrally aligned foreign policy will better serve Turkey’s interests, writes Aaron Stein of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. According to Stein, Ankara doesn’t think its relationship with Washington is nearly as valuable as Washington seems to think it is.
• Russia’s relations with the U.S. will be competitive while Russia’s relations with the EU hold greater potential for rebuilding, Carnegie’s Dmitri Trenin predicts in his new book. The future of Russia’s entente with China will depend on Moscow’s ability to keep the relationship on an even keel, Trenin argues, and should Moscow feel that Beijing is poised to gain the upper hand, Russia’s attitude toward its partner will sour.
• Putin’s approval ratings, despite being lower than he might like, have stabilized, suggesting that Russians have largely accepted their economic plight as a “new normal,” writes Andrei Kolesnikov of the Carnegie Moscow Center. However, that does not mean that Russians are willing to accept other “normal” behaviors by their government, Kolesnikov argues. Russians continue to fight for their government to treat them with the dignity and respect they deserve, he writes.
• It is unclear if the Ukrainian president understands that the true source of his popular support is the desire for normalcy with Russia, writes Prof. Nicolai N. Petro. It is also unclear if Volodymyr Zelensky can avoid the trap of nationalism that has alienated at least half the country, a path that will lead to endless civil conflict, according to Petro. Dialogue with Russia requires an entirely different mindset, Petro argues, one that Ukrainians may be ready to embrace even if their political leaders are not.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

“Call Iran's Bluff With an Offer of Nuclear Power,” Lindsey Graham and Jack Keane, Wall Street Journal, 07.14.19: The authors, a U.S. Senator and the chairman of the Institute for the Study of War, write:

• “Before we reach the point at which military conflict is inevitable, we hope the Trump administration will consider a simple, clear proposal. Iran could be allowed—in concert with their Arab neighbors—to operate reactors and produce nuclear power. If Iran wants peaceful nuclear power, fine. But under this plan, the regime would not have the ability to enrich, reprocess or fabricate its own nuclear fuel.”
• “Since the Iranians don't trust the U.S., other countries—Russia, China, European states—could supply the fuel rods for producing peaceful nuclear energy. The U.S. could begin supplying fuel rods for nuclear reactors throughout the Arab world. Dozens of nations already operate under similar nuclear frameworks.”

“Russia's Real Reasons for Partnering With Iran,” Nadya Glebova, The National Interest, 07.13.19: The author, a fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, writes:

• “Due to Iran's proximity to its borders, Russia has a vested interest in the state of affairs in Western Asia; it has tried its best to contain the impact that the U.S.-Iranian crisis could have on its own national security. As a result, the foreign policy Russia has applied toward the crisis can be divided into three main areas of focus.”
• “The first … is directly related to the size of Russia’s Muslim population and its ability to influence political processes in the country … The second … is concentrated on the areas that Russia sees as a part of its sphere of influence, such as post-Soviet countries like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Armenia and other countries … where Moscow is very popular especially among some political and economic elites.”
• “The third … is connected with overlapping humanitarian and economic concerns that impact both Russia and Iran. … Russian-Iranian educational and cultural projects have doubled since the Trump administration announced its strategy for Iran. … Economic ties between these two countries have been strengthening over the past few years, with bilateral trade reaching $2 billion in 2018.”
• “Although Moscow’s leaders have valid concerns about the Middle East, they continue to see the benefits of maintaining strategic partnerships with various countries in the region. It is through these partnerships that they hope to gauge how much the Trump administration is willing to pay in order to achieve its goals.”

New Cold War/saber rattling:

“No, We Aren't on the Brink of a New Cold War With Russia and China,” Michael O’Hanlon and Sean Zeigler, USA Today, 07.12.19: The authors, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, write:

