This Week’s Highlights

• Overall, the paradigm of fierce rivalry between Russia and the United States is unlikely to change under U.S. President-elect Joe Biden, writes Ivan Timofeev of the Russian International Affairs Council, adding that new political crises are possible, and will bring with them more sanctions. However, Prof. Ivan Kurilla writes that without a constant internal clash in the United States over Russian policies that prevailed during the Trump administration, routine U.S.-Russian diplomatic contacts could become more efficient.
• As the Kremlin considers questions of transition—reshaping the political system, dealing with the question of a long-term successor to Putin and efforts to jumpstart the “national projects” designed to rejuvenate the Russian economy—Moscow may decide that it does not need unnecessary problems in its relationship with the United States, writes Prof. Nikolas K. Gvosdev. In turn, if the Biden team decides it needs a period of peace and quiet to deal with a post-pandemic recovery, then perhaps Moscow and Washington can re-engage on “strategic stability” dialogue and expand the limited deconfliction process developed for Syria to encompass other flash points around the world, according to Gvosdev.
• The U.S. Missile Defense Agency has confirmed that, for the first time, a Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) Block IIA interceptor successfully destroyed an intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM) target in a test, writes Carnegie Endowment’s Ankit Panda. Russia, China and North Korea, he writes, will reason that any U.S. Navy destroyer is nominally capable of destroying an ICBM. The United States should take Russian and Chinese concerns seriously, Panda advises, writing that unilateral gestures, such as a declaration by the president of the United States that the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons will be to deter nuclear war, may have value in reducing Russian and Chinese concerns about a U.S. first strike.   
• The strengthening of the Sino-Russian axis is against Western interests, writes Alexander Gabuev of the Carnegie Moscow Center. First, resources provided by Russia to China, like the newest arms or help in fundamental research, boost Beijing’s assertive-ness. Second, with Moscow becoming increasingly dependent on Beijing, there is a risk of the two capitals starting to work in tandem in regions like eastern Europe or the Arctic, as well as to coordinate closely on matters affecting the global commons. Finally, Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union becoming firmly embedded into Pax Sinica will help Beijing to extend its sphere of influence into continental Eurasia, according to Gabuev, and it will reduce Russia’s ability to maintain strategic autonomy and thus decrease its chances for a gradual political transformation in the future. 
• Frustration over Armenia's loss of much of the disputed enclave and surrounding areas has dwarfed praise for Russia in Armenia, the Wall Street Journal reports. Citizens' frustration also stems from the fact that many had believed Armenia would get the full support of Russia if faced with military aggression.   

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

New Cold War/saber rattling:

• No significant developments.

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant developments.

Missile defense:

“A New US Missile Defense Test May Have Increased the Risk of Nuclear War,” Ankit Panda, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11.19.20: The author, the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment, writes:

• “The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has confirmed that, for the first time, a Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) Block IIA interceptor successfully destroyed an intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM) target in a test. With this milestone, the SM-3 Block IIA becomes only the second U.S. interceptor type to exhibit this capability. The consequences for strategic stability and future arms control are serious.”
• “Beyond North Korea … Russia and China have long expressed concerns that the United States seeks to counter their capacity to use ICBMs against it … Officials in both countries have expressed concerns that U.S. homeland missile defense efforts undermine their strategic nuclear deterrents. They have reasons to think this.”
• “Just like their counterparts in Washington, officials in Moscow, Beijing and even Pyongyang plan for the future and prepare for worst-case scenarios. With doubts about the SM-3 Block IIA’s ability to manage ICBM-class threats reduced, these countries will reason that any U.S. Navy destroyer is nominally capable of destroying an ICBM. Moreover, they may reason that any U.S. installation featuring a Mark 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS)—the physical canister that hosts the SM-3 Block IIA … has such a capability.”
• “The United States should take Russian and Chinese concerns seriously and address them in good faith. Additionally, unilateral gestures, such as a declaration by the president of the United States that the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons will be to deter nuclear war, may have value in reducing Russian and Chinese concerns about a U.S. first strike. Separately, by adopting an arms control approach to reducing nuclear risks with North Korea, the United States could consider capping homeland missile defense capabilities at current levels in exchange for a freeze on Pyongyang’s strategic missile production. Ultimately, the consequences of the technical demonstration in FTM-44 will be challenging to reverse.”

