I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

• No significant commentary.

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

“The Back Door to a New Arms Race: The Military Hailed a Successful Missile Defense Test in May. Here's Why It Could Make Us Less Safe,” Thomas Graham Jr. and Bernadette Stadler, Politico, 06.28.17: The authors, experts in non-proliferation, write that while an effective missile defense system may offer some protection in the short term from North Korea, it also poses the much larger threat of instigating a new arms race with Russia. The current U.S. ground-based missile defense system, which will have 44 interceptors by the end of 2017, “poses virtually no threat” to Russia’s 1,700 deployed strategic nuclear weapons. Comments by high-ranking Russian officials confirm that an expanded U.S. missile defense system would be met with an increase in Russian offensive weapons. The goal of a missile defense system is to keep the country safe overall, not simply to protect against one adversary. Largely increasing U.S. missile defense capabilities “will only create additional tension with Russia.”

Nuclear arms control:

“Review of NASIC Report 2017: Nuclear Force Developments” Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 06.30.17: The author, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, reviews the updated Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat report by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC). Notably, Russia’s nuclear modernization is an upgrade rather than a buildup. In fact, its ICBM force “will continue to decline.” This report is also the first official American document to identify Russia’s INF Treaty-violating ground-launched cruise missile: the 3M-14, which may have a nuclear option. Another missile with a possible nuclear option is the SS-N-26 anti-ship cruise missile. The modernization of Russia’s nuclear forces will conclude in the mid-2020s and will include a complete replacement of its ICBM force at lower numbers, along with other upgrades. While the report mentions that Russia has surpassed the U.S. in deployed warheads capable of reaching the U.S. as of September 2014, the author notes that it fails to mention that Russia is still on track to meet the New START limit for deployed strategic warheads in 2018. Despite popular claims to the contrary, Russia’s ICBM numbers will continue to decline for various reasons. The Russian navy’s modernization includes an upgrade from Soveit-era Delta-class SSBNs to Borei-class SSBNs. The Russian cruise missile that violates the INF Treaty is one of two new cruise missiles with a possible nuclear option, and it has “ground, ship and sub” versions.

“Is It Too Late to Have an Informed Discussion About the INF Treaty?” Pavel Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Blog, 07.01.17: The author, a nuclear forces expert, writes that the U.S. Congress’ moves towards killing the INF Treaty is lamentable. The discussion has shifted in the last two years since Russia’s alleged violation of the treaty from a “business as usual” kind of response to preserving the INF treaty “by killing it together with much of the arms control process.” The author argues that the Obama administration shoulders some blame for mishandling the situation by withholding details for an extended period. “If the United States is serious about preserving the INF and New START treaties, it should take steps to preserve them.” The Russian missile that violated the treaty, knowns as SSC-8, is related to the Kalibr sea-launched cruise missile, which is a member of the 3M14 family. This missile was undergoing flight tests since 2008 and looked like a SLCM development program until 2011. The range capability can also be estimated. The author points out that Russia’s dismissal of U.S. concerns regarding this missile “is more or less how the United States treats Russian concerns about the Mk-41 launcher deployed as part of the AEGIS Ashore.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

“Russia Knows Its Next Move in Syria. Does America?” Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The National Interest, 06.27.17: The author, a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, writes that with the end of the Syrian civil war finally in sight, “there is no longer any way the question of Syria’s future can be postponed.” Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria was to stabilize Assad’s regime and produce a stalemate that would shift the goals of those supporting different parts of the Syrian opposition from regime change to “deal making along the lines of a ‘soft partition’ for Syria.” When this did not look promising, Russia moved to recovering Aleppo and testing out which of Syria’s rebel groups “could be co-opted” and which could not. This phase ended in 2016 with moves to set up exclusion zones and safe areas. The Trump administration does not appear to have much of a strategy on Syria, and without clearly defined interests, the risk of a clash with Russia, Syria and Iran rises. The channels of communication through which the U.S. and Russia could communicate are blocked due to political upheaval. With American uncertainty comes the risk of accident, “the consequences of which no one seems prepared for.”

“5 Reasons America Should Not Fight Iran, Russia and Assad in Syria,” Richard Sokolsky and Aaron Miller, The National Interest, 06.27.17: The authors, a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program and a vice president and distinguished fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, discuss the future of the U.S. in Syria. The idea that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad must be unseated in order to destroy ISIS is appealing, but inadvisable and unlikely for several reasons: the U.S. cannot destroy ISIS in Syria, Syria has no stable end state, a war with Iran is also inadvisable, as is sidelining Russia and “U.S. interests in Syria aren’t as vital as those of its adversaries.” The authors argue that managing ISIS is Syria, while not exactly glamorous, is “the right approach” for the U.S.

