Russia Analytical Report, Sept. 13-20, 2021
This Week’s Highlights
“Moscow and Beijing have not outright challenged the U.S.-led security order in the [Middle East], because they benefit from it: It has provided the security umbrella for them to become more involved in the region without having to assume the costs of physically protecting their interests,” argues Jon Hoffman, a Ph.D. candidate at George Mason University. “Indeed, their ability to continue their low-cost maneuvering in the region would be undermined by a U.S. absence. In the Middle East, Russia and China are opportunists, not revisionists.” “Washington should explore selective engagement with Moscow about securing a formal ceasefire in Syria’s northwest and reaching agreement on a ‘no-foreign forces zone’ in Syria’s south,” writes Aaron Stein, director of research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI).
“Western policymakers need to be clear-eyed about Russian strategic interests in Afghanistan and the wider region, which are dominated by concerns about maintaining partner relationships among Central Asian states and assuring a prominent place at the table for any post-U.S. regional security architecture,” argue Mary Chesnut and Julian G. Waller, associate research analysts at the Center for Naval Analyses’ (CNA) Russia Studies Program.
“Minsk’s isolation from the West and the transition of power that has already begun there will create a window of opportunity for the Kremlin and the temptation to fundamentally increase its political influence in the neighboring country,” writes Dzianis Melyantsou, coordinator of Belarus's Foreign Policy Program of the Minsk Dialogue Council on International Relations. “But putting too much pressure on Belarus right now could backfire and lead to unforeseen consequences. It would appear that Russia understands that, and is therefore playing the long game on integration, seeing it as a safer option.”
“By leaving its own storage facilities in Europe at very low levels, Gazprom is effectively declining to supply itself, and signaling to the industry that the market will be tight. Such actions can spook the market even if Gazprom is supplying its long-term customers,” writes David Sheppard, energy editor for the Financial Times.
“Russia’s ruling party retained a two-thirds majority in the lower house of Parliament and claimed a sweeping victory in opposition-minded Moscow—a stark display of Kremlin power as the authorities on Monday announced the results of a nationwide parliamentary election that opposition leaders denounced as blatantly falsified,” reports Anton Troianovski, Moscow bureau chief for The New York Times. “It was not clear what, if anything, critics of the outcome could do about the situation. The judiciary is under the thumb of the Kremlin, while prominent opposition figures are exiled or behind bars. Street protests are increasingly punished by jail terms. In all, the outcome further demonstrated Mr. Putin’s strengthening lock on political life—and served, perhaps, as a dress rehearsal for the presidential election of 2024, in which Mr. Putin could seek a fifth term.”
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security:
“Twenty years after 9/11, terrorists could still go nuclear,” Matthew Bunn, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 09.16.21. The author, the James R. Schlesinger Professor of the Practice of Energy, National Security, and Foreign Policy at Harvard Kennedy School and the Co-Principal Investigator of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center, writes:
- “The momentum of nuclear security improvement has slowed. There is still a need to ensure that nuclear weapons, materials and facilities are protected against the full range of plausible threats—especially from insiders, who appear to pose the biggest nuclear security problem. The rise of domestic violent extremists in the United States and other advanced democracies makes the insider threat even more challenging. There is still a need for realistic tests and assessments of nuclear security systems’ real capabilities against intelligent adversaries looking for ways to beat them. And there’s still a need to strengthen nuclear security culture—to make sure the staff and guards at nuclear facilities are giving security the priority it needs, day-in and day-out.”
- “If terrorists ever did manage to turn the heart of a modern city into a smoldering radioactive ruin, they would change history. The economic, political and social consequences would reverberate far and wide. ... President Biden has warned of these dangers. Now is the time for him to act. Despite the many other priorities on his desk, it is time for him to launch a new, expanded nuclear security initiative, working to ensure that nuclear stockpiles worldwide are secure and accounted for to the highest standards, that major obstacles are placed in the path of nuclear smugglers, that states are deterred from helping terrorists with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, and that terrorist nuclear plots are found and stopped. The risk of a nuclear 9/11 will persist as long as high-capability terrorists and the materials needed to make a nuclear bomb both exist in the world.”
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:
- No significant developments.