Nuclear arms control:

“Biden’s Immediate Agenda Items,” Michael Krepon, Arms Control Wonk, 11.29.20: The author, co-founder of the Stimson Center, writes:

• “The geometry of nuclear rivalry consists primarily of two interlocking triangular competitions. One triangle consists of the United States, Russia and China; the other triangle is China, India and Pakistan. The unequal sides of triangular competitions do not lend themselves to numerical constraints.”
• “We’re in trouble because of the near-systemic absence of effective mechanisms to tamp down nuclear-tinged competitions. Diplomacy has been replaced by land grabs (China and Russia), overreaching (the United States, Russia and China), treaty shedding (the United States and Russia), and clashes over contested borders (China-India and India-Pakistan).”
• “Two nuclear-related issues demand Biden’s immediate attention. One is extending New START, which expires within two weeks of Biden taking the oath of office. … As long as nuclear excess exists … reductions are called for. One interesting way to proceed might be to employ cooperative and yet not excessively intrusive monitoring techniques to count the dismantlement of warheads that Washington and Moscow already acknowledge to be in excess of their requirements. An agreement on warhead dismantling would break important new ground and set standards for cooperative monitoring for wider application in the future.”
• “The other pressing nuclear policy dilemma facing Biden is Iran which, after Trump’s exit from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, has been growing its stocks of enriched uranium. … The incoming administration will have difficulty putting the Iran nuclear deal back together again. Whatever Team Biden decides, it won’t have time for a long breather. … After Trump’s exit, Biden’s options with Iran are even narrower than Obama’s.”

"US Withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty: Three Legal Issues,” Michael Krepon, Arms Control Wonk, 11.24.20: The author, co-founder of the Stimson Center, writes:

• “Donald Trump’s misguided decision to withdraw the United States from the 1992 Treaty on Open Skies has dealt a severe blow to global stability, alliance solidarity and U.S. national security. It has also raised a host of novel legal questions: 1) whether the president possesses the legal authority unilaterally to withdraw the United States from a treaty in the face of congressional opposition; 2) whether the other parties to the treaty can take effective action to dodge the legal effects of the purported withdrawal; and 3) whether an expedited procedure could be invoked for the United States to rejoin the treaty, should the Biden administration decide to reverse course.”
• “In sum, each of these three legal issues remains controversial; legal and political wrangling remains to be resolved. But in combination they do suggest pathways for Biden’s personal support of the Open Skies treaty to be vindicated. There is a long, ignoble tradition of an outgoing defeated president attempting to thwart his successor by entrenching policies and laws in ways that will be hard to reverse—but at least for the Open Skies Treaty, that ossification may not succeed.”

“The Power of Augmented Reality: How Narratives Impacted US-Russian Arms Control Negotiations,” Mikhail Troitskiy, PONARS Eurasia, November 2020: The author, dean of the School of Government and International Affairs (MGIMO), writes:

• “U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations have almost never come to successful closure without the parties displaying verifiably stable intentions—when there is no suspicion of surprise maneuvers being contemplated by either. Shared narratives are effective means of signaling stable—even if adversarial—intentions and building the necessary trust. By implication, over the last half-century, arms control agreements have never materialized against the backdrop of adverse mainstream trends in U.S.-Russian relations.”
• “Those mainstream trends have been reflected in the narratives that have either enabled or discouraged arms control, but not the other way round. Unfortunately, it means that no end to the current U.S.-Russian arms control crisis is in sight unless the mainstream narrative describing their relationship is reversed—either as a result of actual shifts in the state of the relationship, as happened in the late 1980s, or in anticipation of such shifts, as was seen in 2001-02 and 2009-11.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

• No significant developments.

