This Week's Highlights

• The Moskva provided protection for the transfer of troops to Berdyansk and provided most of the air defense for the Black Sea Fleet, writes Russian journalist Arkady Babchenko. “It provided air defense for ships involved in the blockade of Ukraine. It was supposed to provide air defense for the assault on Odesa and to command that assault. … None of this will happen now.” Babchenko argues the naval blockade of Ukraine, the Odesa operation and the creation of a corridor to Transnistria are all “now in doubt.” Geopolitical analyst Gav Don, however, argues that while the Russian flagship’s “neutralization has marginally changed the balance of naval power in the Black Sea, it is not likely to cause Moscow any real worry. At the same time, Don believes “the reputational and emotional effect of Moskva’s loss is likely to be much more powerful.”
• “For three decades, U.S. foreign policy has run on inertia and called it strategy,” writes Stephen Wertheim, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Biden should reject a cold war strategy of dividing the world and keeping one half dependent on the United States. … The first step is to support Ukraine while avoiding escalation into a direct clash between U.S. and Russian forces.” 
• “The war in Ukraine is a significant event, but not because the outcome will have a dramatic independent effect on the global balance of power,” writes Harvard Prof. Stephen M. Walt. “Rather, it is important because it signals the end of the brief [U.S.] ‘unipolar moment.’” Walt argues the “emerging future will be neither a U.S.-centered ‘liberal order’ nor a Chinese-centered autocratic one.
• “By blocking Moscow’s access to nearly half of its $630 billion in foreign-exchange and gold reserves, Washington has offered a demonstration of how much raw financial power still remains in the hands of the West,” writes Diana Choyleva, chief economist at Enodo Economics. “That can only strengthen China’s determination to stick to its own ideological path and carve out a sphere of geopolitical influence,” according to Choyleva.
• “The absence of escalation across decades of strategic interaction in cyberspace—a record that has only been reinforced in the conflict in Ukraine—should cause policymakers to reevaluate long-standing assumptions about the cyber-domain,” writes Erica D. Lonegran, assistant professor at West Point. “In doing so, they may be able to see how cyber-actions are but one of a number of strategic tools that, properly understood, can limit the risk of conflict as much as increase it.”
• “For now, Russians seem content to project their discontents on the enemy. To the question, ‘Who is to blame?’ they answer: the United States and Europe,” writes Carnegie’s Andrei Kolesnikov.  “But in the long term, it is a disaster for the Russian people, too. ... [U]ltimately, it will be up to Russians themselves to prove by their own actions that their country is more than Putin and what he has wrought,” according to Kolesnikov.

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“The Strategic Meaning of Russian War Crimes in Ukraine,” Nigel Gould-Davies, MT, 04.13.22. The author, senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia at IISS, writes:

• “The mass torture and killings carried out by Russian forces in Bucha, Irpin, Borodyanka and other Ukrainian towns add a new level of horror to a terrible war. But they are not only a humanitarian disaster: they also change the strategic context in three ways.”
• “First, they will entrench Ukrainian hostility towards Russia, completing the estrangement that began with Russia’s first invasion in 2014 and intensified with the second in February.”
• “Second, they are driving the Russian public into a dark place. Expecting a rapid and easy victory, the state did not try to mobilize mass opinion before the invasion of Ukraine.”
• “Third, the war crimes show that, as long as Russia occupies Ukrainian territory, an end to fighting does not mean an end to violence. On the contrary: a ceasefire would allow Russian forces not only to regroup and rearm, but to brutalize and murder civilians unhindered.”
• “Some argue that documenting and investigating war crimes distracts from larger strategic issues. The opposite is true. These crimes have strategic consequences that will shape the course of the war. Above all, they make it more likely that any outcome will be defined not by compromise and settlement, but by victory and defeat.”

Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“Russia's Black Sea flagship Moskva sunk – the anatomy of a missile strike,” Gav Don, BNE, 04.18.22. The author, an analyst specializing in geopolitics, writes:

• “Assuming the Moskva was indeed hit and sunk by Neptunes (and no other interpretation is now credible), what implications are there for the future conduct of the war?”
• “First, Russia would have to accept that any ship sailing within about 280 km of Ukrainian-held coast is at serious risk of attack. That applies to amphibious assault ships, as well as to much smaller fast attack ships and ships equipped with Kalibr land attack missiles. ... It seems likely that the Russian Navy will position its assets at much greater distances from the coast of Ukraine, reducing the number of frequently-used Kalibr cruise missile launch platforms available … and also reducing their reach.”
• “In terms of amphibious operations, Neptune’s success substantially decreases the risks of an amphibious landing near Odesa. With targeting provided by NATO AWACs assets, an amphibious group would have to spend some seven to ten hours within range of a Neptune strike before reaching the beach – likely to be a suicidal exercise.” 
• “On the other hand, the strike does nothing to relieve the effective blockade of Ukraine by Russian naval forces. As Turkey has closed the Bosphorus straits to military traffic Moskva cannot be replaced, but it was only one Russian naval asset among many already in the Black Sea. … So the blockade of Ukraine will persist, at a greater distance from Odesa, but nevertheless will be effective.”
• “In the arena of surface warfare and sea surface control Moskva was an imposing asset with long arms and heavy fists, but without any real surface threat to counter. … If Moskva’s neutralization has marginally changed the balance of naval power in the Black Sea, it is not likely to cause Moscow any real worry. However, the reputational and emotional effect of Moskva’s loss is likely to be much more powerful. For Kyiv the sinking of the Moskva is, if nothing else, a huge propaganda coup and will considerably boost morale.”

Arkady Babchenko on the sinking of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s Moskva flagship, Facebook, 04.15.22. The author, a Russian journalist, writes:

• “The Moskva cruiser was designed to destroy aircraft carriers. Its task was to approach the aircraft carrier group at maximum speed and manage to fire a salvo. The total yield of that salvo of nuclear warheads would equal five and a half megatons. For comparison, the yield of the Hiroshima nuclear blast was 21 kilotons.”
• “The crew of the cruiser totaled 500 people. … It carries 64 S-300 missiles. A land version of a S-300 battery consists of six launchers, each of which has four containers.... It also carries 16 Vulkan missiles, which is an equivalent of an Iskander battery on the ground ... if armed with nuclear warheads, such a battery would generate a combined yield of 260 Hiroshimas.”
• “Displacement of the Mosvka is eleven and a half thousand tons. That’s enough metal to build 250 tanks. The initial price is 2 billion dollars … If one were to calculate what sinking of the Moskva would equal in terms of loss of land-based assets, then these losses would amount to the simultaneous destruction of personnel of a battalion tactical group, three S-300 batteries, one Iskander battery, a platoon of a self-propelled artillery guns, an air defense platoon, two APC platoons, one MLRS, one helicopter, one Krasukha-4 electronic warfare station, an airfield support radar station and ... a group of armies HQ. It would be a catastrophic defeat ... The fields would be littered with corpses and torn iron.”
• “But even that is not the main damage: the ‘Moskva’ provided protection for the transfer of troops to Berdyansk and provided most of the air defense for the Black Sea Fleet. It provided air defense for ships involved in the blockade of Ukraine. It was supposed to provide air defense for the assault on Odesa and to command that assault, which Putin has announced to be the second part of the special operation. And it has been commanding sea operations. None of this will happen now.”
• “British intelligence has concluded that the loss of the Moskva cruiser is likely to change Russia’s positions in the Black Sea ... that is, in the region. With one shot, Ukraine has changed the balance of power in the entire region. Now do you understand what happened?”

