This Week’s Highlights:

• If the State and Defense departments and the National Security Council staff were in good hands, they would all strongly advise Trump against tearing up the Open Skies Treaty, writes Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Stimson Center. Only the continuation of nuclear arms control can create the political and military conditions for limiting innovative weapons systems and technologies and for a shift to multilateral nuclear disarmament, argues Alexey Arbatov of Russia’s IMEMO Institute.
• Some observers have speculated that Russia is delighted by the chaos caused by the possibility of Trump’s impeachment; however, this is not the scandal the Kremlin wants for three reasons, writes Carnegie’s Tatiana Stanovaya: The Russians wanted an improvement in Russia-U.S. relations under Trump, the Ukraine scandal undermines Trump’s capacity to conduct his own Russia policy, and there is also the growing fear that a private presidential conversation with Trump could be published without Russia’s permission.
• By cooperating with China in missile launch detection and strategic anti-missile defense, Russia loses virtually nothing in terms of security, while making life difficult for the United States, claims Vassily Kashin, a senior fellow at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Kashin posits that this new caliber of Sino-Russian military relations will likely be enshrined in a new agreement on military cooperation likely to be signed in the near future. Meanwhile, Putin’s gift of IceBerry ice cream to Xi in 2016 has already led to a 267 percent increase in sales of Russian ice cream in China the following year, according to an estimate by Prof. Elizabeth Wishnick.
• The story of how Putin bent Erdogan to his will is remarkable and would make an excellent case study in coercive diplomacy, writes Prof. Michael A. Reynolds. Meanwhile, the Cato Institute’s Doug Bandow and Christopher Preble argue that it doesn’t make sense for Washington to maintain every alliance forever, irrespective of circumstance; in that vein, the U.S. and all other NATO members should reconsider Turkey’s status in NATO.
• During the 2019 presidential election campaign, Zelenskiy repeatedly promised that, if elected, he would re-energize efforts to end the war, but his initiative quickly ran into problems, write Duncan Allan of Chatham House and Leo Litra of the New Europe Center. Zelenskiy may now attempt to “freeze” the conflict by ending active operations; this is not Ukraine’s favored outcome but could be the most realistic one in current conditions.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/saber rattling:

“Exploring the Role Nuclear Weapons Could Play in Deterring Russian Threats to the Baltic States,” Paul K. Davis, J. Michael Gilmore, David R. Frelinger, Edward Geist, Christopher K. Gilmore, Jenny Oberholtzer and Danielle C. Tarraf, RAND Corporation, October 2019: The authors of the report find that:

• “The do-nothing option is very risky: NATO's current deterrent in the Baltic states is militarily weak and generally questionable. Improvements to conventional forces have the highest priority; they could also enhance the value of some nuclear options. Practiced options for extremely fast response without much strategic warning are important because Russia might otherwise find ways, using deception, to accomplish a short-warning fait accompli.”
• “Despite Russia's regional escalation dominance, the modernized nuclear options might be valuable in certain circumstances of crisis or conflict if Russian leaders have not already anticipated and discounted the significance of NATO's nuclear use (whether a first use or in response to Russian first use).”
• “Given the limited military value for modernized NATO nonstrategic nuclear weapons, some may question the priority of pursuing such modernization. However, modernized nuclear options would reduce Russian asymmetries in theater-nuclear matters, which can be significant to public and international perceptions.”
• “Recommendations: To achieve deterrence-favorable conditions, NATO would need to consider substantially enhancing and improving its conventional forces based in and near the Baltic states; fielding some limited nonstrategic nuclear weapons feasible for use throughout a conflict, including very early in the conflict; and going through the lengthy and difficult political and military peacetime processes necessary to make prompt response to warnings feasible and credible.”

