This Week’s Highlights

• “It is difficult to see what Russia would tangibly gain from a renewed military assault [on Ukraine],” writes Brookings’ Angela Stent. “A possible way out of this impasse would be to rethink Minsk and replace it with a process that includes the United States as a full participant. … [I]f the Kremlin does invade Ukraine, ... the Euro-Atlantic region will instead be thrust into a new, dangerous period of confrontation,” according to Stent. 
• “Russia has strong reasons for restraint,” argues Stephen Kinzer, a senior fellow at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs. “If it invaded Ukraine, it would certainly suffer heavy sanctions from the European Union. In some areas, its ground forces would encounter fierce resistance. Even if successful, Russia would have a hard time controlling a country that is twice the size of Britain. ... The big winner would likely be the Chinese [while…] [t]he greatest defeat the United States could suffer in Ukraine is to be drawn into war there,” Kinzer writes.  
• “Biden should tell Putin that Washington is prepared to engage more actively on diplomacy,” writes Brookings’ Steven Pifer. “Biden can tell Putin there is no enthusiasm within NATO for putting Kyiv on a membership track now. Biden can also tell Putin that he would be ready to take due account of legitimate Russian security interests. … The U.S. president should aim to leave Putin with an understanding that military action would have painful costs for Russia but that U.S. diplomacy is prepared to engage more actively to resolve the problems at the root of the crisis,” Pifer advises.
• “The recent round of escalation in Eastern Europe showed that the old principles of security on the continent are no longer working,” writes Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs. “Keeping things as they are could lead to new conflicts, while abandoning the belief that the [NATO] bloc calls all the shots will require a drastic revision of all approaches. Russia will have to change the system and draw new ‘red lines.’ We could, for example, redefine ‘Finlandization’ as something positive,” Lukyanov writes.
• “The Biden administration has stated that while confronting Russia on certain issues, it wants to work with Russia where U.S. and Russian interests converge. The history of the Middle East over the past 20 years suggests that, in this area at least, a strong basis for cooperation does in fact exist,” argues Anatol Lieven, a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. “To develop such cooperation will, however, require U.S, policymakers to acknowledge—at least to themselves in private—the number of times that Russia has been proved right, and America wrong.”
• “China and Russia, which Biden has also singled out for criticism, are not the main causes of the weakening of democracies around the world. Most of the backsliding, according to a recent study, has been caused by erosion within the world's democracies, including the United States and many of its allies,” write Aaron David Miller and Richard Sokolsky of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
• “[Russian] state prosecutors are taking action to shut down Memorial, a step that signifies a dual assault on modern Russian civil society and on the nation’s wider struggle for historical memory and justice,” writes the FT’s Tony Barber. “Memorial’s roots lie in an era when hopes ran high for a Russia at last becoming confident enough to speak the truth to itself. Its liquidation would be the bitterest blow to the brave Russians who try to keep these hopes alive.”

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

“Getting to ‘No’ With Iran,” Eric Brewer and Henry Rome, War on the Rocks, 12.01.21. The authors, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the deputy head of research at Eurasia Group, write:

• “First, the United States needs to keep the door to diplomacy open and consider potential alternatives. … Second, the United States and its allies and partners should expand economic and political pressure on Iran.”
• “Third, the U.S. military presence in the Middle East is significantly less than what it was the last time there were rumors of military action against Iran’s nuclear program ... That could encourage more risk-taking by Iran.”
• “Fourth, compared with a decade ago, U.S. relations with China are much worse, making collective global action against Iran less likely. … Finally, the United States should immediately begin a coordinated process aimed at determining, at least internally, nuclear developments that would trigger a military response.”
• “There is room for debate about what these red lines should be and how they can most effectively be communicated to Iran. But the basic theory behind setting them would be to prevent Iran from producing weapons grade material or to avoid a situation in which Iran’s program advances to such a level that it would be impossible for the United States to stop Iran if it were to try to break out.”  

Great Power rivalry/New Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Toward a Trans-Atlantic Strategy on Russia Sanctions,” Maria Shagina, War on the Rocks, 12.06.21. The author, a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for Eastern European Studies at the University of Zurich, writes:

• “The West should abstain from slapping on sanctions on Russia in situations where they cause collateral damage, have negligible impact and are applied without trans-Atlantic coordination. Sanctions should not be deployed when there are risks of unintended consequences. Certain Russian entities like Gazprom and Rosneft are simply ‘too big to sanction’ and it would unleash collateral damage, hurting Western interests in the first place. The designation of Rusal is an example.”
• “Extraterritorial sanctions, which target non-U.S. individuals and entities mainly through the dominance of the U.S. dollar, prompt particular concerns across the Atlantic. ... In the long term, if left unchecked, digital currencies and alternative payment platforms could undermine the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions. It is unfeasible for Washington to prevent others from developing alternatives.”
• “The West should be prepared to lift sanctions if the target complies. The failure to provide sanctions relief could backfire on the West’s credibility and the ability to negotiate future concessions. If the West is not prepared to follow through on its promises, targets will have even fewer incentives to do so.”
• “The U.S.-initiated Summit for Democracy scheduled for December 2021 represents a pivotal opportunity to galvanize collective commitments for fighting against corruption and advancing more coordinated solutions.” 

