This Week’s Highlights:

• In the wake the Mueller report, the U.S. and Russia should be able to resume working-level contacts on cyber issues, writes columnist David Ignatius, as well as possibly on bigger problems “such as Ukraine, Syria and nuclear arms control.” Ignatius also cites ex-national security advisor Stephen J. Hadley as arguing the basic rationale for a [U.S.-Russia] reset: “The lack of dialogue between the two countries is not in either country's interest. It is also potentially dangerous.” Robert G. Papp, former director of the Center for Cyber Intelligence at the CIA, also sees an opportunity for a “U.S.-Russian discussion about setting boundaries for cyber activity.”
• The Mueller investigation has changed the way liberal Russians look at America, writes Alexey Kovalev, investigations editor at independent Russian news outlet Meduza: “Etched in our minds are comments like the one James Clapper, the former director of national intelligence, made in an interview when he said that Russians are 'almost genetically driven to co-opt, penetrate, gain favor, whatever.'”
• Preliminary results show Volodymyr Zelensky led in the first round of Ukraine’s presidential elections with over 30 percent of support, while Petro Poroshenko came in second with less than 17 percent. “No presidential candidate in Ukrainian history has been able to overcome such a first-round deficit,” notes Bloomberg columnist Leonid Bershidsky. According to Bershidsky, Zelensky “is winning everywhere except in three Western regions.”
• NATO members, such as Germany, “are less committed to the alliance than they used to be because most worry less about conventional military attacks from Russia,” writes Professor Walter Russell Mead. The alliance, he writes, is “not what it was in its prime. This is a consequential fact in world politics, and in Moscow and Beijing, conclusions are being drawn.”
• Former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s recent argument that Finland or Sweden will be Russia’s next target is “based more on threat inflation, Russia hype and bad analysis than it is on a realistic understanding of interstate relations in Northern Europe today,” writes Jyri Raitasalo, a professor of war studies at the Finnish National Defense University.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/saber rattling:

• No significant commentary.

NATO-Russia relations:

“NATO Is Dying, but Don't Blame Trump,” Walter Russell Mead, Wall Street Journal, 03.25.19: The author, a professor at Bard College, writes:

• “Is NATO dying? The idea was once unthinkable, but after the German cabinet decided to keep defense spending as low as 1.25 percent of gross domestic product for the next five years it has become unavoidable. What Berlin means by this decision is clear: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the U.S. are not as important to Germany as they used to be.”
• “Germany isn't alone in distancing itself from NATO. Turkey's plans to buy S-400 missiles from Russia, and Italy's recent decision to sign on to China's Belt and Road Initiative, are also measures of the diminished value placed on the trans-Atlantic alliance.”
• “NATO members are less committed to the alliance than they used to be because most worry less about conventional military attacks from Russia. … Countries with the misfortune to be neighbors of Russia are still enthusiastic about NATO. But the anti-Russian zeal of Poland and the Baltic states is something of an embarrassment for Germans eager to cut Nord Stream 2-type deals with Moscow over the heads of their mostly small, poor and importunate eastern neighbors.”
• “Without a change of heart on the part of its most important members, the outlook for NATO is poor. The longest-lived and most-effective multilateral military alliance in history is not what it was in its prime. This is a consequential fact in world politics, and in Moscow and Beijing, conclusions are being drawn.”

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

• No significant commentary.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary.

Cyber security:

“A Cyber Treaty With Russia,” Robert G. Papp, Wilson Center, 03.29.19: The author, a former naval officer and former director of the Center for Cyber Intelligence at the CIA, writes:

• “What would a cyber treaty with Russia look like? We would need to start with terms of reference, carefully defined and mutually agreed upon.”
• “One would not expect for a moment that espionage against legitimate military and national security targets could or should end, nor preparations for cyberattacks against these in wartime. Negotiators will need to clearly elaborate exactly which targets would be prohibited, and under what circumstances.”
• “The most important element of treaty negotiations, however, would be how to handle perceived violations … Active mechanisms to enable dialogue among genuine experts will be the key to success. Above all, the goal must be to avoid the rapid escalation of misunderstandings that could lead to reprisals or even armed conflict.”
• “A cyber treaty, with the establishment of formal deconfliction, verification and inspection mechanisms, could take very clear cues from previous arms control treaties. … [S]uch measures as investigation of IP addresses, unpacking of malware by investigators, procuring records from internet service providers, identifying botnets and other technical measures might be envisioned. Absolute specificity of intent and action will be required in any treaty language.”
• “Opening a discussion about setting boundaries for cyber activity going forward … need not be seen as weakness or folly. It is precisely when bilateral relations are plumbing new depths, and there seems to be no hope for improvement, that our professional national security establishments must engage.” 