Iran:
“Iranian Membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Motivations and Implications,” Nicole Grajewski, The Washington Institute, 09.15.21. The author, an international security fellow at the Belfer Center and a doctoral candidate in international relations at the University of Oxford, writes:
- “The SCO is often portrayed as an inherently anti-Western bloc, with some even calling it the ‘anti-NATO.’ Yet differences between individual member states have constrained the bloc’s policy coordination and regional integration since its inception. This is partly due to institutional design—the SCO is governed by consensus, which limits the extent of substantive cooperation, while its two permanent bodies (the Secretariat in Beijing and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure in Tashkent) lack the legal capacity to enforce decisions. Consequently, the SCO functions more as a forum for discussion and engagement than a formal regional alliance akin to the EU or NATO.”
- “In practical terms, then, conferring membership on Iran will have only modest implications. Tehran will now be able to partake in SCO decisionmaking, including the preparation and signing of documents. Yet despite the organization’s reliance on consensus, giving Iran a say is unlikely to entail any fundamental changes to the organization’s posture, since China and Russia remain crucial to Tehran’s foreign policy and will presumably sway its votes on important matters.”
- “Iran’s full accession to the SCO—a process that could take up to two years once formally set in motion—is unlikely to spur substantive changes to the organization itself. Rather, the move should be viewed in the context of Tehran’s efforts to alleviate its international isolation by expanding bilateral and multilateral ties with Russia, China, and the Central Asian states. Membership would also bolster Tehran’s role in managing regional security and further its quest to add an ‘Eastern vector’ to its foreign policy.”
Great Power rivalry/New Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:
“Why Aukus is welcome in the Indo-Pacific,” Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 09.20.21. The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:
- “The Australia-U.K.-U.S. security pact—Aukus—has been greeted with rage in China and France. But more significant than the flamboyant anger in Beijing and Paris are the countries that are quietly applauding the agreement. The many Indo-Pacific nations that are worried by China’s increasing belligerence look to America, not France, to balance Chinese power. Japan and India, the two largest economies in the region outside China, have welcomed Aukus. Later this week, the White House will host a summit meeting of the leaders of the Quad—the U.S., India, Japan and Australia. Week by week, the U.S. is visibly strengthening its network of security relationships across the Indo-Pacific.”
- “The attempt to contain Chinese power will heighten tensions with Beijing. But the alternative would be to accept uncomplainingly China’s efforts to dominate the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. and its allies have decided to draw a line.”
“American Global Leadership Is in Retreat,” Walter Russell Mead, The Wall Street Journal, 09.13.21. The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:
- “Globalists have so far failed to master the challenges of the 21st century. Progress on international trade liberalization stalled as the World Trade Organization's last comprehensive round of global trade talks ground to a halt during the Obama years. Since then, protectionism has been on the rise. Liberal democracy is also losing ground. Surveys by democracy monitors like Freedom House show a steady decline in political freedom around the world. Meanwhile, China, Russia and Iran are challenging American power with growing success. The problems facing the liberal world order are more acute and urgent than they were in 2001; the order's resources to address them have diminished.”
- “More failures seem likely. The fall of Hong Kong, the consolidation of Russian power in Belarus, the Afghan collapse, and gains by Iranian clients across the Middle East signal to both U.S. allies and adversaries that Washington has lost control of geopolitical events. The liberal order's record in managing global challenges ranging from COVID-19 to migration to climate change also remains uninspiring.”
- “The Biden administration occupies an unenviable spot. Its goals on issues like climate change, human rights and denuclearization would have been difficult, if not impossible, to achieve even at the height of U.S. geopolitical dominance a quarter-century ago. Today, the determined and focused hostility to American world leadership emanating from Beijing, Moscow and Tehran limits Washington's ability to orchestrate a global diplomatic consensus around those ambitious goals.”
“Russia’s Response to US Withdrawal From Afghanistan: Criticism of US, Concerns About Security Environment,” Mary Chesnut and Julian G. Waller, Russia Matters, 09.14.21. The authors, associate research analysts at the Center for Naval Analyses’ (CNA) Russia Studies Program, write:
- “While schadenfreude and strategic anti-U.S. messaging forms the most visible aspect of Russia’s immediate response, Moscow’s more material concerns—regional instability, narcotics trafficking and the spread of radical Islamic terrorism—should not be understated. As Afghanistan’s political order readjusts under the Taliban, expect Moscow to vie for an outsized role in the process … Thus far, official Russian messaging toward the Taliban can be characterized as somewhere between cautious optimism and a more measured ‘wait and see’ approach.”