• “[I]t has become common to hear talk of a new Cold War with great-power rivals. But this way of thinking is imprecise at best, dangerous at worst. A distinguished group of American experts has just warned against such thinking in regard to China, lest it create a self-fulfilling prophecy. … [W]e need a similar corrective for how we think about Russia.”
• “The dangers and fallacies of thinking in Cold-War, zero-sum and military-first policies towards Russia are several-fold. First, today's Russia … has nothing like the global ambitions of the Soviet Union. Second, a Cold-War-like attitude ignores how much we are still working with Russia on key global security concerns.”
• “Third, … [NATO] remains impressive. … NATO would do well to make its reinforcement capabilities for this region more robust, but it is hard to see Mr. Putin really believing he could get away with an all-out invasion, even today.”
• “Fourth, European nations do not get enough credit for … sustaining their sanctions on Russia as a result of its aggressions against Ukraine. And finally, thinking in Cold-War terms can blind us to the need to debate some of our own policies, where there may be opportunities to defuse U.S.-Russia tensions with creative ideas.”
• “A case in point is the future of NATO expansion, especially into former Soviet republics. Since 2008, NATO has officially promised to bring Ukraine and Georgia into the alliance at … That would be a mistake. … We need to work out a new concept for security in eastern Europe that would enhance their security short of alliance membership … The world is unsettled, and risky, yes. But those who liken the contemporary environment to the Cold War may have forgotten how profoundly dangerous most of the latter period really was.”

NATO-Russia relations:

“Why Turkey Turned Its Back on the United States and Embraced Russia. A Rift That Began in Iraq and Syria Now Threatens to Divide NATO,” Aaron Stein, Foreign Affairs, 07.09.19: The author, director of the Middle East Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, writes:

• “U.S. support for Kurdish militias in Syria has cemented that view in Ankara, driving Turkey into Russia’s arms and raising questions about the country’s commitment to NATO. … Ankara’s pivot toward Moscow wasn’t a foregone conclusion. Russia has a long history of meddling in Turkish affairs.”
• “Ironically, Turkey’s cooperation with Russia came about only because Moscow successfully routed Ankara-backed proxies on the Syrian battlefield … in late 2015 and early 2016, Russia cut off Ankara’s access to that city [Aleppo], which had been a focus of Turkish efforts to pressure Assad since the beginning of the war. The outcome effectively knocked Turkey out of the conflict, necessitating a downsizing of Turkish ambitions in Syria to a narrow focus on refugees and the Kurds.”
• “Ankara realized that it would have to work with Moscow to manage the flow of refugees from conflict-affected areas. … At the same time, Russia has emerged as Turkey’s most reliable military partner in Syria.”
• “Russia is also Turkey’s best avenue through which to influence an eventual peace settlement, and potentially even a new Syrian constitution, both of which would give Ankara an opportunity to frustrate Kurdish ambitions for self-rule in the northeast. Turkey, meanwhile, will likely have to oversee the surrender of opposition militias it has backed as part of any peace deal. This reality has given rise to a symbiotic Russian-Turkish relationship in which each side needs the other to settle the conflict.”
• “All of this helps to explain Turkey’s embrace of the S-400. … In the long run, Erdogan and the ruling AKP are betting that a neutrally aligned foreign policy will better serve their interests, both in Syria and with the Kurdish insurgency at home. Simply put, they don’t think their relationship with Washington is nearly as valuable as Washington seems to think it is.”

“Erdogan Takes Putin Over NATO,” Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, 07.15.19: The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Turkey has begun taking delivery of the S-400 air-defense missile system from Russia, despite U.S. warnings about potential sanctions. … At a minimum this should mean the end of Turkey's participation in the F-35 fighter program.”
• “It's true that a Turkey-NATO breakup is a Vladimir Putin goal in promoting the S-400 sale. The U.S. could lose access to the air base at Incirlik, and Turkey could roll up the Kurdish forces in Syria who helped the U.S. defeat the Islamic State caliphate. Though Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan wants to rule forever, eventually he'll be gone and his successor might rethink his hostility to the West. That's the case for stopping short of NATO expulsion.”
• “But Mr. Erdogan has to suffer some consequences, or the obligations of an alliance shrink to nothing.”

“US Sanctions and Turkey’s Purchase of Russia’s S-400 Air Defense System,” Jarod Taylor, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 07.12.19: The author, an independent analyst, writes:

• “With S-400 components arriving in Turkey, the threshold for CAATSA sanctions has likely already passed. However, despite the clarity that secondary sanctions should be applied, there is little clarity on how quick, forceful or broad the imminent sanctions will be. Both the U.S. executive and legislative branches of government have a role in deciding the tempo of action against Turkey’s entities doing business with designated Russian sanctions targets.”
• “Ultimately, the way this critical period unfolds will not only influence the strained bilateral relations for years to come, but it will also indicate how the U.S. government seeks to wield its financial power in the era of renewed strategic competition. Turkey is not the only ally courting Russia for access to advanced military technology; it is merely the first to follow through on its contracts with Moscow.”

