On May 25, U.S. President Joe Biden nominated Gen. Charles Q. (CQ) Brown to serve as the 21^st chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Senate approved his nomination on Sept. 20, and he began his term on Oct. 1. A graduate of Texas Tech University, he was commissioned in 1984 as graduate of the university’s ROTC program. Brown has served in a number of commanding roles in the U.S. Air Force before becoming its 22^nd Chief of Staff in 2020. 

During his pre-JCS service, Brown has categorized Russia as a significant and acute threat, underscoring its reliance on nuclear coercion. More recently he described China and Russia as the “greatest security risk we face.” Brown has also warned that China’s nuclear trajectory means the U.S. will soon find itself “with two nuclear peer adversaries,” China and Russia. However, Brown takes a skeptical view of the strength of the Russia-China relationship, saying that he thinks the two would “be hard-pressed to have a strategic relationship.” As for the war in Ukraine, he has recently noted the advancements in Ukraine's air defenses and their role in stymieing Russian airpower. 

This compilation is meant as a sampling of Brown’s views. It is part of Russia Matters’ “Competing Views” rubric, where we share prominent American thinkers’ takes on issues pertaining to Russia, U.S.-Russian relations and broader U.S. policies affecting Russia. The quotes below are divided into categories similar to those in Russia Matters’ news and analysis digests, reflecting the most pertinent topic areas for U.S.-Russian relations broadly and for drivers of the two countries’ policies toward one another. All sections may be updated with new or past statements.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• To be updated.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• We are … working on strengthening trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan, and Republic of Korea to better deal with the challenges posed by North Korea’s growing nuclear weapons and missile programs. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• As North Korean ballistic missile threats to the U.S. homeland continue to evolve, the United States is committed to, and I support improving the capability and reliability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system. … [T]he United States will leverage and improve its full spectrum of passive and active missile defeat capabilities, complemented by the credible threat of direct cost imposition through nuclear and non-nuclear means, to continue to counter North Korean missile threats to the homeland. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• We recognize growing concerns about nuclear and missile developments in the PRC, North Korea and Russia, and are committed to strengthening deterrence in ways that are responsive to changes in the regional security environment. Toward that end, we will work with allies and partners to ensure an effective mix of capabilities, concepts, deployments, exercises and tailored options to deter and, if necessary, respond to coercion and aggression. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)

Iran and its nuclear program:

• Iran destabilizes the Middle East, threatening regional security through its proxy forces and desire to obtain nuclear weapons. We must maintain an adequate level of U.S. military presence to decrease threats against the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests and to help build indigenous security capability of our regional partners. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• Through an approach of “integrated deterrence” and growing relations with our allies and partners, the Joint Force maintains a posture adequate to deter and respond to Iranian aggression. Our strength in the region is built on our partnerships, expanding those partnerships, and our ability to move forces rapidly in a time of crisis. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• While Russia continues to build a burgeoning relationship with the Iranian regime, the U.S. has opportunities to strengthen the capacity of our partners to limit susceptibility to Russia’s predatory practices. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

• To be updated.

Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

• I do believe we … have a responsibility to train them [Ukrainians] in various capabilities and capacities. All our allies and partners have an interest to ensure that Ukraine can provide for its own security. (Aspen Security Forum, 07.20.22)
• With the supply of Russian spare parts for MiGs cut off…Ukraine will have to eventually move to other fighters. (Aspen Security Forum, 07.20.22)
• What Ukraine's being able to do is…they've got…integrated to air defenses…being able to move…and complicate things for the Russians and…they [Russians] have less confidence to actually come cruising…through Ukraine. (DARPA, 02.03.23)
• Because of…mobility and being able to shoot down one-way UAVs, shoot down the cruise missiles, but also shoot down the aircraft, that actually puts a little bit of fear into the Russian pilots. (U.S. News, 06.07.23)
• It [air power and air defense] keeps Russian airpower off the back of the Ukrainians and allows them to execute just a bit better based on their being able to use their air defenses to their advantage. (U.S. News, 06.07.23) 
• The most impactful investment of EDI [European Deterrence Initiative] has been the U.S.’ ability to draw from Prepositioned Stock Europe (APS- 2) for timely delivery of material security assistance to Ukraine. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

• To be updated.