NATO-Russia relations:

“Turkey and Russia: A Remarkable Rapprochement,” Michael A. Reynolds, Texas National Security Review/War on the Rocks, 10.24.19: The author, an associate professor of Near Eastern Studies and director of the program in Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies in Princeton University, writes:

• “A source of American disbelief about Turkey’s readiness to buy arms from Russia has been the assumption that Turkey and Russia are fated by geography, history and culture to be adversaries.”
• “Yet, there have been significant episodes of cooperation. … The most relevant instance of Russian-Turkish collaboration came during the Turkish War of National Independence (1919–22), when the Russians provided essential financial and military aid to the Turks.”
• “The collapse of the Soviet Union fundamentally transformed Turkey’s geopolitical situation. The greatest threat to Turkey’s security had dissolved and for the first time in centuries Turkey no longer shared a border with Russia … In addition, the Russian Federation was one half the size and less capable than its Soviet predecessor.”
• “With Russia having demonstrated that it was in the driver’s seat in Syria, Ankara calculated that it had better work with Moscow or face a severe and chronic threat from Syria. … The story of how Putin bent Erdogan to his will is remarkable and would make an excellent case study in coercive diplomacy.”
• “[T]oday the dangers that Ankara perceives coming from the United States drive what is, on the one hand, a stunning rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow and, on the other, a rebuke to Washington. … Moreover, Erdogan’s chronic rancor toward Europe has left Turkey further isolated, and thus vulnerable to Russian power. … The mutual willingness of Washington and Ankara to rebuild their ties will be the key determinant of the future of the Turkish-Russian relationship.”

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Arms control:

“A New Era of Arms Control: Myths, Realities and Options,” Alexey Arbatov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 10.24.19: The author, the head of the Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, writes:

• “The United States’ withdrawal from the 1987 [INF Treaty] threatens to dismantle the entire nuclear arms control system built over the last fifty years. It may lead to an uncontrolled multilateral arms race involving strategic, intermediate-range and tactical nuclear and non-nuclear offensive and defensive weapons, as well as space and cyber warfare systems, laser weapons and other arms innovations. As a consequence, international armed conflicts are more likely and may instantly escalate into a global nuclear war.”
• “Practical limitations, reductions and the dismantlement of such complex, costly weapons of such critical importance for national security never come about as the result of general good intentions alone. As demonstrated by the fifty years of negotiations and a dozen serious and politically binding agreements … between the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States, such steps are only taken on quite pragmatic, material terms.”
• “First, a state adopts these measures if it’s guaranteed tangible security improvements … Second, such steps are possible if the states’ nuclear forces are approximately equal … because it makes the parties equally interested in reaching an agreement and provides the starting point for it. Third, only comparable types of weapons systems are subject to agreements … Based on all of the above factors, the other seven nuclear powers can’t simply join U.S.-Russian negotiations on nuclear weapons reductions, either individually or collectively.”
• “Only the continuation of nuclear arms control can create the political and military conditions for eventual limitations of innovative weapons systems and technologies, as well as for a carefully thought through and phased shift to a multilateral format of nuclear disarmament.”

“All Roads Lead to Putin,” Michael Krepon, Arms Control Wonk, 10.21.19: The author, co-founder of the Stimson Center, writes:

• “Putin benefits from Trump’s withdrawal from arms control treaties and other agreements, but they are several plausible explanations for these tear downs. … Trump finds it satisfying to tear down Barack Obama’s achievements. This might be reason enough for him, and not because he wants to help Putin out. … Trump has no sense of the dynamics of international security, so when he’s told that Russia is violating an agreement, that might suffice; he doesn’t understand that an agreement less than fully complied with could still serve U.S. national security interests more than Russia’s.”
• “Those who dislike treaties on ideological grounds have never had a more pliable instrument to do their bidding. The latest case in point is the Open Skies Treaty, which an unknowing Trump reportedly appears willing to tear down, even though it strengthens U.S. ties to Ukraine, the Baltic States and all of Central and Eastern Europe.”
• “The biggest loser from the death of the Open Skies Treaty, besides the United States, would be Ukraine. … If the State and Defense departments and the National Security Council staff were in good hands, they would all strongly advise Trump against tearing up the Open Skies Treaty, as there is no U.S. national security benefit in doing so. It’s not too late to prevent adding further injury to Ukraine and to utilize the Open Skies Treaty to full advantage.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

