This Week’s Highlights

• The current U.S. policy of seeking to bring Ukraine and Georgia into NATO—or bringing other countries outside the strategic core of the West into formal alliance structures—should be viewed very skeptically, writes Brookings Institution senior fellow Michael O'Hanlon. America should not try to cover the whole Earth with a U.S. security blanket, he writes, arguing that this is especially true for areas near Russia or China. 
• The prospects for preserving American influence in Central Asia depend on formulating a successful exit strategy from Afghanistan, writes Charles E. Ziegler of the University of Louisville. By working with India in Central Asia, the United States can improve the chances of stabilizing and integrating Afghanistan into the broader region, he argues, noting that the U.S. should think creatively about India’s potential as an intermediary, and not reflexively oppose Indian engagement with Russia and Iran.
• Russia’s approach to the Black Sea builds on a centuries-old history of confrontation with Europe’s major powers and on Russia’s long geopolitical rivalry with Turkey, writes Paul Stronski of the Carnegie Endowment. NATO increasingly accepts Russia as its prime adversary, which has reinforced calls for a more robust Western strategy toward Russia, particularly in the Black Sea and southeastern Europe, he argues. Facing these challenges, however, Russia is unlikely to back down and will defend its position fiercely, Stronski writes.
• The United States will likely retain a demographic edge over other great powers, writes Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute. China, Japan, Russia—which has seen nearly 14 million more deaths than births since the fall of the Soviet Union—and the countries of the European Union have all had sub-replacement fertility rates for much longer than the United States, he writes.
• Stanford University’s Rose Gottemoeller discusses the experience of becoming the first woman to negotiate a nuclear arms control deal with Russia, writes. No woman had ever led a negotiation about nuclear arms reduction in the 50-year history of U.S. and Soviet/Russian negotiations; the fact was going to attract comment, and it was going to rouse discomfort, she notes. In the end, Gottemoeller succeeded alongside [her Russian counterpart, Anatoly] Antonov, who showed himself to be a capable, experienced and well-connected diplomat, she writes
• [Last] week, the rotating chairmanship of the Arctic Council, the leading intergovernmental forum for Arctic affairs, passed from Iceland to Russia for a two-year term at a time when the organization grapples with multiple challenges and Russia-West relations have hit another historic low, writes Katarina Kerytsova of the European Leadership Network. Military buildup in the Arctic, coupled with the emerging narrative of great power competition, further undermine the cooperative spirit that the Arctic Council represents, she argues.

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Great Power rivalry/New Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“The Art of War in the Age of Peace,” Michael O'Hanlon, The National Interest, 05.23.21. The author, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes:

• “As for the state of the world, for some, the headlines say it all. There’s an aggressive China, a vengeful Russia, a nuclear-minded North Korea, a hostile Iran, and a disintegrating Afghanistan. All of these foreign policy problems are superimposed on top of warming climates, rising oceans and spreading pandemics. [Meanwhile…] The world has never been more prosperous, democratic, or—for most of us at least—safe and secure. … [T]hese competing realities need to be understood correctly if U.S. foreign policy is to be rightsized for the dangers the country faces.”
• “A Biden national security strategy should be resolute in its commitment to defend the core territories, populations, polities, and economies of U.S. allies, as well as the free and open skies and oceans on which the global economy depends. However, America also needs to show restraint. … For example, the administration should be wary about any further alliance expansion or formation. The current U.S. policy of seeking to bring Ukraine and Georgia into NATO—or bringing other countries outside the strategic core of the West into formal alliance structures—should be viewed very skeptically.”
• “America should not try to cover the whole Earth with a U.S. security blanket. That is especially true for areas near Russia or China. In general, U.S. military forces should be used primarily to shore up what some call the core of the rules-based global order—the basic stability of the global environment and deterrence of major war involving key existing U.S. allies or the United States.”
• “Defend existing allies and the key elements of today’s global economy, yes. But also forgo further alliance expansion, ambitious war plans, or the sense that we can somehow still do it all.  Finding words to convey this mixed message in an inspiring and confident way—and, even more importantly, implementing it well—will not be easy. But if Biden is to make his mark as an important president in foreign policy, then he must attempt to do so.”