“Biden is right that global democracy is at risk. But the real threat isn't China,” Aaron David Miller and Richard Sokolsky, The Washington Post, 12.03.21. The authors, a senior fellow and a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, write:

• “China and Russia … are not the main causes of the weakening of democracies around the world. Most of the backsliding, according to a recent study, has been caused by erosion within the world's democracies, including the United States and many of its allies. Indeed, the upcoming summit includes a number of countries … marked by growing autocratic movements and infringements on freedom of expression and a free press. And pushing these and other countries to reform their political, electoral or judicial institutions from the outside is hard if not impossible.”
• “It is simplistic to believe that Chinese and Russian foreign policies are driven by the ideological impulse to spread autocracy. Both countries see the United States as their main geopolitical adversary and seek to undermine American influence and alliances wherever they can; the Chinese are also bent on outcompeting the United States in 21st-century technologies.”
• “But the Russians don't have an authoritarian model for export, and other autocratic-minded governments don't need inspiration from Moscow to run kleptocratic, corrupt, repressive and misgoverned regimes. Putin's overriding priority is self-preservation and the preservation of his regime. What evidence is there that he believes these objectives can be achieved only if the rest of the world looks like Russia? Likewise, Xi's main priority is maintaining his control and the Chinese Communist Party's monopoly on power.”
• “Another flaw in the Biden administration's approach is the presumption that all democracies think alike based on their shared commitment to democratic values. If only it were that simple. … There's also the politically inconvenient question of whether the United States is best positioned to lead this effort.”
• “Instead of chasing the chimerical goal of democratizing the domestic political orders of other countries according to a one-size-fits-all democratic shoe, the Biden administration … could collaborate on an ad hoc basis with a small number of like-minded democratic countries that have the skill, will, resources and capacity to make progress on pressing global problems.”

“How to Run a Democracy Summit When Your Own Democracy is Dying,” Paul R. Pillar, The National Interest, 12.02.21. The author, former National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia, writes:

• The role of democracy in U.S. foreign relations has usually been thought of in terms of the United States providing inspiration and support to those overseas who are struggling to establish or maintain a democracy. The meeting this month may help to do that, preferably in measurable and material ways, but for Americans, the meeting will be most useful if some of that inspiration and support can flow in the opposite direction—from good democrats overseas to those striving to maintain democracy in the United States. Those who are most determined to overturn democracy in America are unlikely to be influenced, but principled support from abroad may be a morale-booster for those struggling to prevent the overturning. It may also help to nudge into a principled position those who are dithering over such things as filibusters.”

“How Disinformation Corrodes Democracy. Biden’s Summit Must Confront the Scourge of False Narratives,” Nina Jankowicz, Foreign Affairs, 11.30.21. The author, a Global Fellow at the Wilson Center, writes:

• “Disinformation ultimately erodes the faith of citizens in government and encourages them to doubt the possibility of truth in public life. Democracy will suffer hugely when citizens no longer trust or even want to participate in the democratic process.”
• “Biden seems to understand this fateful prospect. ... ‘[E]ach of us has a duty and a responsibility, as citizens, as Americans and especially as leaders, leaders who have pledged to honor our Constitution and protect our nation, to defend the truth and defeat the lies.’ As Biden himself acknowledges, the [democracy] summit is a critical chance not only to make up for five years of U.S. inaction in tackling disinformation but to aspire toward a firm new tone for politics in the digital age, reaffirming that a commitment to truth must form the bedrock of democracies.”

“Building Military Coalitions. Lessons from U.S. Experience,” Jennifer Kavanagh, Samuel Absher, Nathan Chandler, Ariane M. Tabatabai, Jeffrey Martini, Sebastian Joon Bae, Hannah Jane Byrne and Michael Shurkin, RAND, December 2021. The authors of the report write:

• “The United States is more likely to rely on military coalitions when operational demands are expected to be high and when there is a need to build international legitimacy.” 
• “Recommendations: When it comes to building coalitions, establishing strong ties prior to a conflict or crisis can be beneficial. The Army should seek to build and strengthen these ties with potential partners along political, military, economic and cultural dimensions.”
• “There is some evidence that states seeking greater international status or influence might be primed for recruitment to a coalition, even if they are initially resistant. When forming coalitions, the United States should consider whether there are status-seeking states that might be willing to join without explicit or implicit payments or side payments.”
• “Intergovernmental organization sponsorship or leadership might not be required for the formation of strong coalitions, but it can increase the willingness of potential contributors to join. Building and working through NATO or another such organization can help the United States successfully build coalitions for military interventions.”
• “Experience with fighting as a coalition can support success in achieving U.S. political objectives. The U.S. Army should continue efforts to train and exercise with potential future partners but emphasize innovation over routine.”

“This Land Is No Longer Your Land: A Primer on Territorial Disputes,” Paul Poast, War on the Rocks, 12.03.21. The author, associate professor of political science at the University of Chicago, writes:

• “War may not be on the rocks, but it is frequently over rocks. Land, to be exact. From the recent war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, to concerns that Russia is preparing to launch an invasion to conquer Eastern Ukraine, war is frequently, if not always, over land.”
• “The future will largely resemble the past: Territory will remain valuable, states will seek to acquire it and conflicts will inevitably arise. The consequence is that war, particularly over land, is here to stay.”

“Rules of war need rewriting for the age of AI weapons,” Editorial Board, Financial Times, 12.01.21. The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “The most immediate concern is ‘lethal autonomous weapons systems’ (Laws), often dubbed ‘killer robots.’ ... Several military powers oppose a ban, fearing the loss of a chance to gain a military edge or that others would ignore a prohibition that would be near impossible to enforce. Yet many countries have joined conventions on biological and chemical weapons, though these also offer cheap routes to mass lethality. The scientific community says it has ideas and lessons from other arms control efforts on how to devise and police a Laws ban.”
• “Beyond killer robots, AI could be used to enhance or replace human skill in everything from operating weapons to intelligence gathering and analysis, early warning systems and command and control. Dialogue is needed not just between the biggest military powers but more broadly on rules of engagement, what sort of wars countries are prepared to countenance in an AI era, and how to impose some transparency and constraints. Agreements are needed to keep humans ‘in the loop’ in all forms of military decision-making.”

