This Week’s Highlights:

• By 2022, Russia could quite possibly see trade with Asia on par with the EU, according to Wilson Center fellow and senior international trade specialist at the U.S. Department of Commerce Michael Corbin.
• Following the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, Moscow was the least vocal among the dissatisfied—since no Russian vital interests are at stake and some actual benefits emerge, writes Valdai Club Foundation program director Andrey Sushentsov. Sushentsov writes that in the current diplomatic crisis, Russia sees what it’s been forecasting for a long time: the emergence of a multipolar world, the dissolution of Western solidarity and the return of great power politics. In contrast, Middle East specialist Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace says that Trump wants to get out of both the Iran nuclear agreement and the Middle East in general, writes Washington Post columnist David Ignatius.
• Perhaps if the U.S. and Russia worked together, they might be able to persuade both Israel and Iran to exercise restraint, writes government and politics professor Mark N. Katz.
• The Pentagon wants a new low-yield nuclear weapon to deter Russian use of the same, writes former Washington Post reporter Walter Pincus, and asks: How are the Russians going to know the warheads on those incoming missiles are low-yield, and not 10 times more powerful than the bombs used to strike Hiroshima and Nagasaki?
• Domestic policies in Putin’s fourth term will be based upon the quiet rejection of development and change amid enormous successes in “creative accounting” and reporting the country’s achievements and propaganda, according to Carnegie Moscow Center senior fellow Andrey Movchan. For examples, Movchan writes, all Russia’s statistical agency must do is lower purchasing power parity by a further 10 percent and Russia will have overtaken Germany, making Russia the fifth largest economy in the world, something that Putin has tasked the government with accomplishing in his fourth term.
• Political risk-analyst Maximilian Hess and war studies student Lincoln Pigman write that for Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny, it seems that the main problem with supporting the likes of Nicolas Maduro and Bashar al-Assad is material, not moral. Although Navalny has derisively referred to Assad’s government as a “military junta” multiple times, its main crime in his eyes appears to be spending precious taxpayer rubles.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

“Is Trump Really Going To Punch Iran In The Nose? Thinking about a rollback isn’t crazy, but it requires a sustained effort,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 05.15.18: The author, a veteran foreign correspondent-turned-columnist, writes: “Is this White House truly serious about challenging Iranian power in the Middle East? … The right strategy would be reversing Iran's power grab in the Middle East while preserving the nuclear deal as an element of regional stability. Trump's instincts, in contrast, seem to be the opposite … Trump wants to get out of both the nuclear agreement and the region. … A serious strategy to roll back Iran would begin with Syria. … Iraq is another key pressure point. … Getting both Iran and Saudi Arabia out of Yemen would help, too. … So what's the pathway to containing Iranian meddling? It probably passes through Moscow. Russian interests in the region are complicated. Moscow may be fighting alongside Iran in Syria, but it also has growing economic and diplomatic links with Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. … The right combination is combating regional meddling, plus maintaining arms control. Thinking rollback isn't crazy, but it requires a sustained effort, not a grandstand play.”

“A Russian View on America’s Withdrawal From the Iran Deal,” Andrey Sushentsov, The National Interest, 05.15.18: The author, program director of the Valdai Club Foundation and founder and head of the Foreign Policy Advisory Group, writes that in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, “Russia is acting deeply disappointed in public. … But Moscow was the least vocal among the dissatisfied—since no Russian vital interests are at stake and some actual benefits emerge. … can the Trump withdrawal be a pretext for a war or a military strike against Iran? Moscow does not consider this an immediate threat. … Moscow would opt for maintaining the deal with Europe and China and let Washington absorb the diplomatic fallout. … In the current diplomatic crisis, Russia sees what it had [been] forecasting long ago: the emergence of a multipolar world, the dissolution of Western solidarity and return of great power politics. … America’s key foreign policy interest [since 1953] has been to maintain solidarity and share the burden of deterring the Soviet Union with Europe and Japan. … In the last decade, America’s constant unilateral moves have shaken the foundation of this strategy. It is good news for Russia … Moscow was striving for multipolarity—and here it is. … It is a step toward more equilibrium in global politics, with classical power relations back in vogue. Moscow excels in this game and prefers it over unipolarity.”