“America’s Central Asian Dilemma,” Charles E. Ziegler, The National Interest, 05.23.21. The author, a professor of Political Science, University Scholar, and Director of the Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order at the University of Louisville, writes:

• “Fatigued with endless wars in Afghanistan and the Middle East, and more sanguine about the prospects for democracy promotion, Washington is gradually disengaging from Central Asia. However, the United States needs the assistance of friendly South and Central Asian states in extricating its troops from Afghanistan and maintaining regional stability once American and NATO forces have departed.”
• “The prospects for preserving American influence in Central Asia depend on formulating a successful exit strategy from Afghanistan. In Central Asia, the United States faces competition for influence from both Russia and China and has a dubious ally in Pakistan. On the positive side, the United States has an increasingly valuable security partner in India.”
• “By working with India in Central Asia, the United States can improve the chances of stabilizing and integrating Afghanistan into the broader region. New Delhi is too protective of its sovereignty to bandwagon with the United States, but shared interests in Central Asia can provide the basis for a productive partnership. New Delhi’s close relations with Moscow and Tehran could be useful in containing Islamic extremism in Afghanistan—none of these countries wants to see the return of a Taliban caliphate or Islamic State resurgence. The U.S. should think creatively about India’s potential as an intermediary, and not reflexively oppose Indian engagement with Russia and Iran.”

“What Is Russia Doing in the Black Sea?,” Paul Stronski, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 05.20.21. The author, a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, writes:

• “Russia’s approach to the Black Sea builds on a centuries-old history of confrontation with Europe’s major powers and on Russia’s long geopolitical rivalry with Turkey. Its goals include warding off any threat from NATO, either to the Russian heartland or its strategic bastion in Crimea. It also wants to undermine NATO’s cohesion by trying to stoke fissures between alliance members along the Black Sea, and to prevent Ukraine and Georgia from joining the alliance. … More broadly, Moscow sees the Black Sea region as vital to its geoeconomic strategy: to project Russian power and influence in the Mediterranean, protect its economic and trade links with key European markets, and make southern Europe more dependent on Russian oil and gas. … Russia also sees this body of water as an important security buffer zone, protecting it from the volatility that could emanate from further south.”
• “Moscow depends on the Black Sea for access to the Mediterranean and beyond, both for military operations outside its immediate neighborhood and for exports of Russia’s main commodity (hydrocarbons).Moscow sees the Mediterranean as largely NATO-dominated, but it hopes to spot opportunities to make political, economic, and military inroads with key regional states.”
• “The Russian-Turkish rapprochement may be the most remarkable shift in Black Sea regional dynamics over the past decade. Yet Turkey remains an unreliable partner for Moscow, with a long tradition of adversarial relations with Russia. Ankara wants to expand its influence in what Russia sees as its privileged sphere—as most vividly seen in Turkish military support to Azerbaijan in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. Turkey also continues to vocally support Ukraine’s territorial integrity, including over Crimea, and to sell arms to Ukraine.”
• “Finally, NATO increasingly accepts Russia as its prime adversary. This has reinforced calls for a more robust Western strategy toward Russia, particularly in the Black Sea and southeastern Europe. Facing these challenges, however, Russia is unlikely to back down and will defend its position fiercely.”

“Truth Or Consequences: There’s a Strategic Need for Nuclear Modernization,” Stephen Blank and Peter Huessy, The National Interest, 05.23.21. The authors, respectively a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and president of Geo-Strategic Analysis of Potomac, Maryland, write: 