“Russia’s anti-satellite test is a wake-up call to mankind,” Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Financial Times, 12.02.21. The author, former NATO secretary-general, writes:

• “Russia’s recent anti-satellite test is the latest example of Vladimir Putin’s game of brinkmanship.”
• “The EU needs to step in. Europe is the only major jurisdiction not to have conducted an anti-satellite test in space and it has leverage over how its national governments grant market access to satellite operators. If European and national regulators were to set clear conditions to lower the risk of collisions, this could influence other key markets like the U.S.”
• “Space is the new frontier for mankind’s unsustainable behavior. If we fail to design rules that prevent our orbital activity from becoming self-defeating and destructive, we will soon find we have squandered another of earth’s greatest resources.”

“Containment Can Work Against China, Too,” Hal Brands, The Wall Street Journal, 12.03.21. The author, the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, writes:

• “The most effective long-term strategies aren't simply passive: They bait an enemy into blunders and drive up the costs that it must pay to compete. A strategy of this nature will make for a tense, sometimes frightening struggle. But containment emerged in the first place and ultimately prevailed not because it was ideal but because it was the best of bad alternatives. Few observers in the late 1940s or after welcomed a long slog against Moscow. There was little joy in a fraught contest conducted in the shadow of Armageddon.”
• “Only when containment was compared to other possibilities—a replay of the appeasement that had preceded World War II, or a military showdown that would cause World War III—did its merits become clear. Containment offered a way of navigating unacceptable extremes, showing that sharp but patient competition could allow the free world to avoid disastrous confrontations as well as disastrous defeats.”
• “Containing Chinese influence implies a return, for the foreseeable future, to Cold War-style tensions and crises. It requires, once again, discarding the dream of "one world"—a single, seamlessly integrated global order—and accepting the grim realities of competition in a divided one.”

“The Arctic as a Test for a ‘Stable and Predictable’ Russia,” Pavel Baev, PONARS Eurasia, 12.05.21. The author, a research professor at Peace Research Institute Oslo, writes:

• “On June 16, the U.S. and Russian presidents met in Geneva and made a start on reducing tensions inherent to the evolving confrontation by identifying issues and areas where cooperation could be fruitful. The Arctic was mentioned only tangentially in their deliberations, but it is definitely one of the more promising fields for cooperation, even compared with the prioritized and overloaded consultations on strategic stability.”
• “[F]or Russia, the double paradox of unprofitable economic development and self-serving militarization of the Arctic leaves its policymaking heading toward a dead end, in which the Kremlin tries to stay on the course of diverging tracks of cooperation and competition but harvests scant fruit on either.”
• “Putin’s Russia faces a multiplicity of external security challenges … and a possible failure in countering one of those might generate a desire to compensate by scoring a victory in a setting where Russia has a military advantage. What makes such a swing to the High North more probable is the availability of the discourse on Russia’s ‘ownership rights,’ which stretch … all the way to Norwegian Svalbard (Spitsbergen). Domestic turmoil could produce additional impetus for such exercises in power projection, while public opinion might respond more positively to an assertive action in the Arctic than, for instance, in Central Asia.
• “Fears and whims shape much stronger decision-making in the Kremlin than sober risk assessment, so Russia’s behavior is set to remain volatile and erratic, contrary to the best hopes in Washington D.C.”

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

• No significant developments.

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms control:

• No significant developments.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

“Russia Is Right on the Middle East,” Anatol Lieven, Foreign Policy, 11.30.21. The author, a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, writes:

• “A dominant public narrative has been created in the United States and much of Europe that Russia is a ‘revisionist’ power, seeking to overthrow the existing status quo … in the lands of the former Soviet Union, there is a considerable element of truth in this portrayal. … In the greater Middle East, however, there is something seriously weird about this image of Russian behavior. In this region, over the past 20 years, it is in fact the United States that has acted as a disruptor of the existing status quo.”
• “Russians (correctly) saw the U.S. project in Afghanistan as resembling in key respects the Soviet effort of the 1980s, and as doomed to similar failure. … And as Putin told the Financial Times in 2019 concerning the results of the Western overthrow of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s state in Libya: ‘[Do] our Western partners want a region such as Libya to have the same democratic standards as Europe and the U.S.? … It is impossible to impose current and viable French or Swiss democratic standards on North African residents who have never lived in conditions of French or Swiss democratic institutions.’”
• “U.S.-Russian disagreements in the Middle East came to a head with the Arab Spring of 2011 … The Russian response … was shaped partly by a desire to defend old Soviet allies and (in the case of Syria) retain Russia’s last naval base in the Mediterranean. Still more important, however, was Russia’s fear that these uprisings would lead to the triumph of Islamist extremist forces and the creation of bases for the revival of terrorism in Russia.”
• “The Biden administration has stated that while confronting Russia on certain issues, it wants to work with Russia where U.S. and Russian interests converge. The history of the Middle East over the past 20 years suggests that, in this area at least, a strong basis for cooperation does in fact exist. To develop such cooperation will, however, require U.S, policymakers to acknowledge—at least to themselves in private—the number of times that Russia has been proved right, and America wrong.”