“Democrats shouldn't let Trump's problems turn them into the party of war,” Katrina vanden Heuvel, The Washington Post, 10.22.19: The author, editor and publisher of the Nation magazine, writes:

• “Will President Trump's Syrian fiasco transform Democrats into the party of war? Former vice president Joe Biden and South Bend, Ind., Mayor Pete Buttigieg are taking shots at Sen. Elizabeth Warren's continued support for getting U.S. troops out of the Middle East. And ever-martial Hillary Clinton is slandering Rep. Tulsi Gabbard, the most forceful opponent to U.S. intervention in the race for the Democratic nomination, as a Russian asset.”
• “Trump's toxic combination of arrogance and ignorance, his desire to pose as both the tough guy and the peacemaker are truly destructive. But so, too, is the establishment assumption that the United States can police the world with a ‘light footprint’ without finding ourselves mired in endless wars for which we lack the will either to win or to end.”

“Lost in the Furor Over Syria: Alliances Are a Means, Not an End,” Doug Bandow and Christopher Preble, War on the Rocks, 10.23.19: The authors, a senior fellow and the vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, write:

• “Despite the cacophony in Washington, President Donald Trump’s decision to move U.S. forces out of northern Syria was fundamentally correct. His choice was unfortunately influenced by a mix of dubious formal alliances and informal partnerships. Unwinding them has proved chaotic—and deadly.”
• “Avoiding such a tragic outcome in the future requires more than critiquing the current president’s bluster; it means learning to rein in U.S. policymakers’ impulses to add new allies and partners, even when the latter’s interests conflict, and curing Washington officials of their desire to retain those relationships when circumstances change.”
• “The broader lesson here is that Washington should also reconsider past commitments which have outlived their usefulness. … In fact, Tim Sayle, author of Enduring Alliance, notes that U.S. and Canadian officials considered adding to the NATO Treaty an explicit provision to remove countries no longer deemed fit for membership.”
• “It makes no more sense for Washington to anoint new allies, and maintain every alliance forever, irrespective of circumstance. In that vein, the United States and all other NATO members should reconsider Turkey’s status.”

“A Brief Guide to Russia’s Return to the Middle East,” Eugene Rumer and Andrew S. Weiss, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10.24.19: The authors, the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program and the James Family Chair and vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment, write:

• “Despite the chaos unleashed by U.S. President Donald Trump’s abrupt pullout from northern Syria, it would be a mistake to assume that Russia wants to displace the U.S. role in the Middle East completely. Russian leaders likely want Moscow to be seen as on equal footing with the United States and as a regional power broker.”
• “There’s a tendency to ignore Russia’s long history and web of relationships in the Middle East. Many people took the relatively brief period of Russia’s withdrawal from the Middle Eastern scene in the 1990s as the norm. But that was actually an aberration.”
• “The other surprise is the close relationship between Russia and Israel. Israelis pride themselves on being the only democracy in the Middle East and the closest ally of the United States in the region. … But today Russia and Israel have a very close relationship.”
• “Russia is likely to remain an important actor in the Middle East for the foreseeable future. The Kremlin has been careful not to overcommit. It has not overpromised and is pursuing an active diplomatic strategy, which has cost Russia very little in blood or treasure.”

“The Turkish leader has become ever more beholden to his Russian counterpart,” David Gardner, Financial Times, 10.23.19: The author, international affairs editor at the news outlet, writes:

• “Mr. Trump’s pullout from north-east Syria has, for now, given Mr. Erdogan what he wanted: an extension of Turkey’s frontiers southwards into a Syrian buffer zone. But that has left him more vulnerable to Mr. Putin, who is working hard to divide NATO member Turkey from its Western allies. This would seem to be working.”