“The Secret of Ukraine’s Military Success: Years of NATO Training,” Daniel Michaels, WSJ, 04.14.22. The author, Brussels bureau chief for the news outlet, writes:

• “Through classes, drills and exercises involving at least 10,000 troops annually for more than eight years, NATO and its members helped the embattled country shift from rigid Soviet-style command structures to Western standards where soldiers are taught to think on the move. In confounding Russian invaders today, Lt. Kulish says his comrades-in-arms ‘are definitely using procedures they learned during the training with NATO.’”
• “By the time Russia invaded on Feb. 24, training of Ukrainian forces had become so extensive that, although at least eight NATO countries participated, much of the hands-on training was being done by Ukrainian instructors. To NATO commanders, that was a sign Ukraine had internalized their teachings.”
• “Whatever the outcome, say Ukrainians and Western advisers, Kyiv's forces have learned to wage war along NATO's rules, and are showing it with battlefield successes. Ukraine's skirmishing units are the spearhead of a completely rebuilt military establishment. NATO advisers brought with them concepts novel to Ukraine's Soviet-style force including civilian control of the military, professional inspectors, external auditors and logistics specialists. Abandoning the emphasis on numbers of soldiers and weapons, NATO advisers instilled the concept of capacity building, where commanders set goals and ensure they have troops and weapons needed to achieve them.”

“Eight New Points on the Porcupine: More Ukrainian Lessons for Taiwan,” Andrew Erickson and Gabriel Collins, War on the Rocks, 04.18.22. The authors, a professor of strategy in the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute and the Baker Botts Fellow in Energy & Environmental Regulatory Affairs at Rice University’s Baker Institute, write:

• “Dispersion, mobility and hardening are critical to surviving and staying in the fight. Russia’s initial experiences in Ukraine will likely lead China’s military to conclude that attacking Taiwan would require deploying overwhelming fires up front, instead of holding back like Russia did initially. Ballistic missile defense is thus vital for calling into question the reliability of China’s missile might.”
• “Ukraine’s experience demonstrates the importance of layered ground-based air defenses that, even if imperfect, can deny an attacker air control over key terrain.”
• “Washington and Taipei should place greater emphasis on sea mines … Taiwanese forces should pursue a three-layered approach to defending Taiwan’s coastline from amphibious attack. … The third layer of coastline defense should rely on precision fires to turn Taiwan’s nearshore waters and beaches into kill zones.”
• “Aircraft should be protected through sensor denial, with radio frequency jamming pods as well as multi-platform-based jamming of satellite navigation and radio communications to insert confusion into China’s battle plan. … Washington and Taipei should help to prepare the island for insurgency.”
• “Taiwan should prepare for the possibility of siege warfare by Chinese forces. Taiwan’s Petroleum Administration Law currently requires that the government hold petroleum stocks equivalent to 30 days of what consumption was during the prior year, meaning approximately one million barrels per day. It would be better to store 60 days of liquid fuel in hardened, buried, and dispersed locations.”

Punitive measures related to Ukraine and their impact globally:

“Why the US has hit some Russian oligarchs with sanctions but not others,” Courtney Weaver, James Politi and Henry Foy, FT, 04.13.22. The news outlet reports:

• “Vladimir Potanin is Russia’s richest man. … That Potanin and others have so far avoided an asset freeze or transaction ban has raised questions, including in Congress, about the logic underpinning the U.S. sanctions regime … The U.K. and EU have both put sanctions on Alexei Mordashov, the owner of one of Russia’s biggest steelmakers and a minority shareholder in Bank Rossiya, whose shareholders include some of Putin’s best known associates. The U.S. has not. The same applies to Mikhail Fridman and Petr Aven.”
• “Neither the U.S. nor EU have put sanctions on Leonid Mikhelson, who has extensive business ties with Gennady Timchenko … Alisher Usmanov, the Russian metals and mining tycoon, was hit with sanctions by the U.S. immediately after the war in Ukraine, but his companies were not. Roman Abramovich has been placed under sanctions in the EU and U.K., but not in the U.S.”
• “Former U.S. officials and people familiar with deliberations inside the Biden administration said one reason for the selective nature of its sanctions regime was that Washington wanted to avoid the mistakes it made when it targeted Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska’s aluminum company Rusal and En+ in 2018.”
• “Sanctions against Potanin and his companies could roil markets in nickel and palladium, key components for car batteries and catalytic converters, causing problems for auto manufacturers. Mikhelson is the founder and chair of liquefied natural gas producer Novatek. A former Treasury official said the energy sector had been ‘very expressly written out, at least initially, of the sanctions that were imposed at the onset of the invasion.’ ‘This is no longer about fair and unfair,’ the person added. ‘We’re pulling our punches where there would be implications for the U.S. and our allies.’”

“Russia’s Treasure in the U.S. Should Be Turned Against Putin.” Laurence H. Tribe and Jeremy Lewin, NYT, 04.15.22. The authors, a former instructor of constitutional law at Harvard and a third year Harvard Law School student, write:

• “President Biden could liquidate the tens of billions of dollars the Russian central bank has parked in the United States as part of its foreign exchange reserves; by some estimates, those funds may total as much as $100 billion.”
• “Liquidating them now would not only be likely the fastest way to increase American aid to Ukraine without further burdening and fatiguing American taxpayers. It would also send a potent signal that the United States is committed to making even the world’s most powerful states pay for their war crimes.”