Cyber security:

• No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

“Europe’s Energy Security Problem Leaves it in the Cold,” Emily Holland, War on the Rocks, 11.30.21. The author, an assistant professor in the Russia Maritime Studies Institute at the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, writes:

• “To ensure the energy security of its member states and the wider European community, the European Union may have to consider modifying or temporarily suspending some of its ambitious climate rules. The energy crisis in Ukraine exemplifies this hard choice: Ukraine will likely face energy shortages that may be severe enough to cause blackouts this winter. The West could help avoid this by sending coal supplies immediately, a policy that contradicts long-term climate goals. Poland, the biggest coal producer in the European Union, may also need to push back its coal phase out by more than a decade to maintain its energy buffer against Russia. This short- and medium-term solution would help lessen Ukraine and Poland’s dependency on Russia, but are counter to European Union green initiatives.”
• “In the long term, the European Union will have to reckon with its profound disagreement on nuclear energy, which could both reduce dependency on Russian energy supplies and help the European Union meet its climate initiatives.”
• “Europe is facing its most existential energy challenge in over a decade. This crisis, however, presents an opportunity for European states to work together, or at the very least bilaterally with the United States, to coordinate plans on how to manage its energy relationship with Russia. If Europe does not manage to overcome its energy coordination problem, it will continue to be vulnerable in the face of Russian pressure, and will not adequately manage the threat of climate change.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Mutual Images of Russia and America as Part of Their Domestic Culture Wars,” Ivan Kurilla, Center for Security Studies at ETH Zürich, 11.29.21. The author, a professor of history and international relations at European University, St. Petersburg, writes:

• “The ongoing discursive conflict between Russia and the United States is amplified by the domestic identity crises in the two countries, for both of which the other country’s distorted image is an essential part. We can expect that when the identity crises are resolved, relations between Russia and the United States will start to improve. Until this happens, we should learn to distinguish between domestic use of the Other and the real problems and opportunities of U.S.–Russian relations.”
• “In a more distant future, we may expect that another country will take on the role of constitutive Other for one or both of the U.S. and Russia (in the case of the U.S., China is the first country that springs to mind, but this is not yet predetermined). If this happens, bilateral relations as a whole may take on a different character, as happened with U.S.–English relations once Ameri-cans stopped looking at their former ruler as the Other.”
• “The United States will maintain its role as Russia’s Other for longer. Of course, history testifies that Russian ‘othering’ of the United States has not always been hostile: during every cycle of Russian reforms, the country has turned to America as a source of innovations.”

“6 Months On: Does the Biden-Putin Summit Get a Passing Grade?” Simon Saradzhyan, Russia Matters, 12.01.21. The author, founding director of Russia Matters, writes:

• “[T]he U.S. president asserted publicly that he did not view the [June] meeting as an end in itself: Whatever he and his Russian counterpart agreed on … had to be implemented if U.S.-Russian relations were to move away from hyper-tension during his presidency, Biden said. He even set a deadline for taking stock of progress: ‘What is going to happen next is we’re going to be able to look back … in three to six months and say, ‘Did the things we agreed to sit down and try to work out, did it work?’”
• “As Biden’s self-imposed deadline of Dec. 16 nears, I have decided to comb through open sources to review the two leaders’ agreements and offer a mostly subjective assessment of their implementation … An optimist would interpret the results as encouraging enough to continue the U.S.-Russian summitry in hopes of first stabilizing the relationship and then, perhaps, attaining tangible positive results on issues of mutual interest … A pessimist, in contrast, would see a lining that is not silver enough to move beyond deconfliction.”
• “That said, there are still two weeks left before Biden’s … deadline … and there are quite a few things that could go wrong between now and then. Some of them could derail attempts at stabilizing the bilateral relationship for long, if not for good. … If no black swans appear, however, then, perhaps, we will continue to see an incremental stabilization of the relationship between the two nuclear superpowers—able to destroy each other and the rest of humanity—per Biden’s wish that this relationship be ‘stable and predictable.’”

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Russia clamps down on historical memory and justice,” Tony Barber, Financial Times, 12.01.21. The author, Europe editor for the news outlet, writes:

• “Opposite the Moscow headquarters of the FSB, successor to the KGB which once employed Vladimir Putin, stands a large slab of rock on a plinth. Known as the Solovetsky Stone, it was brought from a former labor camp constructed in the 1920s in Russia’s icy northern wastes. It was placed on Lubyanka Square in 1990 at the initiative of the human rights group Memorial to commemorate the millions of victims of Soviet repression. Now state prosecutors are taking action to shut down Memorial, a step that signifies a dual assault on modern Russian civil society and on the nation’s wider struggle for historical memory and justice.”
• “In the shrinking space of Russian civil society, Memorial is far from the only organization struggling to survive. In June the courts outlawed Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation, which has published several reports on alleged high-level graft, as an extremist group. Memorial’s roots lie in an era when hopes ran high for a Russia at last becoming confident enough to speak the truth to itself. Its liquidation would be the bitterest blow to the brave Russians who try to keep these hopes alive.”

“Putin is banning the group that memorializes Stalin's crimes. That's bad for Russia,” Benjamin Nathans, The Washington Post, 12.01.21. The author, associate professor of history at the University of Pennsylvania, writes:

• “Russian President Vladimir Putin is on the verge of liquidating his country's most important civic organization. Since its founding more than three decades ago, the Memorial Society has pursued a dual mission: to document and increase public awareness of mass repressions during the Soviet era and to promote human rights in today's Russia.”
• “If Memorial is destroyed, none of the few remaining Russian nongovernmental organizations that dare to assert their independence from the Kremlin will be safe. Shutting down Memorial will jeopardize not just the work performed by its courageous staff and the unique archive of historical documents they have amassed, but also the future of civil society itself in the Russian Federation.”
• “Even as Putin pays public lip service to the victims of Soviet repression, his government is dismantling all genuinely independent sources of authority within Russia. In Memorial's case, this involves the Orwellian tactic of invoking the battle against terrorism to prosecute an organization dedicated to documenting Soviet state-sponsored terror and to making sure nothing like it recurs.”
• “How is it that an association formed by and for the descendants of the roughly 18 million Soviet citizens sent to Stalin's Gulag—several million of whom never returned—gets stigmatized as a ‘foreign agent’? ‘We are not agents of anyone,’ Memorial's executive director, Yelena Zhemkova, announced at a recent news conference. ‘We ourselves decide what and how to work.’ In Putin's Russia, that ethos is now an endangered species.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant developments.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Russia-India: From Rethink to Adjust to Upgrade,” Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 12.02.21. The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “Russian-Indian relations are traditionally good. The chemistry between the leaders is excellent, and members of the public are well disposed toward each other. Economic ties have long been stalling, however, and mutual suspicions have recently been creeping in over India’s relations with America, and Russia’s with China. To make the good relationship truly great, Moscow must rethink, adjust, and upgrade its approach to India.”
• “One has to be realistic. The Indian and Russian economies remain far less complementary than those of China and Russia. The Russian and Indian business communities are largely disinterested in each other’s countries, where they see few opportunities for themselves. This can only be changed by a joint effort in creative thinking. At their upcoming meeting, President Putin and Prime Minister Modi need to stimulate such an effort by ordering an in-depth study of potential areas of cooperation to be conducted in time for their next annual get-together.”  

Ukraine:

“The best-case scenario in Ukraine,” Stephen Kinzer, The Boston Globe, 12.02.21. The author, a Boston Globe correspondent, writes:

• “Russia has strong reasons for restraint. If it invaded Ukraine, it would certainly suffer heavy sanctions from the European Union. In some areas, its ground forces would encounter fierce resistance. Even if successful, Russia would have a hard time controlling a country that is twice the size of Britain.”
• “For the United States, the list of dangers is even longer. Countering a Russian force on the battlefield in Ukraine would require large deployments, produce casualties, and quite possibly result in defeat. War would create economic upheaval across Europe and distract Congress from President Biden's cherished domestic agenda.”
• “The big winner would likely be the Chinese, since isolation from the West would all but force Russia into their arms. China could even decide that with the United States at war with Russia, the time would be right to strike against Taiwan.”
• “Despite this shared interest in peace, both sides are engaged in high-stakes geopolitical gambling. Russia holds better cards. It cares far more about Ukraine than we do, and it is willing to sacrifice far more to secure its position there.”
• “The greatest defeat the United States could suffer in Ukraine is to be drawn into war there. An accord that Russia and Ukraine signed in 2015 provides a basis for peace, but it is languishing. Now, as war drums beat, is the time to revive it. Eisenhower swallowed hard and accepted permanent neutrality for Austria. Biden should follow his example and seek the same for Ukraine.”

“What’s Driving Putin’s Ukraine Brinkmanship?” Anton Troianovski, The New York Times, 12.05.21. The author, the Moscow bureau chief for The New York Times, writes,

• “As the Kremlin masses troops near Ukraine, it is signaling one core conviction: Russia cares more about the fate of its southwestern neighbor than the West ever will.”
• “In speeches, interviews and lengthy articles, President Vladimir V. Putin and his close associates have telegraphed a singular fixation this year on the former Soviet republic. The Kremlin thesis goes that Ukrainians are ‘one people’ with Russians, living in a failing state controlled by Western forces determined to divide and conquer the post-Soviet world.”
• “Mr. Putin’s gambit may be a cold calculus of coercion, backed by signals that the threat of war is real — a way to force President Biden to recognize a Russian sphere of interest in Eastern Europe. ... But to Mr. Putin — and many other Russians — the nearly eight-year-old conflict with Ukraine is not simply about geopolitics; it is about a hurt national psyche, a historical injustice to be set right.”
• “Emotions aside, the idea of a Western-allied Ukraine as a security threat to Russia is widely shared in Russian foreign policy circles.”

“Diplomacy—and Strategic Ambiguity—Can Avert a Crisis in Ukraine. Talk With Putin, but Keep Him Guessing,” Angela Stent, Foreign Affairs, 12.06.21. The author, a senior nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes:

• “[Putin’s] central point [on Ukraine]: ‘We are one people.’ That conviction motivated Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014, and it has surfaced again in Russia’s large military buildup on the border with its western neighbor.”
• “The inscrutability of the Kremlin’s intentions may in fact be their purpose. … By contrast, the United States has been more predictable in its approach to the crisis in Ukraine. The Biden administration would do well to take a page out of the Russian playbook and make Moscow wonder—and fret—about Washington’s capabilities and plans. Only then can a reinvigorated diplomatic process—one that puts the United States at the table—work to prevent Russia from pressing its advantage in Ukraine.”
• “Russia might not really be signaling that an assault on Ukraine is coming. The Kremlin might be using this unprecedented buildup to compel the United States to the negotiating table to discuss a broader range of issues, as it did in March when a similar military buildup spurred President Joe Biden to invite Putin to a summit in Geneva. … It is difficult to see what Russia would tangibly gain from a renewed military assault.”
• “A possible way out of this impasse would be to rethink Minsk and replace it with a process that includes the United States as a full participant. Russia’s recent behavior, including the current crisis, indicates that the Kremlin would actually like a China-focused Biden administration to direct more of its attention to Russia.” 
• “U.S.-Russian relations have always been a mix of cooperation and confrontation. Washington can continue to push back against Moscow’s aggressive moves directed against Ukraine while also being prepared to restart negotiations on a way forward. That dynamic of push and pull was how the United States and the Soviet Union dealt with each other during the Cold War, and it remains a possible model for steadying the tense contemporary U.S.-Russian relationship.”

