This Week’s Highlights

• Competing with Russia and China requires a careful evaluation of U.S. obligations around the world, writes Prof. Charles Ziegler. Not all Russian or Chinese actions—in Africa or Latin America, or with the Belt and Road Initiative, for example—are harmful to U.S. interests. Also, the United States may not be able to change Russian or Chinese behavior or undermine their strategic partnership, according to this researcher. The argument that Washington needs to conduct a more restrained foreign policy in place of liberal interventionism, Ziegler argues, should be accorded the serious attention it deserves. 
• The Biden team believes they can do it all: mobilize to meet the existential threat of climate change, rally global efforts to fight pandemics, rebuild America at home, take on China and Russia in a new great-power competition, strike at alleged terrorists in dozens of countries, sustain commitments across the Middle East and continue to police the world, writes Washington Post columnist Katrina vanden Heuvel. But if the debacles of recent years teach anything, Heuvel writes, it is that America can't do it all. Rebuilding America takes a back seat to foreign adventure. Biden has to choose.
• The recent sanction measures suggest that the Biden national security team does not have a unified position on whether Russia under its current management is experiencing a rapid and perhaps permanent decline and whether the risk of foreclosing Russian support for U.S. initiatives (Iran and North Korea) is worth taking stronger action against Moscow, writes Prof. Nikolas K. Gvosdev. Biden’s critics will point to the current set of sanctions largely as a symbolic, box-checking exercise, according to Gvosdev.  
• A creative way for the United States and Germany to end the crisis over Nord Stream 2 would be to convince Gazprom to increase the amount of gas it pumps through Ukraine, because the increased gas revenue might provide the Biden administration a reason to not impose sanctions on the pipeline, writes Brookings’ Steven Pifer.
• In Russia, police fail to respond to domestic violence complaints or refuse to act on them with frightening regularity, writes Yulia Gorbunova, a senior Russia researcher at Human Rights Watch. The lack of a stand-alone domestic violence offense and poor data collection means there are no reliable statistics, but according to a recent independent study, at least 5,000 women were killed in domestic violence episodes in 2018, Gorbunova writes. Women who face domestic violence need protection and support at every step to escape abuse, seek justice and rebuild their lives.  
• A year after the coronavirus pandemic plunged the global economy into turmoil and sent stock markets tumbling, Russia has emerged as one of the world’s best performers, writes The Moscow Times’ Jake Cordell. Russia’s economy shrank by just 3.1 percent in 2020—far less than advanced economies—and could reach its pre-pandemic size within the next 12 months. “There are quite a few elements about Russia’s macroeconomic framework that other countries could try to replicate,” Apurva Sanghi, lead Russia economist at the World Bank told The Moscow Times.

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Great Power rivalry/New Cold War/saber rattling:

“Renewal at Home Requires Restraint Abroad,” Charles A. Kupchan, Foreign Affairs, 03.02.21. The author, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University, writes:

• “With the country’s [U.S.] economy and politics in tatters, the new administration must remain laser focused on domestic renewal, a priority that will inevitably come at the expense of the nation’s efforts abroad. … [Biden’s] foreign policy must be sufficiently ambitious to secure U.S. interests abroad but also sufficiently restrained to enjoy popular support and remain in sync with his domestic priorities.”
• “Until recently, trade liberalization was a key plank of Pax Americana. … Now, free trade is a dirty word for Democrats and Republicans alike. … Avoiding unnecessary interventions and scaling back military commitments in peripheral conflicts will help Biden sustain a robust military presence where it matters most: namely, in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, where checking Russian and Chinese ambition remains a vital U.S. interest.”
• “Biden will confront a world that is less ready to be led than it once was. China will have the world’s largest economy by the end of the decade, and its Belt and Road Initiative … is rapidly spreading Beijing’s influence. … Moscow, for its part, has already formed a quasi alliance with Beijing to expedite the diminution of Washington’s influence. Russia longs for a multipolar world that will check the United States.”
• “Many of Biden’s international priorities … necessitate working with Beijing and other governments that are hardly champions of democracy. Washington will need Moscow’s cooperation if it wants to avoid a new nuclear arms race and restore Ukraine’s sovereignty.” 
• “Biden … is right to reject much of Trump’s errant statecraft—reorienting U.S. foreign policy toward international teamwork, diplomatic reengagement and the defense of the nation’s core democratic principles. But … he should continue Trump’s effort to rectify the overmilitarization of U.S. engagement abroad, trim the nation’s foreign commitments, choose its fights more carefully and press allies to do much more. The justifiable ambition of Biden’s domestic agenda needs to be matched with judicious modesty in his foreign policy.”