Ukraine-related negotiations:

• No significant developments.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“The Ukraine Temptation. Biden Should Resist Calls to Fight a New Cold War,” Stephen Wertheim, FA, 04.12.22. The author, senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes:

• “For three decades, U.S. foreign policy has run on inertia and called it strategy. … When problems appeared, successive administrations generally took them as reasons to expand U.S. deployments. … Now the war in Ukraine is tempting policymakers to repeat that mistake in an exceedingly consequential way. Rather than pivot to Asia, advocates of U.S. primacy argue, the United States must now build up its military presence in Europe to contain an assertive Russia, even as it strengthens its Indo-Pacific defenses to contain a rising China.”
• “The Biden administration should decline this invitation to wage a risky global cold war. … The war in Ukraine has made strategic discipline not only more necessary but also more achievable. … Biden should reject a cold war strategy of dividing the world and keeping one half dependent on the United States. … The first step is to support Ukraine while avoiding escalation into a direct clash between U.S. and Russian forces.”
• “Biden should take advantage of a once-in-a-generation opportunity to put the European security order on the path to self-sufficiency. With immense economic and demographic superiority, Europe is more than capable of developing the military power to balance Russia. … Limiting the United States’ burdens in Europe would enhance its strategy in Asia.”
• “Military restraint is desirable on strategic grounds, but it is also essential to freeing U.S. statecraft to pursue what matters most. The priorities that Biden identified when he came into office—delivering prosperity for ordinary Americans and tackling climate change and pandemics—remain just as important today, and the war has made them even harder to address.”
• “A new cold war promises clarity of purpose. In reality, it would impose enormous costs and generate unnecessary risks. It would not, moreover, make other priorities go away … After 9/11, the United States allowed itself to become consumed by fears of the enemy. After Ukraine, the Biden administration should let nothing keep it from advancing the best interests of Americans.”

Transcript of John Mearsheimer’s April 7th Presentation, American Committee for US-Russia Accord, 04.18.22. In this presentation, the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor in the Political Science Department at the University of Chicago, says:

• “I think it’s [the Ukraine crisis] actually more dangerous than the Cuban Missile Crisis, which is not to minimize the danger of that crisis. … If you want to understand how the Russians think about this crisis, you have to understand the causes.”

• “In my story, it all goes back to the April 2008 decision at the NATO summit … where it was said that both Georgia and Ukraine would become part of NATO. … If you look at his [Putin’s] Feb. 24 speech justifying why Russia invaded Ukraine, it is all about NATO expansion and the fact that is perceived to be by him, an existential threat to Russia. … If you listen to Zelensky talk about a possible solution, the first thing he goes to is talking about creating a neutral Ukraine.”

• “If you believe like I do that he [Putin] is facing an existential threat, you’re in effect saying he views this as a threat to Russia’s survival. ... It’s impossible for both sides to win...So what is likely to happen? There’s now talk on our side, and even on the Russian side, that this war is going to go on for years. In other words, we’re going to have a war between the United States and Russia that goes on for years.”
• “I think first of all, if the United States gets dragged into a fight against Russia and it’s a conventional war in Ukraine or over Ukraine in the air, the United States will clobber the Russians. If the Ukrainians are doing so well against the Russians militarily, you can imagine how much better the Americans will do in air to air engagements and even on the ground, right?”
• “We [Americans] are talking about breaking it [Russia]. We’re talking about not only defeating it in Ukraine, but breaking it economically. This is a remarkably dangerous situation ... even if the Russians and the Americans don’t end up fighting each other, but the Ukrainians are able to stagger the Russians in Ukraine and deliver significant defeats on them, the Russians may still turn to nuclear weapons. It’s possible. Is it likely? No, but it’s possible.” 

“The Ukraine War Doesn’t Change Everything,” Stephen M. Walt, FP, 04.12.22. The author, the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, writes:

• “The war in Ukraine is a significant event … Rather, it is important because it signals the end of the brief ‘unipolar moment’ (1993-2020) when the United States was the world’s sole genuine superpower and because it heralds a return to patterns of world politics that were temporarily suppressed during the short era of unchallenged U.S. primacy. The end of that era was in sight long before Russia invaded Ukraine, however, and the war itself is more of a punctuation mark.”
• “U.S. primacy and unipolar stability would have lasted longer if U.S. policymakers had been smarter, less ideologically driven and more realistic … Instead of preserving U.S. power, resolving conflicts wherever possible, and working to ensure that no peer competitor emerged, U.S. officials mostly did the exact opposite. … Instead of extending liberal institutions gradually through mechanisms such as the Partnership for Peace, they expanded NATO with scant regard for Russian concerns and blithely assumed that Moscow could or would do nothing to stop it.”
• “So where will this leave us? In the immortal words of Talking Heads: ‘Same as it ever was, same as it ever was.’ … First, it is a world where hard power still matters … Second, the world has been reminded—again!—that economic interdependence is not without risks and trade-offs. … Third, even if Russia achieves some limited gains in the Donbass, the war will accelerate its relative decline.”
• “The emerging future will be neither a U.S.-centered ‘liberal order’ nor a Chinese-centered autocratic one. Instead, each of these two major powers will lead partial orders that incorporate states that either share similar values or have little choice but to align with one side or the other. … But as the global response to Ukraine suggests, many countries—especially those in the global south—will resist pressures to pick a side and will try to remain aloof from quarrels that do not involve them directly.”

“Why non-Western countries tend to see Russia's war very, very differently,” Trita Parsi,  MSNBC, 04.11.22. The author, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute, writes:

• “As effective as Zelensky has been in drumming up Western support, Ukraine’s message has been far less compelling to audiences in the Global South, where many countries have declined to join Western campaigns to sanction Russia’s economy and isolate it diplomatically.”
• “In conversations with diplomats and analysts from across Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, it was evident to me that these countries largely sympathize with the plight of the Ukrainian people and view Russia as the aggressor. But Western demands that they make costly sacrifices by cutting off economic ties with Russia to uphold a ‘rules-based order’ have begotten an allergic reaction. That order hasn’t been rules-based; instead, it has allowed the U.S. to violate international law with impunity. The West’s messaging on Ukraine has taken its tone-deafness to a whole new level, and it is unlikely to win over the support of countries that have often experienced the worse sides of the international order.”
• “For Ukraine, the support of the Global South may ultimately not be a high priority. But for the U.S., there’s an important lesson here. Had it pursued a more restrained foreign policy in the past few decades, it might have found it far easier to rally the global community to its side against the aggression of another nuclear power.”

“America’s hypocrisy over Ukraine and ‘spheres of influence,’” Katrina vanden Heuvel, WP, 04.12.22. The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “The United States and Cuba cooperate in efforts to police drug trafficking and limit terrorism. Yet the embargo continues — punishing the Cuban people until they get rid of the government the United States does not approve of. So much for “choosing their own path.” Cuba is not alone. The United States has imposed harsh sanctions on Venezuela and Nicaragua for sustaining regimes Washington opposes.”
• “At the same time, the national security establishment is raising alarms about growing Chinese involvement in the Western Hemisphere.”
• “If the national security establishment has its way, the United States won’t let our neighbors choose their own orientation. It will push propaganda, reinforce corrupt elites and threaten or impose sanctions for those who don’t fall in line with a ‘model’ that has failed repeatedly across the hemisphere.”
• “Hypocrisy is common in international relations. The Russians and Chinese, for example, constantly invoke international law, even as they trample it when they deem it necessary. The United States champions a ‘rules-based order,’ in which we make the rules and hold ourselves exempt from them when desirable. The ‘principle’ of respecting nations and their right to choose their own path is a good one. The countries of our own hemisphere wish we would practice it as well as preach it.”