Elections interference:

“Baffled by the Obsession With Russia,” Alexey Kovalev, New York Times, 03.29.19: The author, investigations editor at independent Russian news outlet Meduza, writes:

• “Russian state media's coverage of Donald Trump's campaign and presidency has vacillated between breathless adoration, mockery and outrage, but one thing has been consistent: The idea of Russia electing and controlling an American president has always been deemed absurd.”
• “When the news broke last week that Mr. Mueller had finished his report … [f]ar from being a top news story, it was practically forgotten after a few angry comments from state officials.
• “These commentaries conveniently focused on the portions of Mr. Barr's summary of the report that ruled out the Trump team's coordination with Russian operatives … Other important portions of the report, which reached the unequivocal conclusion … that there were, indeed, Russian efforts to influence the 2016 American election, went completely ignored.”
• “[L]iberal Russians like myself and many of the people I know are less joyous. … [I]t becomes clear that whatever the outcome of the Mueller investigation, our relationship with America has changed. … We've seen anti-Russian xenophobia spread into the American mainstream. Etched in our minds are comments like the one [by former director of national intelligence] James Clapper … that Russians are 'almost genetically driven to co-opt, penetrate, gain favor, whatever.'”
• “To those of us who paid attention to American media and politics over the past two years, it quickly became clear that too many in the United States know nothing about our country. … The end of the Mueller investigation … may allow Washington and Moscow to begin to try to fix diplomatic and business relations. I'd be glad to see that. But my perception of the United States' politics and media might have suffered irreparable damage as a result of #Russiagate, and I'm afraid that's the case for many people like me.”

“A Way to Detect the Next Russian Misinformation Campaign,” Philip N. Howard, New York Times, 03.26.19: The author, a professor at the University of Oxford, writes:

• “Nearly a billion people in India and across Europe will prepare to vote in the next few months, and presidential campaigning in the United States has already started. The solution [to detecting misinformation campaigns] is to have all technology companies put all ads, all the time, into public archives.”
• “A comprehensive archive of all ads would create a record of misinformation campaigns that could be used to prevent them in the future. The people and groups behind these ads aren’t going to volunteer the details about them on their own. A fully searchable public archive, maintained by an independent ad council financed by a fraction of ad revenues, will give democracy a healthy shot of algorithmic transparency.”
• “If officials decided to investigate suspected misinformation or manipulation during an election, they would have the evidence they need. Moreover, a full public archive would help ‘future-proof’ us from new problems that might arise from social media advertising.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Moscow Shouldn't Misjudge the Mueller Moment,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 03.27.19: The author, a veteran foreign correspondent-turned-columnist, writes:

• “Russian claims this week that they've been exonerated by special counsel Robert S. Mueller III's final report make my skin crawl. But they highlight the critical question of how the United States and Russia can begin to move back toward a saner relationship. … [T]he first step is for Russia to stop pretending that it didn't interfere in the 2016 presidential election.”
• “Moscow shouldn't misjudge the moment. The special counsel's report affirmed the judgment of the U.S. intelligence community that Russia interfered during the 2016 race.”
• “Chris Painter, who was the Obama administration's top cyber diplomat, told me … that a resumption of working-level contacts about cyber would be fine. But he cautioned against any top-rank contacts about cyber issues now, because they might allow Russia to pretend the 2016 cyberattacks didn't happen.”
• “What about a broader conversation between the United States and Russia—dealing with big, potentially explosive problems such as Ukraine, Syria and nuclear arms control? … [Stephen] Hadley [national security adviser for President George W. Bush] argues the basic rationale for a reset: ‘The lack of dialogue between the two countries is not in either country's interest. It is also potentially dangerous.’ … A warier view comes from Thomas Donilon, … national security adviser under President Barack Obama. He thinks the United States shouldn't engage Russia until its own house is in better order.”
• “If Russia wants lasting improvement in its relations with the United States, it should stop its Trumpian gloating about the Mueller report and start rebuilding the basics of trust. Mueller's apparent affirmation that there was "no collusion" creates some space for better relations, but if Trump supporters are Moscow's only champions, any reset with Russia will blow a fuse.”