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

“The Pentagon Is Seeking Money for a New Nuclear Weapon. Congress Should Be Skeptical,” Walter Pincus, The Washington Post, 05.18.18: The author, a former Washington Post reporter and columnist covering national security issues, writes: “Top Pentagon officials are telling some pretty tall tales in seeking congressional support for a new, low-yield, nuclear warhead to put on a long-range, submarine-launched ballistic missile. … The stated purpose of this new weapon is to deter the Russians from using any of their low-yield nuclear weapons … officials say an additional weapon is needed … because the aircraft that would deliver our bombs … might not be able to get through Russian defenses. … should the Russians initiate the use of tactical nukes on the battlefield, the United States would launch one or two low-yield weapons from submarines … How are the Russians going to know the warheads on those incoming missiles are low-yield, and not … 10 times more powerful than the bombs used to strike Hiroshima and Nagasaki? … Hyten suggested that Putin … would wait 30 minutes for the … U.S. missiles to hit Russian targets before deciding whether to launch a major nuclear response back … Defense Secretary Jim Mattis made a simpler claim … Russia, facing defeat in a conventional battle, ‘would escalate to a low-yield nuclear weapon knowing that our choice would be … to either respond with a high-yield [nuclear weapon] or surrender’ … Rep. Adam Smith … offered the more traditional understanding of [deterrence] … ‘We have over 4,000 nuclear weapons, and if you launch one, we will launch ours back at you. And we are not going to sit there and be concerned to make sure that ours isn't bigger than yours when you started this.’"

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

“The INF Treaty: The Way Forward,” Katarzyna Kubiak, European Leadership Network, 05.17.18: The author, a transatlantic post-doc fellow for international relations and security at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, writes: “Washington and Moscow cannot indefinitely prolong the current crisis without either a positive breakthrough or discontinuation of INF … The key to finding a way out is a proper understanding of Russia’s motives for its alleged development of a treaty-prohibited missile system. The SSC-8 is … an attempt to address military power shifts taking place on both of Russia’s flanks … No amount of military or economic coercion by the U.S. or NATO would bring the Kremlin back to compliance. … Washington and Moscow … need to hasten the speed in finding a diplomatic solution. ... The U.S. should make a unilateral offer of missile defense transparency to break the stalemate … build pressure on Russia to resolve the SSC-8 non-compliance issue and strengthen the credibility of its position in Europe. … European NATO allies should also try to convince Washington to consider verifiable limits on regional ballistic missile defense in response to Russia resolving the SSC-8 non-compliance issue. … Europe should work with China and India to see whether … a global and comprehensive regime … [to] eliminate all types of ballistic and cruise missiles between 500 and 5.000 km, can be revived. … If INF cannot be preserved, manage its collapse … its failure should serve as a springboard to negotiate better, more modern and comprehensive arms control arrangements. Washington should propose to work together with Moscow on the successors to the INF and New START treaties … European NATO allies would need to nevertheless explore cruise missile defense as a credible, collective answer to hedge against guided missiles threat, including the SSC-8.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

“Can Moscow Mediate Between Israel and Iran in Syria?” Mark N. Katz, Russia Matters, 05.18.18: The author, a professor of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government and the 2018 Sir William Luce Fellow at Durham University in the U.K., writes: “The most recent round of frictions between Israel and Iran, along with its ally Hezbollah, can be viewed as one of four overlapping wars going on in Syria … [In Syria] Russia has focused on the air war, which Iran and Hezbollah do not have the capacity to wage, while the latter have focused on the ground war … At the same time, Russia has developed strong relations with Israel … An escalation of Israeli-Iranian conflict threatens to complicate Moscow’s relations with both its partners, and also raises the unwelcome (for Russia) prospect of greater involvement in Syria by the Trump administration … One way that Russia might avoid this is if it could serve as a mediator between Iran and Israel. … The problem that Moscow faces is that it is impossible to mediate a conflict between opposing parties who do not want to resolve it peacefully, but to fight it out instead. Nor does Moscow appear to have the ability to coerce them into mediation. … Perhaps if the U.S. and Russia worked together, they might be able to persuade both Israel and Iran to exercise restraint. But … Washington does not currently seem amenable toward such an approach.”

