This Week’s Highlights

• The two candidates in the upcoming U.S. presidential election have fundamentally opposite views on developing the country’s energy sector, but whoever wins, it doesn’t bode well for Russia’s oil and gas industry—only for different reasons, writes Tatiana Mitrova, director of the Skolkovo Energy Center. Trump’s support for the U.S. oil industry and increase in oil production has led to a noticeable loss of oil and gas revenues for Russia, she writes, while a green swing by the United States under Joe Biden will inevitably lead to slowing global demand for oil, as well as a rethink of energy strategies by other countries.  
• According to reviewer and Cold War historian Timothy Naftali, Tim Weiner’s book, “America, Russia, and Political Warfare 1945-2020,” leaves readers with a sobering question: Why are the Russians more successful at messing with us now than at any time since the dawn of the Cold War? In part, writes Naftali, the answer lies in the unprecedented malleability of information and the ease with which false trust can be created in the social media age. Less blinkered by ideology, the new Russians certainly understand U.S. society a lot better than the Soviets did. But, argues Naftali, there is no escaping that we Americans are arguably as vulnerable to psychological warfare as we have ever been since 1948.   
• If Russia chooses to eschew the U.S.-China confrontation in Asia, Moscow’s line on North Korea will be similar to what it is now, writes Vassily Kashin, a senior fellow at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Russia will try to preserve as close as possible communication with Pyongyang to understand the decisions made by the North Korean leadership, and will use all the instruments at its disposal—especially within the U.N.—to maintain the status quo, above all military stability on the Korean Peninsula. But, writes Kashin, should Russia choose a different strategy, we may see a more active policy toward North Korea, conducted in close coordination with China. Moscow will use all available avenues to intensify its cooperation with Pyongyang and work in tandem with Beijing to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. economic pressure on North Korea. 
• The risk of an expanded war in Karabakh is growing greater by the day, writes Prof. Carey Cavanaugh, and the conflict may soon reach an irreversible point where it will not stop without a dramatic expansion of fighting and increased loss of life. Columnist David Ignatius argues that combatants don't stop fighting unless the costs of continuing are too great. The United States, he writes, should be thinking—urgently—about how to raise the cost of prolonged fighting. An Israeli arms cutoff to Baku? Russian muscle-flexing to support Armenia? A U.S. statement blasting Azerbaijan and its ally Turkey for ignoring the peace deal?  

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“Russia’s Dilemma on the Korean Peninsula,” Vassily Kashin, Carnegie Moscow Center, 10.30.20: The author, a senior fellow at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, writes:

• “The escalating conflict between the United States and China poses a question to Moscow: should it continue with its current policy in the hope of stabilizing relations with the United States at their current level and avoiding involvement in the battle between the two superpowers with unpredictable results? Or should it support China more actively, turning the Pacific region into another stage for the U.S.-Russia confrontation? This would allow Russia to receive some preferential treatment from China and simultaneously weaken the United States, which Moscow considers its key adversary. This fundamental choice will inform future Russian policy on the Korean Peninsula.”
• “If Russia chooses to eschew the U.S.-China confrontation in Asia, Moscow’s line on North Korea will be similar to what it is now. Russia will try to preserve as close as possible communication with Pyongyang to understand the decisions made by the North Korean leadership, and will use all the instruments at its disposal—especially within the U.N.—to maintain the status quo, above all military stability on the Korean Peninsula. But should Russia choose the second strategy, we may see a more active policy toward North Korea, conducted in close coordination with China. Moscow will use all available avenues to intensify its cooperation with Pyongyang and work in tandem with Beijing to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. economic pressure on North Korea.”

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

New Cold War/saber rattling:

• No significant developments.

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant developments.

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms control:

“Hope for Nuclear Arms Control With Russia?,” Steven Pifer, Brookings Institution, 10.26.20: The author, a nonresident senior fellow with Brookings, writes:

• “The Russians [recently] announced that they would agree to a one-year extension of New START and said they are ‘ready to assume a political obligation together with the United States to freeze the sides’ existing arsenals of nuclear warheads during this period.’ The Russian statement added that this presumed no additional U.S. conditions. The Department of State spokesperson quickly and positively reacted, saying U.S. negotiators are ‘prepared to meet immediately to finalize a verifiable agreement.’”
• “If Russian acceptance of a one-year freeze means that the Trump administration has succeeded in persuading Moscow to negotiate a treaty limiting all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, that is a commendable breakthrough. … Questions remain, however.”
• “Irrespective of the freeze, New START is worth saving and extending to 2026 (the treaty’s terms provide that there could be multiple extensions).”
• “One last observation: New START requires that, if a side wishes to withdraw from the treaty, it must give the other three months’ notice before doing so. … [I]f negotiations with the Russians do not go well and the Trump administration were to give notice, the United States could not actually withdraw from the treaty until after Jan. 20, 2021—when Donald Trump will be starting his second term or Joe Biden will have become the 46th U.S. president. Mr. Biden is on record as supporting New START’s extension for five years, with no conditions.”