• “Current Russian threats to Ukraine and the coinciding release of the Biden administration’s budget provide a useful framework for reviewing the need for U.S. nuclear modernization. The Biden budget has predictably incurred the wrath of both hawks and doves because it unexpectedly raised defense spending, which the doves did not like, but it did so only modestly, which the hawks did not like. Also, it echoed the need for ongoing nuclear modernization, which the hawks liked but the doves did not like.”
• “Meanwhile, Russia’s mobilization and deployment of more than eighty thousand forces around Ukraine, including nuclear-capable Iskander missiles, reveals something of Russian nuclear strategy.  … Despite much hand-wringing, nuclear weapons serve no purpose other than to deter other nuclear weapons. Governments act on the belief that these weapons serve many critical political-military and thus strategic functions. Moreover, the trend appears to be running against reductions in favor of larger nuclear arsenals. … While the anti-nuclear community still argues for unilateral reductions or for cutting the budget to eliminate one or another leg of the triad, other governments, not least Russia and China, are modernizing and building new and innovative nuclear and space platforms.”
• “Various governments like Russia are still looking for ways to use nuclear weapons as active ingredients of their military-political strategy. In Russia’s case, it has 20 weapons programs or delivery systems currently underway while the Pentagon expects China to at least double its arsenal in the current decade.”
• “In the current Ukraine crisis, Moscow tried to dominate the escalation ‘ladder’ by mobilizing enormous numbers of combined conventional forces plus nuclear-capable weapons, all the while making threats that Ukraine risked destruction.”
• “Policy recommendations that oppose nuclear modernization amount to unilateral disarmament and a betrayal of U.S. allies. Such recommendations do not merit serious consideration… The idea that if Washington simply shows restraint then its adversaries will do the same is ultimately the triumph of hope over reality. And, after all, ‘hope is not a strategy.’”

“Rocket Artillery Can Keep Russia Out of the Baltics,” Brennan Deveraux, War on the Rocks, 05.20.21. The author, a major in the U.S. Army and is currently attending the Army Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as an Art of War Scholar, writes:

• “Although a significant conflict between NATO and Russia is unlikely, a war of limited aims remains a distinct and dangerous possibility—and in almost any scenario in this context, the conflict will center on the Baltic states.” 
• “Rocket-artillery systems are vital to the Baltic defense plan because their mobility allows the alliance to deploy a long-range precision capability across the theater and prosecute vital targets such as Russia’s area-denial equipment, through a process known as a rapid infiltration.”
• “While the value of large mechanized forces is not in question, it is time to recognize that rocket artillery should be at the forefront of NATO’s military strategy. These rocket-artillery systems can serve as a tool to enable alliance aircraft, offset the lack of air support in a conflict, and help NATO strike targets in places that it would be difficult or dangerous to strike via air.”
• “Therefore, the successful integration of Romanian and Polish High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems is vital to NATO’s future. Particularly, if made part of the Baltic contingency plan, rocket artillery will facilitate rapid reinforcement across the European theater and strengthen the alliance. Overall, rocket artillery is a combat multiplier in Europe. If successfully integrated, European-owned rocket-artillery launchers provide NATO a unique tool that changes the battlefield calculus and strengthens the Alliance’s strategic deterrence posture.”

“To Counter Russia In Africa, America Should Rethink Its Own Role,” John Lechner, War on the Rocks, 05.20.21. The author, a freelance journalist, writes:

• “Russia’s role in Africa is by no means benign, and Washington would do well to counter some Russian activities on the continent.”
• “The reality of many Russian actions—violating human rights, undermining good governance, and prolonging conflict—requires a U.S. response. That response, however, should not come at the expense of the values America promotes. Rather, countering Russia in Africa should be an opportunity for the United States and its allies to double down on their own. If the “Russia in Africa” narrative results in positive engagement and rethinking the gaps between rhetoric and practice, then the discourse’s potency may not prove such a bad thing.”
• “For now, however, the “Russia in Africa” narrative risks creating the wrong response. A Chadian citizen holding a painted, pro-Russia sign on the streets N’Djamena is not a sinister omen of future Russian designs. Rather, it is a justifiable display of anger at both the French and U.S. policies that continue to support authoritarianism in his country. The greatest danger is that “Russia in Africa” has already spun a narrative web which can catch and connect these small, disparate events and serve, like the threat of jihadism and Communism before it, as a new excuse for sacrificing human dignity on the altar of superficial stability.”