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Elections interference:

“Mr. Mueller at the One-Year Mark,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 05.15.18: The news outlet’s editorial board writes: “In the space of only one year, Mr. Mueller has secured guilty pleas from, or indictments against, 19 people and three firms, including very senior figures … He obtained an indictment against a Russian company that helps illuminate the Russian effort to influence the 2016 election. He has done his work without leaks or drama, even as Mr. Trump and his allies continually slander him and his motivation. … Nor is there any evidence that Mr. Mueller has overstepped proper boundaries of prosecutorial behavior. … the Senate Judiciary Committee approved a bill on a bipartisan basis that protects him from inappropriate termination. So far Senate and House GOP leaders have been unwilling to bring such a bill to a vote. That has left lawmakers scrambling for other options, which could include a bill requiring Mr. Mueller to release a public report on his findings, regardless of his fate. That is less than the bare minimum, but it would be better than nothing.”

“Did Trump Collude? Depends on Your Expectations: Absent definitive evidence, guilt is in the eye of the beholder,”  Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 05.17.18: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes: “Trump’s partisan opponents hear echoes of collusion in the June 9, 2016 meeting between Trump campaign officials and Russian lawyer Natalya Veselnitskaya … I hear a human comedy worthy of a Coen brothers movie … More than a year after all the Trump-Russia investigation started, all the hard evidence we have is of Russia’s propaganda and social network trolling campaign in 2016. It means little that this campaign benefited Trump … I, for one, am hungry for something unambiguous … Perhaps it’s coming yet, but the documents on the June 9 meeting are far from providing that sort of definitive material.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“‘Who Lost Russia?’ Isn’t Just an Academic Debate. The answer could help the US avoid alienating other countries,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 05.15.18: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes: “An important discussion took place in New York last week between Michael McFaul … and Stephen Cohen, professor emeritus of Russian studies … for the purposes of debate, Cohen and McFaul are at opposing poles within the constructive spectrum of the ‘who lost Russia?’ debate. … Cohen’s version is that U.S. policy toward Russia has been unchanged since the last days of the Soviet Union, and it’s been arrogantly exploitative. … The book McFaul … is promoting, ‘From Cold War to Hot Peace,’ recalls the time when most of these moves were made: … Would Putin tolerate more NATO expansion? How would Putin react to President George W. Bush’s decision to pull out of the Ant-Ballistic Missile Treaty? The answer to each of these questions was, Who cares? Putin could do little to influence any of these issues. Russia was weak, so the argument went; Russia didn’t matter anymore. …  The way McFaul tells it, Putin’s personality was the biggest obstacle to building a better relationship out of the ashes of the 1990s. … neither Cohen’s nor McFaul’s vision of a working relationship with Russia is attainable in the foreseeable future. Cohen sees a full partnership based on U.S. non-interference in Russia’s neighborhood … and Russian support for U.S. security interests. … no U.S. or Russian politician sees things this way. McFaul’s vision of a healthy give-and-take … depends, at first glance, only on Putin’s departure. But … mutual distrust is so pervasive that only generational change in both countries could erase it. … The argument between Cohen and McFaul is really over the right balance, and it isn’t only relevant to Russia.”