Elections interference:

• No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

 “A Biden Administration Poses Few Benefits for Russia,” Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Russia Matters, 11.24.20: The author, the Captain Jerome E. Levy chair at the U.S. Naval War College and a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), writes:

• “When in the Senate, Biden was a consistent critic of Kremlin policy … A leading advocate for NATO enlargement, the former vice president also was Obama’s point man on Ukraine in supporting Kyiv’s efforts to escape Russia’s geopolitical orbit. … Biden has [also] consistently looked for ways to reduce Russia’s energy influence, especially in Europe. Most of Biden’s selections for senior national security positions in his administration share these views.”
• “On the other hand, Biden does not have any ‘Russia baggage’ that would inhibit him from making conciliarity gestures toward Moscow … He also has consistently demonstrated a pragmatic streak … However, Biden is likely to repair much of the damage in U.S.-German relations and attempt to reconstruct the Obama-era Berlin-Washington consensus on dealing with Russia … If a Biden administration can also lower the temperature in U.S.-China relations, this may reduce some of Beijing’s interests in supporting Moscow.”
• “Moreover, a Biden administration is likely to restart diplomatic efforts to engage Iran, diminishing Russia’s value to Tehran; re-engage in Syria; and pick up where things left off in 2016 to increase efforts to bring post-Soviet states into the Euro-Atlantic community.”
• “Russia therefore derives no benefit from a Biden administration that is able to restore America’s standing around the world, and the Kremlin, to that extent, has nothing to lose by not hoping that political turmoil within the United States will distract and consume the Biden team in the first months of 2021.”
• “As the Kremlin considers questions of transition … Moscow may decide that it does not need unnecessary problems in its relationship with the United States. In turn, if the Biden team decides it needs a period of peace and quiet to deal with a post-pandemic recovery, then perhaps Moscow and Washington can re-engage on ‘strategic stability’ dialogue and expand the limited deconfliction process developed for Syria to encompass other flash points around the world.”

“US-Russian Relations Under Biden Administration,” Ivan Kurilla, Jordan Center, 11.30.20: The author, a professor of history and international relations at the European University at St. Petersburg, writes:

• “We know that nothing will change on the Russian side of the relations. President Putin used 2020 to consolidate his autocratic regime; he amended [the] constitution that now permits him to stay in power for life. Russia does not need to deepen its confrontation with the U.S., but it is hard to imagine the Kremlin changing its foreign policy. So, all the reasons for American sanctions will remain.”
• “Certainly, [the] security sphere always possesses a potential of emerging surprises, but without ‘black swans’ on the horizon the long-term and inevitable process of Russia’s replacement by China as the main rival and major threat to the United States will probably go slower under President Biden than it went under President Trump.”
• “The overuse of the ‘Russian meddling’ during [the] Trump presidency had probably caused a fatigue, and without Donald Trump … it may be abandoned or at least slowed down. However, the main goal of the Biden presidency will be to bridge a split in American society; in such a context exaggerating a foreign threat could look like a justified tool to remind Americans about [the] need for unity.”
• “The most obvious change everybody expect[s] from … President Biden is breaking Trump’s self-imposing taboo on criticizing Vladimir Putin and domestic policies of the Kremlin. … Biden will very probably morally support Russian opposition, and maybe even return to the late Cold War practice of pushing Russia on behalf of some of the country’s new generation of dissidents.”
• “In any case, without constant internal clash in the United States over Russian policies that prevailed during Trump administration, the routine diplomatic contacts could become more efficient. There is always a ‘window of opportunities’ at the start of a new administration, but it rarely looked as narrow as it does now.”