“Biden ran on ending forever wars. He's already undermining that promise,” Katrina vanden Heuvel, The Washington Post, 03.02.21. The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “Interventionism is no small project. As the Brown University Costs of War project has documented, over the past three years alone, the United States has launched drones or airstrikes in seven countries, engaged in combat in eight, held military exercises in 41 and assisted counterterrorism actions in 85 countries. The wars have been going on for two decades at a cost of hundreds of thousands of lives and at least $6.4 trillion.”
• “The Biden team believes they can do it all: mobilize to meet the existential threat of climate change, rally global efforts to fight pandemics, rebuild America at home, take on China and Russia in a new great-power competition, strike at alleged terrorists in dozens of countries, sustain commitments across the Middle East and continue to police the world.”
• “But if the debacles of recent years teach anything, it is that America can't do it all. The fog of war is unpredictable. Great-power confrontations are costly and dangerous. Small forays turn into quagmires. Rebuilding America takes a back seat to foreign adventure. Biden has to choose.”
• “Public disenchantment with the endless wars is clear and has been since George W. Bush declared Mission Accomplished. But the military-industrial complex that President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned us of decades ago still wields immense political clout. Politicians remain terrified of appearing weak. And sadly, the Biden foreign policy team includes no one who has been a clear and consistent opponent of our disastrous interventions across the world. The strike on Syria may have held the front pages for only a day, but it likely will have far greater implications for the rest of Biden's presidency—and perhaps beyond.”

“Biden promises diplomacy but offers more militarism,” Stephen Kinzer, The Boston Globe, 03.05.21. The author, a visiting fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, writes:

• “If Biden truly wants to make diplomacy the centerpiece of his approach to the world, he has no lack of opportunity. He could start by announcing that he is easing sanctions on Iran to jump-start nuclear negotiations. Then he could pledge to uphold last year's accord under which U.S. troops are to be withdrawn from Afghanistan. He could seek a negotiated settlement of the Yemen war, make a diplomatic overture to Russia or China, launch new talks on the Korean peninsula or reopen our embassy in Cuba. None of that, though, seems likely anytime soon.”
• “Biden's first full month in office has been an immense disappointment to those who hoped he would begin extricating us from the Middle East. He and those around him appear frozen in the paradigm of conflict and ‘strategic competition’ that shaped their Cold War generation. That is what allows them to preach diplomacy while bombing Syria—or, in the Pentagon's Orwellian formulation, launching a ‘defensive precision strike’ intended ‘to de-escalate the overall situation.’”
• “In his State Department speech last month, Biden asserted that diplomacy ‘has always been essential to how America writes its own destiny.’ Conflict, however, has been at least as essential. If Biden's first weeks in office are any indication, we are in for four more years of it.”

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant developments.

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms control:

• No significant developments.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

• No significant developments.

Elections interference:

• No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

“How to solve the Nord Stream 2 dilemma,” Steven Pifer, Brookings Institution/Euroactiv, 03.05.21. The author, a nonresident senior fellow at Brookings, writes:

• “As Russia and Gazprom push to complete the last kilometers of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, the Biden administration faces a dilemma. Opinion in Congress and Washington is dead set against the project, but President Biden does not want a big fight with Chancellor Merkel.”
• “A creative way for the United States and Germany to end the crisis over Nord Stream 2 would be to convince Gazprom to increase the amount of gas it pumps through Ukraine, because the increased gas revenue might provide the Biden administration a reason to not impose sanctions.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Joe Biden’s Risky Russia Sanctions Game,” Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The National Interest, 03.03.21. The author, a contributing editor at the National Interest, writes:

• “The sanction measures suggest that the Biden national security team does not have a unified position on two critical questions. … The first is what might be termed the ‘declinist’ question: is Russia under its current management experiencing a rapid and perhaps permanent decline in the sources of its national power (especially economic) as well as an erosion in the legitimacy of the regime itself? … The second is whether the risk of foreclosing Russian support for U.S. initiatives (Iran and North Korea) is worth taking stronger action against Moscow.”
• “For those who hold both to the ‘declinist’ position and who do not believe Russia is capable or willing of providing real assistance to the United States—a stance many members of Congress of both parties hold … then the measures announced by the Biden administration are too little and not strong enough. Yet it seems that President Joe Biden’s own team … are not yet prepared to gamble that Putin’s Russia is on its last legs or that Moscow cannot still raise prohibitive costs should it decided to oppose U.S. initiatives.”
• “And if, as some within the Biden national security apparatus suggest, the ultimate strategic competition is with China, there is concern that too much of a focus on Russia in the short term will allow China to continue to consolidate its position. Moreover … this may create an opportunity to encourage Moscow to reconsider the depths of its strategic partnership with China.”
• “Biden can plausibly claim that he has answered Russian actions and upheld U.S. values by imposing costs on the Putin government—but his critics will point to the current set of sanctions largely as a symbolic, box-checking exercise. Russia’s  Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has responded to U.S. actions by threatening reprisals and warning that U.S.-Russia relations will further deteriorate—but the sanctions do not fatally strike at any key Russian priorities.”

“Why Biden’s Russia Sanctions Won't Change Anything,” Mark Episkopos, The National Interest, 03.06.21. The author, national security reporter for the National Interest, writes:

• “President Joe Biden has leveled a new round of sanctions against Russia over the poisoning and subsequent arrest of prominent Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny. Announced earlier this week by the Treasury, State and Commerce departments, the measures included sanctions against seven Russian government officials and a slew of export restrictions on items that could be used for biological and chemical agent production.”
• “What, in concrete policy terms, has been accomplished by these latest measures? In a rare moment of consensus, Navalny’s supporters and Russian government officials agree that the sanctions have barely any practical effect. … Outspoken Navalny ally Masha Gessen noted that all of the seven government officials in question have already been previously sanctioned by the European Union.”
• “Navalny aide Maria Pevchykh welcomed the sanctions as a ‘wonderful and cool’ gesture of Western solidarity with the jailed opposition activist, but expressed disappointment that they did not include key Russian business elites: ‘The most painful sanctions, which neither Europe nor the U.S. imposed, are the ones against oligarchs.’ U.K.-based Navalny associate Vladimir Ashurkov likewise signaled frustration with the sanctions’ limited scope.”
• “During his first few weeks in office, Joe Biden made clear that—unlike every post-Cold War president before him—he will not seek a ‘reset’ in relations with the Kremlin. Instead, his administration sought to manage U.S.-Russian competition with a dual policy of punishing Russia for bad behavior while cooperating when and where it benefits U.S. interests. Just over a month into his presidency, that initial approach has all but given way to an overtly hostile relationship. With Russia signaling its intent to respond forcefully to future sanctions, the stage is set for an increasingly dangerous tit-for-tat game between Moscow and Washington.”

“Three big takeaways from Biden’s first Russia sanctions,” Brian O’Toole and Daniel Fried, Atlantic Council, 03.02.21. The authors, a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Program and the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, write:

• “The sanctions package announced [by the Biden administration] on March 2 is well-thought out and measured. It includes sanctions against nine individuals with roles in Navalny’s poisoning and detention; sanctions against seven companies for proliferating weapons of mass destruction, engaging in chemical-weapons activities or operating in Russia’s defense and intelligence sector; marginally enhanced sanctions on certain exports to Russia as required under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Act of 1991; tougher arms-export restrictions; and new authority to deny visas to Russians who enable the Kremlin’s chemical-weapons programs. That’s a lot assembled quickly.”
• “A few aspects of this package stand out. … First, the package brought together mechanisms from across the U.S. government—ranging from the State Department’s visa denials and arms-export restrictions to the Treasury Department’s financial sanctions and the Commerce Department’s export-control regime, and under both executive branch and congressional sanctions authorities.”
• “Second, the choice to sanction the nine individuals was clearly coordinated to overlap with the sanctions that the European Union imposed shortly after Navalny’s poisoning and those agreed upon in Brussels. … Third, this package is credible and sustainable.”