“Free Advice for Putin: 'Make Peace, You Fool,’” Thomas L. Friedman, NYT, 04.13.22. The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “When I called one of America's premier teachers of grand strategy, John Arquilla, and asked him what he'd tell Putin today, he didn't hesitate: 'I would say, 'Make peace, you fool.'”
• “In sum, said Arquilla, 'I am not saying that the Russians are going to be driven out of eastern Ukraine. I am trying to answer the question: Why have the Ukrainians done so very well? And it's because they have applied all these new rules of modern warfare.' And since they will surely continue to do so, it augurs a long, terrible, mutually destructive new round of warfare, in which neither side is likely to be able to administer a knockout blow. After that, who knows?”
• “I still hope Putin the fool will eventually seek a dirty, face-saving deal, involving a Russian withdrawal, some kind of independent status for the more pro-Russian eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk and no Ukrainian membership in NATO but giving Kyiv a green light to join the European Union, along with security guarantees against another Russian invasion.”
• “'The longer the fighting goes on, the tougher the Ukrainian resistance, thanks to the ways of war they are pioneering, the more the risk of escalation grows,' said Arquilla. 'But Putin has cowed Russian civil society into submission. And the Russian military, so embarrassed by their relatively poor performance, is unlikely to turn on him. Thus, he probably thinks he's not under time pressure to de-escalate.' And that, ladies and gentlemen, is how little wars become big wars.”

“Why the Ukraine War Hasn’t Crashed the Stock Market, Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., WSJ, 04.15.22. The author, a columnist and member of the news outlet’s editorial board, writes:

• “The stock market, so far, has largely recapitulated its pattern from past wars: sell the rumor, buy the news. The S&P 500 hit a recent low on Feb. 23, the day before Russia’s invasion. It’s up 167 points since then.”
• “A Canadian fund manager made news by advising his investors to keep buying stocks because in an all-out nuclear war their portfolio allocation would be irrelevant anyway. Looking back and trying to explain a modest 7% drop during the Cuban missile crisis, economists reached for a similar explanation: There’s no point discounting a worst-case outcome because nobody will be around to benefit from a wise investment decision.”
• “Mr. Putin, in astonishingly short order, has turned his Ukraine lark into a risk not for Russia but for Mr. Putin. Hence a heating up of the rhetoric recently. RIA Novosti, an official Moscow news service, issued a bloodcurdling call for the liquidation of Ukraine. Sergey Karaganov, a leading Putin intellectual, told a Western interviewer, ‘The stakes of the Russian elite are very high—for them it is an existential war,’ and gave voice to a miracle scenario in which nuclear threats cause the U.S. to abandon NATO.”
• “It is difficult not to imagine him now fingering his weapons of mass destruction, particularly his tactical nuclear warheads, and wondering if they might offer a way out of his dilemma—a concern publicly aired this week by CIA Director William Burns.”  
• “The consensus after so many hours of White House discussion is that Mr. Putin is likely beyond saving no matter what the U.S. does.”

“Finland and Sweden seek the security of NATO’s embrace,” Tony Barber, FT, 04.15.22. The author, Europe editor for the news outlet, writes:

• “Should Finland and Sweden join NATO, it would mark a transformation of the security landscape in northern Europe unlike anything experienced by the tsarist empire, the Soviet Union and post-communist Russia in more than 200 years.”
• “Public opinion in Finland—and also in Sweden, though less dramatically—did not swing in favor of NATO membership until Putin’s invasion of Ukraine two months ago. Partly in response to public pressure, the mood in the two nations’ political parties is changing, too.”
• “Finland and Sweden expect Russian countermeasures if the alliance’s enlargement goes ahead. But Moscow’s warning this week that it would deploy nuclear-armed ships and missiles in the region prompted some western military specialists to observe that Russia may well have already placed Iskander cruise missiles in its exclave of Kaliningrad.”
• “Various aspects of Russia’s war in Ukraine appear not to have gone to plan — but nowhere more so than in northern Europe.”

“The End of Strategic Cacophony? The Russo-Ukrainian War and the Future of NATO,” Jason W. Davidson, War on the Rocks, 04.14.22. The author, a professor of political science and international affairs at the University of Mary Washington, writes:

• “This tragic war will eventually end — and when it does, NATO will be left with similar challenges to those it faced when the war began. Eastern NATO allies will continue to focus on territorial defense against Russia, although they will press even harder to get the entire alliance to focus there as well. Countries like France and Italy are likely to keep a more watchful eye on Russia, but they will continue to focus on terrorism, illegal migration, and civil war as their most salient challenges. China’s power and ambitions will continue to be the focus of American policymakers, who will push NATO to turn toward Asia. Finally, France will continue to push for European strategic autonomy, which will clash with demands from Warsaw, Vilnius, Tallinn, and Riga for an American presence to guarantee their security. Russia’s attack on Ukraine has not unified the alliance on one threat.”
• “Recognition that NATO’s 30 allies face diverse threats will be critical in getting the alliance to take meaningful steps to address the threats that Russia, terrorism, and China pose to its members. How will the alliance balance the calls for focus on territorial defense against Russia with the need to provide greater stability in the Mediterranean? When leaders from NATO countries convene in Madrid this summer to compose the alliance’s new strategic concept, they ought to avoid the urge to paper over differences for the sake of unity. Instead, they should welcome uncomfortable and candid conversations about how to solve the alliance’s very real and enduring internal tensions.”

“Finland and Sweden belong in NATO,” Editorial Board, WP, 04.13.22. The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Finland has an 830-mile border with Russia, which would become the new front line between NATO and Mr. Putin's realm. For the United States, this is no small consideration, given the prospective obligation to defend new Nordic NATO members from outside attack. Mr. Putin's regime has threatened Sweden and Finland with what one foreign ministry spokeswoman has called ‘military and political consequences’ if they join.”
• “However, both Sweden and Finland already work closely with NATO. As full members, they would readily integrate into its command structure and be more than capable of sharing the collective defense burden. They would add substantial resources—financial, diplomatic and military—to the alliance. The result would be a stronger NATO deterrent, making war less likely in Europe. Finnish and Swedish accession would have to clear procedural hurdles, starting with the two countries' own parliamentary debates and votes. The U.S. Senate, too, ultimately would have to weigh in. A strong ‘yes’ vote would signal yet another defeat for Mr. Putin.”