“Friction in Other Parts of the Globe As Well As Climate Change are Fueling Tensions in the High North,” Tony Barber, Financial Times, 05.19.21. The author, the news outlet’s Europe Editor, writes:

• “At the start of this year, India published a draft national strategy for the Arctic. Even for a country that is closer to the equator than to the North Pole, the Arctic matters. However, in an icy region that once served as a model for post-cold war cooperation, the rivalry heating up among China, Russia and the United States is cause for concern.”
• “The intensifying rivalry reflects more than climate change and the disturbing implications for the planet’s future from rising Arctic temperatures. Ultimately, the US, Russia and China are eyeing each other with suspicion in the region because of sharpening tensions elsewhere such as east-central Europe and east Asia, and in other policy areas such as trade, cyber activities and space.”
• “Low world oil and gas prices, coupled with the professed goals of governments and businesses to move to a carbon-neutral future, make it unprofitable to launch large Arctic energy projects. The biggest exception is a Russian liquefied natural gas venture on the Yamal peninsula that China has invested in.”
• “In principle, the Arctic’s most important future shipping lane is the Northern Sea Route, which extends along Russia’s northern coast and is increasingly free of ice. For China, it could be 10-12 days quicker to send goods to Europe by this route… Arguably, China has more financial resources than its western rivals to invest in the infrastructure needed to exploit the new route.”
• “For sure, the rivalry in the Arctic is not out of control. But the eight-power Arctic Council, a forum for regional co-operation set up in 1996, is not equipped to tackle it because its mandate excludes security issues. The Arctic … needs the United States, Russia and China to find enough common ground to protect its future against the fallout from their other disputes.”

“America Hasn’t Lost Its Demographic Advantage. Its Rivals Are in Much Worse Shape,” Nicholas Eberstadt, Foreign Affairs, 05.24.21. The author, who serves as Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute and as a senior adviser to the National Bureau of Asian Research, writes:

• “The United States’ global preeminence owes a great deal to demographics. After the collapse and fragmenting of the Soviet Union, the United States became the world’s third most populous country, behind the giants China and India. By comparison to other developed countries, the United States maintained unusually high levels of fertility and immigration—a phenomenon I termed “American demographic exceptionalism” in these pages in 2019.”
• “The United States may be losing its advantage and becoming less exceptional as Americans choose to have fewer children. …The U.S. Census Bureau’s 2020 “headline” numbers formally ratify something demographers already knew: the United States’ population growth has been decelerating steadily since 1990—and is now at the slowest recorded tempo in the country’s history, apart from the Great Depression era.”
• “But the demographic future remains relatively bright for the United States. …. Continuing migration and the ‘population momentum’ built into the United States’ current demographic structure (as rising cohorts move into age groups currently occupied by comparatively smaller cohorts) would push the overall U.S. population and working-age population to higher totals for at least another generation.”
• “As a result, the United States will likely retain a demographic edge over other great powers. China, Japan, Russia [which has seen nearly 14 million more deaths than births since the fall of the Soviet Union], and the countries of the European Union have all had sub-replacement fertility rates for much longer than the United States.”
• “The dip in fertility in the United States does suggest that clear-cut U.S. demographic exceptionalism may be over, at least for the time being. The United States will likely surrender its place as the third most populous country in the world to Nigeria at some point before 2050. But it will remain a fairly young and vital society, at least with respect to other developed countries and to competitors such as China and Russia.”

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“The Flag Lags but Follows. The PLA and China's Great Leap Outward,” Andrew Scobell and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, RAND Corporation, 05.18.21. The authors, respectively a senior political scientist and a policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, in a piece originally published in the 2019 book “Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms, Chapter 4, pages 171–199 (2019),” and republished by RAND in May 2021, write:

• “If China were to select a 21st-century military ally, the most likely candidate would be Pakistan or Russia; both countries have proven records of extended strategic cooperation with China. Chinese leaders are deeply distrustful of outsiders and other states and trust takes time to develop.”
• “Russia is [a] logical potential ally for China, but this alliance option comes with heavy baggage for each country. Both Beijing and Moscow are undoubtedly wary of entering another alliance because of the fate of their 20th-century effort.”
  • “The newly established PRC looked to its socialist elder brother—the Soviet Union—for military support and economic aid. Months after formally establishing a new communist party-state in China, Mao Zedong traveled to Moscow to meet with Joseph Stalin and sign the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in February 1950. But a decade later, the alliance fractured because of ideological differences, political tensions, and personality conflicts between two headstrong leaders. These fundamental tensions persist today.”
  • “As one Chinese analyst opined, China and Russia will not cement a 21st-century alliance unless driven to do so by the United States.  A scholar at the China Academy of Social Sciences wrote in 2016 that he could find “no evidence supporting the possibility or necessity of a China-Russia military alliance.”  The expert highlighted the absence of any contributing factors, including lack of a clear direct military threat (from the United States), major differences between Chinese and Russia national interests, and fundamental skepticism that even a formal treaty would guarantee that one country would come to the aid of the other in the event of an attack by a third country.”
• “Moreover, nothing in official PRC rhetoric suggests that Beijing might pursue a military alliance in the near future.”

