This Week’s Highlights

• Russia has made its categorical rejection of Washington’s efforts to keep Iran from resuming arms exports crystal clear; however, opposition to the extension of the embargo should not be mistaken as an indication that Moscow will rush to sell weapons to Tehran, writes Belfer Center fellow Nicole Grajewski. Even though Moscow may possess commercial interests in exporting arms to Tehran, numerous financial, technical and political obstacles complicate Iran’s acquisition of Russian weapons and military equipment, according to Grajewski.
• The imbalance in civil-military relations in the U.S. has raised international tensions, writes Prof. Carrie A. Lee. Current U.S. strategy therefore filters the meaning of the changing geopolitical environment almost exclusively through military perceptions of threat. In the event of a war with China or Russia, the military would face a daunting task in the South China Sea or in the Baltic states. Its instinct, then, is to develop the strategies and build the capabilities that are most likely to win such a confrontation at the lowest cost possible. But, Lee argues, these strategies can have dangerous consequences.  
• Conventional military inferiority can produce increased reliance on nuclear threats, but some states seek to improve conventional capabilities to overcome this dependency, writes Kristin Ven Bruusgaard of the University of Oslo. Russia is one such state: its preferred escalation management option is not, by default, nuclear weapons, Bruusgaard writes.
• In truth, Germany is split over how to approach Russia, writes Anna Sauerbrey, a contributing New York Times opinion writer. In the past weeks, more hawkish voices took the lead. But, Sauerbrey writes, the country is not upending its relationship with Russia—at least not yet. The ECFR’s Roderich Kiesewetter, meanwhile, writes that if Berlin and Brussels are to be taken seriously in Moscow, they must develop a balance of incentives and pressure, while making it clear that they cannot allow Russia to cross their red lines. And, Kiesewetter argues, Berlin and Brussels must engage in sober realpolitik that is bound by values but strictly oriented towards their interests. 
• Fetishizing combat video feeds plays to a Western intellectual preference for the tactical, and system on system evaluations, while ignoring the basic fact that Azerbaijan has not been able to attain a significant operational success, write CNA’s Michael Kofman and Leonid Nersisyan, a military analyst based in Moscow. This perhaps is the most important lesson of the conflict: Tactical successes, which may appear impressive, can fail to add up to an operational breakthrough. In such cases, they argue, military strategy turns to the old familiar: a battle of attrition. 

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

“Beyond Arms Embargo, Obstacles Remain to Iran’s Acquisition of Russian Weapons,” Nicole Grajewski, Russia Matters, 10.15.20: The author, a fellow with the Belfer Center’s International Security Program, writes:

• “On Oct. 18, the U.N. conventional arms embargo on Iran [expired] despite the Trump administration’s numerous attempts to extend the embargo … Russia has made its categorical rejection of Washington’s efforts to keep Iran from resuming arms exports crystal clear; however, opposition to the extension of the embargo should not be mistaken as an indication that Moscow will rush to sell weapons to Tehran.”
• “There are multiple reasons why Iranians will not receive an influx of Russian weapons. First, we should keep in mind that Russia has previously been reluctant to supply Iran with high-tech systems and offensive weapons. …Second, Iran’s domestic economic crisis poses a major impediment to its acquisition of large-scale arms from Russia, especially as Moscow has already declined Tehran’s request to purchase weapons on credit.”
• “Third, arms sales to Iran have clear implications for Russia’s foreign policy in the Middle East, which has been contingent on maintaining close relations with Iran while concomitantly expanding its ties with Iran’s adversaries including Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia.”
• “Given all these constraints, Russian and Iranian military cooperation will likely materialize in the form of limited arms sales which will be supplemented by an increase in regularized technical exchanges and military drills between the Russian and Iranian armed forces.”
• “Moscow and Tehran may also seek to increase military cooperation to enhance interoperability between the Russian and Iranian militaries at the tactical level. This could entail closer cooperation through Iran’s participation in large scale Russian-led exercises like Kavkaz-2020 as well as an increase in regularized military-technical exchanges and drills between the Russian and Iranian armed forces.”