“Russia believed the West was weak and decadent. So it invaded,” Kristina Stoeckl and Dmitry Uzlaner, WP, 04.15.22. The authors, a professor of sociology and a senior postdoctoral fellow at the University of Innsbruck (Austria), write:

• “Christian conservatives' image of a failing and doomed West began to dominate views of Russian conservative elites during the late 2000s. But Russian elites saw their Western conservative partners as part of that failing West: they too were weak and pitiful heralds of a West in decline.”
• “In this collective image of a weak West, Russia depicted itself (to the inside and outside) as the country of strength, the bulwark of traditional families: with strong men, fertile women and children properly guarded against subversive homosexual propaganda.”
• “This image is without any empirical foundation, but that was not important. It resulted in an internal perception of Russia as world messiah and a force preventing the world from sliding into the chaos of evil, with a special mission of saving the world from liberal depravities.”
• “Fascinated by this flattering vision of Russia, elites, it seems, overestimated the nation's strength and underestimated Ukraine's. The Kremlin also appears to have underestimated the strength and unity of the collective West, which appears not as corrupted and not as weak as Russia imagined. Pointedly, J.K. Rowling, whom Putin mentioned as a victim of Western cancel culture, refused his characterization and accused Putin of killing civilians instead.”

“Robert Kagan’s Selective Memory,” Andrew J. Bacevich, The American Conservative, 04.13.22. The author, president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, writes:

• “In the pages of Foreign Affairs, the indefatigable Robert Kagan recently weighed in with yet another fervent appeal on behalf of empire.”
• “According to Kagan, the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War occurred at least in part due to American passivity.”
• “By ‘wielding U.S. influence more consistently and effectively,’ presidents beginning with the elder Bush could have prevented the devastation that Ukrainians have suffered. From Kagan’s point of view, the United States has been too passive. Today, he writes, ‘the question is whether the United States will continue to make its own mistakes’—mistakes of inaction, in his view—'or whether Americans will learn, once again, that it is better to contain aggressive autocracies early, before they have built up a head of steam.’”
• “The reference to containing aggressive autocracies early requires decoding. Kagan is dissimulating. What he is actually proposing is further experiments with preventive war, which in the wake of 9/11 became the centerpiece of U.S. national security policy. Kagan, of course, supported the Bush Doctrine of preventive war. He was all in on invading Iraq. Implemented in 2003 in the form of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Bush Doctrine produced disastrous results.”

“The Cold War Never Ended: Ukraine, the China Challenge and the Revival of the West,” Stephen Kotkin, FA, May/June 2022. The author, John P. Birkelund ’52 Professor in History and International Affairs at Princeton University, writes:

• “The ... episodes of Russian aggression, for all their differences, reflect the same geopolitical trap, one that Russian rulers have set for themselves again and again. Many Russians view their country as a providential power, with a distinct civilization and a special mission in the world, but Russia’s capabilities do not match its aspirations, and so its rulers resort, time and again, to a hyper concentration of power in the state in a coercive effort to close the yawning gap with the West. But the drive for a strong state does not work, invariably devolving into personalist rule.”
• “The combination of weakness and grandeur, in turn, drives the autocrat to exacerbate the very problem that facilitated his appearance. After 1991, when the gap with the West widened radically, Russia’s perpetual geopolitics endured, as I argued in these pages in 2016. It will persist until Russian rulers make the strategic choice to abandon the impossible quest to become a great-power equal of the West and choose instead to live alongside it and focus on Russia’s internal development.”
• “Today’s China is arguably pursuing a strategy similar to the one that Nazi Germany and imperial Japan adopted, albeit by all means short of war: to become blockade-proof and sanctions-proof. And now, with Putin having provoked a siege of Russia, Xi will redouble his efforts.”
• “Others will continue to debate whether great-power conflict and security dilemmas are unending. Yet the important point here is not theoretical but historical: the contours of the modern world established by World War II persisted right through the great turn of 1979 and the lesser turn of 1989–91. Whether the world has now reached another greater or lesser turning point depends in large measure on how the war in Ukraine plays out, and on whether the West squanders its rediscovery of itself or consolidates it through renewal.”

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“China Is Reassessing Western Financial Power After Ukraine: Beijing is likely to speed up global decoupling,” Diana Choyleva, FP, 04.18.22. The author, chief economist at Enodo Economics, writes:

• “By blocking Moscow’s access to nearly half of its $630 billion in foreign-exchange and gold reserves, Washington has offered a demonstration of how much raw financial power still remains in the hands of the West. That can only strengthen China’s determination to stick to its own ideological path and carve out a sphere of geopolitical influence.”
• “The United States and other major Western countries have also barred most Russian lenders from the SWIFT global interbank messaging network and from access to U.S. correspondent banks, a critical enabler of worldwide payments. Such punishments are likely to hasten the bifurcation of the global economic and financial system—a process my firm, Enodo Economics, dubbed the ‘great decoupling’ a few years ago. Financial self-reliance will be an important feature of the emerging new order.”
• “China is not alone in failing to condemn Russia for its invasion and in expressing concern over the sanctions. Any country uneasy of the West’s ruthless display of state financial power may well choose to hedge its dependence on the dollar by taking a stake in Russian and Chinese alternatives.”
• “However the war in Ukraine pans out, the global economy thus faces a huge adjustment. Whoever succeeds in turning the problem of stagflation into an opportunity to boost innovation and domestic productivity as well as succeeds in building a robust sphere of influence will emerge the winner.”

“Kevin Rudd says that under Xi Jinping, China will ‘not distance itself from Russia at all,’” James Fernyhough , FT, 04.18.22. The author, a correspondent for the news outlet, writes:

• “‘Too many Chinese strategic interests rely on the Moscow relationship, to do with the stability of their own border with Russia; the fact that China doesn’t want to focus on a Russia problem, but focus on the United States regionally and globally; and the fact that China sees strategic utility in Russia being a rolling strategic diversion for the Americans, the Middle East, north Africa and Europe,’ according to former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd. ‘China sees Russia as a reliable long-term source of coal, gas, oil, grain and other commodities.’”
• “In his new book, ‘The Avoidable War,’ Rudd argues that war between the U.S. and China is an increasing possibility, but can be avoided by ‘managed strategic competition.’ That would involve setting clear geopolitical ‘red lines,’ competing in ‘non-lethal’ areas such as trade, foreign policy and ideology and cooperating on issues including climate change, public health and global financial stability.”

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms control:

• No significant developments.