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

“Putin Tests Erdogan’s Over-Reach,” David Gardner, Financial Times, 10.28.20: The author, international affairs editor for the news outlet, writes:

• “President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey cannot stop picking fights. … Yet while the Macron spat has captured the headlines, it is Turkey’s rekindled rivalry with Russia in northern Syria that is the more red-hot menace.”
• “Turkey’s desire for strategic depth and Russia’s determination to recover all of Syria for the Assad regime collided violently in February, with heavy casualties on both sides in Idlib, the last rebel redoubt in north-west Syria where Ankara had deployed its army and its Syrian proxies.”
• “This week, Russia’s air force bombed one of those proxies, killing an estimated 78 fighters, although the Turkish army had last week withdrawn from eight outposts in the province to more defensible positions. But resumed hostilities in Idlib look like a Russian reprisal for Turkey’s intervention in support of Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia over the ethnic Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. Mr. Putin seems to have withdrawn his consent to Turkey’s military presence in northern Syria.”
• “It was surely only a matter of time before someone tested Mr. Erdogan’s mixture of over-reach and vulnerability. The first to do so is his ally of convenience, Mr. Putin. Yet, while Turkey’s interests were always difficult to harmonize with Russia’s, they are not really in alignment with anybody in the Middle East except Qatar, the maverick gas-rich emirate blockaded by its erstwhile Gulf allies since 2017.”
• “Turkey, moreover, is grappling with a weakening economy and sinking currency. Tension is growing not just with Europe and Russia but with the U.S. after Ankara test-fired its Russian missiles as a prelude to deploying them, which if Mr. Trump loses to the Democrat Joe Biden … is even more likely to be seen as a line. Too many lights are flashing red.”

Cyber security:

“Russia’s Internet Freedom Shrinks as Kremlin Seizes Control of Homegrown Tech,” Dylan Myles-Primakoff and Justin Sherman, Foreign Policy, 10.26.20: The authors, nonresident senior fellows at the Atlantic Council, write:

• “[Russia’s] sovereign internet law that came into force in 2019 provides a plan for developing pernicious new technical censorship capabilities, including … the ability to selectively censor content on international social media platforms in Russia while maintaining plausible deniability. It also required domestic internet companies to centralize their architecture so authorities could potentially cut off the Russian internet from the rest of the world in the event of a security incident, broadly defined. Thus, it will be incumbent on supporters of internet freedom to continue developing anti-censorship technology and maintain the kind of technical edge that has allowed Telegram to continue operating in Russia without compromising on surveillance or censorship.”
• “With Moscow advancing internet control domestically, officials will continue seeking the normalization of this practice on the global stage. Recently, these efforts have focused on the United Nations, where for years the Russian state has proposed alternative cybercrime treaties that seek to justify its repressive internet policies and practices, clashing with free and open internet norms upheld by democracies worldwide. In December 2019, for the first time, one of these proposals passed, an indicator of broader support among governments for tighter internet control.”
• “These outcomes should also serve as a reminder to tech companies, policymakers and anyone who cares about maintaining an open global internet that internet freedom is neither inevitable nor permanent. Russia’s domestic internet sector, once a model of pluralism and independent thought, has been thoroughly subverted to the ends of the government. As a once global internet splinters into national enclaves, it will take a concerted opposition effort to maintain international norms affirming that the internet should be a tool supporting rather than suppressing freedom of expression and information.”

Elections interference:

“The 75-Year Political War Between the US and Russia,” Timothy Naftali’s review of Tim Weiner’s “America, Russia and Political Warfare 1945-2020” in The Washington Post, 10.23.20: In this book review, Cold War historian Naftali writes:

• “Weiner renders a mixed verdict on the American deployment of the dark arts in the struggle with Moscow. In his telling, the efforts were sometimes successful and other times disastrous, often resulting in a range of unintended consequences.”
• “Although Weiner doesn't discount the reality of Soviet global ambition or the ultimate incompetence of Cold War Moscow, the book's treatment of the Soviets' political warfare lacks the depth of insight and analysis that brings the American sections to life. This changes, however, when Weiner enters the Putin era.”
• “The book leaves us with a sobering question: Why are the Russians more successful at messing with us now than at any time since the dawn of the Cold War? … In part, the answer lies in the unprecedented malleability of information and the ease with which false trust can be created in the social media age. But the answer also involves us. The Cold War provided ample evidence that successful political warfare exploits social cleavages and resentments in its targets. Less blinkered by ideology, the new Russians certainly understand our society a lot better than the Soviets did. But there is no escaping that we Americans are arguably as vulnerable to psychological warfare as we have ever been since 1948. The Trump phenomenon, which the Russians abetted but did not create, emerged from a broken nation. Figuring out what we can do about that vulnerability is the most important national security question confronting us today, whether Joe Biden wins or not.”

