This Week’s Highlights

• Vladimir Putin’s single biggest achievement has been to re-empower the state bureaucracy, no part of which matters more than the national security establishment, writes Stephen Sestanovich of the Council on Foreign Relations. Among them are what Russians call the “power ministries”—the Interior Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the recently formed National Guard and the intelligence and security services. Sestanovich argues that how the Russian system evolves after Putin will depend on whether a new president gets these institutions to do what he wants or whether they get him to do what they want.
• Taken together, Trump’s policies to “greatly strengthen and expand” the U.S. nuclear capability and his failure to engage in good faith negotiations to end the arms race and pursue disarmament are a violation of U.S. obligations under Article VI of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, argue Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association. Kimball urges the Trump administration to heed calls to take up Russia’s offer to extend New START and advises Congress, and perhaps a new president in 2021, to rein in the exploding cost and scope of the U.S. nuclear modernization program, particularly the efforts to develop “more usable” nuclear weapons.
• An uncanny capacity for self-destruction has brought Russia over the precipice several times in the course of the country’s history. Yet each time Russia was able to make a comeback, writes Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. A resurgent Russia is not unusual; it is a time-tested historical phenomenon, Trenin argues.
• Vladimir Putin has sought to use the turmoil in the Middle East to erase international norms and advances in international humanitarian law made since the second World War, argues George Soros. In fact, creating the humanitarian disaster has not been a byproduct of the Russian president’s strategy in Syria, Soros argues—it has been one of his central goals. Selcan Hacaoglu for Bloomberg, however, writes that Russia’s goal in Syria has always been to help Assad reassert control over all Syrian territory, and that Russia’s endgame also includes the reconstruction of Syria, for which it hopes to attract European Union funding. A bloodbath in Idlib could scuttle those aspirations, Hacaoglu argues.
• Recently ousted Ukrainian Prime Minister Honcharuk’s cabinet had embodied the public feeling that saw Volodymyr Zelenskiy himself sweep to power: that it was better to have young and inexperienced people in government than experienced—but corrupt—statesmen, writes Konstantin Skorkin for the Carnegie Moscow Center. With the fall of the government, the president loses some of his own legitimacy. After all, Skorkin asks, if that young team was so incapable of reforming the country, where is the guarantee that the equally young and inexperienced president can do any better?
• There is a bigger geopolitical dimension to Russia’s withdrawal from OPEC+, writes Bloomberg’s Julian Lee. Participation served Vladimir Putin’s ambitions to rebuild Russia’s influence in the Middle East. Withdrawal is aimed at punishing the U.S. for its repeated attacks on Russia’s energy interests through sanctions, Lee argues.

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

New Cold War/saber rattling:

• No significant developments.

NATO-Russia relations:

“Erdogan’s Pivot to Putin Has Left Turkey Weaker,” Editorial Board, Financial Times, 03.04.20: The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s pivot to Moscow has proved to be a humiliating experience. The Turkish leader spurned his Western allies after their perceived lack of solidarity following the failed coup against him in 2016 … Erdogan sought kinship with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. He invited Russia to build Turkey’s first nuclear power plant and pipe gas to Europe through the country. He incensed NATO partners by buying a Russian air defense system, which could help the Kremlin counter U.S. stealth aircraft.”
• “Yet Turkey [last] week came close to a dangerous military confrontation with Russian forces in northwestern Syria, where the objectives of Ankara and Moscow collide … Mr. Erdogan knows this is a war he cannot win. The Turkish leader saved faced by agreeing a ceasefire in talks with Mr. Putin … But Russia and Turkey are still on collision course and previous deals between them have collapsed. Fighting could easily erupt again.”
• “Erdogan allowed Mr. Putin to drive a wedge between NATO members. But it was his NATO allies that Mr. Erdogan turned to last week for assistance after incurring the troop losses. Having defied Washington over the Russian air defense system—which is not yet deployed—he implored the U.S. to deploy Patriot missiles instead.”
• “Now Mr. Erdogan is helping the Kremlin to drive a wedge between European states by encouraging refugees and migrants to cross Turkey’s borders. That has certainly caught the attention of EU leaders … He has exposed the vulnerabilities of a bloc that remains incapable of devising a new asylum policy.
• “The Turkish leader likes to make Europe quake with his refugee threats, but it is the Russian leader who is calling the shots. Europeans and Americans have abdicated responsibility for the Syria catastrophe. Mr. Erdogan’s behavior has given them another excuse not to reconsider.”

