I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

“Strengthening Strategic Stability with Russia,” Christopher S. Chivvis, Andrew Radin, Dara Massicot and Clint Reach, RAND Corporation, 2017: The authors argue that strategic stability between the United States and Russia is eroding, and the options for shoring it up are few. They examine factors that have increased the likelihood of strategic nuclear exchange in recent years. While the probability of the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria escalating to nuclear war is very low, the authors do believe that the escalatory risks of conflict between the U.S. and Russia are increasing, while “crisis stability” is decreasing. The main reasons for this are: Russia’s alleged willingness to use nuclear weapons against a conventional attack; reliance on vulnerable space assets for warning and other purposes; the potential for both countries to conduct sophisticated cyber espionage and attacks and also to increase uncertainty and generate potentially escalatory pressures in a crisis; and U.S. development of advanced conventional capabilities, especially missile defenses and hypersonic glide vehicles, which could eventually pose a threat to Russia’s second-strike capability. While generally pessimistic in tone, the authors do note that some of the major breakthroughs of the Cold War took place in the face of growing tension, not during relaxation in East-West relations.

New Cold War/saber rattling:

“Managing the Cold Peace between Russia and the West,” Position Paper V, Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe, July 2017: A group of policy thinkers including former senior officials from Finland, Germany, Russia, the U.K. and other countries are appealing to leaders in greater Europe to halt the downward spiral in West-Russia relations and manage its risks better through developing a more stable and sustainable security relationship. They ask political and military leaders to agree on four fundamental points: a war between Russia and NATO cannot be won and must never be fought, and any attempts to achieve political goals by threat or use of force would be futile; any efforts to gain decisive military advantage in Europe or any of its regions by developing or deploying new weapons systems will ultimately be pointless, as other countries would counter such moves; there are grave risks of an unmanaged, un-regulated deterrence relationship in which unintended escalation is more likely; the lack of a mutually satisfactory agreement on stabilizing the relationship would have a negative effect on each country’s broader national priorities, including economic development and social well-being. The paper includes half a dozen recommendations: Check national decisions on new defense acquisitions and deployments against their potential to escalate tensions in Europe; observe the commitments of mutual restraint included in the NATO-Russia Founding Act; preserve and ensure full implementation of the existing arms control and confidence-building agreements; explore opportunities for new arms control agreements; initiate a comprehensive expert discussion on the conditions for strategic stability in Europe; conduct disciplined dialogue, for the long haul, on the future of European security order.

NATO-Russia relations:

“Trump, Putin and the Growing Risk of Military Escalation,” Lukasz Kulesa and Shatabhisha Shetty, European Leadership Network, 07.04.17: This new policy brief argues that the increased level of uncertainty introduced into U.S. relations with Russia and NATO by President Trump complicates an already tense and challenged deterrence relationship between Russia and NATO. Coupled with the tendency of the Russian leadership to take foreign policy risks, this can produce a combustive mixture leading to a military escalation during any Russia-NATO crisis. The paper does not argue that war is imminent, but sketches the most dangerous escalation scenarios and proposes a few practical measures to address what seem to be the greatest risks. With Russia and NATO continuing to strengthen their defense and deterrence postures viewing each other as adversaries, three paths to military escalation are possible: intentional initiation of hostilities or an accidental escalation (less likely); inadvertent escalation, when one side’s action is erroneously interpreted as escalatory, prompting a forceful response (more likely); “mixed” scenarios of escalation, in which the use of military force is not pre-planned, but emerges as the only logical choice in the course of a crisis (equally concerning). Recommendations for a way forward include: limiting the potential for unintended escalation in Syria; establishing a NATO-Russia Military Crisis Management Group to pursue military confidence and security building measures; a joint presidential declaration and bilateral nuclear risk reduction plan; and undertaking efforts in good faith to preserving existing bilateral arms control agreements, including through strategic stability talks.