“What Biden should say to Putin on Ukraine,” Steven Pifer, Brookings Institution, 12.06.21. The author, a nonresident senior fellow at Brookings, writes:

• “Biden has said he would make it ‘very, very difficult’ for Putin to attack. He should lay out the potential costs to ensure his Russian counterpart fully understands what would follow a Russian invasion. Those costs are substantial: A West-Russia freeze. … New sanctions. … Bolstering NATO’s defenses. … Military assistance. … A potential military quagmire.”
• “Biden should also tell Putin that Washington is prepared to engage more actively on diplomacy. … Biden might offer two qualifiers regarding Minsk. … First, all parties must implement the agreements, including Russia. … Second, U.S. support does not mean acceptance of Russia’s desired interpretation of undefined Minsk provisions.”
• “Biden can tell Putin there is no enthusiasm within NATO for putting Kyiv on a membership track now. But the alliance will not reverse its ‘open door’ policy.”
• “Biden can also tell Putin that he would be ready to take due account of legitimate Russian security interests. For example, Putin expressed concern about deployment in Ukraine of U.S. missiles that could strike Moscow.  Biden can tell Putin that, in the right context, Washington would assure Moscow that it would not deploy offensive missiles on Ukrainian territory.”
• “The U.S. president should aim to leave Putin with an understanding that military action would have painful costs for Russia but that U.S. diplomacy is prepared to engage more actively to resolve the problems at the root of the crisis. That just might help stop a war.”

“Why the CIA is so worried about Russia and Ukraine,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 12.01.21. The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “The CIA discovered something scary in October: Russia was moving troops toward the Ukrainian border — and, unlike in previous border thrusts, was making secret plans about how to use them. The agency also worried that the potential conflict zone didn’t appear to be just the eastern sliver of Ukraine occupied by Russian-backed separatists, which Russian troops had approached the previous April, but a much broader swath of the country. Alarm bells rang at the agency, and then across the U.S. government.”
• “As the Ukrainian crisis enters December, the Biden administration is pursuing what policymakers like to call a ‘dual strategy.’ To deter a Russian invasion, Secretary of State Antony Blinken will meet Wednesday [Dec. 8] with NATO allies in Latvia to share U.S. intelligence and discuss joint military plans to raise the cost of any Russian invasion. At the same time, the White House has continued high-level conversations with Moscow that could lead to a meeting between Biden and Putin, virtual or in person, before year end.”
• “How do you stop a ‘master of audacity,’ as a former CIA official describes Putin? One way is to talk to him, as Biden is planning to do, and offer a dignified retreat. But if that fails and Putin invades Ukraine, the United States and its allies are discussing this week how to make him pay as heavy a cost as possible.”

“The best response to Russia’s threats is a closer relationship with Ukraine,” Michael McFaul and Oleksiy Honcharuk, The Washington Post, 12.02.21. The authors, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia and a former Ukrainian prime minister, write:

• “It’s time for a new U.S. strategy toward both Russia and Ukraine. Toward Russia, Biden must embrace more coercive diplomacy. Gestures of cooperation must be accompanied by credible commitments to coercive action should cooperation fail.”
• “Biden should state publicly his desire to reinvigorate diplomacy to end the war in eastern Ukraine, including naming a senior envoy to represent the United States in these negotiations and insisting that the United States formally join Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France to reinvigorate the now moribund Normandy talks tasked with ending the war in eastern Ukraine.”
• “At the same time, Biden, Congress and our European allies and partners should spell out publicly and now — not after another Russian military intervention — a package of serious comprehensive sanctions to be implemented in response to new Russian aggression. … A new model — cascade sanctions — should be adopted to ratchet up new sanctions every year that Russia continues to sustain the war in eastern Ukraine.”
• “Toward Ukraine, Biden needs a more comprehensive strategy of engagement. … The first, obvious and overdue step is to name a high-profile U.S. ambassador to Ukraine with personal ties to Biden. … Second, the Biden administration and NATO allies must deepen military-to-military ties with Kyiv, including an expanded military new assistance package to create greater capabilities to protect critical infrastructure and defend against aerial and naval threats, and tacit support for new Ukrainian purchases of armed drones from Turkey. … Third, Biden’s team, together with European allies, must articulate a more sophisticated, comprehensive and long-term strategy for consolidating democracy and spurring economic growth in Ukraine. … Fourth, Biden and his democratic allies should create a Donbass Development Fund — a Marshall Plan for eastern Ukraine.”
• “Biden also needs a new grand strategy for engaging and containing Russia well beyond Ukraine.” 

“NATO’s Mistake Is That It Still Thinks It’s Dealing with the Weakened Russia of the 1990s,” Fyodor Lukyanov, Russia in Global Affairs, 11.24.21. The author, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, writes:

• “Recent shockwaves in Russian-Ukrainian relations, and the increasing involvement of the U.S., could prove to be among the most significant milestones in the history of Europe since the end of the Cold War, over three decades ago. But the groundwork for a clash of heads was laid long before the present day. Since the reunification of Germany, the continent’s security architecture—the careful truce between East and West that held strong even at the most tense moments of the 20th century—has been systematically dismantled.”
• “When President Vladimir Putin delivered his recent address at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he told the country’s top diplomat, Sergei Lavrov, to discuss the security guarantees his counterparts in other countries can provide, similar to the ones penned in the 2000s.  The idea is to abandon the principle that countries can choose their alliances as though it is nobody else’s business—which was never part of traditional geopolitics, but has become a given in recent decades. Well, this approach is no longer working. But creating a new one through political and diplomatic talks alone doesn’t seem feasible.”
• “The recent round of escalation in Eastern Europe showed that the old principles of security on the continent are no longer working. NATO expansion has created a new military and political landscape. Keeping things as they are could lead to new conflicts, while abandoning the belief that the bloc calls all the shots will require a drastic revision of all approaches. Russia will have to change the system and draw new ‘red lines.’ We could, for example, redefine ‘Finlandization’—the Cold War idea whereby countries retain their sovereignty but stay out of the geopolitical fray—as something positive. The term has become pejorative since then, but everything changes.”