“Modernizing Conventional Arms Control: An Urgent Imperative,” Nicholas Williams and Simon Lunn, European Leadership Network (ELN), 03.09.20: The authors, senior associate fellows at ELN, write:

• “The demise of the Intermediate- Range Nuclear (INF) Treaty has been a severe blow to already fragile relations between Russia and the West, posing a challenge to the maintenance of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. It also represents a further setback for arms control.”
• “Hopes of maintaining a degree of control and restraint in the continuing development of armed forces are rapidly fading, just as the Russia-NATO confrontation
is intensifying. In such a volatile and ever-changing political and military environment, what measures can be taken to restore a degree of order, certainty and stability to the Europe-Atlantic area?”
• “This paper … It proposes twelve innovative measures to reverse the negative trend of increased military confrontation, looking in detail at the most immediately worrying situation in the Baltic area. The paper argues that there is now an urgent imperative for both NATO and Russia to accept both increasingly restrictive measures on military flexibility and improvements in military transparency. It also addresses the question of implementation of the necessary measures.”

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms control:

“No One Wins an Arms Race or a Nuclear War,” Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Today, March 2020: The author, executive director of the Arms Control Association, writes:

• “[T]he Trump administration acknowledged last month that the United States has deployed for the first time a low-yield nuclear warhead on some U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). … The move comes as the administration is proposing to increase spending to more than $44 billion next year to continue and, in some cases, accelerate programs to replace and upgrade all the major elements of the bloated U.S. arsenal. Unless curtailed, the plan … will accelerate global nuclear competition and increase the risk of nuclear war.”
• “As if to underscore the dangers of the administration’s strategy, the Defense Department led an exercise last month simulating a limited nuclear war [with Russia]. … The exercise perpetuates the dangerous illusion that a nuclear war can be fought and won. … Russian military leaders would be hard pressed to know, in the heat of a crisis, whether the missile was part of a ‘limited’ strike or the first wave of an all-out nuclear attack.”
• “Nevertheless, Trump officials insist that the president needs ‘more credible’ nuclear use options to deter the possible first use of nuclear weapons by Russia. … Lowering the threshold for nuclear use by making nuclear weapons ‘more usable’ takes the United States and Russia and the world in the wrong direction.”
• “Taken together, Trump’s policies to ‘greatly strengthen and expand’ the U.S. nuclear capability and his failure to engage in good faith negotiations to end the arms race and pursue disarmament are a violation of U.S. obligations under Article VI of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.”
• “First, the Trump administration needs to heed calls from military officials, U.S. allies and bipartisan national security leaders to take up Russia’s offer to extend the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty by five years … Second, the Congress, and perhaps a new president in 2021, must rein in the exploding cost and scope of the U.S. nuclear modernization program, particularly the efforts to develop ‘more usable’ nuclear weapons.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

“Idlib Residents Put Little Faith in Russian-Turkish Peace Deal,” Laura Pitel, Henry Foy and Chloe Cornish, Financial Times, 03.08.20: The authors, correspondents for the news outlet, write:

• “After weeks of clashes that killed scores of Turkish and Syrian soldiers, a truce hammered out by Ankara and Moscow has brought some days of much-needed calm to the province of Idlib. … [M]ost analysts share the doubts of Idlib’s weary 3 million inhabitants that the deal will provide a long-term solution … ‘Obviously, the agreement that was reached is temporary,’ said Vladimir Evseev, deputy director of Russia’s CIS Institute. ‘Most likely, we will [in the months ahead] approach a new crisis with Turkey.’”
• “The ceasefire freezes the fighting on the existing front lines and creates a buffer zone along the strategic M4 highway that dissects Idlib province and will be policed by joint Turkish-Russian patrols. The deal achieves Mr. Erdogan’s aim of halting the fighting, but represents a concession on his previous demand for Syrian troops to withdraw from newly captured territory as it leaves a much smaller patch of land under Turkish control.”
• “The two-page joint memorandum signed in Moscow contains just three agreed outcomes. Russia and Turkey have committed to more talks in the days ahead to thrash out key details. Analysts said a sticking point would be the contentious issue of dealing with Islamist groups in Idlib.”
• “The Turkish president has faced a difficult balancing act in recent weeks as he has poured troops and equipment into Idlib to counter the Syrian regime’s assault. … Turkish drone and artillery attacks inflicted significant damage on Mr. Assad’s forces, but the offensive also carried a heavy toll for Ankara … Further fighting would have risked a public backlash, and jeopardized Turkey’s relationship with Russia, which extends to energy, trade, tourism and defense.”
• “‘Turkey is stuck in this asymmetrical relationship with Russia where Erdogan doesn’t call the shots, Putin does,’ said Soner Cagaptay, author of ‘Erdogan’s Empire: Turkey and the Politics of the Middle East.’”

