5 Things to Know

1. Asked at the G-7 in Évian whether Ukraine remains a priority, Donald Trump said the war was “no longer high” on his list. Trump bluntly told reporters that the United States has “nothing to do” with the Ukraine war beyond selling weapons, saying it is “thousands of miles away” and not a priority compared to Iran. Though he called his meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy “very good” and repeated that Russia “should make a deal,” Trump signaled no special focus on Ukraine, underscoring European fears that Washington’s security commitment has sharply diminished. Emmanuel Macron brokered two meetings between Trump and Zelenskyy on the sidelines of the summit. Trump said he had a "very good meeting" with Zelenskyy, while also calling the Ukraine war “sort of the same thing” with both sides “losing soldiers,” estimating “25,000 young people die every month.”¹ Thus, while the headlines tout a G-7 agreement to tighten sanctions on Russia, when asked about Ukraine, Trump speaking more candidly said, “Look, we have nothing to do with it.” He went on: “It has no impact on us other than we sell weapons.” And again, “We are thousands of miles away.” Such comments are much more informative about the Trump administration’s position on Ukraine and what it will and won’t do in the period ahead. That doesn’t mean that it won’t try to encourage the parties to settle on the terms that are now on the table, since he would like to rack up another peace deal. But it does tell you where his view of his interests lies.*
2. Data from Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group indicates that in the past four weeks (May 19–June 16, 2026), Russian forces have gained a net 10 square miles (less than half the size of Manhattan Island), according to the latest issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. In comparison, from April 22–May 19, 2026,² Russia gained a net of 20 square miles. In the past week (June 9–16, 2026), Russian armed forces made a net gain of 7 square miles of Ukraine’s territory. In addition, Russian forces were reported by DeepState to have advanced in or near eight distinct settlements in the period of June 9–16, 2026. DeepState reported no advances by the Ukrainian forces in that period. In contrast, RM’s analysis of ISW data for the past four weeks (May 19–June 16, 2026) indicates that Russia lost a net 57 square miles of Ukraine’s territory, while during the past week (June 9–16, 2026), Russia gained 5 square miles of Ukrainian territory. 
3. Russia’s Defense Ministry said its air defenses intercepted 992 Ukrainian drones, four long-range cruise missiles and 10 guided aerial bombs over the 24 hours to June 18—the largest single-day claim of the war—with Moscow mayor Sergei Sobyanin saying at least 180–194 drones were shot down on approaches to the capital. Nearly 200 drones targeted Moscow and its region alone, where multiple UAVs, for the second time in two days, struck Gazpromneft’s oil refinery in Moscow’s Kapotnya, which normally processes over 12 million tons of oil a year and supplies about one third to 40% of the city’s fuel and over half of its diesel and airport fuel. Russian officials reported around 16–17 injured in the Moscow area, including a 10-year-old girl in Ramenskoye and a three-year-old child at the Mega Belaya Dacha mall, while separate strikes in the Rostov region killed one and wounded two. All four Moscow airports temporarily closed. Zelenskyy called the strike the second on the plant in a week and a “fully justified response,” warning, that “if Ukraine burns, your Moscow will burn as well.”³
4. Russia is exploiting Ukraine’s biggest weakness with persistent ballistic missile attacks, NYT reports, warning that “the Ukrainian military does not have enough Patriot missile interceptors to keep up with the barrages.” According to data compiled by NYT, Russia has launched “410 ballistic missiles” so far this year and is on pace to launch “roughly 900 for the year” if current trends continue. While Ukraine has received over 1,600 Patriot missile interceptors over the course of the war, as of last summer, their stockpile had fallen to as low as 16 interceptors. Furthermore, Lockheed Martin has said its total production of Patriot interceptors in 2026 will be just 620. With U.S. forces in the Middle East, U.S. forces in PACOM (from which Patriot interceptors were borrowed for the Iran war), Israel, and many others demanding the new Patriot interceptors, Ukraine will certainly not be at the front of the line. While firms are announcing plans to both expand production of Patriot interceptors and develop low-cost alternatives, most of these are plans and it is unlikely that any will be delivered in the next year. The war with Iran has placed further strain on the U.S. stockpile. CSIS estimates that the U.S. expended between 1,030 and 1,400 Patriot interceptors over the course of the conflict. With an estimated prewar inventory of 2,330 interceptors, the shortfall is especially dire. When it comes to replenishing Ukraine’s stockpiles of Patriot interceptors, Kyiv will probably have to wait until the U.S. restores its own stock, and then restores the stocks of Israel and other key U.S. allies in the region, in what would take years. Additionally, while NYT claims that Russia has fired 410 ballistic missiles in 2026, based on RM’s analysis of CSIS data, between January 2026 and May 2026, Russia only launched 111 ballistic missiles. 
5. Ukraine has turned to AI-assisted interceptors to combat Russian drones, according to NYT. While in the first years of the war Ukraine relied on machine guns, electronic warfare and missiles to bring down Russian drones, “last August, the Ukrainian military began to widely deploy interceptor drones piloted by humans, without AI.” In recent months, Ukrainian company Skyfall reported that they developed interceptors that “have made dozens of AI-assisted strikes on Shahed-type drones.” This is just one of what Ukrainians claim are “a range of AI-powered weapons that have been deployed in recent months.” Further advances in AI may “eventually allow one pilot to oversee several missions, instead of just one at a time,” and help negate Russia’s manpower advantage as a result. Zelenskyy has warned that “it’s only a matter of time… before drones are fighting drones, attacking critical infrastructure and targeting people all by themselves.” While Ukrainian officials have stressed that drones still need human confirmation before engaging a target, the author argues that “at this point it is clearly an ethical, rather than a technological, limitation.” The readers of this article would have benefited from estimates of how many AI-assisted drones Ukraine has produced and what difference they make in the larger picture, in the view of the author of the article or experts that she could have interviewed on this issue.

