This Week’s Highlights

Governments in the Euro-Atlantic region should work to identify elements of common ground, including near-term steps for reducing nuclear risks now, and long-term steps contributing to a comprehensive approach to building mutual security—one that emphasizes both a synergy between process and substance, and is likely to yield concrete results, according to a statement released by the Euro-Atlantic Security Leadership Group. The near- and long-term steps could include establishment of cyber nuclear “rules of the road.” The risk of any one incident or set of circumstances leading to nuclear escalation is greatly exacerbated by new hybrid threats, such as cyber risks to early warning and command and control systems, the statement reads.  

“When I meet with Vladimir Putin in Geneva,” writes U.S. President Joe Biden in an op-ed for The Washington Post, “it will be after high-level discussions with friends, partners and allies who see the world through the same lens as the United States, and with whom we have renewed our connections and shared purpose. We are standing united to address Russia’s challenges to European security, starting with its aggression in Ukraine, and there will be no doubt about the resolve of the United States to defend our democratic values, which we cannot separate from our interests.”

China and Russia do indeed share a lot of strategic objectives, and their partnership has been deepening across the board since the 2014 outbreak of war in Ukraine and Western sanctions against Moscow, write Alexander Gabuev and Leonid Kovachich of the Cargnegie Moscow Center. But it would be a mistake to overstate the degree to which Moscow’s and Beijing’s propaganda machines are actively working in tandem at present, they argue; for now, Chinese and Russian influence operations can be—and continue to be—conducted independently. 

Silo-based multiple-warhead ICBMs have a consistently bad reputation with the arms control crowd and nuclear hawks alike… [but] there is precisely zero evidence that the Soviet Union ever contemplated attacking US silo-based missiles, whether as part of a first strike or in an attempt to limit the damage during a nuclear exchange, writes Pavel Podvig for the Russian Nuclear Forces Project. It built its MIRVed missiles for entirely different reasons, he argues. 

In none of the three countries in Central Asia where the United States could in theory open a military base do the potential advantages for the host country outweigh the risks, writes Temur Umarov for Carnegie Moscow Center. In all likelihood, none of them will agree to house a base–a fact that reflects both the United States’ declining role in the region, and the intensifying rivalry between the global powers, he argues. It appears that Washington will have to look for other solutions, such as moving some of its troops to the Middle East and using an aircraft carrier for patrols, Umarov writes. 

The cost of supporting Lukashenko’s regime could also be his undoing, writes Ben Aris for bne IntelliNews. Lukashenko is costing Russia about $2-3 billion a year, which it is willing to pay, but if that cost were to increase to say $10 billion, which would accompany the stringent EU sanctions currently being considered, then at some point the Kremlin may reconsider, analysts argue. Kirill Rogov writes for The Moscow Times, “what is truly amazing is how Lukashenko … manages to remain a bone lodged firmly in Moscow’s throat, moving neither forward nor backward.”

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Great Power rivalry/New Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Statement by the Euro-Atlantic Security Leadership Group,” Des Browne, Wolfgang Ischinger, Igor Ivanov, Ernest J. Moniz, Sam Nunn, Euro-Atlantic Security Leadership Group, June 2021. The authors, representing the European Leadership Network, the Munich Security Conference, the Russian International Affairs Council, and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, write:

• “The decision of the U.S. and Russian presidents to extend the New START Treaty for five years confirms that nations can act to advance their common interests, including reducing nuclear risks. … Governments in the Euro-Atlantic region should build on this achievement and work to advance strategic stability and reduce the risk of miscalculation by agreeing to these principles:”
  • “Restore dialogue.”
  • “Manage instability—and build mutual security.”
  • “Increasing leadership decision time.”
  • “Manage and control emerging threats and technologies.”
  • “Identify and advance areas of existential common interest.”
  • “Increase transparency and predictability.”
• “Consistent with these principles, governments should work to identify elements of common ground, including near-term steps for reducing nuclear risks now, and long-term steps contributing to a comprehensive approach to building mutual security… The near- and long-term steps could include the following:”
  1. “Reinforce the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”
  2. “Deepen U.S.-Russia and West-Russia crisis management dialogue.”
  3. “1,400 in 2021. With New START extended for five years, Washington and Moscow should commit to further reduce U.S. and Russian deployed strategic nuclear weapons while working urgently to establish the mandate for and scope of a successor agreement to New START.”
  4. “Conduct internal ‘fail-safe’ reviews.”
  5. “Open a new dialogue. Direct a new strategic dialogue among Euro-Atlantic states about building mutual security—in both new and existing tracks, such as the Russia-NATO Council and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.”
  6. “Agree to ban INF-range missile deployment.”
  7. “Establish cyber nuclear ‘rules of the road.’ The risk of any one incident or set of circumstances leading to nuclear escalation is greatly exacerbated by new hybrid threats, such as cyber risks to early warning and command and control systems.”
  8. “Establish a Joint Data Exchange Center.”
• “A new strategy for managing instability and building mutual security in the Euro-Atlantic region can reduce the chances of conflict and catastrophe and build a more secure and promising future for all.

“Biden Is Embracing Europe, but Then What? NATO and the E.U. Have Concerns,” Steven Erlanger, The New York Times, 06.06.21. The author, who is chief diplomatic correspondent for the news outlet, writes:

• “As [European leaders] prepare to welcome President Biden, the simple fact that he regards Europe as an ally and NATO as a vital element of Western security is almost a revelation. Yet the wrenching experience of the last presidential administration has left scars that some experts say will not soon heal.”
• “Yet as much as the Europeans appreciate Biden’s vows of constancy and affection, they have just witnessed how 75 years of American foreign policy can vanish overnight with a change in the presidency. And they fear that it can happen again.”
• “The NATO summit meeting of 30 leaders will be short, with one 2.5-hour session after an opening ceremony, which would leave just five minutes for each leader to speak. … Still, NATO officials and ambassadors say, there is much to discuss down the road.”
  • “Questions like how much and where a regional trans-Atlantic alliance should try to counter China.”
  • “How to adapt to the European Union’s still vague desire for ‘strategic autonomy,’ while encouraging European military spending and efficiency and avoiding duplication with NATO, are other concerns.”
  • “The other main issues for this brief NATO summit meeting will be topical [Afghanistan, Russia, China, Belarus].”
• “There is wariness, too, and not just about the possibility that another Trump-like president could follow Biden.”
  • “Despite warm words of consultation, German officials … believe that Biden’s decision to pull all U.S. troops out of Afghanistan by Sept. 11 was made unilaterally in the old pattern.”
  • “European leaders were angered and embarrassed by Biden’s decision to support the waiver of intellectual property rights on COVID-19 vaccines.”
  • “Europeans do not see China as the peer rival that Washington does and remain more dependent than the United States on both China and Russia for trade and energy.”
  • “Some worry that Mr. Biden’s effort to define the world as a competition between democracy and authoritarianism is too black-and-white.”

“What a Future Russia House Must Look Like," Daniel Hoffman and Paul Kolbe, The Cipher, 05.26.21. The authors, respectively a former CIA station chief and the director of The Intelligence Project at the Belfer Center, write: 

• “We can be quick to fall into the old paradigm that we’re fighting a new Cold War with Russia, that we are back in conflict with the Soviet Union … [W]e’re not in a new Cold War. It’s not an ideological struggle.  It’s not an economic struggle. Russia poses no economic challenge in terms of fundamental systems.” 
• [Russian President Vladimir Putin] proved himself to be a much better strategist than just about everyone in the U.S. Government across administrations … I think that means there’s a very different set of requirements that the intelligence community and the national security community needs to address that are very different from those that we addressed during the Cold War.” 
•  “Russia is a revisionist power. The Kremlin is trying to reshape what we like to call the international rules-based order, consistent with its authoritarian model. And in order to guarantee his regime security, Russia is entering into what is probably a decades-long partnership with China.” 
• “[W]ith Russia we’re looking at a Venn diagram where there’s some shaded space, where our interests coincide, a lot of unshaded space where they do not, and some grey areas, where there is an opportunity for diplomacy. We’ve already seen the extension of the new START agreement. Arms control is one area where we can and do work on together.” 
• “[I]t’s really important to lead on the notion that we can’t look at Russia as just a threat. We really do need to have a nuanced view of, ‘Okay, how do we counter in this area?’ But make sure that we’re building relationships, building connections, building institutional ties and maximizing interests. That, over time, can actually have a difference in a new environment and a new administration.” 