“What’s at Stake in Idlib, Last Battle in Syria’s War,” Selcan Hacaoglu, Bloomberg, 03.06.20: The author, a reporter for the news outlet, writes:

• “Russia’s goal has always been to help Assad reassert control over all Syrian territory. Recapturing Idlib would allow the Syrian government to expand links between … Damascus, and the former commercial hub Aleppo, and to declare final victory in the war.”
• “Assad would still have to deal with Syrian Kurdish forces who emerged as one of America’s closest allies in the fight against Islamic State and wound up controlling about a third of the country in the northeast. But the Kurds seek autonomy from the regime … Russia’s endgame also includes the reconstruction of Syria, for which it hopes to attract European Union funding. A bloodbath in Idlib could scuttle those aspirations.”
• “Both Turkey and Russia have reasons not to let the conflict escalate and lead to a breach in relations … In a meeting in Moscow March 5, presidents Vladimir Putin of Russia and Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to an agreement that allowed the Syrian government to retain control of some ground it regained in previous weeks. The deal appeared to fall short of Erdogan’s desire to establish a new zone of control in Idlib to resettle millions of refugees and keep them from spilling into Turkey.”
• “The zone would also give Turkey a pretext to maintain troops and thereby some influence in postwar Syria. At the Putin-Erdogan summit, tensions weren’t far below the surface, as each side blamed the other’s allies for the latest escalation in fighting.”

“Europe Must Stand With Turkey Over Putin’s War Crimes in Syria,” George Soros, Financial Times, 03.04.20: The author, chairman and founder of Soros Fund Management and the Open Society Foundations, writes:

• “Vladimir Putin has sought to use the turmoil in the Middle East to erase international norms and advances in international humanitarian law made since the second World War. In fact, creating the humanitarian disaster that has turned almost 6 million Syrians into refugees has not been a byproduct of the Russian president’s strategy in Syria. It has been one of his central goals.”
• “In May 2019, Russia bombed four hospitals in 12 hours … As recently as Feb. 26, 2020, according to the U.N., 10 schools were targeted in a single day … Local health officials claim that, since … April 2019, at least 49 medical facilities have been targeted. … Russia has also targeted at least 14 camps holding internally displaced persons during the conflict for Idlib.”
• “As Russia is a permanent member of the Security Council, it has used its veto repeatedly … to block efforts at accountability. That includes the veto, alongside China, of a resolution supported by 65 countries and the rest of the security council that would have referred war crimes committed in Syria to the International Criminal Court.”
• “In 2014, I urged Europe to wake up to the threat that Russia was posing to its strategic interests, albeit in a different context and geography. … [W]hat is happening in Idlib now is following the same pattern: Europe is evading a confrontation with Russia over its Syria policy when it should be standing up to it. By focusing on the refugee crisis that Russia has created, Europe is addressing the symptom and not the cause.”
• “Europe should therefore seek to bolster Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s negotiating position with Mr. Putin in trying to reach a cease fire that would preserve a ‘safe zone’ in Idlib for Syrian refugees. I hope that this would also put Mr. Putin’s war crimes at the center of the European conversation.”

Cyber security:

• No significant developments.