“A Letter to John: Where Are US-Russia Relations Headed?” Andrey Kortunov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 05.17.18: The author, director general of the Russian International Affairs Council, writes: “In the decades I spent working with the United States, I acquired quite a large circle of contacts in Washington. … Today, I’d like to address these Washingtonians as one individual, whom I’ll name John for the sake of simplicity. … It’s clear that we’re in for even tougher times that may last for quite a while. … Cooperation, if it is still possible, will be selective, tactical and situational. … How do you envision the preferred endgame for our current geopolitical contest? … John, you are certainly aware that many in Washington would prefer some variation of the 1991 scenario—that is, regime change in Moscow and the revision of Russia’s foreign policy. … intensifying external pressure on Moscow only hardens the Kremlin’s resolve. … let’s assume that … Russia followed the Soviet path out of existence. … are you able to predict the concomitant global and regional risks, the risks for U.S. interests and security? While regime change in Moscow is merely a theoretical scenario, continued cooperation between Russia and China looks far more realistic … further consolidation … would lead to the geopolitical configuration that the United States has been trying to prevent since at least the early twentieth century. … Another possible option is Moscow’s international isolation … If you drive Moscow into a corner, it will most probably take a leadership role in the international fraternity of such pariah actors, both state and non-state ones. … We have role models to whom we can look up. Our generation still remembers brilliant intellectuals of the bygone years … They taught us ethics of responsibility. These people were thinking in terms of eras and generations rather than election cycles and bureaucratic squabbles.”

“Vladimir Putin Is an Evil Man,” John McCain, Wall Street Journal, 05.11.18: The author, a U.S. senator, writes: “I’ve gotten plenty of things wrong in a long political career. Putin isn’t one of them. … I made a speech on the Senate floor in 1996, after I returned from a trip alarmed by Russian attitudes, and warned of ‘Russian nostalgia for empire.’ … I urged an early and rapid expansion of NATO to include the former Baltic republics and Warsaw-bloc countries … Resentment and insecurity had been powerful drivers of Russian history for centuries. An ideological component was added for three-quarters of the 20th century … When the ideology failed, it was abandoned. … It was just delusional to believe that Putin would ever be our democratic partner. … Vladimir Putin is an evil man, and he is intent on evil deeds, which include the destruction of the liberal world order that the United States has led and that has brought more stability, prosperity and freedom to humankind than has ever existed in history. He is exploiting the openness of our society and the increasingly acrimonious political divisions consuming us. He wants to widen those divides and paralyze us from responding to his aggression. He meddled in one election, and he will do it again because it worked and because he has not been made to stop. … Putin’s goal isn’t to defeat a candidate or a party. He means to defeat the West.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“For Navalny, Foreign and Domestic Policy Are One,” Maximilian Hess and Lincoln Pigman, Carnegie Moscow Center, 05.21.18: The authors, a London-based political risk analyst and a student in the department of war studies at King’s College London, write: “Most observers have paid little attention to Navalny’s worldview. … To be sure, Navalny’s position strikes a contrast with the Kremlin … Domestic concerns, and in particular the notion that Russia’s military interventions abroad are unsustainable, appear to be key drivers of his foreign policy outlook. … According to Navalny, the main question Russia’s leaders must pose when making foreign policy decisions is, ‘Will our people become wealthier as a result?’ For Navalny, it seems that the main problem with supporting the likes of Nicolas Maduro and Bashar al-Assad is material, not moral. Although he has derisively referred to Assad’s government as a ‘military junta’ multiple times, its main crime in his eyes appears to be spending precious taxpayer rubles. … In a controversial debate … Navalny described the war in eastern Ukraine as ‘an expensive thing.’ … In 2008, he supported Russia’s conflict with Georgia, explicitly calling on Russia to recognize and militarily support Abkhazia and South Ossetia, blockade and sever relations with Georgia, and expel Georgian citizens from Russia.  Navalny thus shares the establishment view that Russia is entitled to a say in the domestic affairs of its post-Soviet neighbors. … Could post-Putin political elites seeking economic growth and a less inhospitable external environment co-opt his [Navalny’s] foreign policy views? … The change and continuity Navalny promises should serve as a warning to Russia’s foreign allies and adversaries alike: prepare for a post-Putin foreign policy, for better and worse.”