- “Western policymakers need to be clear-eyed about Russian strategic interests in Afghanistan and the wider region, which are dominated by concerns about maintaining partner relationships among Central Asian states and assuring a prominent place at the table for any post-U.S. regional security architecture.”
- “Overall, these initial reactions provide an image that Moscow is primarily concerned with the evolving, uncertain security environment, particularly as it affects regional stability, refugees, illicit drug flow and the growth of radical Islamic terrorism. While Putin and other Russian domestic political actors have been quick to point out American weaknesses, much of the Russian response has been focused on seeking to reassure Central Asian states while aiming to leverage Russian influence as the crisis unfolds. Russia has also utilized the withdrawal to publicly fortify its negative position toward Western state-building. It remains to be seen how Russian reactions will evolve as the transition to confirmed Taliban rule continues.”
“Neither Russia nor China Could Fill a U.S. Void in the Middle East,” Jon Hoffman, Foreign Policy, 09.15.21. The author, a Ph.D. candidate at George Mason University, writes:
- “The 20th anniversary of 9/11 and America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan have renewed debate over whether the United States should remain so deeply engaged militarily in the broader Middle East.”
- “More recently, however, the topic of great-power competition among the United States, Russia, and China in the Middle East has increasingly moved to the forefront of such debates, and U.S. officials and policy analysts have begun raising the alarm over the possibility of Moscow or Beijing filling the void if Washington were to withdraw militarily from the region.”
- “U.S. policymakers should dispel the myth that Russia or China are capable—or willing—to fill a void in the Middle East if the United States were to withdraw militarily. This narrative has primarily been used by those who have their own special interests in keeping the United States deeply engaged in the region, namely regional partners who have for too long exploited this fear of losing ground to either Russia or China in order to extort concessions from Washington.”
- “Moscow and Beijing have not outright challenged the U.S.-led security order in the region, because they benefit from it: It has provided the security umbrella for them to become more involved in the region without having to assume the costs of physically protecting their interests. Indeed, their ability to continue their low-cost maneuvering in the region would be undermined by a U.S. absence. In the Middle East, Russia and China are opportunists, not revisionists.”
China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?
- No significant developments.
Missile defense:
- No significant developments.
Nuclear arms control:
“Nuclear Dilemma: New Challenges for a New Era of Arms Control,” Peter Huessy, The National Interest, 09.19.21. The author, director of strategic deterrent studies at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, writes:
- “Combining Russia’s maximum possible deployed nuclear weapons under New START with a modest Chinese buildup yields a total of 3,500 to 5,000 deployed strategic nuclear weapons within two to four years. That is a significant increase from the 2,500 deployed nuclear warheads assumed today. Russia’s six strategic systems not declared under New START restrictions create further uncertainty. China’s deployment of new DF-41 missiles could mean thousands of new warheads, perhaps exceeding the total number of American warheads deployed and on alert. This would likely require a unique tripartite nuclear arms deal between or among Russia, China and the United States. … A number of obstacles stand in the way of such an agreement.”
- “China has never been transparent with respect to its nuclear forces, nor forthcoming about its nuclear strategy or policy. Beijing has shown zero interest in formal nuclear arms deals. … [T]he presence of additional uncontrolled theater nuclear forces in China and Russia may tip the nuclear balance against the United States. This could worsen strategic stability, and even make the possible use of nuclear weapons more likely.”
- “Russia and China’s theater or non-strategic nuclear forces will likely have to be included in any arms agreement. There is no precedent for that … China is seeking a highly coercive capability to prevent the United States from coming to the defense of its allies. This would tear the fabric of our nuclear umbrella, undermining both nuclear and conventional deterrence. … Most importantly, without a continued firm firebreak preventing nuclear weapons from ever being used, our current strategy to prevent conventional conflict cannot be sustained.”