“US Sanctions Under Biden: What to Expect,” Ivan Timofeev, The Moscow Times/Carnegie Moscow Center, 11.24.20: The author, a director of programs at the Russian International Affairs Council, writes:

• “There’s no good news for Russia. But there’s no outright bad news either. None of the sanctions in place will be reviewed: issues in the U.S.-Russian relationship like Ukraine, cybersecurity, the Middle East, and human rights are not going to show improvement, so nor will the sanctions policy.”
• “Things could, however, undoubtedly take a turn for the worse. The United States has not yet adopted any sanctions over the poisoning of the opposition politician Alexei Navalny. This will likely happen before Trump leaves office in January. But there’s no reason to expect radical measures. Most likely, Washington will limit itself to blocking entry and visas to the United States for the Russian officials already included on the EU sanctions lists.”
• “If there are no major crises … it’s unlikely that there will be an escalation of sanctions on Washington’s part. The Biden administration won’t, without any compelling reasons, move forward with the draconian DASKA (Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression) act or other ideas for radical measures against Russia. The Trump administration also had reservations about the act, not least because of the potential damage from it to the United States itself.”
• “The Americans will keep up the pressure on the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from Russia to Germany one way or another: sanctions relating to the project are enshrined in law, so the president can’t change them single-handedly. Overall, the paradigm of fierce rivalry between Russia and the United States is unlikely to change. New political crises are possible, and will bring with them more sanctions.”

“How Biden Will Impact Russian Domestic Policy,” Andrei Kolesnikov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 11.25.20: The author, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “Soviet leaders talked to a wide variety of figures from the U.S. establishment, and held serious and often productive conversations with them. That’s not something that representatives of the Russian elite can boast of today. It’s doubtful whether there’s even a theoretical chance of Biden coming to Moscow once again for talks on arms control.”
• “If Russian propaganda chooses to focus on the negative consequences of Biden’s victory, it will fan the flames of anti-American sentiment. What action the Russian authorities take largely depends on the early actions and statements of the Biden administration. If Biden’s team shows a rational approach to possible areas of cooperation, that will at the very least delay any large-scale anti-American propaganda campaign. A calm and pragmatic tone in initial statements and contacts is also capable of reining in legal cases and legislative initiatives targeting Russian civil society.”
• “History shows that public opinion can easily warm to a former enemy in the event of official relations between the two countries improving. This happened during the détente of the 1970s, which would not have happened without the Soviet Union and the United States adopting negotiating positions that were above all pragmatic. In his 1970 report to Congress on foreign policy, President Richard Nixon proposed adopting a ‘fair and businesslike manner’ in talks with the Communist countries, and acknowledged that both the Soviet Union and the United States had ‘recognized vital mutual interest in halting the dangerous momentum of the nuclear arms race.’”
• “Back then, other tactics that paid off included back channels, as described in detail by Henry Kissinger. They made it possible to reach the Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, culminating in the joint Apollo-Soyuz mission and the handshake in space. Direct historical extrapolation is, of course, entirely provisory, but it does give an idea of possible tools for cooperation, and is testimony to the positive impact of pragmatic cooperation on détente amid a tense domestic atmosphere.”

“How the West Should Deal With Russia,” Alexander Vershbow and Daniel Fried, Atlantic Council, 11.23.20: The authors, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia and a former U.S. ambassador to Poland, write:

• “Dealing with Russia ‘as it is,’ as some capable Russia experts … recommend in their ‘open letter’ urging that the United States rethink its Russia policy, sounds unarguably realistic. … It is instructive to examine what went wrong (and right) and why, including what the United States did wrong, and what the Russians and the West can do to make it better.”
• “The high hopes of the early 1990s, and the more restrained but positive expectations of the Bush and Obama years, were not fulfilled. The United States made its share of misjudgments, but did not spurn or exploit Russia at its post-Soviet moment of weakness. These hopes ultimately failed because Putin’s terms for good relations with Washington included an expectation that the United States would turn a blind eye to Putin’s deepening authoritarianism at home, and would cede the independent states that emerged from the Soviet Union to Kremlin domination.”
• “Putin’s Russia is not the only possible Russia … A Russia less authoritarian at home, more constructive abroad, and less hostile to the West and its values, is by no means inevitable. But, in the authors’ view, it is possible.”
• “The United States needs a policy framework to address both Russia’s dismal current realities and its better future potential. The authors offer the following suggestions. Don’t be in a hurry. … Don’t seek a ‘grand bargain’ with Putin. … Don’t sacrifice other countries on the altar of better relations with Moscow. … Don’t buy into clichés about Russia … Do resist Kremlin aggression. … Do try to stabilize the relationship. … Do look for areas of potential common ground. … Do work with Europe. … Do be patient. … Do reach out to Russian society. … Do fight back in the information space. … Do invest in, and prepare for, a better future with Russia.”