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

• No significant commentary.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

“Why Countries Target Civilians Indiscriminately,” Anna O. Pechenkina, The Washington Post, 07.09.19: The author, an assistant professor of political science, writes:

• “When Syria and Russia intensified their Idlib offensive in May, there was condemnation from United Nations officials and other countries, as well as renewed media scrutiny. Cluster and barrel bombs targeted hospitals and residential areas, killing 300 civilians and displacing 300,000 in just five weeks.”
• “Attacks on civilians are not unique to Syria—consider, for instance, the actions of the Israeli, Ukrainian and Saudi Arabian governments. Policymakers and scholars tend to agree that targeting civilians backfires, because those who survive often start cooperating with insurgents … Why do governments launch counterproductive indiscriminate attacks?”
• “One possible answer is that civilians themselves may see government targeting of other civilians as justified. Governments work hard to create the perception of the dangers of rebel provocation.”
• “We found that civilians living in relative safety tended to act as rather cynical endorsers of government attacks on other citizens. If the domestic public … is insulated from violence, governments probably can avoid public disapproval if their indiscriminate response produces civilian casualties.”
• “We think it's possible that even competent governments could choose this strategy—as long as they believe they can insulate their core supporters from violence.”

Cyber security:

“Russian ITC Security Policy and Cybercrime,” Alexander Sukharenko, PONARS Eurasia, July 2019: The author, director of the Center for the Study of New Challenges and Threats to the Russian Federation, writes:

• “Hundreds of thousands of cybercrimes are registered annually with associated financial losses estimated at several billion dollars. … Statistical analysis highlights the high rate of criminalization of the digital sphere in Russia. Over the past 17 years … the general number of crimes committed using computerized telecommunications technologies increased from 1,300 to 174,674. … The majority … are listed as fraud (52 percent), theft (19 percent) and drug trafficking (11 percent).”
• “However, crimes identified by law enforcement agencies illustrate only the surface of this dark iceberg. According to a poll of 500 Russian companies from eight federal districts by the National Agency for Financial Research (NAFR), half faced cyber threats.”
• “[T]he number of persons prosecuted in Russia is insignificant compared to the scale of this segment of crime. … The main reasons for the lack of arrests persist: its transnational nature (anonymity), evolving criminal technical toolkits, a lack of ITC-qualified law enforcement officers and thorough, fast, cooperative investigative techniques. This means that ever-increasing domestic attention and global cooperation—both of which Moscow is trying to do—are required to minimize the scale of cyber threats that plague the ITC environments around which modern national economies revolve.”

Elections interference:

“The Evolution of a Russian Troll: Alexander Malkevich, whose employees were detained in Libya, is part of Moscow’s efforts to create a ‘concert of chaos’ around the globe,” Amy Mackinnon, Foreign Policy, 07.10.19: The author, a staff writer for the magazine, writes:

• “Last summer, when the Russian media manager Alexander Malkevich came to Washington to launch a news website called USA Really—reported to be linked to the infamous Russian troll factory … he did not receive a warm welcome. He was ejected from his office near the White House—a WeWork rental—within hours of arriving, and Facebook and Twitter blocked access to the website.”
• “During another trip to Washington for the U.S. midterms in November 2018, Malkevich was detained for questioning at Washington’s Dulles Airport and the next month was added to the U.S. sanctions list for attempted election interference.”
• “But that hasn’t stopped him. … Last week, Bloomberg reported that two of Malkevich’s employees had been detained in Libya in May and were accused of seeking to influence elections in the country. … In an interview with Foreign Policy … Malkevich confirmed that the men had met with Qaddafi’s son but denied that they had sought to interfere in the country’s factious politics.”
• “Lee Foster of FireEye underscored the fact that just because Malkevich has turned his attention to Africa, it doesn’t mean that Russia has lost interest in political maneuvering in the United States. As for whether Russia will try to interfere ahead of the 2020 U.S. presidential election, he said it can be difficult to predict what will happen as Russia and other actors that engage in this type of behavior are always trying to refine their approach. Foster said it would be misguided to expect Russia to simply repeat the tactics it used in 2016.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Putin Declared That Liberalism Is Obsolete. Is He Right?” Robert J. Samuelson, The Washington Post, 07.08.19: The author, a journalist for the news outlet, writes:

• “It looks as if Vladimir Putin wants to be recalled as something besides being an aggressive autocrat. He yearns, it seems, to be seen as a leading political thinker, respected for his analysis as well as feared for his actions. This is a reasonable reading of Putin's recent interview with the Financial Times, which included his remarkable declaration that the ‘the liberal idea has become obsolete.’ What to make of this? For starters, let's give Putin his due.”
• “[H]e's a keen observer of the times. The post-World War II liberalism that he disparages is clearly under siege. … Economically, it's strapped for cash. … [E]conomic growth in the West has slowed. … [M]ost advanced societies are aging, which means they're committed to paying more in benefits for the elderly. … Finally, there are those pesky budget deficits.”
• “The trouble, professor Putin lectured to the Financial Times, is that many people have lost faith in the liberal idea. … Now, Putin and his fellow travelers, including President Trump and others, propose that we govern by fear: a dread of outsiders.”
• “One question in a 2016 Pew study asked whether increases in the number of ethnic groups, races and nationalities made their countries ‘a worse place to live.’ Large shares of Greeks (63 percent), Italians (53 percent) and Germans (31 percent) said ‘yes.’”
• “We are straddled between two systems. The daunting task is to salvage the best of postwar liberalism while, at the same time, acknowledging the importance of national identities and sovereignty. It may be a mission impossible.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“The Axis of Illiberalism That Threatens Europe,” Editorial Board, Financial Times, 07.15.19: The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Just as Vladimir Putin does not conceal his contempt for Western liberalism, so his far-right European friends make no secret of their admiration for the Russian president and his policies.”
• “The mutual backslapping of the Kremlin and the European far-right should not obscure the fact that Russian meddling in EU politics is ideologically fluid, not to say amoral. … The objectives are transparent: to sow divisions in European societies, to demoralize the public’s faith in liberal political systems and values, to promote Russophile tendencies and to undermine the united front that the EU has adopted towards Moscow, especially since the Kremlin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and intervention in eastern Ukraine.”
• “To be clear, the troubles of European democracies, like those of the U.S., are mainly homegrown. … Nonetheless the axis of illiberalism that unites Russia, Europe’s far-right, President Donald Trump and the U.S. alt-right represents a pernicious threat to the moderate European political order and the wellbeing of European societies.”
• “EU governments, institutions and legal systems can and must do a better job of repelling these assaults. … [T]hey should not hesitate to bring to book far-right politicians and parties if they are discovered to have broken the law … Second, they should make a stronger, more systematic effort to counter disinformation from Russia and the domestic far-right, and to educate citizens so that they recognize fake news … Lastly, EU sanctions on Russia should stay in place until Moscow stops destabilizing Ukraine.”

China:

“A Spy Case Exposes China's Power Play in Central Asia: Kazakhstan's leaders struggle to balance hunger for Chinese investment with fears of encroachment by their giant eastern neighbor,” Thomas Grove, Wall Street Journal, 07.10.19: The author, a reporter for the news outlet in Moscow, writes:

• “In a top-secret operation earlier this year, Kazakh counterintelligence officers swooped in on a Soviet-era apartment block and detained a senior government adviser on charges of spying for China. Months later, the authorities did something unusual. They allowed information about the case to leak in local media, a rare instance of open push back against Beijing's growing influence.”
• “The arrest of Konstantin Syroyezhkin—a former Soviet KGB agent accused of passing classified documents to Chinese agents … comes as Kazakhstan's leaders struggle to balance a hunger for Chinese investment with fears of encroachment by their giant eastern neighbor.”
• “‘China's presence in Kazakhstan, the investments they're making, it's become a divisive issue, and fears are growing that they're getting too powerful,’ said Ruslan Izimov, a China expert at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the capital of Nur-Sultan, which advises the Kazakh government.”
• “Among other things, Beijing recently lobbied Kazakhstan's government to allow Chinese security contractors to operate in Kazakh territory, … a thought anathema to the Kazakh security services. … In some instances, Chinese businessmen have demanded holdings in Kazakh companies to keep up the flow of loans for big projects.”
• “As many as a million Uighurs have been forced into re-education and labor camps, which doesn't sit well with Kazakhs, many of whom share cultural, linguistic and religious ties with the Uighurs. Some ethnic Kazakhs have also been interned in the camps.”