- “Will future arms control be able to help resolve this geostrategic puzzle, or will other combined measures such as enhanced nuclear modernization, long-range conventional strike, and missile defenses have to fill the gap between current American deterrence and future requirements? … Better would be a combination of nuclear, missile defense and conventional strike modernization and if possible a smart, supportive verifiable arms deal.”
Counter-terrorism:
“Al Qaeda Versus ISIS. The Jihadi Power Struggle in the Taliban’s Afghanistan,” Cole Bunzel, Foreign Affairs, 09.14.21. The author, a fellow at the Hoover Institution, writes:
- “Both al Qaeda and ISIS face serious challenges in trying to reestablish themselves in Afghanistan. The return of the Taliban could create the biggest opportunity for al Qaeda to reconstitute and reorganize in more than a decade, but it is not well positioned to seize it. ISIS will seek to play a spoiler role, but it will have a hard time winning domestic support or matching the Taliban in terms of manpower and resources. The United States, meanwhile, will continue to attempt to degrade both groups through continued drone strikes—in the case of ISIS, potentially with Taliban support.”
- “None of this is to minimize the threat that these jihadi groups pose to Afghanistan, its neighbors, and the world. The United States and its allies must remain vigilant and proactive, lest one or both of these groups reemerge in force. But how successful the jihadis might be in utilizing Afghanistan remains to be seen. Their success is by no means a foregone conclusion.”
Conflict in Syria:
“Engaging Russia over Syria: Managing Peripheral Conflict and Narrowing Interests,” Aaron Stein, Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), September 2021. The author, director of research at FPRI, writes:
- “The United States is examining how to narrow core objectives in the Middle East to focus on improving military readiness and increasing the number of low-density, high-demand assets available for deployment in Asia and Europe.”
- “To free up more forces and to help improve readiness, Washington should explore selective engagement with Moscow about securing a formal ceasefire in Syria’s northwest and reaching agreement on a ‘no-foreign forces zone’ in Syria’s south. This policy would not alter the status quo in Syria, but seek to use diplomatic tools to allow for the reallocation of certain resources now tasked with protecting U.S. ground forces. This engagement with the Russian Federation would elevate a key U.S. interest and use counter-terrorism capabilities based in Jordan to disrupt plots against the homeland. It would also seek to use diplomatic tools to create conditions to remove forces that do not directly support this counter-terrorism effort. This approach would retain U.S. forces in the Middle East, but in a way that allows for certain assets to be repositioned in either the United States, Indo-Pacific, or Europe.”
“Russia’s Forever Wars: Syria and the Pursuit of Great Power Status,” Robert E. Hamilton, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 09.15.21. The author, an associate professor of Eurasian Studies at the U.S. Army War College and a Black Sea Fellow at FPRI, writes:
- “Having failed in its attempt to rebuild the Syrian Army and have it assume the lead in the war, Russia has been quietly reinforcing its contingent in Syria, which some estimates now put as high as 13,000.”
- “Russia’s struggle to extricate itself from Syria is a problem. The Russian public’s increasing weariness with the Kremlin’s foreign adventures is a bigger one. A recent poll by the Russian Levada Center found that only 32% of Russians say it is important for Russia to be a superpower respected by others—the lowest figure in the Vladimir Putin decades—while 66% say a high standard of living is more important than being a major power.”
- “Although they may feed the Kremlin’s view of itself as a power on the rise and its need to compete with the West, especially the United States, the deployments do little to assuage the concerns of ordinary Russians. Russia is not a democracy, but its government must still be attentive to the will of the public. In the two-plus decades of Putin’s presence at the seat of Russia’s government, his claim to legitimacy was based either on his stewardship of the economy or his ability to protect Russia from the alleged threat posed by the West.”
- “Unless it is able to balance its desire for great power status with an ability to address the concerns of Russians, Moscow may find its foray into high-stakes geopolitics costlier than anticipated.”
Cyber security:
- No significant developments.
Energy exports from CIS:
“Why some see the hand of Russia in Europe’s gas price crisis,” David Sheppard, Financial Times, 09.18.21. The author, energy editor for the news outlet, writes:
- “Record prices across the U.K. and continental Europe have drawn attention to lower supplies of natural gas from Russia this summer, leaving many questioning whether a quiet squeeze of the market has been executed by Moscow.”