“We Have to Guard Against Foreign Election Meddling—Real and Imagined,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 10.27.20: The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “The United States, in short, faces two threats. One is genuine foreign interference. The other is the specter of foreign interference tricking us into distrusting our democracy at every turn—the so-called perception hack. Irregularities occur every election. They are bound to occur this election, too. Already, the president and his allies are alleging the untrustworthiness of mail-in ballots. We must guard against meddlers creating even more chaos, but we also must guard against being manipulated into creating it ourselves.”

“So, Russia, You Want to Mess With Our Voting Machines?” Tim Wu, New York Times, 10.29.20: Wu, co-author of “Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World,” writes:

• “Right now there is no line in the sand: no public, clear and meaningful discouragement of any effort to destabilize the United States through electoral interference. We shouldn’t resign ourselves to a future of constant attacks on our sovereignty and political independence—and merely hope they don’t succeed.”

Energy exports from CIS:

“Neither US Candidate Bodes Well for Russia’s Energy Market,” Tatiana Mitrova, Carnegie Moscow Center, 11.02.20: The author, director of the SKOLKOVO Energy Center, writes:

• “The two candidates in the upcoming U.S. presidential election have fundamentally opposite views on developing the country’s energy sector, but whoever wins, it doesn’t bode well for Russia’s oil and gas industry—only for different reasons.”
• “Trump’s support for the U.S. oil industry and increase in oil production by 4 million barrels a day has led to a noticeable loss of oil and gas revenues for Russia. If Trump stays on for a second term, he has promised to maintain support for fossil fuels, all of which compete with Russian exports, as well as extremely loose regulation of the oil and gas sector and the swift issuing of licenses to develop the Arctic shelf.”
• “Joe Biden holds entirely opposing views on the future of U.S. energy. He has called for a return to the Paris Agreement and the Green New Deal, with a gradual move over from the oil industry to renewable energy sources. His plans to make the U.S. energy sector carbon free by 2035 and to make the country carbon neutral by 2050 are reminiscent of EU climate policy, which has already caused headaches for the Russian establishment. … [I]n the longer term, a green swing by the United States … will inevitably lead to slowing global demand for oil, as well as a rethink of energy strategies by other countries.”
• “There will also be many secondary effects from the outcome of the U.S. election. The differences in the two candidates’ approaches to Iran, Saudi Arabia, China and the EU will inevitably affect energy markets.”
• “Another approach to the problem would, of course, be to diversify the Russian economy to make it less dependent on external markets. But there is no such resolve on Russia’s agenda. It remains only to accept the further deterioration of relations in the energy sector as the new and inevitable normal.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Why American Strategy Fails. Ending the Chronic Imbalance Between Ends and Means,” James A. Winnefeld, Michael J. Morell and Graham Allison, Foreign Affairs, 10.28.20: The authors, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former acting and deputy director of the CIA and the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at the Harvard Kennedy School/ former Assistant Secretary of Defense, write:

• “Foreign policy requires maintaining a balance among four classic variables. Ends are what an administration is trying to protect and advance. Ways are the strategies, policies, concepts and methods employed to achieve those ends. Means are the elements of national power … that enable the ways. And all three variables operate on the landscape of global security, economic and political conditions in which other actors pursue their own interests.”
• “The current loss of equilibrium that characterizes U.S. foreign policy is driven by two of the four variables. … First, changes over the last two decades in the global landscape … present an immense challenge. … Measured by purchasing power parity, the United States’ share of global GDP has decreased from 50 percent in 1950 to 14 percent in 2018 … Moreover, both China and Russia have capitalized on U.S. preoccupation with two decades of ‘endless wars’ to narrow gaps in conventional military capabilities and to develop asymmetric ones.”
• “Second, American voters are signaling their desire for more attention and resources to be used for domestic issues. Moreover, as a result of steps taken to mitigate the economic effects of COVID-19, U.S. government debt has expanded to levels previously thought unsustainable. … The result is that the overall resources available for foreign policy will almost certainly shrink.”
• “Adjusting the ends will require adopting a rigorous framework that recognizes a hierarchy of interests to guide foreign policy decisions. … A framework for addressing threats and choices should start with a hierarchy with five tiers.”
• “With limited means to navigate a deteriorating landscape, there is but one remaining variable to maintain the equilibrium and protect the ends deemed most important: ways. … Changing ways may be even more difficult than adjusting ends. Nonetheless, the next administration has an opportunity to reset the ways it uses each element of U.S. national power to better serve the United States’ ends.”