“The Limits of the Alliance Between China and Russia,” Yacqub Ismail, The National Interest, 07.10.19: The author, an editor at the International Policy Digest, writes:

• “Despite the fact that Sino-Russian relations are significantly improving on multiple strategic domains, this does not mean that differences do not exist. Severe differences in their worldviews and interests exist, indicating that their current partnership will not necessarily lead to a new Sino-Russian alliance or a Sino-Russian-centric world order.”
• “First, China’s growing influence has an impact on the core of what Russia considers its own sphere of influence. … Another area where there is the potential for Sino-Russian cooperation and competition in the future is the Arctic.”
• “For Russia, the order it is seeking entails a world with many poles, with power balanced among the major powers. But for China, a major power’s influence in the international system would be correlated to a nation’s economic heft.”
• “Though the Sino-Russian partnership is growing by the day and will continue to develop, and though both countries have something to gain from this ‘cooperative-competitive’ partnership, it ultimately benefits China at the expense of Russia. But creating a strategic alliance between the two countries that could challenge the current world order seems unfeasible.”

Ukraine:

“Will Nationalism Poison Ukraine's New President?” Nicolai N. Petro, The National Interest, 07.12.19: The author, a professor at the University of Rhode Island, writes:

• “As Poroshenko’s rhetoric became more nationalistic, his room for political maneuver shrank. … Ultimately, he lost his bid for re-election, and the stalemated parliament became the least trusted institution in Ukraine.”
• “Now, the parliament is up for re-election on July 21. The parliament plays an important role because it constrains the president in nearly all executive decisions, including the appointment of key government officials. By arguing that he cannot pursue the policies he wants because of the opposition of the current parliament, Zelensky’s makeshift party ‘Servant of the People’ has gained unprecedented support. It is now so far ahead in the polls that, for the first time in Ukrainian history, it might even be able to rule alone. … And still, no one has any idea what the president’s party actually stands for. Its haphazardly assembled leaders have voiced contradictory views on just about every major issue.”
• “On July 7 the Russian television channel Russia-24 and the Ukrainian television channel ‘NewsOne’ announced that they would hold a two-hour live studio discussion called ‘We Need to Talk’ on July 12. … The mere idea of engaging in a dialogue with Russians was attacked by nearly every political party. … Many now fear that what happened with NewsOne is a portent of what will happen should the government actually try to end the impasse in Eastern Ukraine through dialogue.”
• “It is unclear if Zelensky understands that the true source of his popular support is the desire for normalcy with Russia. It is unclear if he can avoid the trap of nationalism that has alienated at least half the country. Continuing along that path will lead to endless civil conflict. Dialogue requires an entirely different mindset, one that Ukrainians may be ready to embrace even if their political leaders are not.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“All Talk, No Action on Russia-Belarus Integration,” Artyom Shraibman, Carnegie Moscow Center, 07.11.19: The author, a journalist and political commentator, writes:

• “For many months, a group of dozens of officials from both countries [Russia and Belarus] has been working with the utmost secrecy. A road map for integration is due to be presented to the presidents by the end of this month, and if they approve it, action plans for specific areas of integration through 2022–2023 should be drawn up by November, according to the group’s Belarusian co-chair, Economy Minister Dmitry Krutoi.”
• “According to Krutoi, the countries’ positions on social issues, industry and financial markets ‘converge very closely.’ The most sensitive areas for Belarus are the banking sector and energy, along with the priority issue of agriculture: Minsk would like to see permanent guarantees of unfettered access to the Russian market for its produce. It’s not completely clear whether a single currency is being discussed seriously or not.”
• “Minsk and Moscow may sign a road map, but … that document will still run up against the same reality that thwarted all the previous attempts to turn a declaration into action. … The same will happen in any area in which the two sides decide to fully integrate. The trouble is that it’s impossible to create a single currency or unified customs, tariffs, taxes and excises, budget, financial markets, or agriculture without supranational institutes that would establish the rules of the game, resolve disputes and print the single currency. Someone has to head those institutes, and as soon as Minsk and Moscow get to this question, they start squabbling.”
• “The most the two sides can do without betraying their sovereign interests is to start coordinating their decisions on various sectors of the economy a little more closely, such as agreeing on a unified goal for the inflation rate. Then, if it’s really necessary, this can also be described as integration.”