“Biden called climate change an 'existential threat.' Can the U.N. Security Council help?” Joshua Busby, Morgan Bazilian and Florian Krampe, The Washington Post/Monkey Cage, 03.02.21. The authors of the article write:

• “No one country alone can manage the security risks prompted by climate change, as is true for the overall risks of climate change itself. The solutions aren't solely, or even primarily, military. What useful role can the U.N. Security Council play, given its key role in managing peace and security internationally?”
• “The Security Council has been discussing climate change and the associated security risks since at least 2007. Still, the topic is comparatively new and somewhat controversial. Some permanent members of the Security Council, notably Russia and China, have been reluctant to discuss climate change as a security risk, arguing that other venues, such as the U.N. climate meetings, are more appropriate.”
• “The Biden administration could partner with like-minded elected members to the Security Council such as Ireland, Kenya and Norway to deepen the council's engagement.”
• “Thus far, the Security Council has mostly focused on reactions to ongoing conflicts and discussion of how climate change might have had a hand in starting or extending them. There has been little emphasis on prevention of climate-related security risks. The United States could start a dialogue in the council on what capacities are needed to prevent conflicts, building on its own recently released strategy for the 2019 Global Fragility Act, which is intended to get ahead of the problem by identifying issues early.”
• “While the Biden administration's ambassador may be chairing the Security Council's work this month, success will require building support and overcoming skepticism from Russia and China that the council is the right place to discuss climate change at all.”

“For Putin, it wasn’t enough to smear, harass and poison Navalny,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 03.02.21. The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Vladimir Putin is apparently not content to harass, persecute, smear and poison opposition politician Alexei Navalny, who has mocked and embarrassed the Russian leader by exposing the regime's corruption. Now, following Mr. Navalny's cooked-up political trial, Mr. Putin's minions have settled on a new tactic: trying to silence and pressure him psychologically.”
• “Russian media has reported that Mr. Navalny, who returned to Moscow in January after having barely survived a nerve-agent poisoning carried out by a Kremlin hit squad, would be incarcerated at a penal colony known for cruel, dehumanizing conditions. No one doubts Mr. Navalny's personal courage; he knew that in returning to Russia he would face Mr. Putin's wrath. Now, it is precisely the opposition leader's resolve that the Russian president seems determined to put to the test.”
• “Not all Russians regard Mr. Navalny as a viable political alternative to Mr. Putin, yet there is no doubt he has unnerved the Russian leader, On Monday, two senior U.N. human rights experts recommended an international investigation of his poisoning, noting that Mr. Navalny ‘was under intensive government surveillance’ at the time, making it unlikely that the attempt on his life took place ‘without the knowledge of the Russian authorities.’”
• “Most major Western governments have called for Mr. Navalny's release from prison; on Tuesday, the Biden administration reiterated that demand and, to drive home the point, imposed sanctions blocking top Kremlin officials from accessing assets in the United States. There should be no pause in the crusade to secure his freedom.”

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Russia’s Deadly Negligence of Domestic Violence,” Yulia Gorbunova, The Moscow Times, 03.08.21. The author, a senior Russia researcher at Human Rights Watch, writes:

• “In Russia, police fail to respond to domestic violence complaints or refuse to act on them with frightening regularity. Russian media often report on deaths from domestic violence that could have been prevented.  The weak police response is part of Russian authorities’ systemic failure to properly address domestic violence. “
• “Even people facing severe physical abuse do not get adequate protection and assistance. Cases can be prosecuted under various legal provisions but Russia has no specific law on domestic violence. Russian legislation does not contain a stand-alone offense, or even a definition, for domestic violence, nor does it allow for protection orders to ensure immediate and life-saving help.”
• “These legislative gaps only reinforce the impression that the government views domestic violence as a ‘family matter’—something that happens in private and in which it has no business interfering—rather than a significant crime that demands a full government response, just as if a stranger was responsible for the violence.”
• “Official estimates appear to downplay the scale of domestic violence in Russia. The lack of a stand-alone domestic violence offense and poor data collection means there are no reliable statistics, but according to a recent independent study, at least 5,000 women were killed in domestic violence episodes in 2018. These numbers stand in stark contrast with Interior Ministry data, which claims  that 253 women died in ‘family-related’ conflicts in 2018.”
• “Women who face domestic violence need protection and support at every step to escape abuse, seek justice, and rebuild their lives. Russia’s authorities have the responsibility to protect people’s rights, including the right to life, freedom from cruel and inhumane treatment, and access to justice and accountability. Russia could take a crucial step toward fulfilling that responsibility by immediately adopting a comprehensive law against domestic violence that ensures necessary protections for survivors and accountability for their abusers.”