“How US Elections Could Impact EU-Russia Relations,” Andrey Kortunov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 10.30.20: The author, director general of the Russian International Affairs Council, writes:

• “If in January the Democrat Joe Biden is in the White House, changes are inevitable on the western front. … Biden, with his foreign policy experience and his inclination to compromise, will work diligently to restore transatlantic relations.”
• “Even a partial restoration of transatlantic unity will be a blow to the image of the world that the Russian leadership likes to paint. … A change of administration in the White House will likely reduce, though not eliminate, the EU’s interest in normalizing relations with Russia. … In all likelihood, a Biden victory would severely limit Russia’s room for maneuver in its EU policy, and perhaps in its broader foreign policy, too. A more united West might consolidate itself not only on an anti-Russian platform, but also, to a lesser degree, against China.”
• “Amid the standoff with Beijing, a Biden administration would probably seek to expand its alliances and establish new partners in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. Though such a policy would target China, it would also indirectly affect Russia, as it would likely accelerate the move toward a bipolar international system, increasing Moscow’s dependence on Beijing, with all the ensuing consequences.”
• “This is not to say, however, that nothing good for Moscow could come of a Biden presidency and strengthened transatlantic cooperation. Improved ties with the EU could rein in some of the destructive impulses coming out of Washington today. … Overall, it can be expected that U.S. policy under Biden would become more professional, rational, consistent and predictable. A new American foreign policy style will engender both new opportunities and new challenges for Moscow.”

“America’s Dysfunctional Russia Policy Is Unlikely to Improve Under Biden,” Constanze Stelzenmüller, Foreign Policy, 10.30.20: The author, a senior fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings, writes:

• “Chances are slim that the election will make U.S. Russia policy more coherent. … A second term for Trump would presumably be an amplified version of the first … It could well be the end of NATO. Democratic candidate Joe Biden, in contrast, is known to be sharply critical of Putin: In a television interview last week, he referred to Russia as ‘the biggest threat to America.’ Yet as much as Biden cherishes the United States’ alliances, as president he would be bogged down by domestic concerns. Abroad, he would be focused on China above all else.”
• “Emotions in Moscow regarding the most desirable outcome of the U.S. elections appear to be mixed. A second dose of Trump would presumably tax the nerves of a Kremlin already wrongfooted by the pandemic, a tanking economy and persistent protests in its regions. Putin seemed to concede as much when he defended the challenger’s son Hunter against accusations of dodgy business ties with Ukraine.”
• “This is a moment of great danger for Europe—especially for the civil societies from the Balkans to Belarus still seeking to chart a westward course. Whatever the outcome of the Nov. 3 election, a much larger part (if not all) of the burden of regional security will fall to Europe, which urgently needs a common policy that addresses the risks and threats posed by Russia to the continent. If there is a sympathetic administration in Washington that is willing to support and collaborate with it, so much the better. If the administration is hostile, then the task is all the more urgent.”

"U.S.-Russia Relations at a Crossroads,” Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 10.29.20:

• “In September 2020, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) convened a select group of Russian and American experts to discuss four topics of importance to U.S.-Russia relations: arms control, the U.S.-China rivalry, the Arctic and the Eastern Mediterranean. What follows is a summary report of those meetings.”
• “Arms Control: The U.S.-Russia strategic stability framework, which was painstakingly built over decades, is at risk of dissolution.”
• “Russia and the U.S.- China Rivalry:  Americans and Russians characterize Sino-Russian relations in different and at times contradictory ways. … For Moscow, balance and diversification are a strategic imperative. It views the U.S.-China rivalry as the organizing principle that will realign contemporary international relations, requiring all other players to choose their strategies and approaches relative to this struggle. … Because the United States’ strategic priority has shifted towards China, U.S. participants wondered whether Washington might prefer a ‘third way’ for Russia over a complete bifurcation of the global order in which Russia sides with China.”
• “Russia’s Chairmanship of the Arctic Council: The Arctic remains a positive outlier in a receding list of areas where U.S.-Russia engagement is cooperative.”

• “Transparency and Deconfliction in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Eastern Mediterranean remains the most likely flashpoint for a military incident between the United States and Russia.”