“And Then There Was One: Three People Lived in This Village Until Two Were Murdered,” Patrick Kingsley, New York Times, 07.15.19: The author, an international correspondent for the news outlet, writes:

• “Thirty years ago, the village of Dobrusa in Moldova had about 200 residents. At the start of this year, it had just three. Then two were murdered. And now there is just one: Grisa Muntean, a short, mustachioed farmer often found in a flat-cap, a checked shirt and a ripped pair of blue trousers held up by a drawstring.”
• “Between 1990 and 2015, Eastern Europe’s population, fell by 18 million people, to 292 million. About one in four Moldovans lives abroad, according to estimates by the United Nations Development Program, while the resident population fell by 500,000 to 2.8 million between the censuses of 2004 and 2014.”

“Georgians Are Taking a Stand Against Vladimir Putin. Where Is the West?” Salome Samadashvili, The Washington Post, 07.12.19: The author, a member of the Georgian Parliament for the opposition United National Movement, writes:

• “Since 2012, the ruling Georgian Dream party has consolidated control over every state institution. Its shadowy financier—oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili …  is replicating Putin's system of rule. But in a country a hundred times smaller than Russia, the result looks more like state capture.”
• “And just as in Putin's Russia, the Georgian ruling party has escalated attacks on civil society, the political opposition and independent media. Instead of responding to constructive criticism, officials too often attack the messenger—deriding, for example, the anti-corruption organization Transparency International as ‘accomplices of fascism.’”
• “If Ivanishvili succeeds in destroying democracy, it would be Putin's victory and Georgia's tragedy. Moreover, it would be a loss for American and European interests in the region. Time and again, the people of Georgia have chosen the West. Now the West must choose Georgia. It is time to remind Ivanishvili that the West stands with the Georgian people—and that this support will continue, with or without him.”

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

Summary of Dmitri Trenin’s new book, “Russia,” Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 07.09.19: The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “Russia’s character is remarkably consistent, despite its potential to change rapidly … Russia can also be a phoenix: periodically, it burns itself down virtually completely, as in the early 17th century, in 1917 or 1991, before making a stunning comeback. … In Russia, the State—in whatever guise—is dominant; everything else revolves around it. … Geopolitically, Russia is an insecure and lonely power.”
• “These conclusions offer some insights into Russia’s post-Putin future … Post-Putin Russia will be different from what it is now, but hardly too different; it will be ruled by a new monarchical president, whose real authority will depend on how much confidence ordinary Russians will have in him.”
• “Russia’s political economy will have a corporate socio-political structure, with the Kremlin continuing to play the role of an arbiter among the principal vested interests … Russia’s society will gradually mature, but focus on the immediate issues at hand, from local corruption to health and education to urban development.”
• “Russia will continue to develop civic nationalism and will not surrender to Western pressure; and Russia will not be a superpower again, but it can be a key element of global equilibrium.”
• “Russia’s relations with the United States will be competitive, as is normal between major powers. … In contrast, Russia’s relations with the European Union hold greater potential for rebuilding … The future of Russia’s entente with China will turn on Moscow’s ability to keep the relationship on an even keel.”

“What Are Russians Protesting About?” Andrei Kolesnikov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 07.15.19: The author, a senior fellow and the chair of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “Former finance minister Alexei Kudrin … has warned that the country risks an ‘explosion’ of protests caused by declining living standards and widespread poverty. He is wrong. … In assessing today’s social unrest in Russia, Kudrin is confusing economic frustration with something much more fundamental: the struggle for dignity.”
• “The fact remains … that his [Putin’s] approval ratings, despite being lower than he might like, have stabilized, suggesting that Russians have largely accepted their economic plight as a ‘new normal.’ But that does not mean that Russians are willing to accept other ‘normal’ behaviors by their government.”
• “Consider the protests that erupted in May in Yekaterinburg … over government plans to build a new Orthodox cathedral in one of the city’s few remaining green areas. The issue was corruption, not economics or even religion … Then there were the protests spurred by the arrest of Ivan Golunov … The most impressive recent case of civil disobedience occurred in Russia’s far north, in Arkhangelsk Province. Upon learning (by chance) of government plans to ship garbage from Moscow to be buried in the region’s pristine forests … local people launched demonstrations that have lasted for a year and spread to neighboring regions.”
• “The Kremlin, it seems, isn’t quite sure how to navigate this new kind of resistance. And it is new. The Arkhangelsk protesters have demonstrated extraordinary firmness, professionalism and insight about Putin’s government. … [P]rotesters in Arkhangelsk—much like those in Yekaterinburg and even in Moscow—are simply people fighting for their government, finally, to treat them with the dignity and respect they deserve.”