“Why There Will Be No Warming of Russian-American Ties,” Daniel W. Drezner, The Washington Post, 03.27.19: The author, a professor of international politics, writes:

• “In the wake of Attorney General William P. Barr's summary of special counsel Robert S. Mueller III's report—let's just shorten that to BSMR, shall we?—President Trump apparently wants to take a victory lap. So does Russia. The Washington Post's Anton Troianovski reports that Russia is feeling similarly.”
• “Russia wants warmer ties. Trump presumably wants warmer ties. There will be warmer ties, right? Wrong. Most speculation along these lines is based on the portions of the BSMR that conclude the Trump campaign did not collude with the Russian government. … [However,] Barr confirmed that Russian organizations like the Internet Research Agency ‘conduct disinformation and social media operations in the United States designed to sow social discord, eventually with the aim of interfering with the election.’ … Even if Trump has been exonerated from collusion, Russia has not been cleared of attempting to influence the election.”
• “Another problem is that the Russia probe had done nothing to stop arms control negotiations. … The BSMR does not change anything in that set of negotiations.”
• “Russia will need to see progress on arms control and Trump's Helsinki promises to believe in an actual warming of ties. … The United States continues to reject arms control, and Helsinki continues to be the low point of President Trump's handling of foreign policy.”

“The Myth That Won’t Die: Donald Trump as Russia's Puppet,” Ted Galen Carpenter, The National Interest, 03.25.19: The author, a senior fellow in security studies at the Cato Institute, writes:

• “It is long past time to scorn the ‘Trump is Putin’s puppet’ allegation for the preposterous myth that it is. In reality, the Trump administration has pursued a disturbingly hardline policy toward Russia, deepening an already worrisome new cold war.”
• “It is uncertain whether Trump’s stance is an effort to fend-off accusations of treason or if it merely reflects a dangerous herd mentality in Washington about relations with Moscow. In either case, the outcome has fomented unnecessary, potentially very dangerous, bilateral tensions.”
• “If Trump’s domestic political adversaries have integrity and a sense of responsibility, then they will acknowledge that the Mueller investigation did not find proof that Trump colluded with Russia, and they will immediately abandon that ugly, false narrative.”

“Robert Kagan's Big Wrong Idea,” Michael Lind, The Washington Post, 03.26.19: The author, a visiting professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, writes:

• “His [Robert Kagan’s] idea that something called ‘authoritarianism’ is ‘a profound ideological, as well as strategic, challenge’ to liberal democracy is a big idea, and it is wrong. … ‘Authoritarianism’ is a political science label slapped on radically different regimes, not a self-description. … But there is no generic ‘authoritarian’ movement and no common ‘authoritarian’ worldview.”
• “In their own regions, China, Russia and Iran are trying to extend their spheres of influence, at the expense of U.S. influence, and they share a preference for a multipolar world rather than U.S. global hegemony. Russia would like to weaken the European Union for geopolitical reasons; many European national populists would like to weaken the E.U. as well … None of this adds up to an Authoritarian International like the Communist International (Comintern) of old. There is no Authorintern.”
• “Few, if any, of the major conflicts in the world today are battles between liberalism and authoritarianism. Almost all involve nationalism, whether that of stateless nations that want their own nation-states … or powerful nation-states such as China and Russia, which wish to increase their regional influence for nationalist reasons.”
• “Even then the idea that the Cold War was a battle of -isms between democracy and communism was wrong. The United States fought two savage wars in Korea and Indochina supporting allied authoritarian dictatorships and defeated the Soviet Union in the 1980s as a de facto ally of communist China.”
• “In today's multipolar world of low-level, traditional great-power rivalries over regional spheres of influence, prosecuted more in trade and industrial policies and alliance diplomacy than on the military and propaganda fronts, what is needed is sober realism, not anachronistic, Manichean Cold War thinking that unites simple-minded dichotomies with crusading fervor. Realpolitik is back. In fact, it never went away.”