Ukraine-related negotiations:

• To be updated.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

• The Department of the Air Force must improve to reorient itself for great power competition:
  • Connect the Joint Force
  • Space Superiority
  • Generate Combat Power
  • Conduct Logistics Under Attack. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 05.07.20)

• The greatest security risk we face in is the military modernization and strategic breakout of our pacing challenge—China and the acute threat of Russia. (DARPA, 02.03.23)

• In EUCOM, I will continue to build and lead the coalition of allies and partners supporting Ukraine while working alongside our NATO Allies to deter, defend and build resilience against further Russian military aggression. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• The U.S. Forces in EUCOM, reinforced by CONUS-based troops and alongside NATO, are prepared to … defend the Alliance against Russian aggression, should the situation dictate. However, there is no scenario in which the U.S. would act alone. The situation in Ukraine has been the greatest test of NATO cohesion and the Alliance has shown remarkable unity and resolve, a message that has resonated around the world with friends and adversaries alike. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• To maintain the necessary capabilities in sufficient capacity, we must continue to assess the threat posed by Russia, continue to update NATO defense plans and continue to modernize force structure across the alliance. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• We continually assess our global force posture to ensure we have appropriate capabilities in place to address the current and projected situation. I believe the systems and processes we have in place are ensuring our force posture in Europe is sufficient to achieve our current national and alliance security objectives in the theater. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• Russia’s war on Ukraine has shown the criticality of alliances and partnerships, both within Europe and globally. Investing in alliance and partnerships now pays dividends when events call for a coordinated, international response, to address violation of national sovereignty in violation of the United Nations Charter, as Russia has in Ukraine. We must continue to work with allies and partners to deepen and strengthen our cooperation, which we have always done in areas of mutual interest and in a spirit of mutual respect. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• Putin thought he would defeat Ukraine quickly and expected his war would undermine NATO. The opposite occurred. NATO is stronger, more united, and better prepared. NATO’s strength is our mutual trust, commitment and cohesion to collectively deter threats or respond to attacks. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• Getting commissioned during the Cold War and watching what's happened since and then … where we are today vis-a-vis Russia, it's those collective alliances that are important to protect those of our … shared interest and Russia has put that at risk. (Channel 4 News, 07.15.23)
• China will remain the most consequential strategic competitor for the immediate future, while Russia, as a major nuclear power, still constitutes an acute threat. Our greatest risk, however, is our ability to continue to address the current strategic environment at a level needed to deter aggression while preparing for an uncertain future. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