New Cold War/saber rattling:

“Sleepwalking Into World War III. Trump’s Dangerous Militarization of Foreign Policy,” Carrie A. Lee, Foreign Affairs, 10.19.20: The author, assistant professor of international security studies at the U.S. Air War College, writes:

• “The Trump administration has consistently elevated military voices over those of experienced civil servants in the development of foreign policy, and funding cuts to nondefense federal agencies, along with the resignations of many career civil servants, have left government offices woefully understaffed. … Civilian authority over the armed forces is weaker now than at any point in living memory, and the Trump administration is increasingly engaging with the world in ways that mirror military preferences.”
• “The resulting foreign policy is eerily reminiscent of the ‘cult of the offensive’: an overconfidence in offensive military advantage that can lead to rapid escalation; such overconfidence is widely believed to have contributed to the outbreak of World War I. Unless civilian control over the military can be reestablished, the United States risks sleepwalking its way into another world war. … The imbalance in civil-military relations has raised international tensions.”
• “The military naturally seeks to modernize and acquire new weapons systems. In response to this desire, the Trump administration withdrew from at least three major arms control agreements, and it looks unlikely to renew the New START agreement with Russia. But without arms control, the United States not only risks setting off arms races but also loses transparency into its adversaries’ systems, capabilities and intent.”
• “The military’s priority of seeking ever more lethal and modern weapons increases the risks of nuclear use and proliferation. … But by acquiring nuclear weapons specifically designed to be used in a much wider set of circumstances than the current inventory, the military has effectively lowered the threshold for using nuclear weapons.”
• “Current U.S. policy resembles the firm civilian control and oversight of the Kennedy administration far less than it does the posture of the great powers before the outbreak of World War I. … Privileging the military’s perceptions of threat over those of diplomats makes war all but inevitable.”

“Death Dust: The Little-Known Story of U.S. and Soviet Pursuit of Radiological Weapons,” Samuel Meyer, Sarah Bidgood and William C. Potter, International Security, 10.19.20: The authors, a research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the director of its Eurasia Nonproliferation Program and the director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, write:

• “Since Sept. 11, 2001, most expert commentary on radiological weapons has focused on nonstate actors, to the neglect of state-level programs. In fact, numerous countries in the past have expressed interest in radiological weapons [RW]; a number have actively pursued them; and three tested them on multiple occasions before ultimately deciding not to deploy the weapons.”
• “This is encouraging news from the standpoint of RW proliferation, and one may hope that information about the experiences of the United States and the Soviet Union will help to dissuade future would-be RW possessors from pursuing such weapons. Besides program abandonment, what are the major commonalities across the U.S. and Soviet initiatives that emerge from our comparative analysis?”
• “One significant common feature is the presence of individual and institutional advocates for RW at the same time these countries were actively developing nuclear weapons. … A second commonality of the RW programs of both countries was the recognition of the limited military utility of RW.”
• “An additional common feature of the U.S. and Soviet RW programs was the difficulty of weapons innovation despite significant differences in the technical approaches that were pursued. … Although both countries were able to produce prototype radiological weapons and test them with some degree of success, the programs failed to generate a new weapon that was adopted for use by their respective militaries, suggesting that future RW aspirants will need strong institutional support in addition to technical knowhow and material.”
• “This situation appears to be playing out in Russia today where, despite its own unsuccessful history with RW, Moscow shows renewed interest in advanced nuclear weapons that seek to maximize radioactive contamination. One example is a new weapon, known variously as ‘Kanyon,’ ‘Status-6’ or ‘Poseidon,’ which, depending on the source, is being designed, developed and possibly even tested. … If deployed, it would likely provoke the United States to seriously contemplate a response in kind. Under such circumstances, rational calculations informed by past lessons about the limited military utility of RW could well be ignored.”

“America Has No Reason to Be So Powerful,” Stephen Wertheim, New York Times, 10.15.20: The author, deputy director of research and policy at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, writes:

• “The next president, whoever he is, will not determine the future of America's role in the world. Joe Biden does not recognize there is a problem. President Trump has no answers. … If many Americans no longer understand why their country should police the world, it is for good reason: U.S. military supremacy has outlived its original purpose.”
• “Eighty years ago, the United States made a tragic decision to pursue global supremacy. The project has outlived its purpose. … When the Soviet Union collapsed, officials scarcely considered pulling back U.S. deployments and commitments. To the contrary, they extended them.”
• “In the early 21st century, if any power sought world domination, coercing others and flouting rules, it was the United States. Instituted to enable engagement across borders, American supremacy began to obstruct it. Today the United States deploys troops in more than 170 countries. Its military operates against terrorism in roughly 40 percent of the world's nations. Dozens of countries are targets of U.S. sanctions.”
• “The decades went on and no totalitarian rivals arose to take the place of prior nemeses … China is authoritarian and on the rise. But it is hardly Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia. China is open for business, whether on fair terms or not; the world's largest trading nation makes a strange candidate for a totalitarian menace whose every activity closes off the earth. And unlike 20th-century rivals, China has long abstained from armed conquest. Though it threatens Taiwan, no one thinks it is about to invade U.S. allies like South Korea or Japan.”
• “There was a time when Americans believed that armed dominance obstructed and corrupted genuine engagement in the world, far from being its foundation. That insight has been buried, now nearly beyond living memory. But it is perhaps not altogether lost.”

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant developments.

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms control:

• No significant developments.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

• No significant developments.

Elections interference:

“How to Manage the Threat of Foreign Election Interference,” Dov H. Levin, War on the Rocks, 10.15.20: The author, an assistant professor in the department of politics and public administration at the University of Hong Kong, writes:

• “First, the United States and other democracies should raise the legal penalties on any domestic actor knowingly collaborating with a meddling foreign power. … Secondly, in order to discourage overt electoral interventions, democracies should develop comprehensive civic education programs on foreign interference.”
• “Third, if intelligence agencies are fortunate enough to discover highly credible evidence that a foreign covert intervention is happening in an upcoming election, they should inform the public about it immediately.”
• “Fourth, decision-makers should preempt any attempts to digitize other traditional methods of electoral interventions, that could make them more effective or easier to carry out. On that front, countries should prohibit campaign contributions in the form of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. … Finally, democratic countries should reverse the growing trend toward electronic voting and counting and return to traditional, electronics-free methods.”  
• “These reforms can be applied without requiring unprecedented levels of domestic or international consensus about the needed remedies, risking inadvertent harm or modifying key aspects of modern democracy. Foreign meddling in an election is inevitable, but democracies can take steps to contain the damage and preserve the integrity of their institutions.”

“Russian Propaganda Hits Its Mark,” Todd C. Helmus, James V. Marrone, Marek N. Posard and Danielle Schlang, RAND Corporation, October 2020: The authors of the report write:

• “This report describes a study conducted by RAND researchers to assess how people [in the U.S.] react to and engage with Russia's online propaganda and to determine whether the negative effects of that engagement can be mitigated by brief media literacy advisories or by labeling the source of the propaganda. ... This study is among the first to use actual Russian propaganda in a randomized controlled trial.”
• “Its key findings include: Russian content is particularly effective at achieving its goal of generating strong reactions along partisan lines … Strongly positive emotional reactions to such social media content increase the chances that participants will self-report ‘liking’ and sharing it.”
• “Revealing the source of the Russian memes reduced the probability of a positive emotional response to content that aligned with a participant's ideology … Compared with the emotional effects generated among participants for whom the source was hidden, participant willingness to engage by ‘liking’ or sharing material for which the source was exposed was weaker.”
• “In the overall sample, revealing the source reduced the likelihood that participants would ‘like’ pro-U.S. Russian content, but no other effects for ‘liking’ or sharing were statistically significant.”

“From Russia With Regrets?” Edward Luce, Financial Times, 10.16.20: The author, U.S. national editor for the news outlet, writes:

• “It is easy to forget that until about 18 months ago, Russia’s interference in U.S. politics was on the front pages almost every day. One stillborn Robert Mueller report and a failed Ukraine-related impeachment later and we barely think about Russia at all. That is a pity because in the final three weeks of the 2020 election, something comparable is taking place under our noses.”
• “I don’t think Russia’s ill-concealed intrusions on the Nov. 3 voting process will make a big difference to the outcome this time. Unlike in 2016, the gap between Donald Trump and the Democratic frontrunner is too wide today for such story-planting to make a difference.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“What Would Achieving a Real Reset in US-Russia Relations Take?” Ted Galen Carpenter, The National Interest, 10.18.20: The author, a senior fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, writes:

• “A feasible modus vivendi regarding Ukraine would require concessions from both the West and Russia. … An achievable settlement would entail Russia’s willingness to sever all ties with those [separatist] forces [in the Donbass], provide reasonable monetary compensation to Ukraine for the loss of Crimea and sign a new treaty with Kiev explicitly recognizing the sanctity of the new borders. In return, the NATO members would need to provide a written pledge that Ukraine would never be eligible for membership in the alliance and lift sanctions imposed on Russia because of the Crimea annexation.”
• “The issue of new missiles needs to be resolved as part of an overall effort to reduce NATO-Russian military tensions throughout Eastern Europe. Neither side benefits from allowing the wholesale deployment of new generation intermediate-range missiles. Indeed, both the United States and Russia should seek to bring another key power, China, into negotiations for a new, more comprehensive INF Treaty. … Abandoning New START would be utterly reckless.”
• “It is unlikely that Russia’s initiatives had any material impact on the 2016 balloting. Nevertheless, Trump administration officials should make it very clear to the Kremlin that even attempts at meddling have a serious, negative impact on U.S.-Russia relations.”
• “Preserving Washington’s long-standing sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere points to what needs to be the foundation of a new, less confrontational relationship with Russia. … Washington must accept the reality that spheres of influence are still very much a part of the international system. … Eastern Europe is a relatively easy place for the United States to back away and respect another major power’s sphere of influence. Doing so also is a crucial first step in a true reset of U.S.-Russian relations.”

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

• No significant developments.

Defense and aerospace:

“Russian Nuclear Strategy and Conventional Inferiority,” Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, Journal of Strategic Studies, October 2020: The author, a postdoctoral fellow (assistant professor) of political science at the University of Oslo, writes:

• “This paper argues that understanding how nuclear capabilities and strategy interact with conventional capabilities is fundamental to understanding nuclear strategy. … It offers the Conventional Balance of Forces thesis for explaining change in Russia’s nuclear strategy after the Cold War. It shows how Russian nuclear debates and strategy decisions have been affected by perceived conventional vulnerabilities, and how the orthodox Western interpretation of Russian nuclear strategy today as one of ‘escalating to de-escalate’ comes short of explaining when Russia would go nuclear in conflict, and why.”
• “Russian strategists have continued to grapple with two elementary nuclear strategy problems. They debate the credibility and utility of nuclear threats and the difficulty of predicting adversary responses to limited nuclear strikes. This has produced a Russian nuclear strategy that emphasizes non-nuclear options to enhance the credibility of nuclear threats.”
• “The fact that Russia retains a broad range of nonstrategic nuclear capabilities indicates that military and civilian leaders believe such weapons could influence the course of conflict or help terminate it. … Russian nuclear use would convey a Russian willingness to risk further nuclear escalation, not confidence that it thinks it can avoid or control escalation.”
• “Conventional inferiority can produce increased reliance on nuclear threats, but some states seek to improve conventional capabilities to overcome this dependency. Russia is one such state: its preferred escalation management option is not, by default, nuclear weapons.”
• “Russian strategy is a product of perceptions of its conventional and nuclear capability compared to the potential adversary. That perception changed over time, in part because of the adversary’s changing behavior. Scholars and policymakers should acknowledge that both conventional and nuclear forces affect their own position and military options, as well as those of the adversary. Understanding such dynamics will be central to gauging when, in conflict, an adversary might use nuclear weapons and what might deter such escalation.”

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Putin, Putinism and the Domestic Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy,” Michael McFaul, International Security, 10.19.20: The author, former U.S. ambassador to Russia and current professor of political science at Stanford University, writes:

• “Why did Russia's relations with the West shift from cooperation a few decades ago to a new era of confrontation today? Some explanations focus narrowly on changes in the balance of power in the international system, or trace historic parallels and cultural continuities in Russian international behavior. For a complete understanding of Russian foreign policy today, individuals, ideas, and institutions—President Vladimir Putin, Putinism, and autocracy—must be added to the analysis. An examination of three cases of recent Russian intervention (in Ukraine in 2014, Syria in 2015, and the United States in 2016) illuminates the causal influence of these domestic determinants in the making of Russian foreign policy.”
• “When seeking to explain the riskiest Russian behavior in the world today—intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign countries—Vladimir Putin, his ideas, and the political institutions empowering him must be factored into the equation.”
• “In all three cases discussed in this article, Putin's ideas about illiberalism, orthodoxy, sovereignty and the West shaped his decision-making in unique ways. A different Russian leader with different ideas governing in a different regime could have—and probably would have—behaved differently. For example, a Russian leader animated by either realist or liberal ideas about international relations would have made different decisions regarding intervention in Ukraine in 2014, Syria in 2015, or the United States in 2016. In fact, different Russian leaders embracing different ideas did make different decisions—Gorbachev did not annex the territory of a sovereign neighbor; Medvedev supported the international intervention to save lives in Libya; and Yeltsin never tried to influence U.S. elections.”

“New Russia Sanctions Are a Call to Action for Kremlin Doves,” Alexander Baunov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 10.16.20: The author, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center and editor in chief of Carnegie.ru, writes:

• “The new round of sanctions introduced by the EU against Russia over the poisoning of opposition politician Alexei Navalny have three key aspects.  They target individual people and organizations, rather than entire sectors of the economy; they don’t follow the European Parliament’s suggestion of targeting the subjects of Navalny’s anti-corruption investigations; and they don’t distinguish between the siloviki (security services) hawks and in-system liberals.”
• “The sanctions send a clear signal: it’s not enough for individuals to have liberal ideas and reformist intentions; those ideas and intentions must be noticeable in the actions of the Russian state.”

“Is Germany Turning Against Russia?” Anna Sauerbrey, The New York Times, 10.14.20: The author, a contributing opinion writer to the New York Times, writes:

• “In the past few weeks, Germany has helped to rescue Russia’s main opposition leader, Aleksei Navalny, and accused Moscow of poisoning him; rolled out the red carpet for Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, the Belarusian opposition leader who tried to topple one of Russia’s satellite regimes; and accused the country of state-orchestrated murder on German territory. And if that wasn’t enough, it’s pushing for sanctions on Russian officials.”
• “Germany’s newly confrontational style should not come as a complete surprise. ‘Mr. Navalny’s poisoning has certainly been a catalyst,’ Liana Fix, the program director for international affairs at the Körber-Stiftung Foundation, told me. Far from marking a new departure in Germany’s approach to Russia, Ms. Fix said, the reaction to the poisoning of Mr. Navalny simply laid bare how corroded the relationship has become.”
• “But longstanding foreign policy traditions do not end just like that. Change through rapprochement is still sacred in some parts of the Social Democratic Party and in many states in eastern Germany. Many German businesses, not least those who cater to Eastern European and Central Asian markets, are also strongly in favor of maintaining good relations with Russia—as are the more business-focused sections of the Christian Democratic Union.”
• “In truth, Germany is split over how to approach Russia. In the past weeks, more hawkish voices took the lead. But the country is not upending its relationship with Russia—at least not yet.”
• Germany won’t be able to backpedal all the way. The confrontation may have progressed too far already: Mr. Putin is unlikely to forget, or forgive, the actions of the past weeks. And as Russia confronts the coronavirus at home and conflicts among its neighbors, there’s no guessing what might come next. Germany ought to be prepared — and know how it will respond.

“A Balance of Values and Interests: Germany, Realpolitik and Russia Policy,” Roderich Kiesewetter, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 10.15.20: The author, an ECFR council member, a foreign policy representative of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the German Bundestag and a former Bundeswehr General Staff colonel, writes:

• “Recent events (e.g. poisoning of Navalny) show that Moscow does not take Berlin seriously when it acts alone. Germany must coordinate its actions at the European level and find common responses to Russia’s behavior.”
• “If Berlin and Brussels are to be taken seriously in Moscow, we must understand what kind of language is spoken there. Otherwise, Russia will simply take advantage of us. We must honestly ask ourselves how the Putin system works. We must develop a balance of incentives and pressure, while making it clear that we cannot allow Russia to cross our red lines. And we must engage in sober realpolitik that is bound by values but strictly oriented towards our interests.”