Conflict in Syria:

“Working with Russia might be the best path to peace in Syria,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 07.04.17: The author, a veteran foreign correspondent-turned-columnist, takes a close look at the process that established the recent “arc of deconfliction” between U.S.- and Russian-backed forces in Syria because it shows how different Russia’s public and private actions have been and possibly offers a model for wider U.S.-Russian cooperation in Syria. The U.S.-Russian agreement reached in the past several weeks keeps the combatants on both sides of the dividing line focused on fighting the Islamic State, rather than sparring with each other. While Russian-American cooperation on Syria faces huge obstacles right now, Ignatius writes, working with Russia may be the only way to reduce the level of violence and to create a foundation for a calmer, more decentralized Syria. A Russian official initially suggested the Euphrates boundary about 18 months ago, but it wasn’t formalized, so the two countries had been operating on an ad hoc basis at three levels, reaching up to top military command on both sides. A crisis arose last month when several Syrian tanks pushed north of what U.S. commanders believed was the informal line of separation. The U.S. shot down a fighter jet backing the small force and the Russians announced they were suspending contacts. “For a few hours, it looked pretty hairy,” one U.S. official told Ignatius, who reported the column from Syria. But the Russians quietly resumed talking, and by late June, the two sides had agreed on the formal arc, with precisely delineated coordinates. Similar U.S.-Russian cooperation has been calming tensions the past few weeks in southwest Syria. “So far Russia is working in earnest with us on the effort,” a senior State Department official said. Secretaries Tillerson and Mattis are said to favor exploring options with Moscow. Cooperating with the Russians in Syria would be distasteful, the author concludes, but spurning them would almost certainly make things worse rather than better for all sides.

“Vladimir Putin should be wary of declaring victory in Syria,” David Gardner, Financial Times, 07.05.17: The author, an international affairs editor focusing on the Middle East, makes several points about the conflict in Syria, among them: that Putin has chosen Syria and the Middle East as the setting to stage Russia’s comeback as a great power; that the U.S. and Russia, so far more through their proxies than directly, are coming perilously close to conflict there, in part because they back opposing forces; that Trump appears to be letting his generals expand military action not just against ISIS but to thwart Iran, a Russian ally; and that—although Russia appears to be ahead in the competition between Washington and Moscow in Syria—Putin will be hard pressed to prove that he can stay clear of the treacherous divides plaguing the big players in the Middle East.

Cyber security:

“Russia Causing Cyber Mayhem, Should Face Retaliation: Ex-UK Spy Chief,” Reuters, 07.10.17: In his first interview since stepping down, the former head of Britain's GCHQ spy agency said Russia is causing cyberspace mayhem and should face retaliation if it continues to undermine democratic institutions in the West. He praised French and German leaders for publicly calling this out in recent months. “Ultimately people will have to push back against Russian state activity and show that it's unacceptable,” Robert Hannigan said. "It doesn't have to be by cyber retaliation, but it may be that is necessary at some time in the future. It may be sanctions and other measures, just to put down some red lines and say that this behavior is unacceptable." Hannigan also said it would be a mistake to force social media companies to allow intelligence agencies to access services protected by encryption through so-called "back door" access and cautioned governments to wait and see how a global working group on tackling online extremism established by several major tech companies performed before seeking new laws, which he called “a blunt last resort” that is not always effective against terrorism.

Russia’s alleged interference in U.S. elections:

“‘Time to Move Forward’ on Russia, Trump Says, as Criticism Intensifies,” Julie Hirschfeld Davis, New York Times, 07.09.17: This analytical article says that President Trump has not been successful in trying to put the matter of Russia’s election meddling behind him. Although he insisted July 9 that he had “strongly pressed” President Putin on the matter in a private meeting last week—the leaders’ first—and declared it was “time to move forward,” the meeting might have raised more suspicions than it quelled, as lawmakers in both parties said Trump had appeased the Russian president and empowered him by appearing willing to partner on a cybersecurity effort to prevent future incursions. The potential cybersecurity initiative with Moscow—which Trump quickly backed away from in a tweet—prompted derision from Republicans and Democrats who said Russia was the last country the United States should trust on such matters. Given Trump’s past questioning of the extent of Russia’s role in the election-related hacking, the impression that Trump is soft on Putin is likely to persist. To make matters thornier, the White House is now confronting reports that Donald Trump Jr., the president’s eldest son, agreed to meet with a Kremlin-connected Russian lawyer during the campaign last year after being promised damaging information about Hillary Clinton.