China:

“Kennan Cable No. 33: A Russian Pivot to Asia? Russian Trade with Asia from 2006 to 2016,” Michael Corbin, Wilson Center, 05.18.18: The author, a fellow at the Wilson Center and a senior international trade specialist in the U.S. Commerce Department, writes: “Not only is Russia in the midst of a decade’s long redirection in trade flows and economic relations with Asian countries, but [also] … in many ways Asian countries are actively seeking improved economic ties with Russia in the form of trade and greater investment. Moreover, the current movement eastward is part of a decade and a half long turn that precedes the economic crisis, Russia’s entry into the WTO and geopolitical tensions with the West. … By 2016, Russia’s imports from China and other Asian partners had grown significantly. Among the top 10 in market share, the top three Asian countries were almost level with the top three European countries. … Overall, exports to the EU declined by 27.5 percent from 2006 to 2016. … South Korea has risen to become Russia’s seventh largest trade partner. … As would be expected, the shift in the flow of fuel exports explains much of the changing flow of exports from Russia. … Fuel trade to Japan has greatly increased in importance and trade between Moscow and Tokyo has quadrupled since 2006. … Imports from East Asia increased from 22.5 percent to 32.1 percent from 2006 to 2016. … A key factor in the significant rise in imports from Asia in particular, and China specifically, is the increase in various types of machinery imported into Russia from China. … China will continue to be the true driver of Russia’s trade with Asia. … Russian trade is moving in an eastward direction and Russia could quite possibly see trade with Asia on par with the EU by 2022.”

Ukraine:

“Nationalist Radicalization Trends in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine,” Volodymyr Ishchenko, PONARS Eurasia, May 2018: The author, a lecturer in the Department of Sociology at the Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, writes: “Ukraine today faces a vicious circle of nationalist radicalization involving mutual reinforcement between far-right groups and the dominant oligarchic pyramids. This has significantly contributed to … creating divisiveness and damaging Ukrainian relations with its strategically important neighbors. … Local deterrents are insufficient to counter the radicalizing trend … Western pressure is needed on influential Ukrainian figures and political parties in order to help shift Ukraine away from this self-destructive development. … Ukraine has … a legacy of historical conflicts with neighbors … and encompasses plural and strongly opposing versions of historical memory about the Soviet Union and relations with Russians. … the overall state approach of dealing with dissenting citizens …  has not been inclusionary but exclusionary … far-right groups pressure the government directly, relying on their own mobilization potential and politically loyal armed units. … Among the most dangerous consequences is the lack of public condemnation of the government’s repression and far-right extra-legal violence against dissenters (often simply branded as “pro-Russian.”) … Neither Moldova nor Georgia, which had very similar internal and external conflicts, experienced radicalizing dynamics to the same extent as Ukraine. This implies that radicalization has its roots primarily in the structure of both Ukraine’s political regime and civil society.”

“Has Trump Mis-Stepped on Ukraine?” Gustav Gressel, European Council on Foreign Relations, 05.17.18: The author, a senior policy fellow on the Wider Europe Program at the ECFR Berlin Office, writes: “In principle, supplying ATGW [Javelin anti-tank guided weapons] to Ukraine makes sense both on the strategic as well as tactical level. The unfolding of the conflict has justified the strategic rationale for this decision: the more capable Ukrainian armed forces have become at repelling Russian offensives, the more Moscow has wound the war down. … While Russia issues verbal protests about Western support to Ukraine, it is hardly likely to resort to all-out war against its neighbor. … ATGW are a means to stabilize the contact line. … But the choice of weapon matters too—and here the administration may have made a mistake. The Javelin belongs to the latest generation of ATGW that the U.S. and many NATO members rely on to defend themselves against possible Russian action. If a Javelin were to fall into Russian hands … this would compromise U.S. security. … The supply of Javelins changes the overall balance little but increases the risk for Ukraine and the U.S. … the decision to send lethal aid has, literally, delivered first-class equipment to a country which cannot use it, leaving the ATGW to gather dusk locked away, far from the front.”