“Let's Empower Russians Who Are Fighting Putin's Propaganda,” Christian Caryl, The Washington Post, 03.28.19: The author, an editor for the news outlet, writes:

• “Rather than paying Americans and other Westerners to broadcast news and ‘messaging’ at the Russian people, let's try empowering the Russians themselves—specifically those who have found effective ways to break through their own government's censorship and propaganda. Let's empower Russian journalists, activists and satirists—with help from Ukrainians, Georgians and people of other European countries that have felt the effects of Putin's lies firsthand. Let's give them the resources to do what many of them are already doing—often at great personal cost.
• “Russians need all the alternative sources of information they can get, and what could be better than information produced by other Russians? Let's figure out some creative ways to get resources to the journalists, the satirists and the activists who need them—and help them to overcome the Kremlin's information blockade, while we're at it. Satellite Internet, anyone?”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Scandinavia Won’t Be Russia’s Next Target. Mikheil Saakashvili’s country was a victim of Putin’s aggression. Finland and Sweden won’t be,” Jyri Raitasalo, Foreign Policy, 03.27.19: The author, a professor of war studies at the Finnish National Defense University, writes:

• “In a recent Foreign Policy article, former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili argued that ‘Russia’s most likely target in the near future is either Finland or Sweden.’ … Fortunately for Finland and Sweden, Saakashvili’s argument is based more on threat inflation, Russia hype and bad analysis than it is on a realistic understanding of interstate relations in Northern Europe today.”
• “First, starting a war is always a potential avenue for future catastrophe. Looking at the costs of Russia’s incursions in the Crimean peninsula and Eastern Ukraine since 2014, they are very high—and rising.”
• “Second, even though relations between Russia and the West are strained, there is quite a lot of day-to-day cooperation. This state of affairs reflects the fact that Western states—or Europe as a whole—cannot be secure without some sort of a long-term diplomatic understanding with Russia. … Finally, Finland and Sweden take their territorial defense commitments very seriously.”
• “After all, even the biggest bear will not eat a porcupine. Georgia did lose part of its territory to Russia in 2008, when Saakashvili was president of Georgia. There is much to learn from that experience, but it does not suggest that Russia will start a war against Sweden or Finland, as Saakashvili contends, in order to boost Putin’s popularity.”

“Moscow's Rise in Africa Puts West on Guard,” Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 03.31.19: The author, a senior writer for the news outlet, writes:

• “Russia has been steadily expanding its military influence across Africa, alarming Western officials with increasing arms sales, security agreements and training programs for unstable countries or autocratic leaders.”
• “In the Central African Republic, where a Russian has been installed as the president's national security adviser, the government is selling mining rights for gold and diamonds at a fraction of their worth to hire trainers and buy arms from Moscow. Russia is … helping a former general in Libya fight for control over his government and vast oil market. Sudan's president, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, brought in Russian mercenaries … to help shore up his rule … And last spring, five sub-Saharan African countries … appealed to Moscow to help their overtaxed militaries and security services combat the Islamic State and Al Qaeda.”
• “Expanding Moscow's military sway on the continent reflects Mr. Putin's broader vision of returning Russia to its former glory. But it also illustrates Russia's opportunistic strategy to carve out logistical and political gains in Africa wherever and whenever it can.”
• “Russia is also seeking new economic markets and energy resources, in some cases rekindling relationships with countries that were in place during the Soviet era. … 'They are trying to seize the spoils,' Gen. Tony Thomas … said last year at a security conference at the University of Texas at Austin. 'They are very active.'”