3 Ideas to Explore

1. In an interview with NV Radio, former foreign minister of Ukraine and Belfer Center senior fellow Dmytro Kuleba systematically dismantles what he sees as misleading narratives about the Russia-Ukraine war—above all the idea that the war has reached a turning point favoring Ukraine.¹ Against manifestations of optimism regarding this proposition in Western capitals and Kyiv, Kuleba warned, “People are racing ahead of reality… No turning point in any war has ever been recognized in real time… Of course not. That's nonsense. Turning points are identified retrospectively.” “Claims that Ukraine has achieved a decisive turning point and is now heading straight toward victory are largely nonsense,” he added. “In November, we'll probably return to discussing how to survive another winter,” he warned. Kuleba also said “there are really only two major unanswered questions in this war. First: Will Ukraine develop a ballistic missile capability that can genuinely threaten Moscow and other major Russian cities? Second: If that happens, will Putin be willing to use nuclear weapons in response?” During WP columnist David Igantius's Q&A, when asked by RM whether he thinks the war has or has not entered a turning point favoring Ukraine per Kuleba’s proposition, Ignatius responded, “I think Ukraine's brilliant use of technology… has allowed them to survive in this war—where survival is a kind of victory. But I think people should be careful about announcing a turning point or saying that Russia is finished. My hope is that Ukraine's technology mastery will force even Putin to see that this war is ‘unwinnable’—and change course. But I don't think he's there yet." Ignatius is not the first to describe how Ukraine’s survival can be framed as a victory. Former commander of the Ukrainian armed forces Valerii Zaluzhnyi did so earlier this year.*
2. In the view of The Economist’s staff, “Ukrainian strikes are inflicting pain deep inside Russia,” while Jack Clover writes in The Times of London that “Ukraine transforms war with mid-range drones that ‘destroy anything.’” These drones play a significant role in “really hurting the Russians,” Mick Ryan, a retired Australian general, told Marc Santora of NYT. In fact, “Ukraine is winning—for now at least,” Hal Brands of Bloomberg claims in his recent column. According to Balázs Jarábik of R. Politik, however, the battlefield is “mixed:” “Ukraine has stabilized parts of the front, slowed Russian momentum,” but “Russia continues advancing gradually; retains advantages in manpower, glide bombs, missiles and industrial capacity,” so “Ukraine recovered coherence not dominance.” Moreover, in the view of John J. Mearsheimer, “the Russians are winning on the battlefield.” “For sure, and not as quickly as I'm sure the Russian people and Russian leaders would like, but they are moving inexorably forward,” this professor claims in an interview with Andrew Napolitano. Mearsheimer also claims that “the Ukrainian military is in deep trouble [because] they're unable to raise large numbers of troops to replace those who are killed in battle” and “because the United States and a number of European countries are no longer able to provide as much weaponry to Ukraine as they have in the past.” Mearsheimer predicts that ultimately, “the Russians will end up capturing all of the territory in those four oblasts that they had formerly annexed.” To the extent that estimates of changes in territorial control are a useful criterion for determining whether and which side is winning (but not sufficient on their own), RM keeps track of such changes in its weekly Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. Citing data from Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group, the June 10, 2026, issue of the card shows that during the four-week period of May 12–June 9, 2026, Russian forces saw a net loss of 1 square mile.² In the past year, Russia made a net total gain of 1,369 square miles, according to DeepState data, and Russia’s average monthly gains for the past 12 months were 120 square miles per month.
3. Fiona Hill argues in a research paper for Brookings that “Ukraine and Iran may prove the nemeses of Russian and American ambitions,” as both expose the limits of great‑power coercion. “Deadlock in Ukraine discredits Russia as a global military force,” while the Gulf standoff “undermines the United States and Trump,” pushing allies “to look beyond them at new regional security options.” Ukraine has inflicted “massive casualties” and “heavy costs,” on Russia and is now “the most competent military force in Europe,” according to Hill, who is member of the Harvard University Board of Overseers and an alumna of the Belfer Center. Both Hill and Neil MacFarquhar of NYT argue that Russia in Ukraine and the U.S. in Iran misread supposedly “second‑rate” adversaries, assuming quick capitulation. Meanwhile, David Ignatius argues in his recent WaPo column that Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin are “trapped in the power they created,” each having launched wars they “thought would be quick and decisive” but which “turned into quagmires.” 

Find past issues in the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive. 

June 16, 2026, update:¹ Data from Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group indicates that in the past four weeks (May 19–June 16, 2026), Russian forces have gained a net 10 square miles (less than half the size of Manhattan Island). In comparison, from April 22–May 19, 2026, Russia gained a net of 20 square miles.²  In the past week (June 9–16, 2026), Russian armed forces made a net gain of 7 square miles of Ukraine’s territory. In addition, Russian forces were reported by DeepState to have advanced in or near eight distinct settlements in the period of June 9–16, 2026.³ DeepState reported no advances by the Ukrainian forces in that period. In contrast, RM’s analysis of ISW data for the past four weeks (May 19–June 16, 2026) indicates that Russia lost a net 57 square miles of Ukraine’s territory, while during the past week (June 9–16, 2026), Russia gained 5 square miles of Ukrainian territory.⁴

Territorial Control (figures as of June 16, 2026)^5,6