“The End of the Annexation,” Andrei Kolesnikov, The Moscow Times, 05.18.18: The author, senior fellow and chair of the Russian domestic politics and political institutions program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes: “At the opening of the Kerch Bridge this week, Vladimir Putin invoked religious terminology to describe the new construction. … the 19-kilometer connection between Russia and the Crimean peninsula was ‘a miracle.’ … In a way, the bridge is the culmination of Russian authoritarianism and the pinnacle of the Putin regime. It is a symbol of the historic reunification of the Russian people. … It is also the conclusion of Crimea’s incorporation into Russia, both physically and politically. Any haggling over on what terms Russia might return Crimea to Ukraine is now definitively null and void.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“A Pragmatic Revolutionary: What to Expect From Armenia’s New Leader Pashinyan,” Mikael Zolyan, Carnegie Moscow Center, 05.16.18: The author, an associate professor at Yerevan State Linguistic University, writes: “The recent protests in Armenia ... don’t really correspond to the categories that many people … are used to employing to describe what happens in former Soviet states. Nor does the image of [newly elected Prime Minister Nikol] Pashinyan himself. … He has two images: one of a charismatic revolutionary … and the other as a pragmatic politician ready to make compromises and form tactical unions. The new prime minister and his supporters … talk about fighting corruption, the oligarchy and monopolies; and about how rule of law will preside in the ‘new Armenia’; and that businesses of all sizes will be able to develop without fear of pressure from the state organs. But how exactly they plan to achieve all of this is so far unclear. … Pashinyan himself qualifies his position on Nagorno-Karabakh as follows: the conflict should be solved by reaching a compromise, but as long as Baku continues to employ aggressive rhetoric, it’s impossible to speak of a compromise. Sargsyan used to say something similar, but it sounds somewhat different coming from Pashinyan. … the emergence … of a new leader [in one of the countries party to the conflict] who enjoys the trust of his people gives hope that the peace process can be revived. … for now, the priority for both Armenian society and the new authorities is not foreign policy or frozen conflicts, but the country’s.”

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Creative Reporting: What to Expect From the Russian Government in Putin’s Fourth Term,” Andrey Movchan, Carnegie Moscow Center, 05.15.18: The author, senior fellow and director of the economic policy program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes: “The newly nominated [Russian government] officials perfectly fit the country’s current internal political moment and represent the conclusion of a long transition to authoritarian governance. … Putin’s new term … already stands out for the total clarity of its domestic policies. They will be based upon the quiet rejection of development and change amid enormous successes in ‘creative accounting’ and reporting the country’s achievements and propaganda. … For example, what does Putin’s promise to make Russia one of the five largest economies on Earth mean? … If we measure GDP by purchasing power parity … then Russia lags behind fifth place (held by Germany) by only 4.5 percent. … All Russia’s statistical agency must do is lower purchasing power parity by a further 10 percent ... and Russia will have overtaken Germany. Or how … shall we treat the task of ensuring a ‘total fertility coefficient of 1.7,’ if it is already above 1.7 in Russia? … Russia already has a fertility rate higher than any European country while having a population with a fairly European lifestyle and social behavioral patterns. … there is likely some flexibility here. For example, the coefficient may be treated as only applicable to Russians of child-bearing age. … Speaking metaphorically … Russia has recognized that it is stuck in the middle of the ford between socialism and capitalism. Luckily, the stream dividing them is full of oil. Its fate in the coming decades is life without movement, sunken into the stream. We will hear constant assurances that Russia will soon cross over onto the proper shore. … And one task will consume Russia’s leaders: how to convincingly declare the river’s muddy bottom to be solid ground and standing half-submerged to be Russia’s successful end destination.”

“The Kremlin Revives a Soviet-Style Law Against Dissent,” Vladimir Kara-Murza, The Washington Post, 05.18.18: The author, vice chairman of the Open Russia movement and chairman of the Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom, writes: “On Tuesday the State Duma approved on the first reading a law making it a criminal offense, punishable by up to three years in prison, for Russian citizens to ‘intentionally enable foreign states, alliances of foreign states or international organizations to impose restrictive measures on Russian persons and public entities.’ … The latest addition to the criminal code has an intended recipient, too, and apparently it is the author of this piece. …  Andrei Isayev, deputy speaker of the State Duma from Putin's United Russia party, … specifically cited my work in support of targeted Western sanctions on Russian human rights abusers. … ‘If the bill is passed and becomes law, such activities will be considered a crime.’ I will continue this work, as I know will many of my colleagues … As was often the case in Soviet times, humor is an important asset in facing political repression. The first thought that came to my mind when I heard of the new law was that, compared with my two near-fatal poisonings, three years in prison seem almost like a move toward liberalization.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.