“Has Russia Beaten Boom and Bust?” Jake Cordell, The Moscow Times, 03.02.21. The author, who covers business and economics for the news outlet, writes:

• “A year after the coronavirus pandemic plunged the global economy into turmoil and sent stock markets tumbling, Russia has emerged as one of the world’s best performers. Russia’s economy shrank by just 3.1 percent in 2020—far less than advanced economies—and could reach its pre-pandemic size within the next 12 months.”
• “That Russia’s strong performance came after five years of stagnation is no coincidence, economists say, and has triggered fresh debate over whether Russia has managed to conquer the pernicious boom-and-bust cycle, and what other countries can learn from its example.”
• “Russia’s 2014-16 economic crisis—triggered by the imposition of sanctions and a painful crash in world oil prices—was a turning point in its approach to managing the economy. … Putin set about boosting Russia’s economic sovereignty, rolling out a new macroeconomic framework designed to use years of boom to better prepare for future hardship. The approach was based on saving, not splurging, the multibillion dollar profits from Russia’s oil exports, running a balanced government budget, reducing public debt, moving to a free-floating exchange rate and setting inflation targeting as the Central Bank’s key goal—in line with other major economies.”
• “If the coronavirus was the first test of whether Russia’s model would work in killing off the ‘bust’ in boom-and-bust, so far, the approach appears to have worked. … Some economists see opportunities for other countries to learn from Russia’s success. … [Apurva Sanghi, lead Russia economist at the World Bank] called Russia’s fiscal rule, which requires the country to buy foreign currency reserves when oil prices are above $42 a barrel and sell them when prices are low, ‘a must for any commodity-exporting nation’ as it ‘shields public finances from the vagaries of global commodity prices.’”
• “Other economists are hesitant to put Russia forward as a positive case study. … Nevertheless, Renaissance Capital’s Donets believes Russia is set to record faster growth, if not quite a boom, coming out of the pandemic, as the hard work of its ‘great stabilization’ has already been achieved.”

“Dissidents Aren’t Saints: The organized campaign against Alexei Navalny was damaging and misplaced,” Natalia Antonova, Foreign Policy, 03.05.21. The author, a writer, journalist and online safety expert based in Washington D.C., writes:

• “In an age of online communications, it’s easy to think the worst of a person you’ve never met and to decide that they’re evil based on one video or comment—even if they’re just, like most of us, imperfect. And it’s also easy, it turns out, for bad actors to weaponize those feelings themselves.”
• “That’s what happened with Amnesty International’s recent decision to strip jailed Russian dissident Alexei Navalny of his ‘prisoner of conscience’ status after a shadowy email campaign brought up his past xenophobic statements. The decision emboldened Kremlin propagandists covering Navalny’s case, and it has given both trolls and useful idiots reason to cast both Navalny and anyone who supports him as outright Nazis. From the start, Amnesty seemed to realize it had been played—and the organization is now undergoing a review of what happened. But the damage has been done.”
• “It’s too early to tell just how the latest chapter in Alexei Navalny’s fascinating and terrifying existence will play out and how it may influence and affect him. All I can confidently say is that it was clearly his conscience that made him refuse to take the offramp. Conscience made him go back to Russia. And if he is not a prisoner of conscience, no one is.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant developments.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“A New Arctic Strategy for the EU. Maritime Security and Geopolitical Signalling,” Michael Paul, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), March 2021. The author, a senior fellow in the international security research division at SWP, writes:

• “If the new EU Arctic Strategy is to give realistic guidance for the future it must address Russia both as a problem and a challenge. … European and Russian interests coincide in certain policy areas—even if prioritizations may diverge and the situation over eastern Ukraine and Crimea will dictate caution over any … engagement.”
• “Using the Arctic as an arena for renewing relations, might have positive spill-over effects on other areas of dispute. Russia will be interested in projects and scientific exchange as long as they are politically unproblematic. … Its own agenda, however, foregrounds national security. … But Russia is naturally also interested in enhancing SAR capabilities in the circumpolar Arctic and open to cross-border cooperation on environmental issues.”
• “Given the grave infrastructure deficits, EU support would benefit international shipping, and European climate and environmental standards could be useful for both sustainable development and safeguarding the environment. A viable strategy will need to take this into account not only for regions adjoining the Russian Arctic and relations with Russia, but also for Greenland, whose Project Independence could give rise to new maritime vulnerabilities in terms of securing shipping routes and associated infrastructure.”
• “Russia, for its part, will have to work during its upcoming Arctic Council chairmanship to reduce the growing conflict potential noted in its own Arctic Strategy. Continuing collaboration in the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) and enhancing regional security dialogue are also in the interest of the new U.S. administration. An expert dialogue on Arctic military security could be initiated as a substitute for the Chiefs of Defense meetings that were suspended in 2014 – or as prelude to reactivating them. That could involve taking up the Recommendations of the NATO-Russia expert dialogue before potentially moving on to agree military rules of conduct for the Arctic.”