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

• No significant developments.

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant developments.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Russia’s Arctic Strategy Through 2035,” Janis Kluge and Michael Paul, SWP, November 2020: The authors, a senior associate in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division and a senior fellow in the International Security Division at SWP, write:

• “On Oct. 26 Vladimir Putin formally adopted the new ‘Strategy for Developing the Russian Arctic Zone and Ensuring National Security through 2035.’ It is based on the ‘Basic Principles’ for Arctic policy adopted in March and succeeds the Arctic strategy 2020 dating from 2013.”
• “While the new strategy is largely built around continuity, shifts in Russian domestic and foreign policy since 2013 are also visible between the lines: The strategy does discuss the possibilities for international cooperation, but more space is devoted to threat scenarios.”
• “The door to international cooperation has not been slammed completely shut, even if the space devoted to threat perceptions has grown in the new Arctic Strategy. The sometimes contradictory interests—such as defending national sovereignty versus internationalization of the sea route—are reflected in an ambivalent stance that contains both confrontational and cooperation-seeking elements, emphasizing political competition or practical cooperation depending on the situation.”
• “The new Arctic Strategy contains a separate section on international cooperation, where foreign investment plays a central role. Here, Moscow is principally interested in technologies for and investment in the energy sector—which fall under Western sanctions. Western firms could cooperate in infrastructure projects and in tackling environmental problems.”

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

“Pax Sinica: Europe’s Dilemma in Facing the Sino-Russian Axis,” Alexander Gabuev, The Berlin Pulse/Carnegie Moscow Center, 11.24.20: The author, a senior fellow and the chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “The strengthening of the Sino-Russian axis is against Western interests. … First, resources provided by Russia to China, like the newest arms or help in fundamental research, boost Beijing’s assertive-ness. … Second, with Moscow becoming increasingly dependent on Beijing, there is a risk of the two capitals starting to work in tandem in regions like eastern Europe or the Arctic, as well as to coordinate closely on matters affecting the global commons. … Finally, Russia and the EEU becoming firmly embedded into Pax Sinica will help Beijing to extend its sphere of influence into continental Eurasia—and it will reduce Russia’s ability to maintain strategic autonomy and thus decrease its chances for a gradual political transformation in the future.”
• “Europe’s policy should start with a clear identification of those elements of Sino-Russian cooperation that are detrimental for EU’s interests and that whose direction it can influence.”
• “An honest internal discussion on the side effects of the sanctions is long overdue, and there should be careful consideration of future sanctions that could undermine western interests and push Russia deeper into China’s embrace at the same time (for example, a potential ban on selling European 5G equipment).”
• “Germany should play a leading role in keeping channels of communication with the Kremlin open, including on China. This dialogue, properly communicated to and supported by Germany’s allies, such as those in eastern Europe, is a tool of diplomacy, not a reward. Unfortunately, Russia’s counterproductive behavior makes this strategy very difficult to execute, even with a transatlantic consensus appearing on the horizon.”

Karabakh conflict:

“Russia's Role in Enforcing Peace in Nagorno-Karabakh Stirs Hopes, Bitterness,” Raja Adulrahim and Ann M. Simmons, Wall Street Journal, 11.28.20: The authors, reporters for the news outlet, write:

• “A Russian-brokered peace agreement halted weeks of fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan and handed Moscow a geopolitical triumph, but has failed to instill a sense of safety among Armenians, for whom the presence of Russian troops in the area arouses a mixture of gratitude and distrust. … The Nov. 10 peace agreement cements the Kremlin's status as a regional power broker and its leverage over both countries … While Russia already had a military base in Armenia, with which it also shares economic ties, Moscow had no forces in Azerbaijan until now.”
• “The war ‘resulted in a very predictable outcome—increased dependency on Russia,’ said Styopa Safaryan, a policy analyst at the Armenian Institute of International and Security Affairs. Analysts said Russia could leverage the peacekeeping mission into a permanent military deployment in both countries and work to integrate the militaries of former Soviet states into Russian-dominated command structures.”
• “While some Armenians said they felt abandoned by the international community and could only trust Moscow, others were wary of the Russian forces, especially those old enough to remember Soviet control.”
• “However, frustration over Armenia's loss of much of the disputed enclave and surrounding areas has dwarfed praise for Russia. The discontent has rocked the government of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who has been branded a traitor by many citizens, with mass protests calling for his ouster. More than a dozen high-level officials have resigned or been fired, putting the government on a fragile footing, analysts said.”
• “Citizens' frustration also stems from the fact that many had believed Armenia would get the full support of Russia if faced with military aggression. However, the Kremlin argued that its security agreement only allowed it to assist if Armenia was attacked, and didn't cover Nagorno-Karabakh. Some observers insist that Armenian areas did come under fire, but that Russia still failed to act.”

“Russian Troops in Nagorno-Karabakh ‘Clearly a Win for Moscow,’” Jack Losh, Foreign Policy, 11.25.20: The author, a journalist, photographer and filmmaker, writes:

• “Moscow’s military intervention follows a six-week war that, for the most part, had favored its regional rival, Ankara, chief patron of Azerbaijan. Turkish military support had fueled a powerful Azerbaijani assault against ethnic Armenian soldiers who have held Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding areas since the 1990s.”
• “Operating in a region regarded by Russia as its ‘near abroad,’ Turkey had given unprecedented support to Azerbaijan, directing the Azerbaijani offensive and bolstering it with combat drones and Syrian mercenaries—a clear threat to Moscow’s sphere of influence. Despite the moniker of peacekeepers, analysts regard the Russian troops as simply a tool to push back against Turkey’s postwar presence, with the added benefits of opening up trade routes and linking the administration of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to the Kremlin.”
• “The scenes now unfolding in Nagorno-Karabakh correspond to what was known in recent years as the ‘Lavrov Plan.’ That meant the entrance of Russian peacekeepers in tandem with Armenia’s phased withdrawal from occupied territories. For Paris and Washington, mere bystanders during the conflict, such unilateral action was always unacceptable. Yet that’s just what Putin did in the war’s waning hours.”
• “By swinging this deal, Moscow has saddled itself with that responsibility, though it may call on other parties, from the OSCE to U.N. agencies, Western capitals, and other international organizations.”

“Israel’s Azerbaijan Mistake,” Michael Rubin, The National Interest, 11.29.20: The author, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, writes:

• “Israelis may justify their relationship with Azerbaijan in realpolitik consideration: In its crudest terms, it is a relationship based on a weapons-for-energy calculation. Jerusalem sold Baku billions of dollars’ worth of top-shelf military equipment, and Israel received almost half of its oil needs from Azerbaijan. The long-term detriment to ties may soon surpass any short-term gains, however.”
• “Israel’s embrace of Azerbaijan has not only been commercial but also strategic as the two countries cooperated against a common adversary in Iran. … Here, Israeli officials’ misreading of the regional dynamics creates a self-fulfilling prophecy: By embracing Azerbaijan and Turkey but remaining silent on those two countries’ blockade of Armenia, they force Armenia to rely on Iran as an economic lifeline.”
• “The final aspect of Israel’s short-sightedness involves the more than 7,700 Arab or Turkmen mercenaries transported into Azerbaijan from Syria by Turkey in order to wage religious jihad against Christians. The identities of these mercenaries are increasingly known: Many come from Syria and some previously fought for al Qaeda-linked groups or the Islamic State.”
• “Azerbaijan’s embrace of Islamist mercenaries might not only destabilize the country in the long run, but it could also make Israel more vulnerable.”
• “Israel need not break ties with Azerbaijan; there is still much about which the two countries can cooperate. But, just as the United States did not let its Arab partners dictate the U.S. relationship with Israel nor let Pakistan and India dictate Washington’s ties to the other, neither should Azerbaijan presume to dictate Israel’s relationship with Armenia. Rather than be partisan in the dispute, Israel’s goal should be to have cordial relations with all parties. So long as Jerusalem supports Baku uncritically, however, not only will Israel bring a lasting moral shame upon itself, but it will also create precedents corrosive to its own long-term strategic interests.”