- “Critics say the strongest evidence that Gazprom is playing a dangerous game with the market can be found in the data on European storage. Despite total storage being lower than normal, European energy companies have broadly managed to top up inventories at facilities they control to a reasonable level. Most of the storage in Europe that has not been filled is actually controlled by Gazprom itself.”
- “By leaving its own storage facilities in Europe at very low levels, Gazprom is effectively declining to supply itself, and signaling to the industry that the market will be tight. Such actions can spook the market even if Gazprom is supplying its long-term customers.”
- “If Gazprom were to start to fill its European-based storage now, prices would be likely to stabilize or retreat. But while winter might be coming, whether any more Russian gas will arrive with it remains in doubt.”
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
- No significant developments.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
“We Can No Longer Expect Google and Apple to Fight for Internet Freedom,” Andrei Soldatov, The Moscow Times, 09.20.21. The author, a Russian investigative journalist, writes:
- “The news of Google and Apple finally succumbing to Kremlin pressure and taking down Navalny’s app caused confusion and understandable anger among Russian liberals. But it was hardly surprising.”
- “The idea that there is a substantial, almost ideological difference between the way tech and internet giants do business and, say, energy companies like BP or Shell, is based on the idea that tech giants’ business models are based on winning and maintaining the trust of their customers.”
- “In the book ‘The Red Web,’ Valery Bardin, one of the Soviet Union’s internet pioneers, who was in charge of maintaining the first Soviet Internet network, Relcom, explained why he decided to keep the line open during the 1991 August coup, despite personal risks.”
- “‘We were already on the losing side, just because information exchange is what Relcom was all about. We would be the enemies of the regime anyway, no matter what we did.’ But today, exactly 30 years later, the Internet is more, and less, than it was in 1991—it is part of the country’s infrastructure. We don't expect gas stations to go on strike, do we?”
“Facade falls away from Vladimir Putin’s fake democracy,” Editorial Board, Financial Times, 09.16.21. The news outlet’s editorial board writes:
- “Authoritarian systems can sometimes be ‘enlightened,’ with intentions to drive through liberalizing reforms or even pave the way for a transition to democracy. Some in the president’s circle in the early 2000s believed this was his plan. Instead, the regime’s essential emptiness has become clear. The urge to cling to office is motivated by what some insiders say is a messianic delusion that only Putin stands between Russia and chaos. It reflects, too, his own fear and that of system insiders of what might become of them all if he were toppled.”
- “This is a misfortune for Russia’s people, above all. But it is hazardous for global security. Putin remembers how his popularity surged after the 2014 annexation of Crimea; Moscow continues efforts to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty and is increasing its sway over Belarus in return for bolstering Lukashenko. Portraying Russia as a ‘besieged fortress’ that the West is bent on undermining both reflects genuine Kremlin paranoia and is useful for rallying patriotic support. European leaders mostly understand this threat; the Biden administration, more focused on China, should pay closer heed.”
II. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
“In Russia Election Results, Online Votes Sweep Putin Opponents Aside,” Anton Troianovski, The New York Times, 09.20.21. The author, Moscow bureau chief for the news outlet, writes:
- “Russia’s ruling party retained a two-thirds majority in the lower house of Parliament and claimed a sweeping victory in opposition-minded Moscow—a stark display of Kremlin power as the authorities on [Sept. 20] announced the results of a nationwide parliamentary election that opposition leaders denounced as blatantly falsified.”
- “Partial results released after the polls closed on Sunday evening had shown significant gains by opposition parties and potential victories by several candidates supported by the imprisoned opposition leader Aleksei A. Navalny. But by the time Russia’s Central Election Commission revealed a nearly full count on Monday, those gains were largely gone—prompting anger from Kremlin critics, claims of large-scale fraud and scattered calls for protests.”
- “Russian elections are not free and fair, and the country’s best known opposition figures were barred from the ballot, jailed or exiled in the months before … But Mr. Navalny’s allies had hoped to use a coordinated protest vote … to deliver a rebuke to President Vladimir V. Putin.”