“America’s Cultural Institutions Are Quietly Fueled by Russian Corruption,” Casey Michel and David Szakonyi, Foreign Policy, 10.30.20: The authors, an investigative reporter and an assistant professor of political science at George Washington University, write:

• “A new database compiled by the Anti-Corruption Data Collective reveals that seven … post-Soviet oligarchs connected to interference efforts have donated between $372 million and $435 million to more than 200 of the most prestigious non-profit institutions in the U.S. over the past two decades.”
• “More transparency is needed, ideally through a centralized, publicly accessible database with information on donors and donations. A forthcoming paper from the National Endowment for Democracy regarding oligarchic funding for American and British universities … recommends a ‘comprehensive, searchable list of all donations (foreign and domestic) over a modest threshold,’ as well as ‘the identity of donor, amount and major stipulations,’ all of which should be a perfectly acceptable threshold to American universities—and should set a model for the think tanks, cultural centers and foundations mentioned above.”
• “But transparency isn’t a panacea. To that end, these institutes and their governing bodies should provide greater details regarding gift acceptance policy … They should also create formal committees to review donations. And when it comes to vetting these donors, there must be greater emphasis and effort at conducting due diligence. Not only should all potential donors be vetted for the sources of their wealth, but extensive searches should be implemented for any and all negative news coverage.”

“Russian Labs Are Caught Making Illegal Chemical Weapons. Will Trump Finally Respond?” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 10.28.20: The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “While the Chemical Weapons Convention has allowances for developing antidotes and defenses against chemical weapons, actually producing and using Novichok to poison the Skripals and Mr. [Alexei] Navalny are treaty violations. Recently, the European Union and Britain acted, but the Trump administration remains strangely silent about sanctions in response to the Navalny attack. Bipartisan groups of lawmakers in the House and Senate are urging a tougher response. Both the EU and the United States should investigate the newly identified research organizations. When the states parties to the treaty meet Nov. 30 to Dec. 4, they should consider a strong response.”

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Putin’s Real Arctic Playbook: Demography, Development, and Defense,” Elizabeth Buchanan, The National Interest, 10.27.20: The author, a lecturer of strategic studies at Deakin University, Australia, writes:

• “We can expect Moscow to keep tensions low in the high north at the helm of the Arctic Council. The ‘Strategy for Development’ further underlines the importance to Russia of the ‘effective participation’ in the Council for realizing its development objectives. Priorities of its 2021-2023 Chairmanship will likely include the ‘sustainable development of the Arctic’ and programs supporting the cultural heritage of indigenous peoples throughout the Arctic.”
• “2020 has seen a deluge of Arctic interest from Moscow in terms of investments, military footprints, and indeed, Kremlin policy planning documents. Some lofty ambitions continue to sneak into these planning documents, with this recent decree putting Northern Sea Route cargo at 130 million tons per year by 2035. In 2019 the NSR managed just 31.5 million tons. Of course, further Kremlin policy for the Russian Arctic Zone will be unveiled no doubt as we await the updated Russian ‘National Security Strategy’ due in 2020. Something tells me this burst of Russian Arctic policy documents will do very little to alleviate warming tensions in the Arctic, let alone freeze the pace of hot takes signaling the arrival of a ‘new’ Cold War.”

“A Coercive History Lesson From Vladimir Putin,” Andrei Kolesnikov, Foreign Affairs, 10.29.20: The author, a senior fellow and the chair of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “The atmosphere in today’s Russia encourages the vindication of Stalinism and its atrocities. By simplifying and mythologizing history, the Russian president is encouraging the deterioration of public knowledge of historical events. Historical discourse that was once marginal is becoming mainstream, with the state’s endorsement. Those who commemorate the victims of repression face official persecution.”
• “While Russia’s Investigative Committee was thinking up new ways to combat historical dissidence, parliamentarians in Spain began debate over a new draft law on ‘democratic memory.’ The Spanish law, which has come under fierce criticism, includes ‘a plan to recover the remains of victims of the civil war and setting up a special prosecutor to investigate human-rights abuses from 1936 to 1978.’ If and when Russia transitions from Putin’s authoritarianism to democracy, it should look to Spain’s example. Russia needs to restore, rather than erase, the memory of the millions of victims of totalitarianism and cease putting it in competition with the memory of those who fell in battle in World War II. Promoting that false opposition is a deliberate tactic to deepen the national divide.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant developments.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant developments.