Elections interference:

• No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

“OPEC’s Epic Fail Will Hurt All Oil Producers, Even Russia,” Julian Lee, Bloomberg, 03.08.20: The author, an oil strategist for the news outlet, writes:

• “Friday’s  [March 6] gathering of oil ministers from [OPEC] and their international allies broke up in disarray. … What’s become clear is that by making any OPEC output cut dependent on the participation of non-OPEC allies, the group effectively cemented Russia’s full control over the whole process of supply management … This isn’t the first time OPEC+, which controls almost half of the world’s oil production, has been an uneasy partnership, but it is by far the most damaging. The partnership remains on life-support.”
• “But this meeting was not just about making a further output cut. It was also meant to ratify an extension of the current agreement between the 20 nations to remove as much as 2.1 million barrels a day of oil from the market. That deal … expires at the end of this month, leaving members free to pump as much as they wish from April 1.”
• “Russia didn’t reject further output cuts just because its oil companies are reluctant to pump a bit less out of the ground. After all, they haven’t exactly stuck to their commitments so far … Had they wanted to do so, there was plenty of room for Russia to accept an output cut and implement it only in part, if at all.”
• “One reason for refusing to play ball may be disagreement over how best to deal with a sudden sharp, but temporary, drop in oil demand. By allowing oil prices to fall, the Russians may be hoping to spur demand. … Cheap oil won’t ease fears of the Covid-19 virus. But it may encourage countries like China and India to build up their strategic stockpiles.”
• “But there is also a bigger geopolitical dimension to Russia’s withdrawal … Participation served President Putin’s ambitions to rebuild Russia’s influence in the Middle East. Withdrawal is aimed at punishing the U.S. for its repeated attacks on Russia’s energy interests through sanctions. … Russia intends to make sure that U.S. oil companies share the pain of the collapse in oil demand. Saudi Arabia appears willing to help it. The next few months will be ugly.”

“Russia’s Defiance Sets the Stage for Oil Price ‘Bloodbath,’” Keith Johnson, Foreign Policy, 03.09.20: The author, a correspondent for Foreign Policy, writes:

• “Russia surprisingly torpedoed an attempt by big oil producers to cut crude output and stabilize the market, sending the price of oil sharply down on [March 6]. Saudi Arabia and other big oil exporters that make up OPEC had agreed … to further cut their oil output by 1.5 million barrels a day, a desperate attempt to shore up the price of oil as the new coronavirus wreaks havoc on the global economy. But that agreement was conditional on the support of Russia—which ultimately balked, ending the two-day OPEC meeting in Vienna with no new agreement and sending crude prices into freefall.”
• “The bloodbath came on [March 9] as oil prices plunged by more than 20 percent to the low $30s per barrel after Saudi Arabia declared an all-out price war by sharply cutting the selling price of its crude. … The IEA slashed its forecast for global oil demand this year, and said that in a worst-case scenario the economic impacts from the spread of Covid-19 could mean the world consumes 700,000 fewer barrels per day of oil this year–a historic drop in consumption.”
• “OPEC had planned to make more cuts now and to extend the big production cuts they’d made last year, which are set to expire at the end of this month. After the collapse of talks on [March 6], it’s not even clear if those previous cuts will remain in place … Russia, which isn’t formally a member of OPEC, nevertheless managed to scupper the cartel’s efforts to deal with the collapse in oil demand and falling prices. … [While] OPEC was prepared to cut a further 1 million barrels a day if Russia made cuts of its own, the big OPEC producers were not willing to unilaterally make bigger sacrifices to shore up the oil market unless Russia shared the effort.”
• “Russia and OPEC agreed to continue consulting on oil supplies, but it’s not clear when they will meet again. Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak said that countries in OPEC+, the broader grouping of OPEC plus Russia and some other producers, are free to pump with abandon next month.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Is This the End of the Open Skies Treaty?” Steven Pifer, The National Interest, 03.07.20: The author, a William Perry Research Fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, writes:

• “Senior Trump administration officials reportedly will meet the week of March 9 to decide on withdrawing from the 1992 Open Skies Treaty. Doing so would constitute another mistake by an administration that increasingly seems set against arms control.”
• “[C]ritics note that Russia has violated the treaty. … Second, opponents … assert that [improved satellite technology] makes observation flights unnecessary and redundant. … Third, critics express concern that the Russians use observation flights to gather information on U.S. infrastructure as well as military facilities and activities.”
• “U.S. withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty would mean forgoing a number of advantages. First, Open Skies imagery and other data can be used in ways that U.S. satellite imagery, which is highly classified, cannot. … Second, the United States conducts far more overflights of Russia and Belarus (the two are paired as a group of state parties) than vice-versa. … Third, few countries possess the sophisticated space-based reconnaissance capabilities that the United States and Russia have. … Fourth, Open Skies can provide a particularly useful tool in times or regions of crisis.”
• “Should Trump unwisely decide to withdraw from the treaty, it could mean the treaty’s end. With Russia no longer having the possibility of flights over the United States, it might also withdraw. That would likely provide the death knell for the treaty … Trump over the past year has said that he wants to go big on arms control and negotiate an agreement with Russia and China covering all types of nuclear arms, but his administration has yet to offer a proposal or even an outline for doing so. A decision to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty would provide the latest evidence that he sees little point in arms control.”