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

“The Cyber-Escalation Fallacy: What the War in Ukraine Reveals About State-Backed Hacking,” Erica D. Lonergan, FA, 04.15.22. The author, assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute at West Point, writes:

• “During a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing in March, Sen. Angus King, an independent from Maine, pressed Gen. Paul Nakasone, the head of U.S. Cyber Command and director of the National Security Agency, about the lack of significant cyber-operations in Russia’s war in Ukraine.”
• “In fact, the negligible role of cyberattacks in the Ukraine conflict should come as no surprise. Through war simulations, statistical analyses and other kinds of studies, scholars have found little evidence that cyber-operations provide effective forms of coercion or that they cause escalation to actual military conflict. That is because for all its potential to disrupt companies, hospitals, and utility grids during peacetime, cyberpower is much harder to use against targets of strategic significance or to achieve outcomes with decisive impacts … In failing to recognize this, U.S. officials and policymakers are approaching the use of cyberpower in a way that may be doing more harm than good.”
• “The absence of escalation across decades of strategic interaction in cyberspace … should cause policymakers to reevaluate long-standing assumptions about the cyber-domain. … Of course, the potential for cyberattacks to temporarily paralyze large information networks or even whole sectors of an economy should not be discounted. But in a world in which armed conflict continues to destroy entire cities and wreak terrible human costs, both civilian and military, cyber-operations should be regarded less as another form of hard power than as a way for states to pursue strategic goals by other means.”

Energy exports from CIS:

“How to cut off Russian oil and gas to Europe without causing chaos,” Daniel Yergin and Carlos Pascual, WP, 04.14.22. The authors, vice chairman of S&P Global and a senior vice president at S&P Global and former U.S. ambassador to Mexico and Ukraine, write:

• “Gas and oil are the big-money sources for Russia’s war financing. If Europe cut off shipments completely, we calculate that it would cost the Kremlin, at current prices, more than $250 billion a year. … Completely severing Europe from Russian energy, though, will depend on skillfully managing the resulting energy shortages and turbulence. To succeed requires something that has until now been largely missing: collaboration between government and industry.”
• “U.S. and European governments need to collaborate with companies on a daily basis, sharing information, to coordinate the complex logistics and supply chains of an oil market of nearly 100 million barrels per day. This is wartime, and that means reaching back to the government-industry collaboration of World War II.”
• “With such cooperation, sanctions against Europe-bound Russian oil might just be manageable. According to our figures, about half of Russia’s 7.5 million barrels per day of crude and product exports go to Europe—meeting about 35 percent of total demand.”
• “Natural gas is the biggest challenge, because of Europe’s high dependence on pipeline delivery from Russia—normally about 35 percent of EU demand but fluctuating down to 25 percent. While liquefied natural gas has brought much additional gas to Europe and with more to come, there is not enough additional LNG capacity globally or sufficient LNG infrastructure in Europe to offset a shortfall from turning off the Russian spigot.”
• “Significantly expanding renewable energy will take years. But there are immediate steps that could reduce Europe’s gas dependency: temporarily using more coal; if possible technically, not shuttering Germany’s last three operating nuclear reactors; energy conservation; behavioral changes (e.g., adjusting building temperatures); and possibly some form of rationing.”

“What It Will Mean as Europe Frees Itself From Russian Energy,” James Henderson, NYT, 04.12.22. The author, chairman of the gas program and director of the energy transition research initiative at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, writes:

• “Europe has benefited from relatively cheap natural gas from Russia for decades. But for all the talk now of diversifying away from this supply, the plain reality is that it will not be easy to find alternatives. It will be a yearslong undertaking. The continent imports roughly 40 percent of its natural gas from Russia. That’s an enormous amount. Liquefied natural gas from the global market would be the main substitute, but competition will be intense and prices are likely to rise and remain high. Consumers will bear the burden. But even if a premium must be paid for energy security, an added benefit could be an accelerated transition to cleaner fuels.”
• “Although there is likely to be short-term price pain as Europe moves to divorce itself from its dependence on Russian natural gas, the EU strategy can lead to long-term gain. Morally, Europe will defend its values and demonstrate its strength in the face of Russian aggression. And the emphasis on reducing demand for natural gas and speeding up the development of green energy will help Europe reduce its greenhouse gas emissions, an ever more urgent imperative as the world continues to warm.”

“The Ukraine Crisis Offers a Rare Chance for Energy and Climate Cooperation,” Jason Bordoff, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, FP, 04.18.22. The authors, a columnist at FP and the Jeane Kirkpatrick professor of the Practice of International Affairs at HKS, write:

• “The energy transition will be as complex and geopolitically fraught as it is necessary. Smoothing its jagged path requires more societal consensus. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, for all its tragedy, offers an opportunity to forge such a consensus—not by lurching to the left or to the right but by bringing together a motley coalition to collectively seize the future without forsaking the present.”

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant developments.

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“How Popular Is Putin, Really?” Ora John Reuter, Noah Buckley, Katerina Tertytchnaya and Kyle L. Marquardt, WP, 04.13.22. The news outlet reports:

• “Our research found that the image of Putin’s popularity helps maintain his actual popularity. To investigate the relationship between perceptions of Putin’s popularity and his actual popularity, we fielded a set of experiments in four public opinion surveys in Russia.”
• “Telling people that Putin enjoyed stable and high support had no effect on support for the president in any of the four experiments. However, when people were told that Putin’s approval was low and declining, their support for the president dropped significantly—by six to 11 percentage points.”
• “The Kremlin’s current efforts to shape perceptions—through propaganda, ‘patriotic’ lessons in schools that justify the invasion, manipulated polls, censorship and repression—all aim to boost the regime’s popularity.”
• “As Russia’s war in Ukraine grinds on, signs of public dissatisfaction about the war may increasingly enter the public consciousness. Street protests across the country, scenes of soldiers’ mothers criticizing the authorities and a sharp rise in food prices coupled with shortages could dent Putin’s image of popularity. In turn, that could set off a larger loss of support.”
• “However, Putin is also increasing repression to make citizens afraid of expressing opposition to the regime. The dueling dynamics between growing dissent and increasingly stifling repression will help shape Putin’s rule in the months and years ahead.”

“Russians at War: Putin’s Aggression Has Turned a Nation Against Itself,” Andrei Kolesnikov, FA, 04.18.22. The author, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes:

• “Putin has divided the nation. Both opponents and supporters of the Russian leader have become more radicalized. … Today, the dominant response of ordinary Russians to the war is aggression. It is undergirded by what seems to be an almost subconscious effort to block out any bad news, and with it, any sense that the nation might be in the wrong. … Russians are collectively experiencing a version of Stockholm syndrome, sympathizing more with their own captor than with his other victims.
• “[T]his year, during Victory Day celebrations on May 9 … Putin will no doubt equate the Soviet victory in 1945 with his own triumph over the powers of reason. … By May 9, Putin will have to find the words to describe the specific parameters of the new victory in Ukraine. And they must be convincing enough to make the triumph resemble 1945.”
• “Faced with looming economic catastrophe, the state seems likely to aim its efforts at those Russians who can be relied on to support the regime provided they are offered enough cash and other basic rewards to do so.”
• “Over time, the accumulating effects of the war could erode public trust in Putin. ... [F]or now, Russians seem content to project their discontents on the enemy. To the question, ‘Who is to blame?’ they answer: the United States and Europe. Putin has hit a dead end, and Ukraine, along with the rest of the world, is suffering as a result. But in the long term, it is a disaster for the Russian people, too.”
• “The West has to understand that, as banal as it sounds, Putin’s system and the Russian nation are not one and the same. And this understanding will be crucial for building a post-Putin Russia. Otherwise, the country will continue to be regarded as a hostile enclave, to be shunned by the world. But, ultimately, it will be up to Russians themselves to prove by their own actions that their country is more than Putin and what he has wrought.”