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

“A Russian-Chinese Partnership Against America?” Charles E. Ziegler, The National Interest, 03.06.21. The author, professor of political science and university scholar at the University of Louisville, writes:

• “Russia and China do not have a formal defense treaty, and it seems unlikely they will conclude one in the near future. Each wants to keep options open and not be dragged into a conflict that is not in their national interest.”
• “Lee Kwan Yew once observed that as China rose, a stable balance of power in the Asia-Pacific would depend on America and Japan maintaining an isosceles triangle, where U.S.-Japanese ties remained closer than either Sino-Japanese or Sino-American relations. Today … Russia and China are far closer to each other than to the United States. This relationship, however, is not equilateral … America no longer occupies the swing position in the power triangle.”
• “Competing with Russia and China requires a careful evaluation of U.S. obligations around the world. Not all Russian or Chinese actions … are harmful to U.S. interests. The argument that Washington needs to conduct a more restrained foreign policy in place of liberal interventionism should be accorded the serious attention it deserves.”
• “The United States should cooperate with both countries where feasible, but any wedge strategy like that pursued during the Richard Nixon era is unlikely to succeed. Instead, Washington needs a more nuanced and subtle strategy of engaging bilaterally where possible, pursuing more effective diplomacy, cultivating allies, and prioritizing arenas of competition. … The United States should push back against malign behavior. … It may take some effort to find common ground, but there are serious global threats that demand collective action. … We should also seek cooperative trade agreements with both Russia and China.”
• “United States may not be able to change Russian or Chinese behavior or undermine their strategic partnership, but restoring some degree of consensus and effective governance in Washington … will better position the country to deal with the Sino-Russian challenge.”

“Kissinger Revisited. Can the United States Drive a Wedge Between Russia and China?” Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky, Carnegie Moscow Center, 03.02.21. Rumer, a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie's Russia and Eurasia Program, and Sokolsky, a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie's Russia and Eurasia Program, write:

• “Administrations change, but bad ideas live to fight another day. One example is the notion … that the United States should … get Russia to change sides and align with the United States against China. … So far, the Biden administration has shown little inclination to embrace such thinking. Hopefully, it will refrain from doing so in the future.”
• “The Trump administration’s heralded reinvention of great power competition was … ‘a rising China and a vindictive Russia’ … [that] had never abandoned their great power ambitions or resolve to compete with the United States. … The fallacy of the Trump administration’s approach to Russia and China was further demonstrated by its supposedly clever ‘divide and conquer’ tactic … based on a fundamental misreading of the past and misunderstanding of the present.”
• “Kissinger’s triangular diplomacy succeeded for two reasons. … First, … he recognized and took advantage of the rift between the two Communist powers after their 1969 border clash. … Second, Moscow wanted an opening with Washington to ease the twin burdens of the arms race with the United States and the standoff with China. … Neither of those conditions exists today.”
• “The notion that the United States can successfully entice Moscow to align with Washington instead of Beijing overlooks the motivations that cement the Sino-Russian partnership: they share a deeply adversarial relationship with the United States and want to thwart what they perceive as its hegemonic ambitions aided by democracy promotion and the unilateral use of military power.”
• “It makes sense for U.S. policy to avoid actions—wherever possible—that drive Moscow closer to Beijing. But the idea of driving a wedge between them to weaken their alignment is wishful thinking. … Partnership with China is a strategic imperative for Russia, and its modern-day leaders see no alternative.”