“Is Russia's Dialogue With the EU Coming to an End? Sergei Lavrov's recent comments on the EU may sound extreme, but they were a long time in the making,” Fyodor Lukyanov, Vtimes/The Moscow Times, 10.15.20: The author, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, research director of the Valdai Discussion Club and research professor at the Higher School of Economics, writes:

• “Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dropped a bombshell on Tuesday, warning that Russia might halt all dialogue with the European Union. Mr. Lavrov offered no explanation for what was probably the most severe public statement on the EU of his career.”
• “A new framework is needed now, but it will probably be a long time in coming. And the framework Russia might want for its relations with Europe will not materialize for the very reasons mentioned above: present circumstances are simply too unfavorable.”
• “Of course, no new Iron Curtain between Russia and the EU will fall from the sky. Their mutual humanitarian and economic relations remain very strong, despite some damage from sanctions, and cultural and even political ties remain intact. However, these are strictly utilitarian relations, without any pretense of common goals, and they take a backseat to Moscow’s bilateral relations with individual European countries. Russia and Europe are devolving into coolly polite neighbors that have no real interest in each other, but who are forced to interact simply because they live next door to each other.”
• “In fact, Russia must now focus more on its main neighbor, China. Although Russia’s quarrel with the West plays some role in this pivot eastward, it is the enormously long Russian-Chinese border and the fact that China is rapidly becoming … one of the two pillars of the new world order that compels Moscow to devote far more attention to this neighbor than it is accustomed to.”
• “More importantly, and what will cause fundamental change to Russia’s relations with Europe, is the fact that, for better or worse, the global balance is shifting towards Asia. As a result, the focus that Russia has had on Europe and West for the past 300 years no longer corresponds to the global reality.”

“Vladimir Putin Has a Vaccine, and He’s Rushing to Share It,” Judyth Twigg, New York Times, 10.15.20: The author, a professor of political science at Virginia Commonwealth University, specializing in global health with a focus on Russia and Eurasia, writes:

• “As America retreats from world affairs, Russia is promising other nations help on the pandemic. … Mr. Putin is using his under-tested vaccine as part of a global full-court press to win friends and enhance his country’s soft power.”
• “Russia is pitching dozens of countries licensing and production offers for Sputnik. These deals aren’t limited to obvious friends and neighbors like Belarus and Kazakhstan. Pending regulatory approval, India is set to produce at least 300 million doses and buy 100 million more; Brazil’s Bahia state will buy 50 million, and Mexico has a purchase agreement for 32 million.”
• “All told, Russia is claiming preliminary applications from at least 40 partners totaling well over a billion doses.”
• “Mr. Putin’s only rival for the role of global savior is China, which is also rushing across regulatory milestones for vaccines and pushing deals, like a billion-dollar loan to help Latin American and Caribbean countries pay for them. China has also just joined Covax.”
• “Russia is betting that its short-term diplomatic gains outweigh the longer-term reputational risk should problems arise with the Sputnik vaccine. The United States could counter Russia’s gambit and contribute to an important global public good by making a relatively modest investment in the Covax vaccine effort.”

“How Russia Views Afghanistan Today,” Nurlan Aliyev, War on the Rocks, 10.19.20: The author, a freelance expert based in Warsaw, writes:

• “Russia’s Afghan policy has seen several changes. Currently, it prioritizes three goals. First, to stabilize Afghanistan and to maintain Russia’s strong role in the negotiations while also seeing the removal of U.S. and NATO military bases. Second, to use the Afghanistan peace process in its current confrontation with the West. And finally, Moscow considers its participation in the peace settlement as a confirmation of its return to the world’s global-power competition. As Moscow assumes the Taliban will play a huge role in the country in coming years, it aims to be on good terms with Afghanistan’s assumed future power brokers.”

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

• No significant developments.

War over Karabakh:

“The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Is a Bad Omen,” Paul Stronski, Carnegie Moscow Center, 10.14.20: The author, a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, writes:

• “The long-running Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which dates to the waning days of the Soviet Union, is not going to trigger a global war. Nor will it affect the vital interests of the world’s great powers. Yet it shines a harsh spotlight on the unraveling post-Cold War world that the United States led for more than three decades. The United States and the European regional powers that previously cherished and protected these arrangements are now pulling back, along with the multilateral institutions they lead. Moreover, they are no longer displaying much unity of purpose when it comes to emerging powers, like Russia and Turkey, who want to carve out a bigger role for themselves in a multipolar world.”
• “Throughout the Trump era, Moscow has been eager to insert itself into hotspots in the Middle East and Africa—to highlight U.S. failures and to portray itself as a major power on the world stage. But Russia rarely is a problem solver and its interventions generally exacerbate instability. China, too, is more assertive globally and eager to benefit from a dysfunctional West. But while it has cash to throw around, cash is not a stabilizing force. Thus, the number of intractable conflicts is growing. The dynamics that grip parts of Africa, Libya, Syria, eastern Ukraine, Venezuela and Yemen are now spreading to the Caucasus. With the West no longer capable or willing to lead this messy world, regional powers—Iran, Turkey and the Gulf states, among others—are stepping in but not necessarily bringing order. That is a bad omen not only for Azerbaijan and Armenia but also for the many efforts aimed at maintaining peace and stability around the globe.”

“The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Two Weeks In,” Michael Kofman and Leonid Nersisyan, War on the Rocks, 10.14.20: Kofman, director and senior research scientist at CNA Corporation and a fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, and Nersisyan, a military analyst based in Moscow, write:

• “The chances of this war becoming a broader regional conflict are low, but it should not be dismissed as a distant war between small states.”
• “The Azerbaijani offensive can be divided into several stages. … During the first three days, Azerbaijani troops attempted a ground assault with armored formations, while providing fire support with artillery, drones, and loitering munitions. … From the end of the third day until the beginning of the sixth day, the parties engaged in position warfare. … Day six began to show some exhaustion among both sides, but by this point, Azerbaijan had begun shelling Stepanakert ... Armenians forces began firing against infrastructure in Azerbaijan. … On the morning of day seven, Azerbaijan’s First, Second, and Third Army Corps … were reinforced by the reserves of the Fourth Corps, which protects the Absheron Peninsula and Baku. The Azerbaijani attack knocked Armenian forces from their forward positions.”
• “The war has not resulted in dramatic turnovers of territory, and has proven costly for both sides. … It is not clear if what Azerbaijan has gained so far … will suffice as a political victory for Azerbaijan’s leader. … All together Azerbaijan may have captured 2.8 percent of the territory of Artsakh. At this stage the conflict may settle into a position war of attrition, but a genuine ceasefire is not on the horizon.”
• “The lessons from this conflict are consistent with those of other wars in the latter 20th century: It is much better to have a smaller ground force that is well defended from the air, than a vast armored force that is completely exposed to sensors and airpower from above. … Tactical successes … can fail to add up to an operational breakthrough. In such cases, military strategy turns to … a battle of attrition.”

“Turkey’s Erdogan Is Fueling Aggression Against Armenia,” David L. Phillips, The National Interest, 10.16.20: The author, director of the program on peacebuilding and human rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights and former senior adviser and foreign affairs expert to the State Department, writes:

• “Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is both directly stoking violence and undermining diplomacy aimed at achieving a ceasefire. … According to a report by Reuters, Turkish arms sales to Azerbaijan surged from under $1 million in July to $33 million in August and $77 million in September.”
• “Today Turkish troops are also engaged on the battlefield. Credible sources indicate that around 150 Turkish Special Forces are on the front lines commanding Azeri battalions. Private contractors hired by Turkey have also been deployed. … Two Turkish F-16s have been photographed at Azerbaijan’s air force base in Ganja, and an Armenian Sukhoi-24 was shot down by a Turkish F-16 in Armenian air space. … Turkish drones, including the Bayraktar TB2, provide close support to Azeri troops and jihadists fighting on Azerbaijan’s behalf.”
• “What can be done to rein in Turkey and bring peace to the South Caucasus? Canada this week announced it was halting some weapons sales to Turkey after allegations its equipment was used by Azerbaijani forces. The United States should do the same. Additionally, sanctions are required under the Countering American Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) for Turkey’s purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia. U.S. efforts should also extend to Azerbaijan. In 1992, President George H.W. Bush signed into law Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which prohibits assistance to Azerbaijan ‘until the President determines, and so reports to the Congress, that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.’ This legal requirement must be enforced.”
• “The United States should impose economic and diplomatic sanctions on Azerbaijan to punish its aggression. … The United States should more strongly support mediation by the Minsk Group.”