• I think they’d [China and Russia] be hard-pressed to have a strategic relationship, partly because I don’t know that they have the same outlook on the geopolitical aspects of what’s going on in our region. They have exercised together, but they don’t exercise like we do. You could probably describe it as exercising in the same location, same day; parallel play, less integration. We’re much more integrated and operable with our partners than they are. (Air and Space Forces Magazine, 04.01.20)
• I’ve asked this question rhetorically, “who’s going to be the junior partner?” Because I don’t think either one of them wants to be the junior partner. You don’t necessarily have to have a junior partner, but you have to have an understanding of [the relationship] between the two. There’s some natural friction that we don’t necessarily have with our partners, where we’re able to work closely together. Some of our partners have capabilities we don’t have. (Air and Space Forces Magazine, 04.01.20) 
• We continue to see China and Russia increasingly challenge free and open international order imposing their authoritarian models beyond their borders and employing misinformation campaigns to change perceptions favorable to their objectives. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 05.07.20)
• On Feb. 4, 2022, Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin signed a joint statement, declaring their two countries shared a friendship with “no limits.” Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. has observed no discernible change in Beijing and Moscow's strategic partnership even as the international community has united to impose costs on Russia. While China does not openly criticize Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Beijing does openly blame NATO and supports the Russian war effort through economic, diplomatic, public support and non-lethal military means. We must reinforce the norm against territorial conquest, as a key element of preserving global stability. While the security challenges presented by Russia and China are different, our best defense against a deepening Russia- China relationship is investing in multinational alliances and bilateral relationships with like- minded countries to foster and propagate our shared values and demonstrate the strength of democracies. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• Both Russia and China have increased their desires to exploit the opportunities of the Arctic. Russia has very clearly stated its claims over the Arctic region, to include the right to regulate Arctic waters, exceeding the authority permitted under international law, with the intent to enforce this through military power. The PRC does not yet have an ability to project significant military power into the Arctic, but seeks to increase its influence there through an expanded slate of economic, diplomatic, scientific and military activities, including its “Polar Silk Road,” with goals of constructing research facilities, and ensuring its access to new sea lanes and natural resources. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)

Missile defense:

• I agree with and support the 2022 Missile Defense Review’s assertion that our missile defense system is designed to deter aggression from rogue states. We rely on a whole-of- government effort to defeat missile technology for all adversaries while raising the threshold of escalation by maintaining a credible kinetic defense. The increasing capabilities of peer and near-peer nuclear states will challenge our limited kinetic missile defenses, however, our nuclear deterrent continues to underpin our missile defense efforts. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• If confirmed, my priorities would be aligned with priorities set by the Missile Defense Review for homeland missile defense. The first priority remains protecting the homeland from an adversary ICBM attack. The Ground-Based Midcourse-Defense system contributes directly to the U.S. deterrence strategies for rogue state ICBM threats to the homeland and would defend against an ICBM attack. Per the NDS, another key priority remains defense of the homeland against cruise missile threats. We must continue to modernize and develop both active and passive defense capabilities that enhance protection of the homeland against cruise missile threats. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• The increasing capabilities of peer and near-peer nuclear states will challenge our limited kinetic missile defenses, however, our nuclear deterrent continues to underpin our missile defense efforts. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• We’re taking a hard look at the changing threat environment as we transition away from a focus on violent extremists and returning our attention to states with greater reach with advanced missile systems. The Missile Defense Review prioritizes the examination of active and passive defense measures to decrease the risk of any cruise missile strike against critical assets, regardless of origin. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• I support the Missile Defense Review stipulation that the United States maintains the right to defend itself against attacks from any source, but GMD is neither intended for, nor capable of, defeating large and sophisticated ICBM, air or sea-launched ballistic missile threats from PRC or Russia. Our strategic deterrence addresses these threats. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• The Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force and NORTHCOM have been working on a comprehensive plan to strengthen our homeland against air and cruise missile threats in the continental United States, Hawaii, Alaska and Guam. The Department will continue to develop active and passive defenses against regional hypersonic missile threats and pursue a persistent and resilient sensor network to characterizer and track all hypersonic threats, improve attribution and enable engagement. Integrated air and missile defense of the homeland is vital to our resiliency at home and to our ability to project power abroad in support of allies and partners. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• I support replacing the existing Ground-based Interceptors with Next-Generation Interceptors, expanding the arsenal of interceptors, and leveraging the full spectrum of current and emerging missile defeat capabilities supports this approach and hedges against future uncertainty in missile threats against the homeland. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)

Nuclear arms/nuclear arms control: 