Ukraine:

“Biden and Ukraine: A strategy for the new administration,” Anders Åslund, Daniel Fried, Melinda Haring, John E. Herbst, William B. Taylor and Alexander Vershbow, Atlantic Council, 03.05.21. The authors of the report write:

• “President Joe Biden … has a real chance to move past the difficult detour that U.S.-Ukraine relations took under his predecessor. … Resetting relations with Kyiv will not be simple. … However, Zelenskyy is keen to engage with the new Biden team and seeks recognition as a global leader.”

• "The first priority … should be to get to know the players in Ukraine and Zelenskyy’s inner circle. … The second priority should be to strengthen Western support for Ukraine’s defense against Kremlin aggression. And the third priority should be to craft a strategy to encourage Zelenskyy to embrace a real reform agenda.”

• "Biden’s team should: Appoint an ambassador as soon as possible. Take leadership of Donbas diplomacy. … Work with Congress to increase military assistance to Ukraine to $500,000,000 per year. Enhance security in southeast Europe and the Black Sea. … Deepen Ukraine’s integration with NATO. … Strategic approach to sanctions. … Stay the course on ending Nord Stream 2. Support … the ‘Crimean Platform.’”

• "[Domestically]: Empower a senior official as the U.S. point person for reform. Prioritize the establishment of independent courts. … Take action against the major corrupt figures undermining reform in Ukraine.  … Press for reform of the Prosecutor General’s Office. Work to re-empower the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine. Push for abolition of the Security Service of Ukraine economic department. Push to restore the competitive and transparent appointment of state officials. … Work for a return to a reform program in the health sector. Urge the completion of the liberalization of energy markets. Help establish full transparency of the ultimate beneficiary owners of major media. … Reiterate strong support for the independence of the National Bank of Ukraine. … Champion anti-monopoly legislation. … Outline a program that would stimulate U.S. corporate investment in Ukraine.”

Belarus:

• No significant developments.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Does Georgia’s Latest Crisis Have Global Implications?” Sergei Markedonov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 03.04.21. The author, director of the department for problems of ethnic relations at the Institute for Political and Military Analysis, writes:

• “Two recent events in Georgia resemble a major political crisis that could drag Russia and the United States into a confrontation. First Nikanor Melia, the leader of the biggest opposition (and former ruling) party … was arrested. Then the prime minister resigned in protest at the arrest, and was swiftly replaced. The Georgian opposition now has its very own political martyr and grounds to hold protests and appeal to the West for support.”
• “With the U.S. State Department expressing concern over the arrest of the opposition politician, at first glance, these events may look like yet another clash in the post-Soviet space between pro-Russian authorities and a pro-Western opposition supported by the United States. The reality is very different. … Georgian Dream and UNM … agree on a Euro-Atlantic consensus.”
• “In Russia … the possibility of Saakashvili reentering Georgian politics, never mind returning to power, is seen as little short of a catastrophe. But … it’s clear that Georgian Dream’s foreign policy differs little from its predecessor’s. … For Moscow, the difference between the arrested UNM leader Melia and the new Georgian Dream prime minister Irakli Garibashvili is entirely superficial—especially since Melia is not part of Saakashvili’s inner circle. If Melia ever comes to power, he would be far from certain to share it with Saakashvili, or even to return to the latter’s rhetoric.”
• “Regardless of how the current standoff in Georgia unfolds, geopolitical pivots there are unlikely. Even those parties and politicians who have called for dialogue with Moscow … are in favor of restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity. … Today, the majority of Georgians favor the Euro-Atlantic path of development for their country.”
• “The main task of the West right now is to prevent both serious civil clashes there and a Georgian Dream dictatorship from taking shape.”

“In Georgia, an up-and-down road to justice for victims of the August War,” Norman Eisen, Colby Galliher, Madison Gee, Sue Ryu and Kate Tandberg, Brookings Institution, 03.03.21. The authors of the report write:

• “Since Russia invaded Georgia in the South Caucasus in 2008, the victims of the conflict have found little in the way of justice—until now. Developments at the International Criminal Court (ICC), along with recent strides in the European legal world and in the United States, suggest that meaningful progress may finally be underway for those whose lives were upended by the conflict. Hopefully, Georgia’s worsening democracy crisis will not affect this progress.”
• “Securing true reparations, including the arrest of all parties guilty of war crimes and the return of displaced Georgians to their homes in South Ossetia, remains an elusive goal. But as the aphorism goes: ‘The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice.’ The renewed focus of international legal institutions on the August War’s victims, as well as the return of diplomatic support from the United States and NATO, suggest advances in the right direction.”