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

“The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Development Hampered by Internal Conflicts,” Lucie Messy, Russia Matters, 10.29.20: The author, a recent graduate of Lille Catholic University, where she studied international relations, writes:

• “As we near yet another Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, it is worth taking a look at this organization to try to understand whether it is a paper tiger or a powerhouse, and, if the latter, to attempt to discern whether this organization’s further evolution may have a tangible impact on the balance of power in Asia and Western allies’ interests in that region. Overall, while the capabilities of individual SCO members, such as China and Russia, pose a challenge to Western countries’ interests, due to internal challenges and a loose organizational structure, the organization itself does not.”
• “In spite of recent expansion, the SCO faces a number of serious obstacles, especially in the form of territorial disputes … Thus, the next SCO summit’s agenda (postponed to the fall due to the pandemic) will be partly focused on ensuring regional stability and peace. To achieve these goals, they will have to not only work on fighting COVID-19 but also on ensuring economic growth.”
• “The SCO has been gaining strength steadily since its inception in 1996, developing not only security but also military cooperation with its 2003 ground exercise … the first combined military exercise in which the Russian and Chinese armies participated. Nonetheless, however, the SCO is plagued by internal contradictions … Russia’s success in bringing India in as a full member in 2017 invited accusations from some watchers of Sino-Russian relations, saying that Russia seeks to dilute China’s leadership in that organization.”
• “Moscow has also delayed on the establishment of an investment bank that would have provided more clout to China in the region. … Given all of these internal challenges, while the capabilities of individual SCO members such as China and Russia do pose a challenge to Western countries’ interests, the organization itself does not.”

War in Karabakh:

“Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Is Heading to the Point of No Return: Russia and Turkey may be dragged in if Azerbaijan traps Armenia’s diaspora in the Caucasus region,” Carey Cavanaugh, Financial Times, 10.27.20: The author, who led the 2001 OSCE peace talks and is chair of International Alert and professor of diplomacy at the University of Kentucky, writes:

• “These are already the worst hostilities in this conflict since Russia brokered the original ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1994.”
• “Three new factors have since come into play: Azerbaijan acquired highly sophisticated military equipment from Israel and Turkey; Turkey has injected itself more directly into the dispute; and the three nations charged with handling mediation efforts have been distracted by more pressing domestic and international concerns.”
• “One thing that is known, however, is that Azerbaijan has regained much of its territory along the Iranian border and now appears to be making a vigorous push north towards the Lachin corridor, the arterial supply line linking Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. If this corridor is severed—and conflicting reports place advancing Azerbaijan forces just 20-30 miles away—the conflict will stand on the brink of a humanitarian disaster. Nagorno-Karabakh’s population would be trapped, civilians would panic and Armenia would escalate the conflict further. This could lead Moscow to act in accordance with its mutual defense pact with Armenia, which in turn could elicit the entry of the Turkish military.”
• “The risk of an expanded war is growing greater by the day. The conflict may soon reach an irreversible point where it will not stop without a dramatic expansion of fighting and increased loss of life. At the next round of Minsk Group negotiations in Geneva at the end of this month, international diplomacy must become more assertive. Russia is perhaps best placed to lead the effort, especially as the US is in the last stages of a presidential election. Even so, any diplomatic action will have to be coordinated among the group’s three co-chairs for maximum effectiveness. Time is of the essence.”

“How to Stop a War in the Caucasus,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 10.28.20: The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “Combatants don't stop fighting unless the costs of continuing are too great. The United States should be thinking—urgently—about how to raise the cost of prolonged fighting. An Israeli arms cutoff to Baku? Russian muscle-flexing to support Armenia? A U.S. statement blasting Azerbaijan and its ally Turkey for ignoring the peace deal? Realpolitik, Karabakh version: This cease-fire won't work unless the alternative is more painful. On the way to peace, diplomats need to turn the screws.”

Ukraine:

“Ukraine Courts Cannot Be Allowed to Throw Out Anti-Corruption Gains,” Volodymyr Zelensky, Financial Times, 11.01.20: The author, the president of Ukraine, writes:

• “Ukraine is under attack. Not just at its borders, but also at the heart of its democratic institutions. I want to reassure our international partners that we will fight back and prevail. Last week, Ukraine’s constitutional court issued a destructive ruling in an effort to dismantle our anti-corruption architecture. The judges declared that the National Agency on Corruption Prevention had no constitutional right to review and reveal the asset declarations made by public servants, and that filing false information would no longer be a criminal offence.”
• “Undermining this process is an attempt to destroy an essential part of the anti-corruption achievements of the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, built by Ukrainian civil society with the active support of our western partners. These rulings are part of a systematic effort to undermine the rule of law, push back against the progress made in our fight against corruption, weaken our society and economy and, last but not least, stop Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration.”
• “The leaders of this campaign are well known: it is a coalition of Russian proxies and some prominent Ukrainian oligarchs who feel threatened by the activities of our anti-corruption institutions.”
• “To protect and reinforce our anti-corruption infrastructure, I have decided to take a series of extraordinary measures. The National Security and Defence Council, which I chair, has taken steps to restore the e-declarations. I have also submitted a bill to parliament aimed at re-establishing our anti-corruption institutions and requested our civil servants to maintain their anti-graft activities, no matter what. Additionally, I asked parliament to restructure the composition of the constitutional court, which has lost credibility and authority.”
• “We are also opening investigations against the people who acted illegally on behalf of vested interests of well-known influential financial groups and foreign powers to destroy our anti-corruption agencies.”