“Putin’s dictatorship is now based on fear rather than spin,” Sergei Guriev, FT, 04.18.22. The author, a professor of economics at Sciences Po, writes:

• “The political scientist Adam Przeworski once wrote that authoritarian equilibrium rests on economic prosperity, lies or fear. Like most 21st-century ‘spin dictators,’ Putin originally eschewed fear. In his first decade in office, he presided over a period of fast economic growth, driven by rising oil prices and economic reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s. This prosperity brought him genuine popularity.”
• “As Putin’s governance model is incompatible with economic growth, Russia’s economy continued to stagnate. Despite repeated promises of reforms, investment did not take off, capital kept fleeing the country and Russia fell further behind developed countries. Putin’s corrupt model protected his proxies at the expense of ordinary Russians. In 2019, Russian GDP was 6 percent above its pre-Crimea level, but real incomes of Russian households were 7 percent below their 2013 peak. Putin then turned to Przeworski’s second pillar of authoritarianism: lies. Russia’s government intensified censorship and propaganda.”
• “Running out of options, Putin returned to his 2014 recipe—hoping that a short victorious war would once again raise his popularity despite the lack of economic success. This time, however, he gravely miscalculated. He overestimated his military strength, under-appreciated Ukrainians’ courage and will to defend their country, and did not expect the unity and resolve of the western response.”
• “The consequences of Putin’s aggression are catastrophic for Russia’s economy and deadly for Russian politics.”

“Vladimir Kara-Murza from jail: Russia will be free. I’ve never been so sure,” Vladimir Kara-Murza, WP, 04.15.22. The author, a Russian opposition politician, writes:

• “Editor’s note: On Monday, Russian human rights activist and Post contributing columnist Vladimir Kara-Murza gave an interview in Moscow to CNN in which he harshly criticized the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A few hours later, he was picked up by police and summarily sentenced to 15 days in jail on a charge of disobeying law enforcement. Kara-Murza sent this column to The Post through his lawyer.”
• “When you are told that no one protests against the war in Russia, don’t believe it. Hundreds of people who took part in such protests are imprisoned in police stations and special detention facilities. The police grab them immediately and take them away. And there are no more media outlets in Russia that can talk about it.”
• “Yet the attitude toward ‘politicals’ is good—both among the prison staff and the inmates. In this sense, nothing has changed since the dissidents of the 1970s. I wrote this phrase and thought, [s]o we’re walking in the same circle. We never managed to break out of it in the short window of opportunity in the ’90s. But we’ll get out one day, for sure. There will be another window of opportunity—and this time we need to use it correctly. There will be a dawn. The night, as you know, is darkest just before the light.”
• “As Boris Nemtsov liked to say: ‘We can do it.’ Russia will be free. I’ve never been so sure of it as I am today.”

“Moscow CEOs cannot ignore the costs of Putin’s war,” Andrey Panov, FT, 04.13.22. The author, a former deputy chief executive of Aeroflot, writes:

• “Stopping Russia’s war in Ukraine is critically important. And not just for the people of Ukraine. As former deputy CEO of Aeroflot, I know first-hand how destructive this conflict has been for Russia’s economy and reputation. But our business community has been slow to recognize its own role in enabling Putin and his henchmen. This must change, before executives become accomplices in Moscow’s war crimes.”
• “I want to tell every colleague—those with whom I worked, built projects or negotiated deals, every senior Russian business person: I know why you are afraid to speak out against the war. I was the same when I was still in Moscow. I know it is impossible to be a top executive and oppose the political regime, and I am not calling for martyrs or political prisoners. But you can retire, you can leave, and even if neither of these are possible, there are still things you can do. You can sabotage the war effort, by delaying or ignoring every deal or contract which supports the military invasion or Russian propaganda.”
• “I know some of you believe what you are being told by the Kremlin and its media. But you are smart—and you do business by being well-informed. Seek out Russian independent media or international news on the internet, on YouTube or via Telegram. Look at the economic data. Look at the photos of ruined cities, destroyed buildings and roads, dead women and children. Understanding the horrors of war is a challenge, but once you know what is going on, the rest is simple. And then act—with all the will and ingenuity that Russian executives are known for.”

“The Destruction of Academic Freedom and Social Science in Russia,” Theodore Gerber and Hannah Chapman, PONARS, 04.11.22. The authors, a professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and an assistant professor of political science at Miami University, Ohio, write:

• “The Russian government’s recent domestic repressions and the sudden isolation of Russian scholars from international collaborators will likely destroy Russian academic communities, particularly in the social sciences. Since the Soviet collapse, Russian social science rose virtually from scratch to become an important source of scholarly research, ties to global academic networks and insight into the workings of Russia’s society, politics, culture and economy.”
• “The anticipated loss of Russian social science will cut off a vital source of understanding about Russia. Therefore, although support programs for displaced scholars now (rightly) focus on assisting Ukrainian researchers and students, steps should be taken by Western governments, universities and major donors to preserve and protect Russian social scientists in exile—not just for the short term, but until conditions in Russia change to allow social science there to resume.”

“Russian Orthodox Church lends legitimacy to Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine,” Polina Ivanova, FT, 04.18.22. The author, Moscow correspondent for the news outlet, writes:

• “Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Moscow-led branch of global Orthodoxy, this month called on Russians to rally around their government so that the state could ‘repel its enemies, both external and internal,’ a resounding message of support for the war.”
• “The church, one of the pillars of Vladimir Putin’s rule, has given the war an air of legitimacy among the president’s supporters, bolstering his depiction of Russia’s invasion as a reunion of ancient Slavic-Orthodox lands.”
• “In Ukraine, it has caused outrage among many. Before the outbreak of war, thousands of parishes in Ukraine remained under Moscow’s control, with Kirill their spiritual leader, despite a historic split in 2018 that set up an independent, Kyiv-led church with its own religious leadership for the first time.”
• “A full 12,000 parishes in Ukraine were subject to Moscow and to Kirill before the war … representing about a third of all the parishes under Moscow’s control across both countries. Fourteen percent of Ukrainians identified with the Moscow-led church, out of a population of about 44 million, according to a poll by Ukraine’s Razumkov Centre. Now, many are keen to see a break.” 