“Buyer Beware: Evaluating Russian Exports Under Sanctions and Stagnation,” David Szakonyi, PONARS Eurasia, March 2019: The author, an assistant professor at George Washington University, writes:

• “The use of sanctions to push Russia to change its foreign policy behavior has come under heated debate. … Broad macroeconomic overviews claim that sanctions have worsened the investment climate and inflicted significant damage on Russia’s long-term growth potential. But given their concurrence with the collapse of oil prices in late 2014, many believe the sanctions’ contribution to Russia’s current economic malaise is at best partial.”
• “This memo uses UN Comtrade data to investigate one understudied area where the sanctions could be expected to hit home: Russia’s export relationships with the rest of the world.”
• “[A]lthough Russia’s export volumes as measured in U.S. dollars have fallen dramatically since 2014, Russia’s currency depreciation has blunted some of that impact on revenue in ruble terms. Sanctions have helped decouple the ruble and oil prices. As a result, buoyant ruble receipts have helped the Russian government run a budget surplus in 2018 for the first time since 2011.”
• “[I]nternational sanctions have generated heightened political risk around dealing with Russia, mainly among the countries in the West that actually levied sanctions on Russia. Elsewhere in the world, Russia has been able to maintain, if not improve, its trading relationships. This may deprive the United States and EU of some of their leverage over the Kremlin’s ability to generate much needed export revenues.”
• “This memo concludes with a broader discussion of how analysts should evaluate the resilience of the Russian economy under the dual blow of sanctions and falling oil prices.”

China:

“Russia and Iran cannot always count on China,” Raffaello Pantucci, Financial Times, 03.25.19: The author, director of International Security Studies at the Royal United Services Institute, writes:

• “The reality is that there are deep tensions in Beijing’s bilateral relationships with Moscow and Tehran. Nowhere are these expressed more substantially than in the economic sphere, where Russia and Iran have consistently been disappointed by the willingness of Chinese entities and institutions to invest in their countries.”
• “There are a number of explanations for these trends. First; Chinese banks, companies and other institutions may sometimes act in ways that contradict Beijing’s view, driven by specific concerns of their own. … Second, Chinese institutions drive hard bargains. In the context of Iran and Russia, China is the funder and their local counterparts the supplicants. … Third, countries like Iran and Russia are fearful of becoming overly dependent on Beijing. They realize that opening too much to China risks flooding local markets and potentially curtailing their own development.”
• “While Beijing may have tensions with Moscow and Tehran, the three continue to be willing to support each other at a geopolitical level. If the aggression with which U.S. economic sanctions are employed continues, alternative global economic structures will develop.”
• “Their beginnings are already visible. Moscow is taking the firmest steps in this direction through its de-dollarization policy. Tehran may find itself obliged to follow if it is unable to find a way out of its current impasse. While it is clear that U.S. sanctions may have an effect on their economies, it is not clear that they are generating the change in behavior that Washington desires. In this context, Beijing will sense an opportunity.”

Ukraine:

“A Comedian as President? It's Time to Be Serious,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 04.01.19: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes:

• “Ukraine’s presidential election is going to a run-off, with comedian Volodymyr Zelensky enjoying a hard-to-overcome lead over incumbent Petro Poroshenko. … The vote is, in effect, a referendum on the course Ukraine has taken since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. … [T]he verdict is clear: Poroshenko messed it up. With about three-quarters of the votes counted on Monday, Zelensky was leading with more than 30 percent support and Poroshenko was second with less than 17 percent. No presidential candidate in Ukrainian history has been able to overcome such a first-round deficit.”
• “There is a clear pattern: the comedian is winning everywhere except in three Western regions, which have remained true to the president, and two eastern ones, where a pro-Russian candidate has beaten them both.”
• “If, as Poroshenko and many others have assumed, the comedian is beholden to the billionaire [fugitive oligarch Igor Kolomoisky], it will look a lot like the previous presidency. That means a shop front of liberal and anti-corruption reforms will hide a bonanza for the head of state’s friends and partners.”
• “But if Zelensky … manages to shake off Kolomoisky’s influence, Ukraine could take a leap forward. … The candidate has received support from several leading reformers responsible for key economic achievements under Poroshenko, among them overhauls procurement and the tax system. … Zelensky has said he is willing to make concessions on the eastern regions’ cultural identity … That might lead to some kind of an internationally brokered solution … Zelensky, however, would be unlikely to surrender to Putin in eastern Ukraine—if only because of the Kolomoisky factor.”
• “In between these two scenarios – the oligarch’s puppet and the swamp-drainer in chief – there is a third one: Zelenskiy the weak, inept leader unable to get his hands on the levers of government.”