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“Comrades in Tweets? The Contours and Limits of China-Russia Cooperation on Digital Propaganda,” Alexander Gabuev,  Leonid Kovachich, Carnegie Moscow Center, 06.03.21. The authors, respectively a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center, and a Moscow-based China watcher, write:

• “Russian information operations have drawn greater attention in the West since the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and many analysts have seen echoes of such online trolling and disinformation in the more assertive, confrontational posture of Chinese diplomats on social media during the coronavirus pandemic. Russian and Chinese propagandists also seem to be mirroring each other’s tactics and cross-promoting each other’s content, leading some Western analysts and governments to warn of deepening digital cooperation between Moscow and Beijing.”
• “China and Russia do indeed share a lot of strategic objectives, and their partnership has been deepening across the board since the 2014 outbreak of war in Ukraine and Western sanctions against Moscow. After all, both countries’ leaders decry U.S. hegemony and see the United States and its alliances as challenges to their national security and national interests. And both Chinese and Russian policymakers are striving to exploit existing fissures in Western societies while weakening ties between the United States and its allies through information operations and other means. … Beyond these commonly held strategic objectives, both countries have drawn tactically on their own histories while also learning from one another and others.”
• “Despite all these signs of nascent support and shared goals, it would be a mistake to overstate the degree to which Moscow’s and Beijing’s propaganda machines are actively working in tandem…”
• “At root, both Russian and Chinese leaders are driven by great power calculus. Therefore, they want to maintain strategic autonomy above all else, including in pushing back against the United States and its allies. Rhetorical support from a like-minded great power is nice to have, but it is not indispensable when it comes to the global information domain, an area unregulated by international legal norms. On the UN Security Council, by contrast, Moscow and Beijing frequently act far more in tandem because of the bureaucratic nature of the organization and both countries’ unique position as permanent members. For now, however, Chinese and Russian influence operations can be—and continue to be—conducted independently.”

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms control:

“In Defense of Silo-Based MIRVed ICBMs,” Pavel Podvig, Russian Nuclear Forces Project, 06.02.21. The author, an independent analyst based in Geneva, writes:

• “Silo-based multiple-warhead ICBMs have a consistently bad reputation with the arms control crowd and nuclear hawks alike. … The issue [is this logic] rests on an implicit assumption that both sides build their strategic nuclear forces with warfighting and damage limitation in mind.”
• “There is precisely zero evidence that the Soviet Union ever contemplated attacking U.S. silo-based missiles, whether as part of a first strike or in an attempt to limit the damage during a nuclear exchange. … Building a first strike capability what exactly the opposite of what the Soviet Union was about to do. Even before the Soviet Union embarked on its modernization program that will eventually produce its first MIRVed missiles, it initiated a thorough review of its nuclear posture.” 
• “A commission, [which included scientific, military and industry representatives] worked for over a year [around 1968]. It concluded its work with a strong recommendation to adopt the retaliatory-strike posture … and to begin the silo hardening program. [This choice was formally confirmed in 1969]. The military decided not to fight the decision.”
• “[Why] would these missiles carry multiple warheads if not to attack the U.S. strategic forces in a counterforce damage-limitation strike? The answer … is quite simple. If you build your strategy around a deep second strike, you have to assume that a significant number of your ICBMs will be destroyed. … If that's the case, you would much rather those surviving ICBMs carry ten warheads rather than one - that way you could be reasonably certain that you can retaliate with… multiple warheads. This means that MIRVing your ICBMs is, in fact, quite a reasonable strategy for a second-strike option.”
• “This take on silo-based MIRVed missiles does suggest that the ways different states look at the same issue could be very different. Unfortunately, the history shows that nobody is particularly interested in what their opponents really think. … But we should at least try to be critical about established beliefs, conventional wisdoms, and long-standing dogmas...”