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms control:

“I Was The First Woman to Negotiate a Nuclear Arms Deal With the Russians. They Never Let Me Forget It,” Rose Gottemoeller, Politico, 05.21.21. The author, a lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and its Center for International Security and Cooperation. She was deputy secretary general of NATO from 2016 to 2019, writes in an excerpt from her new book Negotiating the New Start Treaty:

• “[When] I became the first woman to negotiate a nuclear arms control deal with Russia … I knew that I’d stand out for my gender in the very male world of nuclear diplomacy. But I didn’t know just how much until June 2009. We were driving a hard pace to complete the new treaty. It was lucky that I already knew my Russian counterpart, Anatoly Antonov, well.”
• “As we entered June and were preparing for a July encounter between Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev, a Russian newspaper published an article claiming that Antonov would never get the better of me because I was ‘such a tough negotiator.’ … [I]t was clear someone in Moscow was taking aim at Antonov. Not only was the other negotiator tougher than he, but she was a girl. Misogyny is a key feature of the Russian system, so it was a slap.”
• “Early on, I realized that Antonov had an excellent team of young women on his delegation. In fact, he took pride in telling me that he had selected the best young female diplomats to participate. … I told him all along that he needed to let some of the capable female experts on his delegation into the front row and that they should be allowed to speak. Finally, toward the end of the negotiations, it happened. [A female lawyer] launched into a good summing-up of some legal business that we were bringing to conclusion.”
• “As I reflect on the ‘tough-girl negotiator’ incident, I think part of it was inevitable. No woman had ever led a negotiation about nuclear arms reduction in the 50-year history of U.S. and Soviet/Russian negotiations. The fact was going to attract comment, and it was going to rouse discomfort. The Russian discomfort I fully expected. In the end, Antonov and I were able to work through it, and he showed himself to be the capable, experienced and well-connected diplomat that he is.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

• No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

“Russia in the Global Hydrogen Race,” Kirsten Westphal, Yana Zabanova, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), May 2021. The authors, respectively a senior associate and a visiting fellow with SWP's Global Issues division, write:

• Russia is signaling its interest in joining the global hydrogen race and envisions itself as a future hydrogen supplier for Germany and the Asia Pacific. However, it should be aware that becoming a key hydrogen exporter goes hand in hand with building a strong hydrogen economy at home.
• If Russia wants to secure its place in the global energy transition it cannot avoid the adoption of more ambitious decarbonization policies at home. Also, when it comes to hydrogen, Russia cannot assume it will remain an indispensable supplier for the EU by default. Leading economies like Germany have many other options for partnerships. As the hydrogen race intensifies, with governments and corporations committing large funds to the sector, Russia needs to take a risk and muster the political will and resources to seize its share of the future hydrogen market.
• As for Germany, it should consider the comparative carbon content of different kinds of hydrogen as the main criteria, or at least send clear signals regarding the types of hydrogen that it is willing to buy from Russia (and others) in order to create certainty for potential investors. Well thought-out pilot projects are critical at this early stage. Last but not least, industrial de-carbonization in Russia is an untapped and very promising area of bilateral cooperation which deserves much greater attention.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant developments.

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

• No significant developments.

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant developments.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“The Prospects for US-Russia Climate Engagement Under Moscow’s Chairing of the Arctic Council,” Katarina Kerytsova, Russia Matters, 05.19.21. The author, a policy fellow at the European Leadership Network and a Global Fellow at the Kennan and Polar Wilson Center, writes:

• “[Last] week, the rotating chairmanship of the Arctic Council, the leading intergovernmental forum for Arctic affairs, passed from Iceland to Russia for a two-year term. Russia has taken the baton at a time when the organization grapples with multiple challenges and Russia-West relations have hit another historic low … Military buildup in the Arctic, coupled with the emerging narrative of great power competition, further undermine the cooperative spirit that the Arctic Council represents.”
• “The military buildup in the region and zero-sum thinking will continue to put regional cooperation on areas of mutual interest under strain. It remains to be seen whether U.S. concerns about Russian militarization of the Arctic will be spelled out or sidelined in the name of rebuilding regional multilateralism. In the words of Andreas Raspotnik and Andreas Østhagen, the new U.S. administration needs to understand the Arctic status quo, where “cooperation with Russia is a geographic necessity, and the one with China a future imperative; be it on matters of regional security, fisheries management or environmental protection.” Biden should prioritize cooperation on areas of mutual interest over bellicose rhetoric and military-strategic competition with Russia and China, which dominated Arctic relations under the previous U.S. administration. To address the region’s growing militarization, it would be advisable for the Biden administration to find new ways to engage Arctic and non-Arctic actors in defense-related and military security dialogue outside the Arctic Council. This would help reduce the risk of military escalation stemming from miscalculation and misinterpretation of intentions.”

“Russia's Timid Approach to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Marianna Belenkaya, The Moscow Times, 05.18.21. The author, an expert on Arab affairs and a journalist at the Kommersant publishing house, writes:

• “If Lebanese Hezbollah “resistance forces” and other pro-Iranian Shiite groups decide to open a second front with Israel from Lebanon and Syria, and if Israel responds with massive strikes against these countries, it would cause serious damage to Russia’s position, not to mention threaten Russian military and civilian personnel in the region. Clearly, Moscow does not want to have to choose between its two allies in the region.”
• “Moscow focuses on reviving a long-forgotten mechanism for settling the conflict, the so-called Middle East “quartet” of mediators: Russia and the U.S., EU and UN. Russia also advocates direct negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis. The Kremlin continues to offer its own platform for such talks, and despite knowing its offer will not be accepted, continues to assert that there is no alternative to the peace process.”
• “Russia and the EU had begun attempts to revive the “quartet” after the change of the presidential administration in Washington. Under former U.S. President Donald Trump, Washington ignored UN Security Council resolutions and collective settlement mechanisms with respect to the Middle East and elsewhere.”
• “The Trump administration replaced the search for a Middle East settlement with efforts to normalize relations between Israel and the Arab countries. Moscow welcomed this normalization process, but it warned at the time that it should not replace a settlement of Palestinian-Israeli differences based on UN Security Council resolutions.”
• “The Arab countries themselves support this position. Russia will do everything it can to help. In fact, Russia is the only non-Arab mediator that maintains communication with Hamas, a strongpoint among the members of the “quartet””

“How Joe Biden Can Win a Nobel Peace Prize,” Thomas L. Friedman, The New York Times, 05.23.21. The author, a weekly columnist for the New York Times, writes:

• “Leon Trotsky once supposedly observed, “You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.” To President Biden I’d say today, “You may not be interested in Middle East peacemaking, but Middle East peacemaking is interested in you.” Here’s why: All three key players in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been dealt some huge painful shocks over the past year. They know, deep down, that another round of fighting like the one we saw in the past two weeks could unleash disastrous consequences for each of them. Henry Kissinger forged the first real peace breakthrough between Israelis and Arabs after they were all reeling, vulnerable and in pain as a result of the 1973 War. They each knew that something had to change. Today, if you look and listen closely, you can sense a similar moment shaping up in the wake of the latest Hamas-Israel war.”
• “If I were Hamas, I would not just bask in the new voices criticizing Israel on the left. I would also worry that virtually no Arab governments came to its defense, and that the Biden administration and the European Union and Russia and China basically gave Israel the time it needed to deliver a heavy blow to Hamas.”
• “My message to Biden would be this: You may be interested in China, but the Middle East is still interested in you. You deftly helped to engineer the cease-fire from the sidelines. Do you want to, do you dare to, dive into the middle of this new Kissingerian moment? I won’t blame you if you don’t. I’d just warn you that it is not going to get better on its own.”