“Putin Needs a Real Casus Belli to Invade Ukraine; An attack without a clear provocation would cause Russia to lose more than it would gain.” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 12.02.21. The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “It would be reasonable to assume that Putin is weighing some kind of sudden onslaught scenario in case his ‘red line’ in relation to Ukraine is crossed. On Nov. 30, he laid down the ‘red line’ explicitly at an investment forum: If some kind of strike capabilities emerge in Ukraine, flight time to Moscow will be seven to ten minutes, and with the deployment of hypersonic weapons it goes down to five minutes.”
• “As Fyodor Lukyanov, the most clear-sighted of the Kremlin’s foreign policy explainers, wrote recently in the journal he edits, Russia in Global Affairs, Ukraine wouldn’t even need to join NATO to become a de facto U.S. military beachhead. Lukyanov’s suggestion was that Russia is seeking some kind of neutrality, or ‘Finlandization,’ guarantee for Ukraine—but, since it’s unclear what form such a guarantee could take, it’s safe to assume Russia is preparing to use military force if Putin finds his ‘red line’ is about to be crossed.”
• “Putin knows that if he attacks without a clear provocation, or on the pretext of some artificially created incident, he stands to lose more than he gains. In addition to the obvious costs of war, such a move would bring back the currently eroded resolve of European countries to back up any U.S.-initiated sanctions on Russia, including bans on hydrocarbon exports, bond issuance and cross-border financial operations.”
• “Attacking in response to real, provable hostile action, however, likely would not entail such consequences, even in a post-truth world where any event can be spun as its exact opposite. The 2008 Georgian-Russian war provides a relevant example. ... Even in Zelenskiy’s inexperienced and scandal-prone administration, the survival instinct is likely strong enough to avoid Saakashvili’s ruinous example.”

“Russia’s Ever-Shifting Red Lines in Ukraine,” Maria Snegovaya, The National Interest, 12.03.21. The author, a postdoctoral fellow in political science at Virginia Tech, writes:

• “It looks like the Kremlin now draws the line at any Ukrainian defense cooperation with Western military alliances, be it their troops' presence in the country, arms transfers, or use of the territory. All of the above is now deemed unacceptable by the Kremlin.”
• “But it is not the first time Kremlin’s red lines with regards to Ukraine have shifted. Already back in 2014 for the Kremlin, it was not about a formal prospect of NATO accession per se … right after the Euromaidan revolution Russia launched a war with Ukraine and annexed Crimea. Why? Because of the possibility of Ukraine’s active integration with the European Union following the signing of Ukraine’s EU accession agreement.”
• “For the Kremlin, it has never been about NATO expansion per se. It was about the control over Ukraine which precludes any (formal or informal) Ukraine’s collaboration and integration with Western alliances. Putin’s desire to reassert Russia’s dominance and control in the post-Soviet space makes him unhappy with any arrangement that takes Ukraine out of Russia’s sphere of influence.”
• “Frequent predictions about Russia’s inevitable decline, are yet to come true. This dynamic of Western responses has taught the Kremlin to demand more, and hence its red lines with regards to Ukraine keep shifting.”
• “The main takeaway that follows from this analysis is that the appeasement options offered by some analysts do not really exist for the West. There is hardly any option presuming an independent existence of Ukraine that would satisfy the Kremlin. No matter how much the West is prepared to concede to Russia, the Kremlin’s appetites will keep growing over time unless it is faced with strong resistance.”

“Russians Believe Ukrainians Want to Be ‘Liberated,’” Natalia Antonova, Foreign Policy, 12.02.21. The author, a journalist, and online safety expert based in Washington, writes:

• “Arguments against the possibility of invasion argue that it simply wouldn’t be rational, that Russian President Vladimir Putin must be cognizant of the dangers of a long and bloody war, one in which the West might well get involved. Yet many in Russia believe the war would be swift and easy—because the Ukrainians themselves would join them.”
• “Talk to any typical, conservative Russian and you’ll hear all about how ‘Ukrainians have lost their way,’ how ‘they don’t really have their own culture and language,’ and, in many creepy instances, how Ukrainian women are hot, promiscuous and ripe for the taking. A certain Russian official told me as much when he slid into my DMs in 2014, just as the Russians were brutalizing Ukrainians in Ilovaisk while fervently denying they were even there.”
• “It might be tempting to think that these myths are just for ordinary Russians, and that the leadership is more rational. But Putin has his own set of grudges. While he obviously sees Ukraine as an appendage to modern Russia, unfairly cut off due to evil foreign influence, the country is also a staging place for his many specific grievances with NATO and the United States in particular.”

“Russia's threats place Europe at a pivotal moment, Keir Giles, Chatham House, 12.03.21. The author, a senior consulting fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at Chatham House, writes:

• “Whether Russia steps up its war against Ukraine will primarily be determined by Western reaction to Russia’s current demands.”
• “Few will wish to be directly involved in defending Ukrainian territory, especially given Russia’s considerable success in persuading influential figures abroad that the alternative to granting its wishes would be major and widespread war, possibly escalating to a nuclear level. But there is no historical precedent to suggest that if Russia’s current demands are met, new ones will not follow.”
• “The West is at a decision point whose effects will be long-term and far-reaching. Resolutely resisting Russian ultimatums—and providing Ukraine with all possible assistance in meeting the likely cost of doing so—is an investment in setting the limits of Russian power. As such, it would also be the first step in assisting Russia’s long-term future away from the path of conflict and confrontation.”

