I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

“The New NATO-Russia Military Balance: Implications for European Security,” Richard Sokolsky, Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, 03.13.17: The author, a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Endowment, writes that NATO sees Russia as a military threat to its eastern flank. Russia has reformed and modernized its military and shown “an unprecedented willingness to use force as an instrument” of its aggressive, anti-Western foreign policy. In an initial attack against the Baltics, Russia would have an advantage over NATO. “In sum, Russia would attack with a much larger and heavier force, supported by advanced armor, weapons and sensors and by a sophisticated air defense system and long-range direct fire systems.” A fully mobilized NATO response, however, “would present the Russian military with a serious risk of conventional defeat.” As a military attack on the Baltics could end poorly for Russia, Moscow could use soft power tools to destabilize NATO by shaking the Baltic states’ confidence in the alliance. The author urges the U.S. and NATO to take a number of steps in response to Russia’s violation of the INF treaty, such as publicizing Russia’s violation and issuing a high-level statement that NATO is prepared to “take whatever steps are necessary to deter and defend against Russia’s use of these weapons.” The “cool war” between Russia and NATO may now be a new normal, but it is fraught with instability and the potential for dangerous miscalculations. As such, measures need to be taken in order to keep the conflict cool.

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

•  No significant commentary.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

“Trump Deserves a Chance to Deal With Russia Over Syria,” Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The National Interest, 03.15.17: The author, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, writes that U.S. President Donald Trump’s stated desire to work with Russia in the Middle East has met with resistance in Washington. “An initial review completed by the Pentagon, and circulating among his senior national-security team, apparently recommends that the United States not pursue any of the proposals currently circulating for closer U.S.-Russia military cooperation in Syria against the Islamic State.” Lacking precise instructions from the White House, U.S. policy on Syria continues to operate “on autopilot,” still on the course set by the previous administration. While Trump may be persuaded against cooperating with Moscow in Syria, he “is entitled as commander in chief” to request a reassessment, backed by “new guidance on what he sees as the United States’ interests in Syria.” Another option is the one former U.S. President George W. Bush turned to for finding new ways of stabilizing Iraq: looking to people outside “the existing bureaucracy” to take a look at the problem and offer fresh solutions.

Cyber security:

“Nations Jockey for Influence in Cyber Space,” Anne-Marie Slaughter, Financial Times, 03.16.17: The author, president and CEO of New America, writes that “cyber space is a new board for an old game: the jockeying of nations for strategic advantage.” Russia’s efforts to influence U.S. domestic politics “is but the latest round of great power chess” in what may be the first years of a new Cold War. The author suggests robust cyber defenses, “webcraft,” as a more successful defense against cyber attacks than statecraft. A major problem posed by cyber conflict is that it favors the offense, as the offense needs to find merely one entry point, while the defense must guard all possible entry points. As such, strong cyber defenses are increasingly important. “Small teams of cyber defenders and avengers can at least raise the price of cyber attacks and with enough advance information, may even be able to engage in preemptive actions.” The author notes that design and operation of customized networks “will be a critical element of future foreign policy.”

Russia’s alleged interference in U.S. elections:

“The Questions About Trump and Russia Need an Independent Investigation. Don't Count on Congress,” Steven L. Hall, The Washington Post, 03.20.17: The author, former head of Russia operations at the CIA, writes that “there can be little doubt” that Russia attempted to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The author lists the links connecting U.S. President Donald Trump’s campaign to the Russian government, including Michael Flynn’s connection to Russian media outlet RT, the allegations regarding former Trump campaign chief Paul Manafort, the questions surrounding lawyer Michael Cohen and the contact between Trump advisor Roger Stone and a hacker who claims responsibility for hacking the Democratic National Committee. The author stresses the need for bipartisan concern and an independent commission to investigate the matter. “If that doesn’t happen, and the results of the oversight committee’s work is simply a shoulder shrug, grave damage will have been done to the bedrock of our democracy.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant commentary.

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Russian Foreign Policy Is Incomprehensible for a Reason,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 03.14.17: The author, a Bloomberg Views columnist, writes that the recent situation in Montenegro parallels the beginning of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. A top suspect in the attempted Montenegrin coup attempt, former Russian naval attaché Eduard Shishmakov, believed to be working with Russia’s military intelligence service, was expelled from Poland in 2014 for spying. Now, “the same man—at least according to his passport photograph, date and place of birth” is being sought in Montenegro under the name of Eduard Shirokov, a private citizen. It is unlikely that an agent with a blown cover would be reused for a highly sensitive mission. In eastern Ukraine, “privately funded nationalist volunteers,” including former intelligence officers, escalated protests into war, but were soon replaced by Kremlin personnel. These parallels may indicate that the Russian ultranationalist community “may be trying to run ahead of a more cautious Kremlin” in the Balkans. While the relationship between this community and the Kremlin is “one of tolerance,” Putin “appears grudgingly to agree with some of the nationalists' ideas. That introduces an element of unpredictability into Russia's game of restoring the Soviet Union's international influence.”

China:

• No significant commentary. 

Ukraine:

“6 Policies Trump Should Pursue to Block Putin in Ukraine,” Michael Carpenter, Foreign Policy, 03.15.17: The author, senior director of the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement, details policies the new U.S. administration should adopt in order to resolve the conflict in Ukraine. These include continued training and equipment to Ukrainian armed forces, direct U.S. involvement in conflict resolution diplomacy, increased U.S. leverage over Russia, the creation of a detailed plan with France and Germany for Minsk II’s implementation, continued investment in Ukraine’s success and “greater European support for Ukraine’s democratic development.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant commentary.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“The Russian Revolution: Then and Now,” Serge Schmemann, New York Times, 03.16.17: The author, a former editorial page editor of the International Herald Tribune, writes that the “nagging inconsistency” of Russia’s February Revolution taking place in March and the October Revolution taking place in November “offers a foretaste of the extraordinary degree to which perspective shapes” the ways in which the Russian Revolution is seen and understood today. The problem facing Moscow now is that neither the February nor the October Revolution comfortably fit Putin’s preferred narrative himself and of Russia’s uninterrupted greatness. Czarism, Bolshevism “and the post-Communist travails” are themselves contradictory narratives, making the task of rewriting history rather more complicated. “The Soviets' version of revolutionary history ended up in the same dustbin of history to which they had relegated their opponents. And much as Mr. Putin would like to play down the revolution, he cannot stop Russians from continuing to explore an event whose consequences still reverberate around the world.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.