• A safe, secure and reliable nuclear deterrent allows the nation to negotiate from a position of power, provides the United States and our allies with an umbrella of protection, and discourages aggression worldwide. (Air Force, 05.27.21)
• The advantage of global strike provides a critical backstop for our diplomats and reassurance to our allies and partners. Regardless of the aircraft, weapon or system, we must modernize in order to maintain our strike capability… anytime, anywhere. (Air Force, 05.27.21)
• As we look ahead to the next 75 years, investing in nuclear modernization is as relevant as ever and we are committed to transitioning to the Sentinel [new Ground Based Strategic Deterrent weapon system], which will ensure our nation is ready to provide strategic deterrence for tomorrow. (Air Force, 04.05.22)
• Maintaining the nuclear triad is of vital national importance to deter adversaries, assure allies and, if necessary, achieve military objectives. However, the delivery platforms and nuclear warheads of each leg of the nuclear triad are near end-of-life and require replacement with modern capabilities. Fielding modern nuclear weapons requires the recapitalization of the DOE/NNSA nuclear weapons production infrastructure that was largely abandoned and that has largely atrophied since the end of the Cold War. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• Nuclear weapons pose the only existential military threat to the homeland, and ensuring the U.S. maintains credible and effective nuclear forces is critical to deterring nuclear-armed adversaries. Our ability to execute the nuclear deterrence mission underpins our ability to successfully conduct other DOD operations in support of our national security interests. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• The existing nuclear force was designed in the last decades of the Cold War when the U.S. faced a very different threat environment. While the current program of record is sufficient to modernize the existing nuclear force, that plan is increasingly challenged to succeed in a timely manner. If confirmed, I intend to consult key stakeholders to understand whether we should pursue additional capabilities for our nuclear forces and enterprise. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• China is rapidly expanding their stockpile of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, while Russia is expending limited resources to modernize their strategic nuclear forces and maintain a large stockpile of tactical systems. While Russia remains the most capable and diverse nuclear rival, China’s increasing capability is a growing threat to the U.S. and our allies and partners. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• Given China’s nuclear trajectory, we will soon find ourselves faced with two nuclear peer adversaries. We must begin preparing for this challenge now. To do so, I believe we must continue executing our current nuclear modernization programs, evaluate sufficiency of current programs of record to fill any potential deterrence gaps, and engage China in discussions on strategic stability issues and arms control. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• I will work with key stakeholders to assess any changes required to our nuclear doctrine and posture to account for the changing threat environment. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• A No First Use or Sole Purpose policy would result in an unacceptable level of risk in light of the range of non-nuclear capabilities being developed and fielded by competitors that could inflict strategic-level damage to the United States and its Allies and partners. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• I agree with the 2022 NPR direction for DoD and the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration … to develop and implement a risk management strategy to identify, prioritize and recommend actions across the portfolio of nuclear programs. This is essential for monitoring the overall health of the nuclear deterrent as we sustain current capabilities and transition to modernized systems. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• I believe the 2022 NPR [Nuclear Posture Review] appropriately reinforced decades of stability in U.S. nuclear policy even as it seeks to incorporate nuclear deterrence in the broader integrated deterrence framework from the 2022 NDS. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• Based on what we’ve already observed, I believe Russia has already attempted multiple times to coerce [through nuclear coercion] Ukraine and U.S. partners and allies into submitting to Putin’s objectives. Therefore, we must continue to be prepared to respond to further irresponsible behavior by Russia. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• Although our nuclear forces and existing NC3 architecture are safe, secure and effective, we have greatly exceeded their intended design life, and they are showing their age. Deferred modernization has removed margin and there is no longer room for delay. This is further challenged by atrophy in both the DoD industrial base for nuclear delivery platforms and NNSA production capabilities and infrastructure, some of which date back to the Manhattan Project. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• To date, New START has contributed to bilateral stability by limiting the offensive strategic arms it addresses. However, New START does not address Russia’s large and growing arsenal of non-accountable nuclear weapons and novel nuclear systems. In addition, Russia’s violations of the New START Treaty, and its claimed suspension of the treaty, greatly undermine the viability of the treaty. Mutual compliance with New START would strengthen the security of the United States, our allies and partners, Russia and the world. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• I support diplomatic efforts that contribute to national security and in particular this effort to pursue arms control agreements capturing the full scope of Russian nuclear capabilities, including their non-strategic nuclear weapons and novel nuclear systems that are not currently the subject of arms control agreement. Any such agreements must be verifiable, enforceable, and enhance the security of our Nation and our allies and partners. Russia’s noncompliance with many arms control arrangements—including the New START Treaty, Treaty on Open Skies, and INF Treaty—casts a shadow over and creates challenges for any potential negotiations that would lead to a follow-on agreement to replace the New START Treaty when it expires in February 2026. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• The increasing capabilities of peer and near-peer nuclear states demonstrate the importance of missile defense and the need for continued investment. As important and if not more so, the United States will continue to rely on strategic deterrence—underwritten by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal—to address and deter large intercontinental-range, nuclear-capable missile threats to the homeland from Russia and China. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• Delaying or canceling current nuclear modernization plans and programs on a unilateral basis would reduce our strategic deterrence and arms control leverage with Russia and China. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• I am concerned by Russia’s approximately 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons that are not numerically constrained by any arms control treaty. They should be accounted for in any follow-on treaty with Russia. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)