“Baghdadi's death underscores what we've lost in Syria,” Brett McGurk, The Washington Post, 10.27.19: The author, a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes:

• “The killing of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is great news for the civilized world.”
• “Baghdadi is not an easily replaceable leader. He claimed unique religious credentials as a Muslim caliph, and his declaration of an Islamic State ‘caliphate’ galvanized tens of thousands of foreign fighters to flood into Syria. His successor will keep the Islamic State alive in Iraq and Syria—the group maintains more than 10,000 fighters there—but after five years of sustained pressure it's a weakened organization with no remaining territorial hold.”
• “On the ground in Syria, however—where the Islamic State is plotting its future—it is now more difficult to consolidate this achievement. U.S. forces have already abandoned populated areas, and the SDF has been forced to turn to Russia as its new partner in cities where only one month ago the United States enjoyed local support, access and intelligence.”

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Elections interference:

• No significant commentary.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Trump’s Gift to Putin. The President’s Privatized Foreign Policy Is a Boon for Russia,” Michael McFaul, Foreign Affairs, 10.23.19: The author, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia, writes:

• “Trump’s assault on conventional decision-making processes has allowed him to personalize and privatize U.S. foreign policy, often in ways that benefit the Kremlin more than the White House.”
• “By not even mentioning Russia’s military interventions in Crimea and the Donbas during his call with Zelenskiy, Trump made clear his indifference to Ukraine’s sovereignty and democratic consolidation. That’s a win for Putin. … Trump’s politicization of military assistance weakened the United States’ previously rock-solid commitment to Ukraine’s defense—another gift to Putin.”
• “Trump’s subsequent repeated references to Ukraine as corrupt have likewise damaged the country’s reputation precisely at the moment when a newly elected president and parliament have an opportunity to break with the corruption of the past. Score one more victory for Putin.”
• “Trump’s misguided unilateral decisions in Syria also have played into Putin’s hands: Moscow benefits from the tensions that the Turkish offensive against the Kurds has caused within NATO. … Washington now looks unreliable at a time when Moscow is positioning itself as an alternative power broker in the region—not only to the Kurds but to the Saudis, the Turks and the Israelis.”

“No, Putin Doesn’t Like Impeachment,” Tatiana Stanovaya, Politco, 10.20.19: The author, a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “As impeachment proceedings loom over President Donald Trump, some observers have speculated that Russia, actively enjoying sowing chaos in the United States, is delighted by the dysfunction tearing apart the U.S. government.”
• “This is not the scandal the Kremlin wants for three reasons. First, the Russians were interested in an improvement in Russia-U.S. relations during the Trump presidency. … The second reason … is that the Ukraine scandal undermines Trump’s capacity to conduct his own Russia policy, in opposition to the rest of the U.S. political establishment.”
• “The third and final reason … comes from the growing fear that a private presidential conversation with Trump could be published without Russia’s permission. After the release of a transcript of the July 25 conversation between Trump and Zelenskiy, the Kremlin said that Washington would need Russian consent before publishing any transcripts of conversations between Putin and Trump.”

“The America I Knew as Russia’s Foreign Minister Is Gone,” Andrei V. Kozyrev, New York Times, 10.24.19: The author, Russian’s foreign minister from 1991 to 1996, writes:

• “Russia likes seeing President Trump in the White House in part because it provides the Kremlin a chance to point to the ugly side of American politics—to say, just as they did with Mr. Nixon, look how sordid, how hypocritical.”
• “But I believe that if Congress, Republicans and Democrats alike, act to remove this president, a new powerful message would be sent to governments and people around the globe, just like the one that went out in 1974: Moral principles still matter in American politics and policy. And the future still belongs to moral truth and to those who embrace it.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Why Serbia Won’t Stop Playing the Russia Card Any Time Soon,” Vuk Vuksanovic, Carnegie Moscow Center, 10.28.19. The author, a PhD researcher in international relations at the London School of Economics, writes:

• “As long as Serbia lacks a solution to the Kosovo dispute that it can sell both to its international partners and to people at home, and as long as Serbia is denied a clear path to EU integration, it will continue to keep the Russia card up its sleeve.”