“Why Vladimir Putin has Ukraine in his sights,” Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 12.06.21. The author, chief foreign affairs columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “To avert a conflict, the Russians are demanding an explicit guarantee that Ukraine will never join NATO. That demand is likely to be central to the conversation between Putin and Joe Biden, scheduled for this week.”
• “Moscow’s demand sounds like something Washington might consider. ... But there are two reasons why the U.S. and its NATO allies will be very reluctant to make that deal. … The first is a matter of principle: Ukraine is a sovereign nation. It should be able to make its own choices without great powers making deals over the country’s head. … The second reservation is prudential. Would giving Russia what it wants really end the possibility of a war?”
• “As Putin accurately observes, Ukraine and Russia are closely linked by history and culture. So the fact that Ukraine has taken a different political path from Russia raises awkward questions for the Kremlin—which likes to argue that ‘western liberalism’ is completely unsuited to Russia. Perhaps that is the real reason why Ukraine excites such fury in Putin.”

“It's time to let Russia know once and for all that Ukraine is off limits,” Carl Bildt, The Washington Post, 12.06.21. The author, former primer minister of Sweden, writes:

• “Any invasion should be met with more than sanctions. Putin is pushing the alliance — and though he can be reassured that Ukraine won't become a NATO member anytime soon and there won't be any permanent bases, aggression will be met with an unequivocal defense.”
• “Putin has made his intentions clear. His revisionist view of Russia's role in the region is largely opportunistic. But the United States and European allies, acting in concert with Ukraine, must deny him any opportunity.”
• “There can be no room for misunderstanding. An attack against Ukraine would be as devastating to the European order as an attack on Taiwan would be to the Asian order. There are diplomatic and peaceful ways to channel the will of different peoples — but there are no excuses for military powers forcing them to accept a new reality.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“How migration became a weapon in a ‘hybrid war,’” Ben Hall, Sam Fleming and James Shotter, Financial Times, 12.04.21. The news outlet reports:

• “Lukashenko’s very public orchestration of a humanitarian crisis — European officials have accused his regime of simplifying entry for Middle Eastern migrants into Belarus and then directing them towards the border — is perhaps the most blatant recent example of coercive diplomacy using displaced people as a weapon.”
• “Increasingly, that weapon is being aimed at the EU as a way of exploiting its deep political divisions and public fears over uncontrolled immigration. The phenomenon is driving a further hardening of attitudes within the union towards migration and asylum seekers, as member states seek new ways of strengthening their borders and deterring displaced people from heading to the EU. The goal, according to Marcin Przydacz, Poland’s deputy foreign minister, is ‘to check the resilience of our countries’ by ‘shaking the emotions of public opinion.’”
• “Marcin Przydacz, Poland’s deputy foreign minister, like many others in Europe, sees President Vladimir Putin’s hand behind Lukashenko’s provocation, given the Belarusian dictator’s dependence on Kremlin support, although Russia’s direct involvement is unclear. ‘One of Lukashenko’s objectives was to present Poland . . . as an inhumane country that does not observe basic principles, while Putin is giving us lessons on humanity as the president of Russia. I think every European or American reader can see the difference,’ says Przydacz.”
• “Nevertheless, many of the Middle Eastern people who amassed in Belarus remain trapped at the border, even after some have returned home. With the winter setting in it is a human misery that leaves many Europeans both deeply uncomfortable and polarized over the right response.”

“How Migrants Got Weaponized,” Mark Galeotti, Foreign Affairs, 12.02.21. The author, a specialist on Russian politics and security affairs, writes:

• “For Europe, the events on the Polish border should serve as a wake-up call. This tactic is unlikely to end with Belarus, even if few governments are likely to pursue it so brazenly in the near future. The EU itself has greatly facilitated the weaponization of migration by showing how the threat of migrant inflows can be used to extort billions in aid and political indulgence. And as many European countries struggle with populist movements that mobilize around anti-immigration sentiment, the pressure on their leaders to pay authoritarian governments to keep the flow of migrants at a manageable level is unlikely to go away.”
• “More and more, the EU also seems willing to use external countries to do its dirty work on migration and in the process risks undermining the values that Western societies are meant to espouse. Although the conduct of the Polish government may have hit the headlines, the outsourcing of migration policing in North Africa has often meant turning a blind eye to overcrowded detention centers, huge numbers of deaths at sea, authoritarian regimes, and endemic corruption.”
• “The lesson of Minsk’s cynical ploy is that as conflict leaves the battlefield and moves into every other realm of life, migration has become another weapon in an arsenal that ranges from strategic disinformation and the deliberate use of investment for political pressure to controlling access to water or power. Lukashenko is in many ways a very old-fashioned dictator, but his migrant war is a sign of things to come.”

“In a Region that Usually Exports Migrants, Kazakhstan Becomes a Major Destination,” Edward Lemon, The National Interest, 12.02.21. The author, a research assistant professor at Texas A&M University’s Department of International Affairs in The Bush School of Government and Public Service, writes:

• “With its similar culture and language (Kazakh is a Turkic language like Kyrgyz and Uzbek) and its geographic proximity, Kazakhstan was a natural destination for migrants who would have gone to Russia. Despite the pandemic once more unveiling the dangers of an overreliance on migration in Central Asia, none of the Central Asian governments have formulated plans to reduce dependence on migration. In fact, migration from Tajikistan hit record highs in 2021. As Kazakhstan recovers from the pandemic and moves from a decline of 2.5 percent in 2020 to an expected growth rate of 3.2 percent in 2021, it looks like the country will continue to be a destination for migrants from neighboring states, fueling the government’s ambition to become one of the thirty most developed countries by the middle of the century.”