“The Real Russia Story in American Politics,” Joshua Yaffa, New York Times, 03.09.20: The author, a correspondent for The New Yorker, writes:

• “I recently found myself returning to an essay from 2000 by Yuri Levada … called ‘The Wily Man.’ The essay was Levada’s attempt to understand why so many pathologies of the Soviet era … persisted so powerfully in modern Russia. In Levada’s telling, the wily man or woman ‘not only tolerates deception, but is willing to be deceived.’ … After spending a long stretch of time back in the United States, I see clearly that Levada’s description of ‘wiliness’ has become an intrinsic feature of a large and growing swath of American politics in the Trump age.”
• “The starkest example of this came during the recent impeachment trial in the Senate, where Republicans metamorphosed into bodyguards and apologists for Trump. … It is not just politicians who have compromised. Numerous evangelical leaders have contorted themselves to hold up Trump as a virtuous, even godly, figure.”
• “But not all manifestations of American wiliness are so openly cynical. More often, as in Russia, these choices look understandable—perhaps even commendable. It’s hard to argue with those who accepted jobs in the Trump administration and federal agencies on the grounds that they could make a difference on discrete policy issues, or at least prevent Armageddon.”
• “In Russia, the consequence of refusing to compromise is often clear: the frustration of worthy ambitions left unrealized, a career that goes nowhere or maybe, if the stakes are high or you’re supremely unlucky, undue attention from police and the courts.”
• “But in America, at least at the moment, a wider spectrum of choices remains. And that is the scary thing about observing wiliness at home: how readily and quickly we bend, not when there is truly no other choice, but when there are plenty of other choices, the wily one being merely the easiest and most expedient.”

“Contending With—Not Accepting—Spheres of Influence,” Steven Pifer, Russia Matters, 03.05.20: In this response to a piece by Paul Saunders, the author, a William Perry Research Fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, writes:

• “Washington has to deal with efforts by Moscow to establish a sphere of influence in its neighborhood. That does not mean, however, that the United States should accept the legitimacy of the Russian efforts. Doing so would require denying agency to countries on Russia’s borders, countries such as Ukraine and Georgia, that wish to forge their own course. Doing so could also ultimately set back the prospects of Russia’s own development.”
• “Washington has supported NATO’s ‘open door’ policy as well as the right of Georgia and Ukraine to deepen their relations with the West.  But does that justify Russian military action in response? In 2014, when Russia illegally seized Crimea and sparked conflict in Donbass, NATO membership for Ukraine simply was not an issue … Moscow launched war because of the post-Maidan government’s proclaimed interest in signing a trade agreement.”
• “It is difficult to see how what Russia wants in Ukraine, Georgia or Moldova is not an effort to dominate. … The Kremlin … does seek relationships in which neighbors first check with Moscow before making decisions that the Kremlin decides could affect Russian interests, and then defer to Kremlin wishes. That includes how far countries such as Ukraine and Georgia go in their relationships with institutions such as NATO and the European Union.”
• “Yes, Russia has interests and will pursue those interests. But accepting Moscow’s assertion of a sphere of influence means denying that countries such as Ukraine have interests of their own or a right to determine their own domestic and foreign policy courses. … Do we really want to accept a world in which the views and desires of little or smaller countries are sacrificed to the preferences, however legitimate or illegitimate, of their larger, more powerful neighbors?”