“Russia’s FDI Outlook Grim, with No Chinese Rescue in Sight,” Nicholas Trickett, Russia Matters, 07.11.19: The author, editor in chief of BMB Russia and an associate scholar with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, writes:

• “Since its annexation of Crimea in 2014 Russia has seen foreign direct investment decline significantly. Western sanctions meant to punish Moscow … have certainly done their part to scare away foreign investors, but they were only one driver of the drop in FDI.”
• “Chinese investment—despite record-high trade between the two countries—is not making up for the shortfall and, as Russia’s investment climate continues to deteriorate, alternative sources of FDI aren’t forthcoming, notwithstanding a large spike in the first half of 2019.”
• “With the cash pie much smaller, and increasingly concentrated in state hands, competition among interest groups in Russia has gotten more vicious, with their lobbying further undermining policy coherence. Western money is not doing the talking in Moscow these days, so it seems, paradoxically, that by imposing sanctions on Russia the U.S. and its allies may have whittled away an instrument of leverage they once had.”

“Europe's Security Watchdog Reveals Key Evidence in the Nemtsov Murder Investigation,” Vladimir Kara-Murza, The Washington Post, 07.12.19: The author, chairman of the Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom and vice president of the Free Russia Foundation, writes:

• “[There has been a] potential breakthrough in the investigation of Russia's most high-profile political murder in recent memory, the 2015 assassination of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov—or, rather, it would have, if Russian law enforcement had any intention of investigating it seriously. The announcement … [was made] in Luxembourg, where the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) … held its first hearing on the Nemtsov case.”
• “Among other materials made public … was a transcript of sworn testimony by Akhmed Zakayev, a former deputy prime minister of Chechnya who now lives in exile in London. The testimony had been obtained by Vadim Prokhorov, the lead attorney for Nemtsov's family, and submitted to the Russian Investigative Committee, along with Zakayev's contact information.”
• “In his testimony, Zakayev recounts that, in early 2012, he received information from a trusted source in ‘the inner circle of Ramzan Kadyrov and Adam Delimkhanov’ … that Kadyrov had been tasked with organizing the murder of Boris Nemtsov. According to Zakayev's source, the order came directly from then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and his head of security, Viktor Zolotov … in December 2011.”
• “International oversight is a poor substitute for a real investigation, just as the Magnitsky Act sanctions are a pale shadow of real justice. But while Russian authorities continue to engage in a coverup, international organizations must take the lead to ensure at least some measure of accountability—and to bring us one small step closer to the day when all of those behind the murder of Nemtsov stand before a court of law in Russia.”

“New Model North Caucasus: Kremlin Tries New Approach in Ingushetia,” Konstantin Kazenin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 07.09.19: The author, a senior research fellow with the Gaidar Institute, writes:

• “The choice to appoint [Makhmud-Ali] Kalimatov acting head of the [Ingush] republic shows that staking hopes on outsiders, which was much discussed following the appointment of Vladimir Vasilyev—a non-Dagestani—as leader of the North Caucasus republic of Dagestan in October 2017, is at the very least not seen by the federal center as universal to personnel policy in the North Caucasus.”
• “The rich history of law enforcement in the Kalimatov family also contains some hints as to the Kremlin’s new political logic on the North Caucasus. What’s most important here is that the heightened influence of the Chechen leadership in other parts of the North Caucasus does not figure in the interests of the security services, though at the time of Yevkurov’s resignation there was much talk of that growing influence: specifically, that relations between Yevkurov and Chechnya’s Kadyrov had been strained.”