- “The focal point of the opposition’s anger … was the Russian capital, a stronghold of anti-Kremlin sentiment where the government had urged voters to cast their ballots online. Challengers to the ruling party, United Russia, led in several electoral districts before the results of online voting were tabulated, with a delay, on Monday. Soon after, the election commission declared the pro-Kremlin candidate the victor in each of those districts.”
- “As a result, the ruling United Russia party swept to a dominant performance and kept its two-thirds ‘supermajority’ in the lower house of Parliament, the Duma—all despite recording approval ratings below 30 percent … The party received 50% of the vote with 52% turnout—and won 198 of the 225 seats … In all, the outcome further demonstrated Mr. Putin’s strengthening lock on political life—and served, perhaps, as a dress rehearsal for the presidential election of 2024, in which Mr. Putin could seek a fifth term.”
“Will Russia’s Upcoming Duma Elections Change Anything At All?” Andrei Kolesnikov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 09.15.21. The author, a senior fellow and the chair of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:
- “Once the Duma elections are over, protests are unlikely, since the opposition and civil society are demoralized. This is not 2011, when electoral fraud at the Duma elections triggered mass protests. Back then, basic civic activism didn’t amount to breaking the law, and compromise, dialogue and vacillation within the establishment were still possible. Over the last ten years, the enlightened velvet autocracy that had eased somewhat during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency (2008–2012) has transitioned to full-fledged authoritarianism.”
- “The few new faces that will appear in the Duma following the loyalist reshuffle won’t bring about even the slightest change in the political system. The regime crackdown will intensify: it has very little to do with the elections, but it is part of the regime’s strategy following last year’s resetting of the clock on presidential terms. The Kremlin will get what it wanted: the Duma as an institute of support for a political system that is entering a stage not of transition, but effectively another reset in 2024.”
“There’s a Reason Putin Keeps Winning,” Ilya Yablokov, The New York Times, 09.20.21. The author, a lecturer in journalism and digital media at Sheffield University, England, writes:
- “Elections in Russia are always tricky for the Kremlin. Offer too much choice, and citizens may pick the wrong candidates. Offer too little, and the underlying authoritarianism of the regime becomes grimly apparent. This year, for the parliamentary elections that began on Friday [Sept. 17] and end on Sunday [Sept. 19], President Vladimir Putin is not taking any chances. From the moment Alexei Navalny, the opposition leader and the Kremlin’s best-known critic, returned to the country in January, the president has overseen a wave of repression.”
- “Funded to the tune of billions of dollars by those close to Mr. Putin, the media preys on the population’s worst fears. The threats of economic disaster and territorial disintegration, in a country that suffered both in the 1990s, are constantly invoked: Only loyalty to the Kremlin can keep the monsters at bay. The European Union, Britain and the United States are portrayed as sites of moral decay, rife with political instability and impoverishment. In a country where 72 percent of the population doesn’t have a [foreign travel] passport and where the financial means to travel abroad remain generally out of reach, such messages find a receptive audience.”
- “There are still a few independent local and nationwide media outlets in Russia. Though they can hardly compete with state-funded television channels and newspapers, they are able to reach a sizable slice of the population.”
- “The situation, though bleak, is not lost. Independent journalists and outlets continue to find a way to operate, inventively sidestepping the constraints cast on them by the Kremlin through canny crowdfunding and humor. In this, they offer an example to other independent journalists around the world fighting to keep authoritarian politicians accountable.”
- “Even so, Mr. Putin’s media method—propaganda on one hand, repression on the other—continues to bear fruit. Faced with a stagnant economy, an aging population and simmering discontent, it surely can’t go on forever. But, for now, it’s working.”
“Why Putin Is Obsessed With ‘Foreign Agents,’” Natia Seskuria, Foreign Policy, 09.13.21. The author, an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, writes:
- “Russian President Vladimir Putin has reason to be concerned: The popularity of his party, United Russia, has been in steep decline in recent years... Putin’s response to this predicament is less startling: He’s branding his most influential political enemies and critics ‘foreign agents.’”
- “Putin has used Russia’s ‘foreign agents’ law for nearly a decade, but now he’s enhanced it. A series of amendments, enacted on Dec. 30 last year, allows the regime to target any organization that receives foreign funds or any individual who voices criticism of Putin, even on social media.”