“The Art of Negotiating Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” Steven Pifer, The National Interest, 06.04.21. The author, an affiliate of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a nonresident senior fellow with the Brookings Institution, writes:

• “U.S. officials have long sought to negotiate limits on non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), a sensible next step for U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control. Such a negotiation, however, would raise difficult issues, beginning with the imbalance in U.S. and Russian numbers. A likely Russian position that all NSNW be based on national territory would force the U.S. government to face the different perspectives within NATO on the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. As Washington prepares for a possible negotiation with Moscow, U.S. officials should consider ways to manage this issue from the outset.” 
• “A number of ideas might alleviate the basing on national territory problem, including:”
  • “Seek to require that NSNW be stored at declared storage sites—with monitoring and significant transparency—at some distance from facilities basing NSNW delivery systems.”
  • “Seek to require that Russian NSNW be stored at sites more than some distance, say, seven hundred kilometers, from a NATO member’s territory.”
  • “Seek to ban nuclear warheads for short-range land-based missiles.”
  • “Propose that NSNW stored outside of national territory be counted as ‘deployed strategic warheads’.”
  • “Continue nuclear sharing. NATO allies’ aircraft could train with U.S. strategic bombers in exercises for the use of (U.S.-based) nuclear weapons in support of the alliance.”
  • “Put more boots on the ground. NATO members could bolster conventional deterrence and defense in countries such as the Baltic states and Poland by increasing the size of the multinational formations in those countries to 2,000-2,500 troops each.”

“Washington has for some time sought to get all U.S. and Russian nuclear arms on the negotiating table. That is a worthwhile goal for U.S. and allied security. Persuading Moscow will be hard enough. It would be a shame if differences within NATO emerged to frustrate that objective.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

• No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“My trip to Europe is about America rallying the world’s democracies,” Joe Biden, The Washington Post, 06.05.21. 

• “On Wednesday, I depart for Europe on the first foreign travel of my presidency. It is a trip stacked with meetings with many of our closest democratic partners … before concluding by meeting with Vladimir Putin.”
• “In this moment of global uncertainty, as the world still grapples with a once-in-a-century pandemic, this trip is about realizing America’s renewed commitment to our allies and partners, and demonstrating the capacity of democracies to both meet the challenges and deter the threats of this new age.”
• “So, when I meet with Vladimir Putin in Geneva, it will be after high-level discussions with friends, partners and allies who see the world through the same lens as the United States, and with whom we have renewed our connections and shared purpose. We are standing united to address Russia’s challenges to European security, starting with its aggression in Ukraine, and there will be no doubt about the resolve of the United States to defend our democratic values, which we cannot separate from our interests.”
• “In my phone calls with President Putin, I have been clear and direct. The United States does not seek conflict. We want a stable and predictable relationship where we can work with Russia on issues like strategic stability and arms control. That’s why I acted immediately to extend the New START treaty for five years and bolster the security of the American people and the world.”

“Potential Fruits of the Biden-Putin Summit,” Simon Saradzhyan, RM/IPNT, 06.04.21.

• “When heads of state meet for the first time, their aides typically look for opportunities for their bosses to pick some low-hanging fruit in the forms of agreements and/or declarations.”
  • “Toward that end, an easy segue to warmer ties could include a (partial, at least) reversal of recent decisions by the United States and Russia to curtail each other’s diplomatic and consular missions.”
  • “Reviving some scientist-to-scientist meetings and exchanges, which flourished when the two countries cooperated on enhancing nuclear security and preventing nuclear terrorism, would be more ambitious, but may also still be low enough fruit to be picked at the summit.”
  • “Biden and Putin also appear to see eye to eye on temporarily lifting patent protections on COVID-19 vaccines, so agreeing at the summit to coordinate actions on such moves should not be very difficult.”
  • “Finally and importantly, it should not be too difficult for the sides to officially revive bilateral strategic stability talks, which lapsed amid the latest White House changing of the guard. These talks, which Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov has led from the Russian side, are traditionally non-committal, but could lead to better understanding and eventually to progress on arms control beyond the extension of New START, which Biden and Putin have already attained.”
• “If the summit does occur as planned, any sort of a grand deal would be out of the question, given the recent history of collisions on issues such as the Ukraine conflict, election interference and cyber security (even though it was Biden who proposed the ill-fated reset to Russian leadership back in 2009). That said, however, there is no reason why the two leaders cannot come to what Putin’s NSA Nikolai Patrushev predicted would be ‘mutually acceptable decisions’ during the summit.”