“Britain and Russia Are Europe’s Odd Couple,” Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 10.28.19: The author, chief foreign affairs columnist for the news outlet, writes:       

• “Britain and Russia are on the fringes of the European continent. Partly as a result, the two have traditionally had a dual identity—regarding themselves both as European and as something more. Nearly 80 percent of Russia’s landmass is in Asia. The British empire was built outside Europe and the country still has strong cultural ties with the ‘Anglosphere’ in North America, Australasia and south Asia.”
• “[I]t is unsurprising that the U.K. and Russia are likely to end up as the two major European powers that stand outside the EU. However, both countries will continue to worry about the EU’s collective power.”
• “In an increasingly bad situation, the U.K. (or possibly just England) would play what few cards it has—cutting back on security and diplomatic cooperation with Europe, and working with forces that are hostile to the EU. These threats are not taken very seriously in EU capitals at the moment because Britain is in such a mess. The same dismissive attitude was adopted toward the Russians in the 1990s. After all, their country had just fallen apart and their economy was in freefall. But, spurred on by a feeling of humiliation, Russia reasserted its power—in ways that the EU now finds alarming.”
• “The lesson is that countries that have been major European powers for centuries are unlikely simply to drift into irrelevance. Their interests need to be accommodated. If that cannot be done, they will have to be confronted. Either way, a European construction that excludes Britain and Russia is unlikely to be either stable or secure.”

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

“Tacit Alliance: Russia and China Take Military Partnership to New Level,” Vassily Kashin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 10.22.19: The author, a senior fellow at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, writes:

• “Russian President Vladimir Putin’s speech at the recent Valdai forum contained two fundamental points regarding China. His official confirmation that Russia is helping China to create a missile launch detection system got more attention, but of no little importance was Putin’s assessment of the state of Russian-Chinese relations: ‘This is an allied relationship in the full sense of a multifaceted strategic partnership.’”
• “For a long time … both countries rejected the very idea of alliances as only increasing tensions in various parts of the world. They carefully avoided using the word ‘ally’ in regard to each other until relatively recently … [S]ince 2018, military cooperation between the two countries has reached a new level. … [P]rimarily the full-fledged expansion of cooperation to cover strategic arms. The Russian leadership has acknowledged that it helped China to create a missile launch detection system, and for any country, this is the most important and sensitive component in the strategic nuclear forces control system.”
• “The new level can be expected to include cooperation in other sensitive fields, such as strategic missile defense, hypersonic technology and the construction of nuclear submarines.”
• “In the event of a fallout with China … [t]he increased capability of the Chinese navy, construction of a Chinese missile launch detection system, strategic anti-missile defense and an increase in the number of intercontinental missiles don’t pose any particular problem for Moscow. By cooperating with China in these areas, therefore, Russia loses virtually nothing in terms of security, while making life difficult for the United States, strengthening its relationship with a key partner, and gaining a significant economic advantage.”
• “This new caliber of Sino-Russian military relations will likely be enshrined in the Sino-Russian agreement on military cooperation, which will replace a rather vague document signed in 1993 and is likely to be signed in the near future.”

“Putin and Xi: Ice Cream Buddies and Tandem Strongmen,” Elizabeth Wishnick, PONARS Eurasia, October 2019: The author, a professor of political science at Montclair State University, writes:

• “As Moscow and Beijing enter into the 70th year of their relationship since the Communist Revolution in China, what does the apparent bromance between Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin portend for their countries? One short answer: increased Russian ice cream sales in China. Putin’s gift of IceBerry ice cream to Xi in 2016 after the Hangzhou G20 summit led to a 267 percent increase in sales of Russian ice cream [in China] the following year.”
• “While personalistic ties may enable Putin and Xi to push forward with key deals, over the long run, this will prevent constituencies from forming within their governments and societies that will be needed to maintain the relationship far down the road. Ice cream-induced bonhomie notwithstanding, this was made very clear when the 10-year cooperation program between the Russian Far East and the Chinese Northeast was scrapped at the end of 2018, replaced with a much less ambitious shorter-term agenda for 2018-2024.”