- “For the first time in Russia’s recent history, the country has a unifying opposition figure with now-jailed Alexei Navalny, who has somehow managed both to consolidate the opposition around his leadership and motivate young activists to take to the streets... Navalny’s smart voting strategy—which involves voting for whichever politicians are most likely to defeat Putin’s United Russia candidates—spurred the Kremlin to enhance the ‘foreign agents’ law.”
- “One of the Kremlin’s primary targets is investigative journalism.”
- “Putin’s recent demonstration of power sheds light on the regime’s long-term vulnerabilities. By targeting smaller media outlets as well as more prominent ones, the Kremlin hopes to avoid Belarus-style mass protests. But by closing off a necessary safety valve—even as social, economic, and political pressures continue to build—Putin’s strategy could backfire.”
Defense and aerospace:
“Zapad 2021 and Russia’s Potential for Warfighting,” Johan Norberg and Natalie Simpson, Foreign Policy Research Institute, September 2021. The authors, a fellow and an intern at FPRI, write:
- “For which maximum scale and scope of military conflict is Russia preparing its armed forces? Based on an outline of Russian major exercises in terms of mission, quantity of forces, readiness and C2, it is clear that Russia’s war fighting potential has increased in the past decade ... Russian STRATEXes in 2010—2020, enables two conclusions.”
- “First, Russia’s ambition for warfighting potential as mirrored in exercises has always been to carry out strategic-level warfighting operations against a peer adversary. That corresponds to a potential to fight at least a regional war with conventional forces.”
- “Secondly, in the early 2010s, the available warfighting potential for Russian commanders was low. The level of participating forces, some tens of thousands, did not match the C2 scope of the exercises. That available potential in terms of forces in exercises probably enabled exercising forces for at most operational level, which corresponds more closely to the level of local war. Not anymore. The trend since 2014 is force participation in the hundreds of thousands.”
- “In the past decade, Russia's military leaders have used military exercises to put the Russian military body through repeated and increasingly ambitious training for its brain, nervous system and muscles. Limbs have become stronger and better coordinated. Russia's political leadership now has a useful military tool, be it for limited direct interventions such as in Donbas and Syria or as an escalation potential to deter or intimidate other states. Just as one session at the gym does not make a body strong, one STRATEX does not build war fighting potential. Russian STRATEXes since 2010 have in a sense been repeated gym sessions for Russia’s military body. Russia's current political leadership probably wants to retain that military fitness. Expect more sessions at the gym for the Russian military body.”
Security, law-enforcement and justice:
- No significant developments.
III. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:
- No significant developments.
Ukraine:
- No significant developments.
Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:
“Have Moscow and Minsk Really Made a Breakthrough on Integration?” Dzianis Melyantsou, Carnegie Moscow Center, 09.17.21. The author, coordinator of Belarus's Foreign Policy Program of the Minsk Dialogue Council on International Relations, writes:
- “Moscow clearly needs its relationship with Minsk to be more than that of just military and political allies. It needs long-term guarantees of geopolitical loyalty. The best kind of guarantee would be the presence of Russian military and political infrastructure inside Belarus. That is something that will be difficult to obtain under the current Belarusian system, but Russia is unlikely to give up. That means the issue will continue to spark tension and conflict in their bilateral relations.”
- “Minsk’s isolation from the West and the transition of power that has already begun there will create a window of opportunity for the Kremlin and the temptation to fundamentally increase its political influence in the neighboring country. But putting too much pressure on Belarus right now could backfire and lead to unforeseen consequences. It would appear that Russia understands that, and is therefore playing the long game on integration, seeing it as a safer option.”
“Belarus Is Drifting Back to Russia,” John Ruehl, The National Interest, 09.17.21. The author, a contributing editor at Strategic Policy, writes:
- “Obstacles to greater integration [of Russia and Belarus] remain. Lukashenko has called for an end to trade restrictions and continues to demand equal access to Russian energy resources. But time and leverage are no longer on his side. The Kremlin appears to be banking on Lukashenko’s successor being unable to command the same control over Belarus and knows that the Belarusian political opposition is not anti-Russian, despite Lukashenko’s attempts to paint them as such.”
- “While both Russia and Belarus may never be one country again, Moscow may not feel the need for this to become official so long as integration continues at its steady pace.”