“Biden's Anti-Corruption Plan Appears to Have Some Teeth. Here's Hoping They Bite,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 06.03.21. The author, a foreign affairs columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “President Biden introduced a big idea into the global debate Thursday when he declared that combating corruption is a ‘core U.S. national security interest’ and ‘essential to the preservation of our democracy.’ He directed every agency of the U.S. government to mobilize for this battle against the kleptocrat—including the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Treasury Department and the military.”
• “Warning to Russian President Vladimir Putin and the dozens of other klepto-dictators around the world: This means you. The U.S. intelligence community has just been tasked to investigate how and where you hide your money.”
• “If Biden is serious—and frankly, that's still a big ‘if’—this could mark a significant turn in U.S. foreign policy.” 

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

• No significant developments

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant developments. 

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant developments.

Ukraine:

“Are the Minsk II Peace Accords Worth Preserving?” Mark Galeotti, The Moscow Times, 06.02.21. The author, a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute and an Honorary Professor at the University College London School of Slavonic & East European Studies, writes:

• “Instead of the inchoate collection of militias of 2014-15, Ukraine now has increasingly confident 250,000-strong armed forces.  The rebel forces could not prevail against them; frankly, they could not even in the early years of the war, which was why Moscow had periodically to send in its regulars to prevent a government victory. At the same time, Russia can still defeat Ukraine on the battlefield, but only if it is prepared to show its hand openly and throw in the scale of forces needed–and also accept the substantial losses this would mean. This is a balance of terror.”
• “The trouble is that the status quo is too bearable for all the players.”
  • “Kyiv has little real incentive to reintegrate a restive and now war-ravaged badlands.”
  • “Moscow is having to subsidize the Donbass, but better that than acknowledge defeat and lose what little traction it may have on Ukraine.”
  • “The warlords of the pseudo-states can enrich themselves and avoid trial.”
  • “And while the West may get an occasional scare, such as during the spring’s Russian build-up of forces, it can generally reassure itself with the antiseptic language of ‘frozen conflicts’ and unresolved disputes.’”
• “Something needs to be done to break the logjam. Dispensing with the tired mantra that ‘Minsk is the only deal on the table’ and instead clearing the table. There is no reason why prisoner exchanges, family reunion rights, OSCE monitoring and the rest cannot be maintained outside a single, overarching document. And maybe, this would provide the incentive and opportunity for something new. But this is one of those cases where the tolerable is the enemy of the better. What may work in Moscow, Paris and Berlin may not work so well in Kie—and be positively oppressive in Donetsk and Luhansk, Perevalsk and Ilovaisk.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Is There a Place for a U.S. Military Base in Central Asia?” Temur Umarov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 06.04.21. The author, an expert on China and Central Asia, writes:

• “Washington is determined to keep supporting the Afghan government in its fight against the Taliban, and this is unlikely to be achievable without the establishment of U.S. military bases in Afghanistan’s neighboring countries. The U.S. military command’s preferred option reportedly would be Central Asia.”
• “Even if a U.S. military base does eventually open in Central Asia, it won’t change the balance of power on the ground. There are no interests that require Washington to have a long-term policy on the region. Moscow and Beijing, on the other hand, have no choice but to closely follow regional developments, since their own security depends on them.”
• “Furthermore, China is not just an important economic partner now, but is actively moving to institutionalize its relations with the Central Asian states. May 11 saw the second C+C5 meeting among the foreign ministers of China plus the Central Asian nations take place in Xi’an.”
• “Chinese criticism of the United States for interfering in other countries’ internal affairs is likely to become routine now, as it already is from Russia. … China and Russia are also apprehensive of increased U.S. activity in the region because they are convinced that a U.S. base there would be used against them. Beijing believes that Washington plans to destabilize the situation in Xinjiang, while Moscow suspects that the United States will keep sowing chaos around Russia’s borders.”
• “In none of the three countries in Central Asia where the United States could in theory open a military base do the potential advantages for the host country outweigh the risks. In all likelihood, none of them will agree to house a base. This reflects both the United States’ declining role in the region, and the intensifying rivalry between the global powers. It appears that Washington will have to look for other solutions, such as moving some of its troops to the Middle East and using an aircraft carrier for patrols.”