“Putin's Meddling Will Be Good for U.S. Democracy,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg View, 07.05.17: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes that—assuming U.S. intelligence agencies are correct in their attribution of the hacks and leaks related to the 2016 U.S. presidential election—Russian President Vladimir Putin essentially held up a troll mirror to Americans, helping them see where they stand as a country. After reminding readers of what is known and not known about the alleged Russian interference, Bershidsky describes the reflections of that mirror: an existing culture of marginal news and rumor, replete with racial stereotypes, conspiracy theories and the deep-seated hatred of progressive causes; a forced emergence, for liberals and conservatives alike, from their respective news silos to look at the radical fringes of each other's newsfeeds; and an ugly picture of a cronyist insider culture that rejects outside contributions even when they can be useful and that corrupts the people at the top, undermining their connection with the party's rank-and-file. Now all things Russian have grown toxic and legislators are considering further sanctions without much regard for the broader fallout. That's a mistake for a few reasons: Trolls are resistant to this kind of punishment; U.S. attacks make Putin stronger at home; and his mockery of U.S. "paranoia" resonates with Russians and even, to some extent, with Europeans. The author points out that Europe has quickly learned its lessons from what it knows about Putin's attack on the U.S., making its democracies more resistant to propaganda and populism and savvier about cybersecurity. What about the U.S.? Has it become stronger? The author is hopeful that Americans, even if they remain bitterly divided, will perhaps become more serious and smarter about their electoral choices. Next time around, he writes, voters will see honesty and decency as crucial assets, and perhaps the major parties will respond to this by selecting contenders who embody them more than Trump and Clinton did. Perhaps these contenders will also be savvier when it comes to cybersecurity and, in general, modern communication. The global technology superpower needs leaders who are better, not worse, at technology than the average American. While acknowledging that he may be overoptimistic, and maybe the U.S. won't learn anything from this experience except that Russians are evil, the author notes that if the U.S. public does get smarter about its political choices, Putin will be weakened: It will no longer be as easy for him to point to American democracy's flaws or to exploit them.

Energy exports from CIS:

“Russian Gas Trumps American Sanctions,” Nikolay Pakhomov, The National Interest, 07.06.17: The author, president of The New York Consulting Bureau, welcomes the reinvigorated discussion of Russia’s energy policy in Europe that has recently become part of the debate in Washington: It shows that not everybody in Europe considers energy cooperation with Russia harmful or dangerous; and it reminds us that Russia’s energy expansion in Europe is, to a significant degree, based on economic reasoning rather than political doctrine. He casts doubt on the idea of Russia wielding gas as an “energy weapon,” noting that any interruption in Russian gas supplies deprives not only Europe of Russian gas, but also Moscow of profits from gas sales. Why would Russia want to lose billions of rubles in revenue? Or to undermine Russian credibility as an energy exporter, putting future revenue into question? While Russia has decreased its dependency on these revenues in the last decade, it is still impossible for the Kremlin to go without them. The interest on Europe’s end is no smaller: Germany and Austria issued a rare and fierce warning against possible American sanctions connected with the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. American opposition to that pipeline, as well as other projects bringing more Russian gas to Europe, is understandable, writes the author. Beyond the geopolitical rhetoric, Washington aspires to send more American LNG to Europe. However, one can argue that the best way to advance these American economic interests is to use economic arguments, rather than political scaremongering and pressure. Explaining European demand for Russian gas by pointing to Europe’s lack of options is also an oversimplification. Europeans had several decades to find and develop alternatives to Russian gas; they have not done so, because Russia remains an attractive source. (When convenient, by the way, Europeans have always bought natural gas from sources other than Russia.) If Washington wants to truly and sustainably reduce the demand for Russian gas in Europe, the best way to achieve it is to economically support diversification; without a large-scale economic intervention from the United States, the situation will not change much. Whatever the broader geopolitical context, Europe and Russia tend to find compromises and solutions that allow energy cooperation to continue. If the United States enters this dialog armed with sanctions and trying to advance the interests of American LNG exporters without an economic policy to back it up, Europe’s energy situation will be destabilized. It is difficult to see how this would benefit the United States.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“This Is How the G-20 Summit Helped Trump and Putin Claim Victories,” Matthew Rojansky, The National Interest, 07.07.17: The author, director of the Kennan Institute, argues that, despite its length, last week’s Putin-Trump meeting underscored the continuing dysfunction in U.S.-Russia relations. The agenda was narrow and specific deliverables were limited, focusing primarily on improving conditions for continuing dialogue, especially around the shared priority of counterterrorism. The most concrete deliverable from the meeting seems to be a ceasefire to be declared in southwestern Syria. For Putin, the primary focus was always his domestic audience: Although his reelection in March next year is virtually guaranteed, the real test is whether he can maintain the enthusiasm of his electoral base. This two-hour meeting with Trump allowed Putin to showcase his own skills as a negotiator, but also to put the final nail in the coffin of the previous U.S. administration’s policy of “isolation.” For Putin, the author writes, dysfunction in the U.S.-Russia relationship is useful since it reinforces the longstanding narrative that Washington aims to contain Russia geopolitically and degrade it economically, with the ultimate objective of regime change. Even if new dialogues are launched on hacking, Syria and Ukraine, the Kremlin is in no position to make concessions, and the White House is under such pressure and scrutiny from Congress that it is also unlikely to give an inch. The best-case scenario, therefore, may be that increased dialogue helps to manage and prevent unintended military escalation between Russia and the United States and its allies.

