Russia Analytical Report, March 20-27, 2017

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

“The Growing Threat of Nuclear Terrorism: America and Russia Must Cooperate to Thwart Rogue State Attacks,” Moshe Kantor, The Washington Times, 03.23.17: The author, a Russian businessman and president of the International Luxembourg Forum for Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, writes that the nuclear threat is “the greatest contemporary threat of all.” The threat of nuclear terrorism has many forms and is growing. Cooperation between important powers such as Russia, the U.S., Britain, China and others is essential for international security. The author urges previous initiatives and resolutions on nuclear terrorism to be revived immediately.

Iran and its nuclear program:

  • No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

  • No significant commentary.

NATO-Russia relations:

  • No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

  • No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

“Multilateralize the INF Problem,” Steven Pifer, Brookings Institution, 03.21.17: The author, director of the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative at the Brookings Institution, writes that the countries threatened by Russia’s violation of the INF treaty should be the ones engaging with Russia on the issue. The newly deployed banned ground-launched cruise missile, if its range is assumed to be 2,000 kilometers (1,200 miles), threatens European cities from London to Helsinki as well as Japan, South Korea and China in the east. Washington has proposed to answer Russia’s treaty violation with a similar missile of its own, but the author advises further questions be asked before taking such a step. Instead, the author advises Trump’s administration to “raise the political heat on the Kremlin” and “task the intelligence community with figuring out a way to share more details on the Russian violation with NATO allies, Japan, South Korea, friends such as Sweden and Finland, and countries such as China.” The future of the INF treaty may be in jeopardy, “but the U.S. government should nevertheless try” to preserve it.

Counter-terrorism:

  • No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

  • No significant commentary.

Cyber security:

  • No significant commentary.

Russia’s alleged interference in U.S. elections:

“A Whole Lot of Nothing at Russia Hearing,” Monica Hesse, The Washington Post, 03.21.17: The author, a writer for the Washington Post, highlights the lack of information at the House Intelligence Committee’s hearing on Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. FBI Director James Comey and National Secuirty Agency Director Michael Rogers frequently said they could not answer the question posed in public. As a result, the author adds three new categories to Donald Rumsfeld’s categories of knowns: “Things we think we know but have no proof of, which has never stopped the American public before. Things we know that apparently are a big no-no for us to know. Things we would know if FBI Director James B. Comey would tell us, but he won't, except for confirming that the Russian investigation exists, which we already knew.” Even with a lack of concrete answers, the threat of a second Cold War and a new nuclear arms race hung over the room.

“Following the Russian Money,” Tim Weiner, New York Times, 03.24.17: The author, a former national security correspondent for The New York Times, writes that the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) may come into play as the FBI begins investigating the Trump campaign’s possible Russia ties. FARA “requires Americans acting as agents of a foreign government to register with the Justice Department. A willful failure to register can be a crime.” If Trump campaign members were paid by Russia “to exert political influence, they should have registered under FARA.” However, in 50 years, only five people have been convicted under the FARA law. A thorough investigation by the FBI is necessary based on the “growing evidence” of Congress’ inability “to conduct an impartial investigation.” An independent prosecutor would likely be necessary if the case goes to court, something Republicans oppose. “Round 2 of this contest could go to Team Putin. Be prepared for a long battle: Mr. Comey warned on Monday that the Russians will be back for the next election.”

“It’s Time for the Feds to Follow the Russian Money,” Colbert King, The Washington Post, 03.24.17: The author, a columnist for the paper, writes that the U.S. Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and the IRS will likely join the FBI in the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. For example, the recently released financial documents allegedly “showing that former Trump aide Paul Manafort laundered payments from the party of an ex-leader of Ukraine with ties to Russia” call for the involvement of these financial agencies. Treasury agents already have information regarding “offshore transactions involving Manafort in connection with a federal anti-corruption investigation into his work in Eastern Europe.” However, deep hatred of the IRS from Republicans in Congress could pose a problem.

“For Russia and America, Election Inference Is Nothing New: 25 Stories,” Arjun Kapur and Simon Saradzhyan, Russia Matters, 03.22.17: The authors, a research assistant at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the director of the Russia Matters project, look at 25 cases of alleged election interference involving either Russia or the U.S. From America’s earliest post-revolutionary days to the height of the Cold War to the 21st century, election interference in a variety of forms has taken place across the globe. Looking ahead, this year’s elections in Europe “—already marked by suspicions of Russian involvement—are poised to become a critical new scene in the long movie of international election interference.”