“A Consequential Election for Ukraine,” Steven Pifer, Brookings Institution/New Europe Center, 10.28.20: The author, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution's Center on the United States and Europe and the director of Brookings' Arms Control Initiative, writes:

• “If Mr. Trump is re-elected, he will not have to worry about facing the voters in another election campaign. He will cement his control of the Republican Party, leaving Republicans in the Senate and House of Representatives less able to block his bad instincts. What accommodations would he make with Mr. Putin? Would he be inclined, as he suggested in 2016, to recognize Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and lift economic sanctions? Would he withdraw the United States from NATO, as many former U.S. officials fear? The Alliance’s collapse would be a huge gift to Mr. Putin and leave Ukraine in a precarious geopolitical position.”
• “It will be different if Mr. Biden is elected. The United States would have a president who understands the U.S. interest in a successful Ukraine and who knows the country well from his time as vice president. He would be the kind of friend that Ukraine needs, supportive but also ready to press the Ukrainian leadership to take necessary reform steps. He recognizes the security challenge that Russia presents to Ukraine and the West, and he realizes the importance of a strong trans-Atlantic relationship with a robust NATO at its core. And Mr. Biden might prove a president who could bind some of the differences that so badly divide Americans today. An America more unified at home would be a stronger international actor.”
• “Whether Mr. Trump or Mr. Biden wins the elections will mean very different things for U.S. policies affecting Ukraine. That said, the American electorate will decide the next president largely on domestic issues. … Ukraine has no role to play in this, and Ukrainian officials should continue to do all that they can to avoid their country becoming a political football in the U.S. campaign.”

Belarus:

“Will A New US Administration Mean Change on Ukraine and Belarus?” Eugene Rumer, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10.29.20: The author, a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie's Russia and Eurasia Program, writes:

• “Throughout most of Donald Trump’s term in office, foreign policy has been linked to an unprecedented degree not just to U.S. domestic politics, but to the personal political agenda of the president. U.S. policy toward Ukraine in particular has been politicized like never before once former vice president Joe Biden emerged as a leading candidate for the 2020 presidential election, and Trump’s egregious personal manipulation of U.S. policy toward Ukraine became the reason for his impeachment in the House of Representatives.”
• “Should there be a Biden administration on January 20, 2021, this will change. The former vice president has a long history of involvement in U.S. policy toward Ukraine and has surrounded himself with experienced staff, and there is every reason to expect that at least as far as the executive branch is concerned, the issue will be depoliticized.”
• “Support for Ukraine’s membership in NATO will remain part of U.S. policy, but considering the divisive nature of that idea within the alliance itself and the poor prospects of it happening in the foreseeable future, the issue is unlikely to be given high priority.”
• “The top tier of the new administration’s foreign policy agenda will probably include repairing the damage done by Trump to U.S. relations with traditional European allies, dealing with Iran’s WMD program, and extending the New START Treaty with Russia. A handful of other issues, such as the pullback from and residual presence in Afghanistan, relations with Turkey and the U.S. military presence in Syria, will have to be addressed as well.”
• “The same logic applies to Belarus. … Washington, like Brussels, has little in its toolkit for dealing with the standoff in Minsk, other than statements condemning the regime, sanctions, and moral support for the opposition.”

“What's Next for Protesters in Belarus?” Gennady Rudkevich, The Moscow Times, 11.02.20: The author, an assistant professor in international relations at Georgia College, specializing in post-Soviet politics, writes:

• “What would it take for the Belarusian protests to succeed in removing Lukashenko from power? Firstly, there would have to be substantial defections from the elite. Not because political elites in Belarus wield significant power, but because of the signal this would send to the Belarusian military and to Russia. That’s unlikely to happen, barring a significant economic decline.”
• “Secondly, Russia would have to adopt a more neutral stance. Without Russia backing-off in its support for Lukashenko’s regime, the Belarusian economy is unlikely to collapse, the Russian-speaking media will be able to maintain a unified pro-Lukashenko front, and other countries will remain unwilling or be unable to put enough pressure on Lukashenko to resign.”
• “Finally, Lukashenko would have to make a serious mistake — comparable to the Maidan massacre in Ukraine in February 2014—to push otherwise passive opposition supporters to come out to the streets.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“What Will the Next US Administration Mean for the Caucasus and Central Asia?” Paul Stronski, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11.02.20: The author, a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program focusing on the relationship between Russia and neighboring countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, writes:

• “U.S. policy toward Central Asia and the South Caucasus will see little change under the next U.S. administration, no matter whether it is led by President Donald Trump or his Democratic challenger Joe Biden. Consumed by the coronavirus pandemic, economic problems, and a series of higher-profile international challenges (e.g., China, Iran, Russia and transatlantic relations), neither candidate has taken much notice of either region during the campaign. The resurgence of the Karabakh conflict focused some attention on the Caucasus, but the countries to Russia’s immediate south generally do not figure highly in American foreign policy debate. Barring an existential shock, the status quo is for the most part the likely path forward.”
• “It is unclear whether Washington’s traditional toolkit (democratization assistance, anti-corruption programs, closer ties to multilateral organizations and institutions and counterterrorism cooperation) can accomplish all that much in regions that have been resistant to past U.S.-led reform agendas and are increasingly remote from the mainstream U.S. foreign policy challenges of 2020. Biden’s rhetorical support for the region certainly will make it easier for Central Asian and South Caucasus governments to bring their issues to the attention of senior counterparts in Washington. Nevertheless, a Biden administration, if there is one, may not be able to marshal the resources or have the bandwidth to take on a great many new sets of problems.”

"Georgia and Russia: Why and How to Save Normalization,” International Crisis Group, 10.26.20: In this briefing, the organization writes:

• “With normalization increasingly under strain, and a harder line fraught with problems, Georgia seems to have few good Russia policy options. In an effort to break out of the ‘engagement vs. confrontation’ dichotomy, Georgians from across the political spectrum have begun to consider a different approach.”
• “The core of the proposed new policy would be to proactively identify areas where Georgia could cooperate with both Russia and the breakaways. Indeed, normalization—which thus far has excluded discussion of breakaway-related issues—could expand to include conversations about Georgian relations with these entities.”
• “In addition to allowing for discussions of the breakaways under the existing normalization dialogue, Moscow and Tbilisi could add borderization as a general topic to their agenda for Geneva talks. … They might usefully focus on a proposal put forward in December 2019 by Geneva mediators, who recommended establishing a number of demilitarized zones along the South Ossetian line of separation.”
• “Continued and broadened normalization, meanwhile, would also improve prospects for trade talks between Tbilisi and de facto authorities in Abkhazia. … While South Ossetia presently is not interested in trade with Tbilisi, Abkhazia’s economy could get a boost from such ties, potentially leaving Moscow with a lesser burden. If Russia could do so without changing its overall position on the statelet’s independence, it could reap a financial benefit without losing significant political ground.”
• “Normalization, while imperfect, has helped facilitate both since 2012. Without it, both Georgia and Russia would be worse off. But the policy cannot survive if it is not adapted to allow Tbilisi and Moscow to talk frankly about the breakaways, and if the Geneva process … does not take on the increasing challenge of borderization.”

“Great Power Rivalry Hots Up in the South Caucasus,” Tony Barber, Financial Times, 11.02.20: The author, Europe editor at the Financial Times, writes:

• “Parliamentary elections in Georgia have brought victory for Bidzina Ivanishvili, a billionaire oligarch who made his fortune in Russia. His ruling party is arousing concern in the U.S. and its allies with controversial actions on foreign investment projects in Georgia which appear calculated to undermine western interests.”
• “The question is the use to which Mr. Ivanishvili will put Georgian Dream’s victory. He served as prime minister in 2012-13 but prefers nowadays to wield power from behind the scenes. Western governments and investors are in little doubt that he played a part this year in two investment decisions that jeopardize the alignment with the U.S. and EU that Georgia sought after its pro-western Rose Revolution of 2003.”
• “The first was Georgia’s cancellation in January of a project to build what would be its first deep-sea port, at Anaklia on the Black Sea. The project has enjoyed strong support from the U.S. and European governments but encountered opposition from Russia.”
• “The second action concerns a planned fiber-optic network to connect Europe and Asia through Georgia and Azerbaijan. ….Since July, Georgia’s authorities have piled pressure on Caucasus Online, a western-backed consortium that plans to build the new digital network.”
• “Undeniably, Georgia faces hard choices. In many ways, the country has lived in Moscow’s shadow since its annexation by the tsarist empire in 1801. Yet the west backs the independence that Georgia has enjoyed since 1991 and China believes it has interests at stake there, too. It is safe to conclude that a new round of competition for influence in Georgia, and the South Caucasus as a whole, is getting under way.”