“Russia and China in Africa: Allies or Rivals?” Vita Spivak, Carnegie Moscow Center, 10.25.19: The author, analytical projects head at a credit rating agency, writes:

• “Russia can’t compete with China in terms of their influence in Africa, so Moscow’s attempts to make inroads there do not alarm Beijing. But as China asserts itself in the role of the major power in Africa, Moscow’s dual influence (such as selling weapons to different sides of a conflict in the same country) could become an impediment to stabilization.”

“The United States Should Fear a Faltering China,” Michael Beckley, Foreign Affairs, 10.28.19: The author, an associate professor of political science at Tufts University, writes:

• “Beijing’s newfound assertiveness looks at first glance like the mark of growing power and ambition. But in fact it is nothing of the sort. China’s actions reflect profound unease among the country’s leaders, as they contend with their country’s first sustained economic slowdown in a generation and can discern no end in sight. China’s economic conditions have steadily worsened since the 2008 financial crisis. The country’s growth rate has fallen by half and is likely to plunge further in the years ahead, as debt, foreign protectionism, resource depletion and rapid aging take their toll.”
• “China’s economic woes will make it a less competitive rival in the long term but a greater threat to the United States today. When rising powers have suffered such slowdowns in the past, they became more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad. China seems to be headed down just such a path.”
• “When fast-growing great powers run out of economic steam, they typically do not mellow out. Rather, they become prickly and aggressive. … The historical precedents are plentiful. … Russia, too, had a late-nineteenth-century slowdown. … As recently as 2009, world oil prices collapsed, which led a stagnating Russia to pressure its neighbors to join a regional trade bloc. A few years later, that campaign of coercion spurred Ukraine’s Maidan revolution and Russia’s annexation of Crimea.”
• “The question, then, is not whether a struggling rising power will expand abroad but what form that expansion will take.”
• “Perhaps in a few decades, Chinese power will gradually mellow. Now, however, is a moment of maximum danger, because China is too weak to feel secure or satisfied with its place in the world order but strong enough to destroy it. … [T]he United States must contain China’s outbursts with a careful blend of deterrence, reassurance and damage limitation. Compared to gearing up for a whole-of-society throwdown against a rising superpower, this mission may seem uninspiring. But it would be smarter—and ultimately more effective.”

Ukraine:

“Five Years of War in the Donbas,” Robert E. Hamilton, Foreign Policy Research Institute, October 2019: The author, a Black Sea Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, writes:

• “Prospects for settling the war are better now than at any time since it started, for three reasons. The first is the exhaustion and frustration in the separatist-controlled Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic.”
• “The next reason for optimism is Russia’s changing attitude toward the war, which is at least in part a result of the Russian public’s dissatisfaction with Kremlin policy in Ukraine.”
• “Finally, the election of Volodymyr Zelenskiy to the Ukrainian presidency and the control of parliament by his party gives a mandate to a government uniquely positioned to bring the disparate parts of Ukraine together under a single national identity and ideal.”

“Zelenskiy Finds That There Are No Easy Solutions in Donbas,” Duncan Allan and Leo Litra, Chatham House, 10.23.19: The authors, an associate fellow at Chatham House and a senior research fellow at the New Europe Center, write:

• “During the 2019 presidential election campaign, Zelenskiy repeatedly promised that, if elected, he would re-energize efforts to end the war. … But his initiative quickly ran into two problems.”
• “First … concluding that Zelenskiy was vulnerable, the Kremlin welcomed his announcement about the Steinmeier Formula but declined to assent to a summit, hoping to extract further concessions.”
• “Second, Zelenskiy’s action triggered protests in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities. … Ukrainian public opinion wants an end to the war, but apparently not at any price. … Zelenskiy may now attempt to ‘freeze’ the conflict by ending active operations. This is not Ukraine’s favored outcome but could be the most realistic one in current conditions.”