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“The Day After Putin,” Stephen Sestanovich, Foreign Affairs, 03.04.20: The author, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, writes:

• “One reason so much analysis of Russia’s future reveals so little is that journalists, businesspeople, diplomats and scholars—myself included—have too often asked the wrong questions. We focus too much on Putin himself … And we pay too little attention to the institutions that today define the Russian state.”
• “Putin’s single biggest achievement … has been to reempower the state bureaucracy. … No part … matters more than the national security establishment … These institutions may well determine not only who becomes the next president of Russia but what Russian politics will look like after Putin.”
• “Consider what would happen if Putin dropped dead tomorrow. … [T]he prime minister—Mishustin, in this case—becomes the acting president. Within 90 days, an election would be held … But that is not all that would happen. Soon after taking over as acting president, Mishustin would be on the phone to some of the people whose help he would need to win the election. Among them would be the heads of what Russians call the ‘power ministries’—the Interior Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the recently formed National Guard and the intelligence and security services. … [H]ow the Russian system evolves after Putin will depend on whether a new president … gets these institutions to do what he wants or whether they get him to do what they want.”
• “Russia’s power ministries have come to form a kind of ‘deep state’ … Competition among elements of the deep state could, in an extreme case, turn violent. But even if the struggle stays peaceful, the price Russia’s next leader will have to pay for the siloviki’s support could be steep. The power ministries may want expanded autonomy, bigger budgets, perhaps even a greater say on issues beyond their existing domains.”
• “Taking on the deep state will be difficult, but failing to do so will mean accepting strict limits on presidential authority. … A less personalized, more institutionally focused public assessment of how the Russian system works won’t just provide a better indication of what the future holds; it can be part of the United States’ policy response.”

“Discord in Kremlin Helps Putin Remain Russia’s No. 1,” Thomas Grove and Georgi Kantchev, Wall Street Journal, 03.06.20: The authors, reporters for the news outlet, write:

• “For months after the start of his fourth and, by law, final term in office in 2018, Mr. Putin held meetings with technocrats and politicians that raised questions about who, if anyone, would be chosen to succeed his longtime No. 2, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev—and nurturing rivalries between potential candidates. It was a tactic that the Russian leader has long used: create rifts between senior officials to maintain his own supremacy as final arbiter.”
• “As Mr. Putin starts Russia on the political transition that will mark the end of his presidency in 2024, he has triggered battles for influence and power inside the Kremlin. Some extend long-running feuds; others involve newer factions looking to claim their turf if and when posts are reshuffled among the ruling elite. … During the recent competition for prime minister … pro-Kremlin think tanks flagged Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin and audit-watchdog chief Alexei Kudrin as leading candidates, and tax chief Mikhail Mishustin far from the top.”
• “On Jan. 13, two days before Mr. Putin declared his choice, he gathered senior government officials and close advisers at the Kremlin to discuss his annual speech to parliament, in a meeting reported on the Kremlin website. Messrs. Sobyanin and Mishustin sat side by side at the table—two unlikely figures to attend such a high-profile government meeting, according to analysts. The next day, Mr. Putin’s chief of staff called Mr. Mishustin to the president’s office.”
• “Last month, the Duma backed constitutional amendments that would make Russian presidents senators for life after they leave office, a status that would give them immunity from prosecution. … Meantime, Mr. Putin and Mr. Mishustin have installed a government that includes people close to the prime minister and others close to his top rival for the post, Mr. Sobyanin. That sets the stage for a potential tug of war between factions—to the benefit of Mr. Putin.”

“Falling Oil Prices Threaten to Derail Putin’s Spending Promises,” Max Seddon, Financial Times, 03.02.20: The author, Moscow correspondent for the news outlet, writes:

• “The coronavirus outbreak last week pushed Brent crude, the international oil benchmark, down 10 percent to a year-low of close to $50 a barrel. The fall puts prices near Russia’s break-even price of $42 a barrel, threatening to undermine the policy that has helped Moscow run a budget surplus and save $125 billion in excess oil and gas revenue in a national wealth fund since 2017.”
• “Facing a fall in living standards that pushed his approval ratings to record lows, Mr. Putin pledged in January to spend 4 trillion rubles ($60 billion) on infrastructure and social spending as part of sweeping changes that could allow him to remain in power. The national wealth fund, squirrelled away during years of austerity, is key to those plans.”
• “Sinking oil prices could derail those plans by cutting inflows into the fund and weakening the ruble, hampering Russia’s ability to purchase foreign currency to build further reserves. The ruble traded at 67 to the dollar on [Feb. 28], its lowest rate since September last year.”
• “Russia’s finance ministry told the FT it would continue to use surplus oil and gas revenues for foreign currency purchases as long as oil prices remained above the $42 cut-off price. If prices were to fall lower, Russia would sell foreign reserves in proportion to the scale of the dip. This policy is intended to prevent a repeat of the crisis during the last big slump in oil prices in 2014.”
• “The finance ministry said it would keep its 1 trillion rubles spending process so long as the national wealth fund remained above 7 percent of gross domestic product. Though sustained oil prices at $50 per barrel or below could threaten that pledge, the steps Russia has taken to insulate itself from external shocks through the budget rule and move to a free float give it strong protection, said Natalia Orlova, chief economist at Alfa-Bank.”