Ukraine:

“How to turn Nord Stream 2 into a win for Ukraine,” Thomas Graham and Joseph Haberman, The Hill, 05.20.21. The authors, a distinguished fellow and research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations, write:

• “Instead of expending diplomatic capital on a campaign to stop Nord Stream 2, the Biden administration should work with its European partners to prepare Ukraine to withstand the pipeline’s completion. The deadline for action is 2024, when Kyiv’s current gas contract and President Biden’s term effectively end.”  
• “By that time, Washington and Brussels should formulate and implement an economic package that, first and foremost, covers Ukraine’s inevitable budget shortfall from the loss of transit fees to keep the Ukrainian state running. This package should, however, also invest in the country’s sustainable growth. That would entail material and technical support for Kyiv’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign, whose success is a prerequisite for attracting long-term investment. One idea worth considering is a loan to cover revenue shortfalls, whose repayment would be incrementally forgiven in exchange for concrete progress on reforms by Kyiv.” 
• “Beyond that, Washington and Brussels should encourage investment in the country’s green energy sector. Ukraine has the potential to become a major producer of renewable energy, but it must first develop the infrastructure to harness its vast natural wealth of resources, including biomass, wind and hydrogen. Rather than leaving the country out to dry amidst Europe’s green transition, such a project would make Ukraine an integral part of a cleaner, more sustainable European future. Compared to short-term efforts to stop Nord Stream 2, this approach would go a long way in actually supporting Ukrainian prosperity and resilience.”  

“Neither NATO, Nor Nukes: The Answer to Ukraine’s Security is a Strategic Alliance with the United States,” Mariana Budjeryn and Thomas Graham Jr, Just Security. 05.20.21. The authors, a researcher at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center and the former general counsel and acting director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, write:

• “Ukraine’s membership in NATO is not a good idea. NATO has now grown to 30 members that still make decisions by consensus. There are differences in opinion among the members about the gravity of the Russian threat and the desirability of Ukraine’s membership in the alliance. A decision to admit Ukraine and assist it in defense against Russia will likely be mired in disagreements and delays.”
• “Ukraine’s withdrawal from the NPT and a launch of a costly nuclear-weapons program is an even worse idea. It would increase the risk of Russian military escalation, with much the same justification as the United States used for its 2003 invasion of Iraq.”
• “The only way to turn the tables and fill the security vacuum is to forge a U.S.-Ukrainian strategic alliance. Such a strategic alliance should start with the United States granting Ukraine major non-NATO ally (MNNA) status as soon as possible.”
• “Once Ukraine becomes an MNNA, the United States could consider opening a permanent military base, or lease an existing military facility on Ukraine’s territory, like it does in Jordan and Israel.”
• “If Ukraine performs as a capable and responsible ally, the United States should consider a next step — signing a mutual defense treaty, the kind the United States has with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, and South Korea.” 

“Russia Is Watching: Why NATO Must Welcome Ukraine and Georgia,” Mamuka Tsereteli James and Jay Carafano, The National Interest, 05.18.21. The authors, a senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council’s Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and the vice president of the Institute for International Studies at the Heritage Foundation, write:

• “Discussions about shortening Ukraine’s path to NATO membership are underway. At a joint press conference with Ukrainian president Zelensky earlier this month, Polish President Andrzej Duda said: “At the NATO summit in June, it is planned to discuss a road map for Ukraine to take steps to join NATO.” Unfortunately, this approach is not shared by key Western members of the alliance, France and Germany. And it doesn’t look like the United States plans to push hard on this issue.”  
• “But even if the United States were to convince other NATO members to grant a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Ukraine (and Georgia, which has long been in line for this status), what would be the actual military-security meaning of this statement under the current circumstances of Russian pressure? Would it prevent another Russian military invasion when no commitment is made to defend these countries?”
• “Anything short of full NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine with immediate enforcement of the defense of these countries would only stimulate Russia to act even more aggressively against them. Without full-fledged membership, any statement of NATO commitment, or even an upgrade of the status on the road to membership, will have no real security meaning for these countries.  The unpleasant truth is that, at this stage, there is no realistic expectation of a meaningful decision to guarantee the security of Ukraine and Georgia under the umbrella of NATO, or under a bilateral pact with the United States.”
• “The bottom line is that the United States and like-minded European allies need to do what they can, as soon as they can, to make Ukraine too tough a pill for Putin to swallow.” 