Counterterrorism: 

• To be updated.

Conflict in Syria: 

• One year into this coalition effort to rid the world of these [ISIL] terrorists, the team can be proud of what they’ve accomplished. Their hard work and sacrifice have already saved countless lives and we will not stop until we have defeated this barbaric enemy. (U.S. Central Command, 08.07.15)
• The U.S. military mission in Syria remains the enduring defeat of ISIS and we continue to work by, with, and through our partners and allies. The current administration has identified four policy priorities to meet the U.S. objective for a political settlement to the conflict as envisioned in UNSC Resolution 2254: 
  • Sustaining the U.S. and coalition campaign against the Islamic State. 
  • Supporting local ceasefires. 
  • Expanding humanitarian access. 
  • Pressing for accountability and respect for international law while promoting human rights and nonproliferation, including through targeted sanctions imposition. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• The operational environment in Syria remains uncertain and dynamic. U.S. forces have drawn down to a residual presence in Syria to maintain counterterrorism and security operations. If confirmed, any potential future troop level or capabilities changes would have to be assessed based on numerous variables to include regional security objectives, the existing and projected security environment, and sustaining the necessary relationships and partner force capabilities to prevent an ISIS resurgence and secure our enemy’s enduring defeat. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)

Cyber security/AI:

• I will advocate for and use improved modeling and simulation capabilities, digital tools, and prototyping to help refine technical requirements and measure technical success. … Air Force must continue additional development of space, hypersonic, and cyber-security test, and must create new test capabilities in directed energy, autonomous systems, and artificial intelligence/machine learning. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 05.07.20)
• We see the goals in the DoD Cyber Strategy not as a static “end state,” but a dynamic condition where we must compete to achieve. We will continually assess our capacity and capability to project power in and through cyberspace; to defend Air Force capacity to generate combat power from cyberspace attack; to generate intelligence from cyberspace; and to connect the Joint Force with resilient and survivable battle networks. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 05.07.20)
• As we face increasingly aggressive cyber adversaries, we are modernizing our enterprise information technology architecture and transitioning Airmen to cyber security and cyber defense roles to better defend our weapon systems and missions. The on-going competition in cyberspace requires that we continually assess our overall readiness in, through and from cyberspace. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 05.07.20)
• Air Education and Training Command is taking a comprehensive look across the full spectrum of cyber education to reset the foundation and develop warfighters who are proficient in joint all-domain command and control. Cyber training is foundational across all stages of development for officer and enlisted cyber operators. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 05.07.20)
• Defending power projection platforms and systems in, through and from cyberspace will be a priority. I will support expeditionary logistics under attack, providing agile and survivable forward communications defended against cyberspace attack. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 05.07.20)
• The changing character of war, specifically the rapidly expanding importance of doctrine that informs commanders how to leverage the electro-magnetic spectrum, information, space, and cyber capabilities; requires us to reevaluate required capabilities and capacity, and how we build, train, and employ the Joint Force. The Joint Warfighting Concept is the unifying vision for Joint Force development, design, and warfighting approach. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• We are working on greater trilateral cooperation in the areas of integrated air and missile defense, intelligence sharing, joint training and exercises, and technology cooperation including cybersecurity and electronic warfare. We are also pursuing initiatives that seek to build greater integration among regional partners in addition to trilateral cooperation. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• Russia and China continue to improve their space weapons capabilities and better integrate space, cyberspace and electronic warfare into both offensive and defensive military operations. They both have counter-space assets on the ground and in orbit today that will continue to be developed, exercised, and integrated into war plans. These increased capabilities will continue to threaten and challenge U.S. national security interests. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• I fully support the 23-2027 DoD Cyber Workforce (CWF) Strategy signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Dr. Kathleen Hicks, which sets the foundation for how the Department will foster a cyber workforce capable of executing the Department's complex and varied cyber missions. … I will support implementation of the CWF Strategy in coordination with the DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO), the Joint Staff, United States Cyber Command and the Services to focus Department efforts on cyber-related human capital initiatives in support of the 2022 National Defense Strategy. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• Deterring such attacks [cyber-attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure] relies on the implementation of the National Defense Strategy and the concept of integrated deterrence. I would provide advice on how best to utilize all instruments of national power across all domains and working with allies and partners. While the U.S. is not constrained to answer a cyber-attack with a cyber response, the Department will continue to campaign in and through cyberspace to generate insights about malicious cyber actors, as well as defend forward to disrupt and degrade these actors’ capabilities and supporting ecosystems. Additionally, DoD will work with its interagency partners, leveraging all available authorities to enable the cyber resilience of U.S. critical infrastructure and counter threats to military readiness. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)

Elections interference:

• Russia has conducted ambitious and aggressive cyber-enabled information operations against the United States and our European allies aimed at influencing election outcomes, and undermining democracy and collective security. Following the 2016 election, the U.S. election system and networks have been designated as critical infrastructure. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)

Energy exports from CIS:

• To be updated.

Climate change: 

• To be updated.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• To be updated.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• To be updated.

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

• To be updated.

Defense and aerospace:

• I don’t know that, for me personally, it’s [seeing Russian military capabilities in Ukraine] really changed my perspective. We will learn more and more … to really make an assessment of how we need to think about the Russians in the future. (Air Force Times, 03.15.23)

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• To be updated.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

• Significant shifts in geopolitics and technology are converging with efforts by China and Russia to contest the post-World War II international order. Our alliances endure but are subject to stress and pressures catalyzed by intensifying and accelerating trends. The Joint Force, along with our allies and partners must now rapidly build appropriate capabilities and capacities to deter, and if necessary, prevail in great power conflict. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• Russia continues to rely on its few allies in the region like Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela for influence and access. Both China and Russia have influential conventional and social media outlets in the AOR [area of responsibility] which allow them to spread their propaganda effectively to wide audiences. Additionally, if the U.S. is not investing in the region, countries will look for other sources of investment. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)
• The current U.S. strategy [in Africa] focuses on building our partners, working toward shared objectives, operating transparently, promoting good governance and respecting human rights, while highlighting that Russian and Chinese projects do not adhere to high standards and can come with unseen, sometimes negative, consequences. Our competitive edge lies in the quality of the equipment, training, and other security assistance we provide, and our commitment to relationships based on true collaboration with our African partners, which neither China nor Russia currently supplies. Increasing the speed of delivery for commonly sought-after equipment, demonstrating our commitment and prioritization of African needs at a high level, and developing positive messaging that will resonate with African leaders' aspirations. I look forward to working with Congress to achieve these goals. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 07.11.23)

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• To be updated.

DoD photo by Benjamin Applebaum in the public domain.