“Coronavirus Could Rock Russia’s ‘Stable and Isolated’ Economy,” Jake Cordell, The Moscow Times, 03.06.20: The author, a correspondent for the news outlet, writes:

• “The coronavirus outbreak is shaping up to be the first serious test of Russia’s stability-first economic policy introduced in the wake of the economic and geopolitical turmoil of 2014. However, economists are divided on whether the country’s macroeconomic war chest will be enough to weather the coronavirus storm, or if the nature of the downturn still leaves the country exposed to global turmoil.”
• “With oil prices trading at their lowest level since 2017, Russia’s traditional reliance on the black stuff for its economic wellbeing has come into focus yet again. The ruble has fallen to a 15-month low … Meanwhile, the Russian stock market lost almost 6 percent on [March 6] alone, and has plunged by a quarter in the space of just six weeks—one of the biggest drops anywhere in the world.”
• “The slowdown in China, which has seen factories closed and internal movement seriously restricted, will deliver a $10 billion hit to Russia’s exports for 2020 … In another sign of how serious the coronavirus hit to Russia’s economic relationship with China could be, the government this week decided to cancel its flagship St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, scheduled for June.
• “‘The risks for Russian growth forecasts are now primarily concentrated in the export component, which actually brings a pretty sizeable contribution to total growth in most pre-coronavirus forecasts,’ Nordea’s chief Russia economist Tatiana Evdokimova wrote on Twitter. ‘In the worst case scenario we may end up with a negative contribution.’”
• “Should Moscow adopt a worst-case-scenario response to the outbreak, such as large-scale quarantines and shutdowns, Oxford Economics’ Evghenia Sleptsova said Russia would face a ‘proper recession.’ … The market panic could also paralyze Russia’s economic institutions designed to fight turmoil and support the economy. … While it may have a stronger balance sheet, the outbreak has shown that Russia is still deeply connected to the global economy and reliant on global energy prices, despite Moscow’s rhetorical drive towards isolation.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant developments.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“The World Through Moscow’s Eyes: A Classic Russian Perspective,” Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center/The Foreign Service Journal, 03.03.20: The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “An uncanny capacity for self-destruction has brought Russia over the precipice several times in the course of the country’s history. Yet each time Russia was able to make a comeback … A resurgent Russia is not unusual; it is a time-tested historical phenomenon. … … [T]he roots of Russian autocracy run very deep, and that replacing them with a democratic model cannot be an easy task. The task is not made any easier by the extent to which sheer survival has been the country’s top concern historically.”
• “Those looking at Russia’s foreign relations would soon discover that the country is essentially a loner. It is not part of any international large family, whether Europe, the Atlantic community or the West. Asians do not recognize Russia as Asian, either. Its identity is distinct and unique. … This proud but precarious stance makes it imperative that Russia handle itself—and be seen by others—as a great power.”
• “Except in the early post-revolutionary period, Russia’s foreign policy has been squarely built on the principles of realpolitik. … A sound foreign policy is guided by national interests, and requires sobriety and pragmatism. Russia’s preferred model of global governance is a concert of powers … Indeed, the United Nations Security Council … is an ideal model in Moscow’s eyes.”
• “Since Ukraine clearly matters much more to Russia than it does to the United States, Moscow believes it has a de facto veto on Ukraine’s NATO membership through high-cost military intervention. … A prudent U.S. policy needs to make sure that its actions in Ukraine do not cause it to stumble into a military conflict with Russia.”
• “Possibilities for any serious U.S.- Russian cooperation will be extremely limited over the next five years or so. Whatever the outcome of the 2020 elections, the U.S. body politic will probably continue to need Russia as a villain. … The specter of an all-powerful America having no real use for Russia while seeking to hurt it whenever it can will, in turn, be used by the Kremlin and its allies to shore up Russian patriotism and civic nationalism.”
• “During this trying period, the United States and Russia need to prevent direct military collision between themselves. … Conflict prevention and management will require, above all else, direct contacts and 24/7 communication between the military and security departments of the two countries. More substantive dialogue will remain severely constrained.”