“Why deciding to ‘move forward’ with Putin is a big mistake,” Michael McFaul, The Washington Post, 07.10.17: The author, an academic and a former ambassador to Moscow, argues against Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s praise for Moscow and Washington’s attempt to forget about the past and move on. McFaul says such an impulse serves Putin’s interests, not America’s, because it implies a false sense of shared ownership for past causes of conflict. Instead, the author believes it has been Putin’s actions that have contributed directly to the most contentious issues in U.S.-Russia relations today, as well as the tensions between Russia and many U.S. allies. McFaul writes that Putin solely created the “question” (Tillerson’s euphemism) of Russian interference in America’s 2016 presidential elections and removing this issue from the agenda in the name of future cooperation is complete capitulation. The author contends that Putin also created the current bilateral impasse over Ukraine and that Putin’s actions most certainly contributed to the horrible conflict in Syria and the related troubles between the United States and Russia. McFaul writes that Russia may have some marginal grievances from the days of the Obama administration, but all these stemmed from decisions that served U.S. national interests and values, and are small compared to Putin’s messes. He acknowledges that there are some difficult agenda items in U.S.-Russia relations not of Putin’s making, including North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, which the two presidents should address jointly. Moreover, Trump and Putin can work to develop a common agenda based on mutual interests involving other economic and security issues. But, the author concludes, we can do so without wiping the past slate clean and without pretending to forget who caused these previous contentious issues in the first place.

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

China:

“Сhina, Russia Need Shared Vision for Eurasia,” Dmitri Trenin, Global Times, 07.03.17: The author, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, points out that Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin are meeting for the third time this year. The big issue in the Sino-Russian relationship is the "harmonization" of China’s Belt and Road initiative with Moscow's own economic plans. The Kremlin has made it clear that Russia does not intend to simply "join" B&R, like other countries, but seeks instead to carve out a special economic relationship with China. However, to be able to achieve this, Russia will need to display an initiative of its own backed with sufficient resources and engage its partner in areas of interest to Beijing. The author points out that Europe, not Russia, is the destination of China's current journey to the west. This time, no Sino-German-Russian trilateral summit was on the agenda of the G20 meeting in Hamburg; in the next decade, such meetings may become regular. Meanwhile, Putin and Xi will spend some time in Moscow discussing their countries' relations with the U.S. For the first time in over a century, China and Russia have to deal with an America that is going through a crisis. One immediate problem is North Korea, and the approach Trump may take toward Pyongyang. The U.S. president is clearly disappointed that China's recent moves have not resulted in Kim Jong-un surrendering his nuclear and missile programs. The Chinese and the Russians have known all along that that was not in the cards. The Russians and the Chinese also have other geopolitical business to attend to. Last month, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization admitted India and Pakistan. This enlargement, the first since Uzbekistan joined the group in 2001, could render the SCO dysfunctional—hardly something that meets either Moscow's or Beijing's interest. It is not enough, Trenin concludes, for China and Russia to work to reduce U.S. dominance; they have to work on a new continental order that other countries, not just the two of them, would find to be an improvement over the current situation.