Defense and aerospace:

“The Ogarkov Reforms: The Soviet Inheritance Behind Russia’s Military Transformation,” Michael Kofman, Oxford’s Changing Character of War Program/Russia Military Analysis blog, 07.11.19: The author, a senior research scientist at CNA, writes:

• “The modern Russian armed forces owe a great deal to the current generation of military leadership, which disbanded the remnants of the Soviet mass mobilization army. But, in truth, it owes far more to the intellectual heritage inherited from the late 1970s through to the mid 1980s when Marshal Nikolai Vassilievich Ogarkov served as Chief of the Soviet General Staff.”
• “The most recent decade of military transformation would be better known as the ‘Ogarkov reform inheritance,’ since it represents the successful implementation of a vision he had for the Soviet armed forces in the early 1980s, which was only partly realized during his tenure.”
• “Looking across the changes implemented in the Russian armed forces, from the flattening of the command and control structure, to the execution of complex exercises with combined or inter-service groupings from different military districts, the deployment of recon-strike and reconfire loops, the integration of combat branches and arms around strategic operations in the theater of military operations, and the increasing emphasis on non-nuclear strategic deterrence, we can see that Ogarkov’s intellectual children have come home.”
• “The Russian General Staff has made considerable progress in building a military to answer the technological advancements and the concepts of operations developed by the United States in the 1980s and 1990s … It was largely Ogarkov’s answer—a military transformation envisioned by the USSR General Staff in the 1980s, even as the Soviet Union itself hurtled towards state collapse.”
• “Albeit fitful and perhaps incomplete, the restoration of Russian military power was decades in coming, and now it is here. Whether the United States will be able to successfully adapt to these developments, innovate, invent and evolve where necessary, remains the open-ended question for our generation of analysts and strategists.”

“Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics and the Wagner Group,” Nathaniel Reynolds, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 07.08.19: The author, a visiting scholar in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes:

• “Russia’s return to the global stage as a major power relies on an array of diplomatic, information, security and economic tools that help the Kremlin punch above its weight. One of the newest instruments in that toolbox is the Wagner Group—a shadowy band of mercenaries loyal to the Kremlin and controlled by Yevgeniy Prigozhin, a member of President Vladimir Putin’s coterie.”
• “Wagner often operates on the margins of U.S. power—in areas where the United States has few interests or is at a comparable disadvantage to Moscow. Washington need not be overly concerned with Wagner in every locale it appears, but it should still aim to keep it marginalized and manage the overall challenge.”
• “If Moscow uses Wagner again in the post-Soviet space, it will likely try to create confusion and deny involvement, at least temporarily. A concerted effort among Western allies to build a common understanding of, and to better monitor, the group can mitigate this potential advantage.”

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

“A 'Dark Lord' Falls in Russia as Security Agencies Joust for Power,” Andrew Higgins, New York Times, 07.14.19: The author, a Moscow correspondent for the news outlet, writes:

• “A veteran law enforcement official, the head of the regional branch of Russia's version of the FBI, acquired such a fearsome reputation in the southern Russian city formerly known as Stalingrad that when he walked into a local restaurant last summer, the other customers got up and left.”
• “Last month, however, the official, Mikhail K. Muzraev, was forced from his car at gunpoint near his home in the city now called Volgograd by a team of heavily armed men sent from Moscow by Russia's Federal Security Service … He was flown to Moscow and jailed the same day.”
• “Since Mr. Putin came to power nearly 20 years ago, rival agencies like the FSB and Mr. Muzraev's organization, the Investigative Committee, have cooperated in persecuting the Kremlin's critics. They are now increasingly at odds amid mostly hidden jockeying to influence a protracted and possibly unruly succession struggle. With the arrest of Mr. Muzraev, however, the infighting burst into the open.”
• “Over 10 years as a senior prosecutor and then head of Volgograd's Investigative Committee, Mr. Muzraev jailed two mayors and the chiefs of the regional police, the traffic police, the anti-narcotics squad and the emergency services, as well as a host of prominent businessmen … In interviews, several of those blamed Mr. Muzraev for destroying their lives with what they said were bogus criminal charges, and rejoiced at his unexpected downfall. But even they don't believe the story put forward by the FSB that their nemesis was involved in an assassination attempt against the regional governor, Andrei Bocharov.”
• “To ensure that Mr. Bastrykin's agency [the Investigative Committee] … could play no role in deciding Mr. Muzraev's fate, the FSB's investigative department in Moscow has classified his case as 'terrorism,' a crime over which the secret police have exclusive control.”