Cyber security:

“The Russian Trail in the Latest 'Ransomware' Attack. The Developers of the exPetr Virus Didn't Want Ransom: Their Goal Was To Attack Ukrainian Interests,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 06.29.17: The author, a Bloomberg Views columnist, writes that the exPetr malware appears to have originated with M.E. Doc software. Following recent Ukrainian sanctions on the popular 1C accounting software, M.E. Doc was widely recommended as a replacement throughout Ukraine. While the malware demanded a $300 ransom from its victims to get their files back, it quickly became clear that money was not the attack’s goal. The question of who benefits from this attack remains; “even Russian cybersecurity experts don't see what happened as an ordinary ransomware attack.” The author cites the head of a large Russian cybersecurity company, who said the attack appeared to be a test.

Russia’s alleged interference in U.S. elections:

• No significant commentary.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Congress Must Make Russia Pay for Attacking US Elections,” Evelyn Farkas and Jacqueline Ramos, Foreign Policy, 06.29.17: The authors, fellows at the Atlantic Council and the Center for a New American Security, write that U.S. President Donald Trump should be tough in his upcoming meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The authors advise Trump to demand a stop to all Russian information operations against the U.S. and to remind Putin of his commitment to ending the war in Ukraine. However, this approach can only succeed if Trump has leverage, which the author argue can be gained by passing the sanctions bill under consideration by Congress. The bill deals with both Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election and with Russian action in Ukraine.

“The Senate Wants Tough New Sanctions Against Russia, but Key US Allies Are Furious. Here’s Why.” Luke Mackle, The Washington Post, 06.27.17: The author, a recent graduate of Harvard’s Davis Center for Russia and Eurasian Studies, writes that the U.S. Senate’s vote overwhelmingly in favor of extending sanctions against Russia is making Europe unhappy. This unfavorable reaction stems from frustration as the U.S. moves away from cooperation with Europe, the negative implications these sanctions will have for European companies, along with “differing views on the future of European energy security.” Rather than staying true to its original goal of raising the stakes for Russia’s actions in Ukraine, this sanctions bill’s reasoning leans towards punishment for election interference instead. The bill also hurts EU companies doing business with Russia, “while appearing to offer a helping hand to U.S. energy exporters.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant commentary.

China:

• No significant commentary. 

Ukraine:

“Ukraine’s Stalled Revolution. Kiev May Talk Like Brussels but It Acts Like Moscow,” Andrew Foxall and Lincoln Pigman, Foreign Affairs, 06.29.17: The authors, scholars in Russia studies and war studies, write that while Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko “speaks the language of Brussels,” he is increasingly adopting Moscow’s authoritarian methods. In particular, Poroshenko’s ban on all Russian content and online services has drawn much criticism as limits to freedom of expression. However, greater failures are in the anti-corruption front, where Ukraine’s government “has made life exceedingly difficult for anti-corruption activists,” from having their personal information leaked to pro-government activist to having their homes raided by the SBU. Justice against allies of former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych has also faced serious setbacks, with even reports of “backroom deals being made between those allies and the prosecutor-general’s office.” The authors urge the West to continue to support Ukraine and to “prevent Ukrainian democracy from falling victim to Kiev’s imitation of democracy.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant commentary.

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“America Obsesses About a Russia That Misses the '70s. The Economy Is Hobbled By Dependence on Oil and State Encroachment on the Private Sector,” Noah Smith, Bloomberg, 06.29.17: The author, a Bloomberg View columnist, writes that the American idea of Russian President Vladimir Putin as “some kind of genius” is a flawed one, especially if one looks at Russia’s economy. In 2015, around 55% of Russia’s economy was managed by the government, which employed 20 million workers. Although there have been improvements, Russia’s private companies are still far more productive than its state enterprises. The Russian economy is also heavily dependent on oil. The author argues that Putin needs to reduce the nationalization of Russia’s economy as well as its oil dependence in order to achiever stronger long-term footing.

Defense and aerospace:

“Russia.Military Power. Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations,” Defense Intelligence Agency, June 2017: This report looks at Russia’s resurgent military power. Russia’s “assertive promotion of its national interests” shows a more confident Kremlin, but has also renewed international concerns about “a more militaristic Russia.” These concerns are based in Russia’s success in keeping Ukraine from joining NATO by “fomenting an artificial separatist revolt in eastern Ukraine,” along with Russia’s military intervention in Syria, which has transformed the conflict there. These actions also speak to Russia’s insecurity regarding the U.S. and its fears that U.S. intentions are to undermine Russia both at home and abroad. Russia sees the U.S. and NATO as its principle security threats, and it also sees the U.S. as the main driver behind the Arab Spring and Ukraine crisis. However, Moscow is also quite wary of the danger posed by Islamic militants. The Kremlin’s threat perception regarding China is “more divided and nuanced.” While the bilateral relationship has been widely praised in Russia, the power disparity between the two is keenly felt and some worry that Moscow would become “Beijing’s junior partner,” and that over the long term, China will again be a military threat to Russia. Russia today “views wars as often undeclared, fought for relatively limited political objectives and occurring across all domains, including outer space and the information space.” Moscow wants to build a military that is prepared for everything from local war to massive nuclear exchange. Despite some economic setbacks, “Russia is rapidly fielding a modern force that can challenge adversaries and support its ‘great power’ aspirations.”

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.