“Turkey’s Demographic Games Come to the Caucasus,” Michael Rubin, The National Interest, 11.29.20: The author, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, writes:

• “With the ceasefire, many journalists have moved onto the next story but the Syrian mercenaries—at least those who survived the fighting—have remained in Azerbaijan. For all Aliyev’s rhetoric about Karabakh as the heart of Azerbaijan, few Azeris want to live there: Azerbaijan is an oil-rich country and most of the jobs and infrastructure are around Baku, 250 miles away. In Karabakh, those returning from the front suggest that Syrian mercenaries are both sending for their family members to come to Azerbaijan and seeking to then settle in southern areas of Karabakh that have now reverted to Azerbaijan.”
• “While Erdoğan and Aliyev might celebrate ridding the region of Christians, replacing them with mercenaries will be a ticking time bomb for the southern Caucasus. They not only will create tension within majority Shi’ite Azerbaijan, but if they try to link up with jihadists in the northern Caucasus, they could both destabilize the region and trigger greater Russian intervention in the region.”
• “Turkey planned the timing of the war perfectly. Erdoğan understood Washington was distracted both by looming elections and by the COVID-19 crisis. There is no longer any reason to be passive, however. Minsk Group co-chairs France, Russia, and the United States should demand that Azerbaijan detain all mercenaries. Just as many Islamic State veterans and their family members remain incarcerated at al-Hol, in northeastern Syria, so too should the Syrian mercenaries of the Nagorno-Karabakh war be detained as illegal combatants. To do nothing would not only pour fuel onto the fire of regional instability, but would also guarantee further religious violence and demographic games as Erdoğan and now Aliyev conclude that they can, quite literally, get away with murder.”

“Russia and the West Still Need Each Other in Nagorno-Karabakh,” Anna Ohanyan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11.24.20: The author, Richard B. Finnegan Distinguished Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Stonehill College, writes:

• “Both the West and Russia have a lot to gain from deeper diplomatic cooperation in Nagorno-Karabakh. ... For the agreement to hold, Nagorno-Karabakh will need to see continued cooperation from the Minsk Group and the international and regional organizations equipped to address the agreement’s limitations. Such cooperation is absolutely necessary but also would be unprecedented. If cooperation were to take root, Russia would stand to gain much needed credibility for its role as a peacekeeper and a peacemaker. The West would obtain a real chance at solving this conflict, which otherwise would remain a vehicle for authoritarian consolidation in the region.”
• “Despite the shortcomings of the existing Nagorno-Karabakh agreement, the West has few alternatives to engaging with Russia on the peace Moscow has brokered. The temporary five-year Russian peacekeeping provision in Nagorno-Karabakh does reflect the deeper retrenchment of Russia in the region. But it also offers a political window to revive a negotiation process, one with a much stronger and more institutionalized presence of international organizations in post-war deliberation and reconstruction.”
• “The uncertainty, insecurity and unpredictability of the present agreement have already introduced overwhelming stressors to Armenia’s nascent democratic institutions. A deliberative and internationally supported peace process, drawing from myriad other cases of post-war reconstruction, is needed to address the humanitarian challenges of affected communities. But such a peace process is also needed to transform the complex yet cryptic agreement into a durable settlement for the region. A multilayered and a multilateral peace process could yield long-term peace dividends in the form of unblocking closed borders and moving the South Caucasus toward greater regional connectivity. Institutional, political, and financial support from international organizations and Western governments, especially the Minsk Group co-chairs of the United States and France, is a critical step in that regard.”

Ukraine:

• No significant developments.

Belarus:

• No significant developments.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant developments.