“Ukraine Just Showed Us How a Foreign Power Can Play Trump to Its Own Ends,” Melinda Haring, The Washington Post, 03.26.19: The author, editor of the UkraineAlert blog at the Atlantic Council and a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, writes:

• “Now, just as special counsel Robert S. Mueller III's report appears to have cleared President Trump of conspiracy with Russia, the president's supporters and son are pushing a new angle—the real collusion wasn't between Trump and Russia but between Hillary Clinton and Ukraine. This bizarre narrative didn't come from nowhere. It came from Kiev.”
• “What may have set Poroshenko's people off was a speech on March 5 by U.S. Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, who slammed corruption … in the lead-up to the election on March 31. What the president's entourage did next showed just how easy it is for a foreign power with insight into Trump's psyche and some media savvy to game the American media cycle.”
• “Ukrainian Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko told the Hill's John Solomon … that he will open a criminal investigation into an alleged attempt by a top Ukrainian law enforcement official to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Lutsenko claims the head of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine intentionally leaked evidence that Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort was paid off the books by former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych's party in an effort to benefit the Clinton campaign.”
• “The Hill broadcast the interview and then published the sensationalist story. Sean Hannity made Solomon the star of his prime-time show that evening. Trump watches Hannity … and tweeted the title of Solomon's story. More than 25,000 retweets later, the Ukrainian collusion narrative went viral.”
• “The depressing upshot of this sorry spectacle is that foreign powers can get into the president's head by following a simple formula: find some way to connect your pet peeve to the president's obsession with the 2016 election; find someone who can get on Hannity; hope that Trump is watching and tweeting; sit back and watch the fun.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“War of Words Pushes Belarus-Russia Relations to the Brink,” Artyom Shraibman, Carnegie Moscow Center, 03.26.19: The author, a journalist and political commentator for Tut.by, writes:

• “In just one month, Belarus and Russia have gone from a three-day amicable meeting between their presidents in Sochi to a new flare-up in tensions. The Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has accused the Russian ambassador in Minsk, Mikhail Babich, of manufacturing artificial figures in his interviews, and of being unable to distinguish an independent state from a Russian federal district, prompting a similarly outraged response from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”
• “Babich isn’t afraid of damaging relations with Belarus, because Moscow has little to lose from upsetting Minsk. … [T]he thrust of the Russian position in the last few months has been: ‘if you don’t want to integrate with us, then pay your own way, look for cheap oil elsewhere, and let’s see how you get on.’”
• “For Lukashenko and his economic and political system, there really is no easy way out. Europe won’t welcome into its ranks an autocrat, and the economic shocks that would result from a sudden rupture with Russia are too terrible for the Belarusian leader to even contemplate. For this reason, Minsk will strive … to slow down this process, and hedge its bets along the way, while not giving up its sovereignty.”
• “In the intermediate term, the Belarusian economy will be forced to adapt to life without the previous volume of Russian support. And the further this process goes under Lukashenko, the fewer obstacles there will be in the way of the country’s next authorities if they want to be more active in shedding the vestiges of their country’s post-Soviet ties to Russia.”

“Will Russia Try to Occupy Belarus?” Ryhor Astapenia, The Washington Post, 03.27.19: The author, founder and chairman of a Minsk-based nonpartisan NGO promoting democratic reforms in Belarus, writes:

• “Will Russia try to occupy Belarus? Earlier this year, several public figures sounded that alarm, including former NATO general secretary Anders Rasmussen and Washington Post columnist Anne Applebaum. That concern clashes with the idea that Belarus is Russia's closest ally.”
• “So where did they get that idea? Over the past four months, the Kremlin has been proposing closer ties within the Union State of Russia and Belarus, an agreement that aims toward deeper integration between the two. … Some Russian elites are rumoring that creating a fully functioning union might enable Vladimir Putin to stay in power after he reaches his term limit as president in 2024.”
• “But is this realistic? A closer look at the evidence suggests that the chances of Putin governing Belarus are slim. While Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenka may publicly say that the two countries may integrate more, long-term trends show that Belarus is gradually distancing itself from Russia.”