“The Yerevan Protests in 2021: A Sociological Eye,” Georgi Derluguian, PONARS Eurasia, 03.08.21. The author, professor of social research and public policy at NYU Abu Dhabi, writes:

• “[Armenia’s current Prime Minister] Nikol [Pashinyan], despite the war defeat and his dire lack of statesmanship, could still prove his staying power for two reasons. … First, formal legitimacy. … Second, he can still count on loads of popular support. Even if many common Armenians became skeptical of him, they would rather not support his opponents. … Last but not least, Moscow is now taking a rather detached stance on the domestic politics of Armenia. Perhaps, they want to avoid escalation like in Ukraine or Belarus.”
• “Therefore the Armenian opposition and ‘position’ are left to sort out their rivalries as loudly as they do it. What suffers in the process is the state legitimacy and coherence. Yet neither side can stop now. In effect, this is what alienates a sizable majority of the citizenry. But make no mistake, they are not indifferent or apathetic. They are hoping for a third force, more competent and businesslike. If the popular demand for effective statesmanship comes to pass, Armenia could yet emerge as a path breaker among the post-Soviet countries. Only a hope, so far.”

“Lukashenko’s Brutal Crackdown Has Lethal Help From Moscow,” Vlad Kobets and David J. Kramer, Foreign Policy, 03.04.21. Kobets, the executive director of the International Strategic Action Network for Security and a former assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor, writes:

• “Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko’s fraudulent claims of victory in last August’s presidential election triggered massive protests across the country. After 26 years of miserable ineptitude, repression, poverty and corruption under Lukashenko, the citizens of Belarus had enough.”
• “The protesters in Belarus were overwhelmingly peaceful. But because of their size and persistence over many months, Lukashenko appears to have panicked and responded in the only way he knows: by ordering his thuggish security forces to do everything necessary to put them down.”
• “The security services—still known in Belarus by their Soviet-era acronym, KGB—are Lukashenko’s only hope for staying in power. But this relic of the era when Belarus was ruled from Moscow isn’t the only connection between Lukashenko’s violent crackdown and his country’s former Russian masters. An investigation by BYPOL, a network of dissident former officers from the Belarusian security services and criminal justice system, has documented widespread use of Russian weapons and ammunition used by Lukashenko’s forces to put down the protests. This includes many weapons with lethal military capabilities whose use on civilians violates international human rights standards.”
• “Before even more innocent Belarusian pro-democracy protesters are maimed or killed, there must be an immediate halt to the brutal crackdown. A thorough and independent investigation is necessary to look into the use of near-lethal weapons and ammunition, their origin, and those who authorized their illegal use. Lukashenko blames outside forces for the protests against his rule, but in reality, the only outside player complicit in the violent suppression of peaceful citizens is Putin’s Russia.”

“Emerging Forms of Pax Sinica in Tajikistan and Cambodia,” Bradley Jardine, Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), 03.08.21. The author, a global fellow at the Wilson Center's Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, and research consultant for the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, writes:

• “In recent years, Tajikistan has made a habit of parading its new Chinese weapons systems. With perennial concerns over the stability of its southern border with Afghanistan, Tajikistan is reliant on external powers for its security. In many ways, Dushanbe is mirroring developments in South East Asia [Cambodia].”
• “Beijing has used its growing leverage to gain political support from Dushanbe and Phnom Penh. In 2019, after Turkey deported Uyghurs to Tajikistan, Dushanbe immediately repatriated them to China, where they were detained on arrival. Tajikistan is also one of two Central Asian states to have signed a letter to the UN defending Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang. This is a pattern that played out over a decade prior in South East Asia. In 2009, Cambodia deported twenty Uyghurs back to China, knowing that these individuals would likely be executed.”
• “Both Tajikistan and Cambodia are among the seven countries whose debt to China amounts to more than 25 percent of their national GDP. Tajikistan’s external debt has doubled during the past decade, with China owning $1.2 billion, just under half of the country’s total debt. In the past, Tajikistan has paid off debts to China by ceding mining rights, and even 0.7 percent of its territory in a contentious border agreement.”
• “Unlike Cambodia, Tajikistan has been able to maintain ties with Russia to offset dependence on China, but the gap is closing. If the country’s leaders fail to balance external relations, they may find themselves facing a more assertive Beijing.”