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

• No significant developments.

Ukraine:

“Ukraine’s Unromantic Reshuffle,” Konstantin Skorkin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 03.06.20: The author, an independent journalist, writes:

• “The dismissal of the Ukrainian government … signals the end of the honeymoon period of Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s presidency. … Yet in replacing his ministers in an attempt to combat his falling ratings, Zelenskiy may be forfeiting some of his own legitimacy, and risks joining the ranks of Ukraine’s failed reformers.”
• “Honcharuk’s government was intended to be technocratic and pro-Western … Honcharuk did make a good impression abroad, but at home he clashed with an influential enemy: the oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky. … Amid this battle, Honcharuk’s dismissal will cause significant damage to Zelenskiy’s image in the West. The president’s ties to Kolomoisky have long been controversial.”
• “Having used his parliamentary majority to get rid of his cabinet, Zelenskiy found himself facing a staffing crisis. … As a result, the new faces from the cabinet are being replaced by half-forgotten faces from the past. Finance Minister Ihor Umansky previously worked under president Viktor Yushchenko, while Healthcare Minister Ilya Yemets and Social Policy Minister Maryna Lazebna both served under President Viktor Yanukovych.”
• “Zelenskiy is trying to find a new formula for the perfect team. The oligarchs could always offer a helping hand in this respect. … The most obvious example of that is the new prime minister, Denys Shmygal, who made a name for himself at the DTEK energy corporation of oligarch Rinat Akhmetov. … [I]t’s clear that his [Shmygal’s] appointment is a compromise move by Zelenskiy to appease the oligarchs.”
• “Honcharuk’s cabinet had embodied the public feeling that saw Zelensky himself sweep to power: that it was better to have young and inexperienced people in government than experienced—but corrupt—statesmen. With the fall of the government, the president loses some of his own legitimacy. After all, if that young team was so incapable of reforming the country, where is the guarantee that the equally young and inexperienced president can do any better?”

“Joe Biden’s Rise Is the Last Thing Volodymyr Zelensky Needs Right Now,” Ilya Timtchenko,  The Washington Post, 03.06.20: The author, a former editor and reporter for the Kyiv Post, writes:

• “Ukraine dominated U.S. politics in the fall and early winter, as the House impeached and the Senate tried and ultimately acquitted President Trump over his attempts to push Zelenskiy to open an investigation into the Biden family. Once impeachment ended—and Biden’s political fortunes appeared to fade—Washington mostly seemed to lose interest in what was happening here. But now that Biden looks like he may take on Trump in the general election, Ukraine will surely return to the spotlight. And Zelenskiy is in terrible political shape to handle the pressure.”
• “Zelensky’s dependence on being popular is most dangerous when it comes to foreign policy with Russia. Russia’s war against Ukraine looms over almost every aspect in Ukrainian politics. … Zelenskiy’s naively straightforward approach to dealing with Russia has given the Kremlin some easy victories as it scored a favorable gas deal and gained more control in the Donbass.”
• “As Zelensky struggles to manage his team, he pushed a major government shake-up … The new appointees are exactly the opposite of what Zelensky’s presidential campaign stood for. Meanwhile, even as Ukraine’s domestic politics get more chaotic, Washington is about to start poking around in Kyiv again.”
• “The old-time politicians who have been reinstalled in Ukraine’s government should put together a strategy on going public in case Ukraine is pressured once again by the Trump administration. Considering that Trump has already come under scrutiny, Ukraine could use any additional pressure as diplomatic leverage for its security against Russia.”
• “This also means that Ukraine’s civil society and international independent media should keep Ukraine’s state institutions under a magnifying glass during the next few months to hold Ukrainian officials accountable. … Zelenskiy should also consider the outcome if Biden does actually win the U.S. presidential election. Will he be able to win over the favor of a Democratic president after unsuccessfully doing favors for Trump?”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant developments.