“Nagorno-Karabakh: Turkey Instigates an Old War With Older Ambitions,” Pietro Shakarian Artyom Tonoyan,The National Interest, 10.13.20: Shakarian, a PhD candidate in Russian History at Ohio State University, and Tonoyan, a research associate at the University of Minnesota’s Center for Holocaust & Genocide Studies, write:

• “There is significant evidence that Turkey is the main instigator of the current Karabakh war. The country has been involved in every step of the way from the preparation to the execution of the Azerbaijani war plan. … By throwing his full weight behind Azerbaijan, both diplomatically and militarily, Erdogan has managed to catch Russia off guard in his effort to establish a foothold in the Caucasus. … Erdogan seeks to revive this historical claim to the region, against the backdrop of his recent conflicts with Russian president Vladimir Putin in Libya and Syria.”
• “As the war began, Azerbaijan’s objective was to surround the … Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. … Baku’s offensives on the northwest aimed at retaking the strategic districts of Kelbajar (Karvachar) and Lachin (Berdzor), which provide Armenia with a critical overland link to Karabakh. However, the impassable terrain of the Murov (Mrav) mountain range, combined with stiff Armenian resistance, led to heavy casualties for Baku.”
• “Azerbaijan has fared only slightly better on the southeast front … where their main objective has been to retake the towns of Fizuli (Varanda) and Jabrayil (Jrakan). Unlike the northwest, the lowland geography of the southeast is more familiar terrain for Baku. However, even in this area with its more suitable physical conditions, Azerbaijan has encountered stiff Armenian resistance.”
• “Ankara’s actions undoubtedly pose a serious threat to Russian security. Moscow is alarmed not only by Turkey’s flagrant decision to waltz into the conflict but also by its introduction of foreign mercenaries and jihadists into the Karabakh conflict zone. The presence of such fighters so close to Russian borders presents a clear and direct danger to Russia. … Iran shares Russia’s position. … Neighboring Georgia, with its own history of civil war and breakaway conflicts, shares the fear of domestic strife.”

Ukraine:

“The Long and Arduous Road: Ukraine Updates Its National Security Strategy,” Taras Kuzio, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 10.16.20: The author, a professor at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, writes:

• “There is little to differentiate Poroshenko’s 2015 and Zelensky’s 2020 national security concepts on the questions of declaring Russia a threat to Ukraine and the goals of returning occupied territories. In the 2020 concept, Russia is defined as an ‘aggressor state’ on eight occasions which conforms to the view of 72 percent of Ukrainians. The 2020 concept has the benefit of seven years of Russian full-spectrum warfare to more fully understand the threat it poses.”
• “The 2015 and 2020 concepts continue to outline the goals of NATO (mentioned 11 times), which has been included in every national security document, except under Yanukovych, and the EU. In February 2019, the Ukrainian constitution was changed to incorporate the goals of NATO and EU membership, making these more challenging to change. While the 2020 concept declares the US, UK, Canada, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania, Poland and Turkey as ‘strategic allies’, it mistakenly omitted Romania. Meanwhile, including Germany and France was a sop to the Normandy Format which provides a stage for Zelensky but which has been quite moribund.”
• “Following a prolonged war and referendum which made Putin de facto president for life, the 2020 concept shows a greater realization that the Russian–Ukrainian war will continue. This is irrespective of Zelensky’s striving for peace because Putin’s objectives in Ukraine are unrealistic and unattainable short of Ukraine’s capitulation.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“The Secret of the Tajik President’s Staying Power,” Temur Umarov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 10.15.20: The author, an expert on China and Central Asia and a consultant at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “On Oct. 11, Emomali Rahmon was reelected President of Tajikistan for a fifth term with almost 91 percent of the vote. This outcome could have been described as dull and predictable—if this wasn’t 2020, and the post-Soviet space wasn’t gripped by wars and revolutions. Rahmon has been in power longer than anyone else in the former Soviet Union, and looked doomed to become yet another victim of this crisis year. But he managed to get reelected for yet another term without any mass protests or other hitches. The regime in Tajikistan has fused so closely with Rahmon’s extensive family that neither a new generation nor the coronavirus pandemic can dent his power.”
• “There’s no point in expecting anything like the Belarusian protests—not to mention the revolution in Kyrgyzstan—in Tajikistan. In the decades he has been at the helm, President Rahmon has concentrated all the power in the country in his own hands.”