“Who Revolts? Empirically Revisiting the Social Origins of Democracy,” Sirianne Dahlum, Carl Henrik Knutsen and Tore Wig, The Journal of Politics, October 2019: The authors, a senior researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo and a professor and an associate professor at the University of Oslo, write:

• “Several prominent accounts suggest that democratic transitions are more likely to take place when opposition to the incumbent regime is led by certain social groups. We further develop the argument that opposition movements dominated by industrial workers or the urban middle classes have both the requisite motivation and capacity to bring about democratization.”
• “We find that movements dominated by one of these urban groups more often result in democracy, both when compared to other movements and to situations without organized mass opposition. … When further differentiating the groups and accounting for plausible alternative explanations, the relationship between industrial worker campaigns and democratization is very robust, whereas the evidence is mixed for middle-class campaigns.
• “Regarding the estimated short-term effect, Polyarchy increases by about 0.05 in t+1t+1 given an IW [industrial workers] campaign in t, comparable to the change in Ukraine from the start of the Orange Revolution to the year after it finished (0.05).”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant commentary.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“As Putin Era Begins to Wane, Russia Unleashes a Sweeping Crackdown,” Andrew Higgins, New York Times, 10.24.19: The author, Moscow bureau chief for the news outlet, writes:

• “After a teenager blew himself up inside a branch of Russia’s secret police near the Arctic Circle late last year, a freelance journalist hundreds of miles to the south drew what she thought was ‘an obvious and banal’ conclusion in her weekly radio commentary. Her conclusion—that relentless repression by Russia’s security forces is radicalizing Russian youth— =now has the journalist, Svetlana Prokopyeva, facing up to seven years in jail for ‘publicly inciting terrorism.”
• “The prosecution of Ms. Prokopyeva and other harmless critics comes against the backdrop of foreboding and uncertainty over what might follow Mr. Putin, who has anchored the system for nearly two decades. Even the question of whether he will depart as scheduled in 2024 is the subject of speculation, since he remains more popular than any opponent despite a dip in his ratings.”
• “The resulting jitters, exacerbated by economic stagnation and mostly small but widespread protests that erupted this summer, have left Russia’s numerous law-enforcement bodies scrambling to prove their mettle against potential threats, no matter how puny, and secure their future in a country they all view as a fortress besieged by enemies at home and abroad.

“Might Before Rights: Russia Shakes Up Its Human Rights Council,” Andrey Pertsev, Carnegie Moscow Center, 10.23.19: The author, a journalist with Kommersant, writes:

• “The replacement of Russia’s Human Rights Council head Mikhail Fedotov, who was completely loyal to the authorities, with United Russia party member Valery Fadeyev, determines the council’s status once and for all. It is first and foremost a presidential council, and only then a human rights council.”
• “It looks as though the presidential human rights protection system from now on will be to correct particularly odious actions by the authorities, when the system accepts that it has made a serious mistake: when a completely innocent person is being prosecuted, and people begin to speak out for that person en masse, including high-profile people. The system will amend incidents that post a serious threat to its image, while declining to notice those that are less of a risk. This activity can be summed up as the simultaneous defense of both human rights and the state’s image.”

“Development in the Russian Regions and the 2019 Elections. Is There a Correlation Between Economy and Politics?” Natalia Zubarevich, PONARS Eurasia, October 2019: The author, director of the regions program at the Independent Institute of Social Policy, writes:

• “Two trends have taken shape in Russia: the wealthier and more educated residents of large urban centers demand institutional change, while those in less developed regions acquiesce to the existing rules of the game and lay their expectations on their governors.”
• “At this point, only Moscow demonstrates a new model of electoral behavior. Objective trends, such as the concentration of educated, high-income constituencies in the largest urban centers, contribute to the modernization of values and institutions, including in the electoral realm. The government strongly resists this dynamic, and the results of modernization are unlikely to manifest themselves in the near future. The expansion of modern values from large urban centers to less developed regions is a lengthy process, but it has already begun.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.