• “Over the years, Belarus has grown more independent. … Throughout Putin's term, Belarus and Russia have consistently had disputes. … Belarus still matters for Russia, but the Kremlin has fewer resources to finance Lukashenka's rule. … Discussion of Russia occupying Belarus is primarily a political trick.”

• “And yet each year, Belarus acts more independently. Russian officials may feel that they need to reimpose control on Belarus now or lose yet another ally.”

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Why Russia Might Shut Off the Internet. The Kremlin’s Long Obsession With Central Control,” Andrei Soldatov, Foreign Affairs, 03.29.19: The author, an independent journalist, writes:

• “In March, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law making it a crime to publish ‘fake news’ or ‘disrespect of the authorities’ on social media. Another proposed bill on ‘digital sovereignty’ aims to provide the Kremlin with the ability to cut off Russia, or a particular Russian region, from the global Internet. The two bills deal with different things … but they both have the same goal … depriving the people of the means to start a revolution.”
• “In 2011, when Muscovites took to the streets to protest Putin’s return to presidency, the Kremlin saw the prominent role of Facebook and Twitter in organizing the gatherings as another cunning move by Washington … Social media’s role in the protests offered a stark warning: the security services could easily fail to prevent a revolution, as protests organized on Facebook have no leaders and no offline organizations that government agents could infiltrate and disrupt.”
• “For the last six years, the Kremlin has been trying to find a solution to the Internet problem. The government has passed a barrage of repressive Internet legislation with no apparent effect. … The Kremlin hopes that the latest two bills will make a breakthrough.”
• “The so-called fake news law should help eliminate content that could provoke unrest, and the draft digital sovereignty law gives the government control over Internet traffic within Russia and across its borders. The law would require Russian Internet exchange points, through which Internet providers exchange traffic between their networks, and Internet service providers to report to a government agency about how they direct traffic and to install special equipment provided by the Kremlin.”

“Are Russian Show Trials Back? Today’s Russia is no Soviet Union. And yet, recent arrests come straight from a playbook of a bygone era,” Maxim Trudolyubov, The Moscow Times, 03.31.19: The author, a senior fellow at the Kennan Institute, writes:

• “Mikhail Abyzov … was arrested in Moscow on Tuesday. Investigators suspect Abyzov of embezzling and funneling abroad 4 billion rubles (about U.S. $62 million). This developing story is important because of the businessman’s long-standing ties to Dmitry Medvedev, the prime minister, and Arkady Dvorkovich, former deputy prime minister.”
• “The consensus view is that this is the Kremlin’s way of getting back at Medvedev and his dwindling circle of allies, who promoted a liberalizing agenda in the Russian government in the aftermath of the 2011–2012 protests. Between 2011 and 2018, Abyzov ran an initiative called Open Government.”
• “The Federal Security Service (FSB), which is on the Abyzov case, hated it, and the initiative, which never took off anyway, has now been shut down. As usual, it is unclear how far the FSB is prepared to go: is the plan just to weaken an already weak Medvedev in the run-up to the next political cycle or to destroy him altogether?”
• “Modern Russia’s history moves by epic court cases, just as in the Stalinist Soviet Union, whose history was punctuated by show trials. … The high-profile arrests and trials of Nikita Belykh (2014), the former governor of Kirov oblast, and Alexei Ulyukayev (2017), the former minister of economics, were landmark cases … Their exact message … is still being debated, and that is a problem with modern Russia’s language of power: as opposed to its Stalinist predecessor, it is not clear enough.”
• “Why this Byzantine way of communication even arises is a fundamental question. One straightforward answer is that Russia still lives in a state of unreconciled conflict between a set of legislation that it is unable or unwilling to enforce and an unwritten set of rules by which the country really runs.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.