Three Washington Post pieces on the Congressional investigation:

Energy exports from CIS:

  • No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Reality is Creeping Into the Trump Show,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 03.21.17: The author, a foreign-affairs columnist for the paper, writes that “the must-watch reality/horror show” that is the Trump presidency needs Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to play larger roles. Both Mattis and Tillerson offer stability to a “wounded” presidency. Both men “know how to say no to Trump” and face three major tasks: getting rid of the Islamic State, “building in North Korea” and fixing “the dangerously strained relationship with Russia.” While the FBI’s investigation into Russian interference continues, dialogue and cooperation between Washington and Moscow should not cease. Tillerson, “the right messenger to Moscow,” will be visiting Russia next month.

“Arctic Imperatives. Reinforcing US Strategy on America’s Fourth Coast,” Independent Task Force of the Council on Foreign Relations, March 2017: The authors, experts from diverse backgrounds, write that climate change has opened up the Arctic as a source of natural resources and new trade routes. As a result, the Task Force recommends the U.S. pursue six goals in the region: securing rights to a large area of resources, funding icebreakers to keep in the Arctic, improving infrastructure in Alaska “to support a sustained security presence and economic diversification,” working on “confidence-building and cooperative security measures” with other Arctic states, including Russia, “supporting sustainable development” for indigenous groups in the region and sustaining research on its climate changes and their global impact.

“Defusing Future Crises in the Shared Neighbourhood: Can a Clash Between the West and Russia Be Prevented?” Thomas Frear and Ian Kearns, European Leadership Network, 03.27.17: The authors, a research fellow and the co-founder of the European Leadership Network, write that the deteriorating relationship between Russia and the West could still get worse. As such, they ask what can be done to “best prevent that from happening while still defending” the interests of each side? This report looks at possible political scenarios, such as an escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, a succession crisis in Belarus and “renewed conflict in Georgia.” The authors detail steps for “manag[ing] these flashpoints before they escalate.” The report also urges both sides to use “existing dialogue mechanism” and to adopt “new diplomatic initiatives.”  

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

  • No significant commentary.

China:

  • No significant commentary. 

Ukraine:

“It Sounds Unlikely, but There Is a Way Ukraine and Russia Could Make Peace,” Josh Cohen, The Washington Post, 03.23.17: The author, is a former U.S. Agency for International Development project officer, details the provisions of a possible Ukraine-Russia resolution. Ukraine’s unlikely NATO membership “should be taken off the table,” in return for which Russia will acknowledge Ukraine’s right to join the EU or make any non-military economic or political relationship it likes with the EU. The author advises greater control for Ukraine’s regions over their own tax, spending and social issues. Only once those issues are addressed can the Russia-Ukraine economic relationship be addressed. Free-trade agreements between the two are possible, if technical issues are resolved. “Last but not least comes Crimea —it will likely prove necessary to simply defer Crimea negotiations until some later date.” If Russia and Ukraine strive for what is attainable, “a Russia-Ukraine deal may well be possible after all.”

“We Built the Russia Sanctions to Last,” Edward Fishman, Wall Street Journal, 03.23.17: The author, a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council and one of the diplomats involved in creating the sanctions, writes that sanctions on Russia were designed “to be sustainable.” Although sanctions on Russia appear to always be “on the brink of collapse,” three years after their implementation, they remain in place. The first press conference between U.S. President Donald Trump and German Chancellor Angela Merkel “suggests Mr. Trump assured Mrs. Merkel” that he will not remove sanctions on Russia until it “pulls back from eastern Ukraine.”  The author attributes the resiliency of the sanctions to several factors: the EU’s “remarkable leadership and solidarity,” the relative harmlessness of sanctions to the U.S. or EU economies and the quick connection between sanctions removal and the implementation of Minsk II. “It now seems doubtful that trans-Atlantic sanctions will end in the way most frequently envisioned: with the EU throwing in the towel. The irony of the present moment is that the EU—so often dismissed as "soft" on Russia—has emerged as the West's bulwark.”