Defense and aerospace:

•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Who we are, where we are, what we are for—and why,” Dmitri Trenin, Russia in Global Affairs, 04.11.22. The author, former director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “The military operation in Ukraine was not caused by Russia's desire to break the world order. It pursued a much more limited goal: to solve, by use of force, a number of geostrategic, geopolitical, humanitarian tasks in Ukraine and, more broadly, in the European direction as a whole.”
• “The point of no return in Russia's relations with America and Europe has been passed. … In fact, we are talking about rejection of part of the legacy of Peter the Great—a three-hundred-year tradition of positioning Russia not only as a great European power and an integral part of the balance of power on the continent, but also an integral part of the pan-European civilization.”
• “A common house in Europe has already been built and inhabited, under the general patronage of the United States, but without Russia. It was not a mistake on one side or the other. The collective West could not include such a large figure in its community without shaking the foundations ... expansion of the foundation would have entailed rejection of U.S. domination. Russia, for its part, could not obey the rules worked out without her participation and promising her, in essence, a subordinate position in that common European home.”
• “The role of Russia in the new international context could consist not only in defending sovereignty in confrontation with the united forces of the West, but mainly in building new models of relations within the non-West.
• “But with all this, you need to start from the basics: who we are, where we are, what we are for—and why.”

“It makes sense to engage Putin’s tech exodus,” John Thornhill, FT, 04.14.22. The author, innovation editor for the news outlet, writes:

• “Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine has driven millions of Ukrainians out of their country and triggered a mass exodus of Russians.”
• “Numbers are hard to verify, but OK Russians, an information site set up by recent emigrants, estimates that more than 300,000 Russians have left the country since the start of the war in Ukraine. Among them are many workers from the tech sector as foreign firms have shut their offices in Russia.”
• “Some emigrants are returning to Russia because they cannot access bank accounts or find jobs. ‘What we are finding is that we are double sanctioned,’ Dmitry Aleshkovsky, one of the founders of OK Russians and a former civil society leader from Moscow, tells me from the Georgian capital of Tbilisi. ‘We are enemies of the state within Russia and we are enemies of the world outside Russia.’”
• “There remain both good economic and political reasons for engaging, rather than rebuffing, these latest Russian exiles.”

Ukraine:

“Do people in Donbas want to be 'liberated' by Russia?” John O'Loughlin, Gerard Toal and Gwendolyn Sasse, WP, 04.15.22. The professors write:

• “In January, we conducted a large, computer-assisted telephone public opinion survey of people living in the two regions on both sides of the military line of contact. … In total, 4,025 people were interviewed, with equal numbers on both sides of the line of contact dividing the Donbas. Data are weighted proportional to current population estimations separately in the Kyiv-controlled and separatist areas.”
• “Each respondent could choose from five answers. When the responses are weighted by the estimated total population on either side of the line of control in the Donbas before the war (1.7 million in the Kyiv-controlled zone and 2.1 million in the separatist republics), more people preferred to remain in Ukraine (42 percent) than be annexed to Russia (31 percent). Just 9 percent opted for independence.”
• “But the figure in which we averaged data from all the survey firms summary data hides some big differences. While the Ukrainian and Russian pollsters found similar opinions in areas controlled by the Ukrainian government, in the breakaway area, pollsters calling from Russia found higher support (70 percent) for joining Donbas with Russia than did the pollsters calling from Ukraine (16 percent). In the Ukrainian government-controlled areas, almost 3 in 4 respondents (72 percent) wanted the breakaway territories back within Ukraine. These residents were twice as likely to say the Donbas should not have any special status as to say it should have special autonomous status within Ukraine.”
• “Our research suggests that in a free and fair referendum held throughout the Donbas—under international supervision and with impartial, transparent and inclusive voting rules that allowed those displaced since 2014 to vote—the majority would be likely to vote to remain in Ukraine. However, a vote restricted to just those remaining in the Donbas would be likely to endorse joining Russia.”

"What Putin Fears Most," Robert Person and Michael McFaul. Journal of Democracy, vol. 33 no. 2, April 2022. The authors, an associate professor of international relations at the U.S. Military Academy and a former U.S. ambassador to Russia, write:

• “Contrary to his expectations, Putin's use of force has strengthened Ukrainian democracy, not weakened it. His decision to invade Ukraine has united Ukrainians and strengthened Zelensky's popularity and image as a leader of the nation. ... Russia's aggression has galvanized a Ukrainian people who will forevermore turn their backs on Muscovy's autocracy, choosing instead to embrace the universal value of freedom—freedom from Russian domination, freedom to choose their own destiny, freedom to live in peace.”
• “But despite early Ukrainian successes on the battlefield, the long-term survival of Ukraine's democracy hangs in the balance. Putin's continued bellicose rhetoric and rejection of any serious attempts to negotiate a ceasefire suggest that Moscow's assault will continue unabated. ...it is too early to predict the outcome of this gruesome war. But despite the Russian army's poor performance so far, there is no evidence to suggest that Putin has abandoned his objective to remove Zelensky from power and subjugate Ukraine to Moscow's control.”
• “Putin is threatened by a flourishing democracy in Ukraine. He cannot tolerate a successful and democratic Ukraine on Russia's border, especially if the Ukrainian people also begin to prosper economically.”
• “The Kremlin will remain committed to undermining Ukrainian (and Georgian, Moldovan, Armenian, and the list goes on) democracy and sovereignty for as long as Putin remains in power and maybe longer if Russian autocracy continues. And the Ukrainian people have already proved their mettle: They will fight for their democracy until the day Russian forces leave Ukraine.”

“I Didn’t Think My Mother Would Escape Putin Twice,” Anna Myroniuk, NYT, 04.17.22. The author, a Ukrainian journalist and the head of investigations at The Kyiv Independent, writes:

• “In 2014, my mother fled her home in eastern Ukraine. She didn’t want to. She’d just started a new job as a teacher and was keen to carry on her work. But as Russia-backed separatists waged war in Donetsk, the situation became unbearable.”
• “Through the months of Russia’s military buildup [in 2021-2022], I knew the east was at grave risk of Russian aggression. But I assumed it would stop there. Instead, President Vladimir Putin launched a brutal war on the entire country—and my mother, in Bucha, was suddenly at risk. Once again, she had to flee ... She’s now in western Ukraine, staying with some relatives, an internally displaced person once again.”
• “The war, which began in the east eight years ago, is returning there for its culmination. Given Russia’s brutality—which now extends to the possible use of chemical weapons in besieged Mariupol—it’s likely to be a terrible contest.”
• “For Ukrainians, it will be the latest installment of horror. But the country, like my family, is standing strong. East and west, displaced and not, Ukrainians have acted with bravery and resilience. No matter what Russia does to us, we refuse to be beaten.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant developments.