“Belarus' economy will collapse without Russia's help,” Ben Aris, bne IntelliNews, 06.03.21. The author, the news outlet’s chief editor, writes:

• “Despite its backward nature, during his 27 years in office Lukashenko has built up a sustainable neo-Soviet model that provides much of the cradle-to-the-grave services that are one of the most missed features of the old system. He also provides full employment and relative stability while the countries surrounding Belarus have been rocked by economic crises, hyperinflation, political revolutions and a rapacious oligarch class.”
• “But the system doesn't work without Russian subsidies, which have run to an estimated total of $100 billion , according to expert estimates. … Moscow has narrowed its scope and is more fully focused on its own national interests and is no longer willing to buy favours with cash. … Since the beginning of 2020, Russia has only offered a mere $1.5 billion, including $500 million extended by the Russian-controlled Eurasian Fund for Stabilisation and Development. Thus far, Belarus has received a total of $1 billion  from the sum pledged; the second tranche was doled out last week during the Sochi meeting between the two heads of state.”
• “China, which Minsk is presenting as its strategic ally, has failed to express any interest in providing additional credit to the Belarusian economy other than the loans it offered in previous years.”
• “As a result of all these problems the economy is close to collapse, and probably would if it were not for Moscow’s support. … The cost of supporting Lukashenko’s regime could also be his undoing. Tadeuz Giczan, the editor-in-chief of the opposition Nexta Telegram channel, says currently Lukashenko is costing Russia about $2-3 billion  a year, which it is willing to pay. But if that cost were to increase to say $10 billion, which would accompany the stringent EU sanctions currently being considered, then at some point Giczan argues the Kremlin may reconsider. The alternative is that if the Kremlin is backed into a corner then it may simply decide to annex Belarus too as the cheaper option, argues bne IntelliNews columnist Mark Galeotti.”  

“How Lukashenko Became a Bone in Putin’s Throat,” Kirill Rogov, The Moscow Times/Proekt, 06.07.21.

• “The Kremlin almost certainly worked to undermine Lukashenko’s ‘re-election’ in 2020, and at his election rallies, Lukashenko, exploited those efforts as a ‘Kremlin threat to Belarusian sovereignty.’ In the 2010s, Lukashenko used this issue of ‘national sovereignty’ as domestic political capital in the same way he had relied on the promise of ‘union with Russia’ in previous decades.”
• “However, it seems that neither he nor the Kremlin realized the extent to which his ‘credit’ had been devalued with the Belarusian people, or how much the protest mood in the country had grown.  In a broader sense, they underestimated the fundamental shift in attitudes that had taken place, at least among the younger citizens of the republic who envision Belarus becoming more a cozy little province of Eastern Europe, like neighboring Lithuania, than an outpost of flawed Russian great power.”
• “The Kremlin now expects him to crush the Belarusian opposition in the bud, thereby securing its plan for a creeping de facto takeover of Belarus.”
• “If the costs of forced integration had been a counterargument before the current problems, now Belarus—which, according to German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas could become the subject of a “spiral of sanctions”—is beginning to look more like a stone around Moscow’s neck. And it comes at a time when Russia is itself trying to mobilize resources to survive its own international isolation and unfavorable market conditions. In other words, Belarus’s deepening political isolation makes it easier for Moscow to force Lukashenko into obedience.”
• “It will take several years for Lukashenko’s current cloud of toxicity to dissipate enough for it to flirt with Europe again. But what is truly amazing is how Lukashenko—a fierce enemy of democracy and Western values who pioneered the ‘Slavic dictatorship,’ a natural ally of the Kremlin who is heavily indebted to and practically dependent on the Kremlin for everything—manages to remain a bone lodged firmly in Moscow’s throat, moving neither forward nor backward.”