“Russian Defector's Murder Sends a Chilling Message,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 03.23.17: The author, a Bloomberg Views columnist, writes that the murder of former Russian legislator Denis Voronenkov sends a clear message to Kiev from the Kremlin. The shooting in Kiev follows “the long-standing KGB tradition of executing traitors.” Voronenkov worked faithfully for the Kremlin until defecting to Ukraine “after developing problems working in the fuzzy zone between Russian government and business.” The author notes that this hardly makes Voronenkov a “whistleblower” or “Putin critic.” The often successful tradition of executing traitors began with the Cheka, the intelligence service of the Bolsheviks, and has survived in its successor organizations. While the Kremlin denied involvement in Voronenkov’s shooting, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko called it “an act of state terrorism on the part of Russia.” With relations between the two at a new low, “the final severing of the remaining economic and cultural ties looks like preparation for an all-out war. Whether or not that's the case, the high-profile murder in Kiev is a direct warning from the Kremlin, which is showing that it can operate anywhere in Ukraine as though it were its own turf.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Belarus Is the Latest Thorn in Putin's Side,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 03.21.17: The author, a Bloomberg Views columnist, writes that “Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko is caught in the crossfire of a much larger battle.” While Lukashenko would like to shift towards the EU and away from Russia, this desire stems from popular dissatisfaction with Lukashenko’s government and the mismanaged economy. Until Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Lukahsenko’s regime “was dependent on Russia for cheap natural gas and other indirect subsidies,” an arrangement that “was mostly fine” with the Belarussian leader. Following the annexation of Crimea, Lukashenko “refused to back Putin's move,” fearful that Belarus would become Russia’s next target. According to retired colonel and former political prisoner Nikolai Statkevich, “Russia used to pay for all the fun, but now it cannot keep paying more, and more is constantly needed because the efficiency of this kind of economy is falling. Russia demands more and more in exchange, and giving it up is already dangerous for Lukashenko's personal power."

“The Power Struggle Dividing Uzbekistan’s Leadership,” Petr Bologov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 03.22.17: The author, an international columnist at Slon.ru, writes about the hostility among new leadership in Uzbekistan following the death of Uzbek President Islam Karimov. The greatest tensions are between President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, “presented as a liberal and a reformer” and the head of Uzbekistan’s National Security Service (SNB), Rustam Inoyatov, “playing the role of a reactionary force and protector of traditional Karimov-era values.” Inoyatov does not support Mirziyoyev’s plan “to restore Uzbekistan’s full cooperation with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).” This would liberalize the country’s currency market, making things easier for businesses at the expense of Uzbekistan’s booming, security service-controlled black currency market. As head of the SNB, Inoyatov profits from Uzbekistan’s major exports. He also appears to be responsible for a series of recently rolled back reforms. “Inoyatov will have to either support the president’s agenda completely, or attempt to return Uzbekistan to the way it was under Karimov. But the resources he has to achieve the latter are getting smaller and smaller.”

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

Hundreds arrested in anti-corruption protests over the weekend; mostly news stories so far, though some include a line or two of preliminary analysis:

  • Guardian, 03.27.17: “Authorities have struggled to deal with the political threat posed by [Alexey] Navalny. In recent years, he has been put on several trials, widely believed to be politicized, and his brother has been jailed. At times, authorities have experimented with allowing him to take part in politics, and he stood for mayor of Moscow in 2013, winning 27% of votes. Although he has declared his intention to stand for president next year, it is unlikely he will be allowed on to the ballot. … Authorities will have to decide between a … crackdown [similar to 2012] or trying to weather the protest mood in the year leading up to the presidential election next March.”
  • New York Times, 03.26.17: “While less heavy-handed than in Belarus, … the police crackdown in Moscow could still complicate efforts by President Trump to deliver on pledges to ‘get along’ with Mr. Putin.”
  • New York Times, 03.27.17: “‘Right now it looks like a major new phenomenon in Russia that there are young people who are active and have agendas,’ Maxim Trudolyubov, a columnist, said. ‘One important factor is that these people all grew up under Putin. They don’t remember any other leader.’ … In another potentially destabilizing development, Russian truck drivers across the country began organizing their largest concerted protest since December 2015, against a new toll system on national highways.”
  • The Washington Post (Opinion), 03.27.17: “While late in coming, the [State Department’s] condemnation of Russia marks the first real criticism from the administration of any Russian action.”

Defense and aerospace:

“New Gerasimov article on nature of warfare,” Dmitry Gorenburg, Russian Military Reform blog, 03.17.17: The author, a senior research scientist at CAN, discusses the new article on the nature of modern warfare by Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov. Not much has changed since the 2013 article on the same subject. The new article still discusses “the American origin of hybrid warfare” at length. Gerasimov details the conflict in Syria, and Gorenburg pays particular attention to Gerasimov’s discussion on the origins of that conflict. Gerasimov concludes that the U.S. and NATO prefer and actively practice hybrid warfare as it “does not fall under the definition of aggression.” He also continues to focus on “the continuing erasure of the boundary between conditions of war and peace,” as he did in his 2013 piece. In the second half of the article, Gerasimov discusses Russia’s response “to this heightened risk of ‘new generation’ warfare.” Here, the discussion becomes one of strategic deterrence, development of long range cruise missiles and the like. “There is virtually no discussion of Russian efforts to engage in information warfare or hybrid warfare of any kind … Instead, we are given to understand that Russia will respond to any aggression with overwhelming force.”

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

  • No significant commentary.