Ukraine:

“Positive Change Is Happening in Ukraine,” Volodymyr Groysman, Wall Street Journal, 07.04.17: In this op-ed, the author, Ukraine’s prime minister, extols his government’s accomplishments. He writes that when he became prime minister in April 2016, the government's main challenge was to stabilize the country. They had to establish new rules and greater transparency to fight corruption and create a business-friendly climate; over the past three years they've canceled more than 3,000 regulatory acts. After a 17% drop in 2014-15, Ukraine's GDP grew by 2.3% in 2016, accelerating to 4.7% in the final quarter. The International Monetary Fund has committed $17 billion in financial support for the government's reform efforts. Under previous rules, subsidized energy prices cost Ukraine’s government around 10% of GDP each year and offered politically connected oligarchs the chance to siphon off billions into their own pockets. Groysman’s government deregulated gas prices and substituted energy-tariff subsidies with direct subsidies to households. In pursuing greater transparency, Ukraine has made it obligatory for state bodies and civil servants to purchase goods and services through an e-procurement system called Prozorro, developed by Transparency International. Ukraine’s government has identified five priorities in its 2020 Reform Plan: economic growth to create new jobs, higher wages and increased personal wealth; effective governance, aimed at high-quality public services and better control over state funds; combating corruption in order to secure equal rights for all; increasing our security and defense services to protect our citizens; and increasing the availability and quality of health care across the country. Groysman notes that Ukraine is a member of the World Trade Organization, has a free-trade and visa-free travel arrangement with the European Union and has recently concluded a free-trade agreement with Canada. It’s also created the Ukraine Investment Promotion Office to attract more foreign investment. A recent European Business Association Investment Attractiveness Index characterized Ukraine's investment environment as the best it's been in six years. Foreign direct investment last year totalled $4.41 billion, 17.1% more than in 2015. Groysman’s op-ed does not mention the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Archrival or just the next Putin?” Oleg Kashin, New York Times, 07.03.17: The author, a Russian journalist and regular columnist for the Times, describes the ways in which Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny and Russian President Vladimir Putin need and even resemble each other. Navalny, who was sentenced to 30 days in jail on June 12, has become Russia’s only opposition leader, which was not the case until very recently. Navalny had been an activist in the liberal Yabloko party, but was kicked out in 2007 for his involvement in xenophobic, nationalist causes. For a while afterward, he experimented with different forms of protest, seeking a theme that would set him apart. This turned out to be corruption in Russian official circles; he became an online political superstar. During the protests of 2011-12 Navalny was already quite popular, but he was still just one of a handful of powerful opposition leaders—not even the most influential or experienced among them. After the protests, the liberal opposition became fractured and weak. Navalny returned to his anti-corruption campaign. Over five years, he has become the only active opposition leader, with no need for parties or coalitions; his hundreds of thousands of online followers are enough. In fact, the author writes, he’s a lot like Putin: Navalny cannot be pinned down as a leftist or rightist; his ideological statements are vague and contradictory, even on simple questions; he has an authoritarian leadership style; his closest associates have come from the hired staff of his foundation, people whom he pays a salary and for whom he will always be a boss, not a partner. Also like the president, who has consciously sought to get people to identify him with Russia itself, many of Navalny's supporters are his personal fans, who equate his name with hopes for a future democratic Russia. Some of Navalny's detractors accuse him of working for the Kremlin. That is probably not the case. But he may very well be unwittingly serving Putin's interests, Kashin writes. In 2013, Navalny was released from prison the morning after being sentenced to a five-year term so that he could participate in the Moscow mayoral election; when he failed to collect enough signatures to register as a candidate, Putin's party provided them. Navalny intends to participate in the presidential election next spring; the law does not allow him to run because he has a criminal conviction, but the possibility cannot be excluded. In Russia, such decisions are made in accordance with the Kremlin's needs. If Putin runs, he will have to demonstrate that it is a real election, and that he is capable of defeating not only fictitious opponents, but also a real opposition leader. Putin and Navalny cannot do without each other, and their confrontation somehow is evolving into a state of codependency, with the Putin leadership model getting duplicated in the anti-Putin opposition. While the alternative to Putin ought to be democracy, an alternative logic is possible: Putin is simply a bad authoritarian, ineffective at wielding his unlimited power, and if Navalny were to replace him, then everything in Russia would work out fine—even without democracy.