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Power and Paralysis: Stalemate in Belarus,” Benno Zogg, RUSI, 05.18.21. The author, a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, writes:

• “Lukashenka… must arrange his succession in the longer term. However, the Belarusian leader is trying to dominate and delay the procedure. Elites still depend on loyalty to him. Accordingly, the Belarusian leader has initiated a slow and vague process, accompanied by vague and changing promises, and staged consultations. Meanwhile, the economic situation further aggravates the population’s plight. Coupled with the global economic slump, brain drain and the poor investment climate are accelerating Belarus’s economic decline. So, in addition to the state crisis, there is the threat of an economic and monetary crisis.”
• “A look back in history and at other countries, especially in the post-Soviet space, indicates that regimes can often hold on for a long time even under such adversarial conditions – particularly if they have foreign sponsors. Likewise, discontent among the population can erupt again. Still, the probable long-term scenario remains one of a managed transition which allows for some optimism. A proliferation of political actors and a slightly stronger role for parliament may entail an increased need to incorporate urgent economic reforms and popular demands, particularly of the younger generation – at least as far as an autocratic system and the interference of the Kremlin can tolerate.”

“Belarusian Media Onslaught Leaves Lukashenko With No Way Out,” Artyom Shraibman, The Carnegie Moscow Center, 05.21.21. The author, a Minsk based political analyst, writes:

• “The Belarusian government’s move to destroy the country’s biggest non-state media outlet—the website tut.by—is more than just another salvo from the front of the Belarusian counterrevolution.”
• “Before it was blocked, the website was attracting 3.3 million unique users per month, or 63 percent of Belarusian internet users. In other words, nearly all Belarusians who read the news online do so on tut.by—or rather, they did until May 18.”
• “The consequences of the demolition of the country’s main news site will be far-reaching. Its audience of more than 3 million won’t switch over to state media outlets, which call daily for a crackdown on the “fifth columnists.” Tut.by’s readers will simply turn to remaining independent platforms, such as onliner.by and nn.by, as well as sites that are blocked but can still be accessed using a VPN: naviny.by, euroradio.fm, svaboda.org, belaruspartisan.by, belsat.eu, and others.”
• “For the most part, however, tut.by’s readers will turn to social media and Telegram channels, where the editorial staff of tut.by have already taken refuge. And if YouTube, Instagram, and Facebook can in theory be blocked, it’s much harder to shut down Telegram, as the Russian authorities learned the hard way back in 2018.”
• “The West, meanwhile, doesn’t have enough influence to make a difference, and even introducing the toughest sanctions possible will only push Minsk toward even more repressive measures rather than choosing to cave and lose face. This atmosphere of a cold civil war is not only causing Lukashenko to become more repressive, but also to put off indefinitely the political reform promised to Moscow, or to do it purely for show.”

“Are There Any Winners of the War on the Kyrgyz-Tajik Border?” Temur Umarov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 05.19.21. The author, an expert on China and Central Asia, and a consultant at Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “Over the course of just a couple of days, a run-of-the-mill conflict between the inhabitants of border villages in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan spiraled into a battle between the two countries’ armies, the taking of hostages, and the seizing of checkpoints. Both sides moved their armed forces to the border and deployed tanks, helicopters, and mortars, and there were dozens of fatalities. After several false starts, Bishkek and Dushanbe eventually agreed a ceasefire, and Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and his Tajik counterpart Emomali Rahmon are set to meet at the end of May to discuss the issue further.”
• “At present, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have about seventy unresolved border disputes. Of their 971-kilometer shared border, only 519 kilometers are properly delineated.” 
• “The fact that none of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan’s international partners were eager to take up the role of mediator is a worrying sign. The chances of the two sides being able to work something out themselves are slim.”
• “The biggest winner from this escalation has been Rahmon. This little war demonstrated his regime is still capable of mobilizing the country in the face of danger, and a popularity boost will help him in the upcoming transfer of power to his son. In contrast, Japarov’s already damaged reputation—he seems incapable of fulfilling his pre-election promises—suffered further as a result of the fighting.”
• “The border fighting has shown that populist statements can have unpredictable consequences, particularly in a region where politicians do not shy away from nationalism. And Japarov cannot rely on help from outside: nobody is prepared to take a risk for him when he looks unlikely to last much longer as president.”