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Analysis | Mar 15, 2023
Key goals are to invest in more resilient deterrence and to understand whether the two countries' views on strategic stability have fundamentally diverged.
Analysis | Nov 03, 2022
Its main focus has been targeting pro-Russian collaborators and disrupting Russian military logistics, not engaging in head-on confrontations with Moscow’s forces.
Analysis | Nov 23, 2021
Putin may have lost patience with Zelenskiy, but he is unlikely to give marching orders to Russian troops until he exhausts options with Biden.
Analysis | Nov 05, 2021
This comparison of all provisions of the enacted 2021 and proposed 2022 NDAAs that affect Russia, former Soviet republics and Baltic countries highlights how U.S. priorities regarding Russia have shifted in recent years.
Analysis | Apr 16, 2020
How are nuclear organizations coping with COVID-19 and what strategies seem to best ensure the safety and security of their operations? Responses have varied around the world, but already some lessons may be inferred.
Analysis | Feb 26, 2020
There are several major reasons why, whether under the Clinton, Bush, Obama or Trump administrations, Capitol Hill has been reluctant to normalize relations with Russia and even at times hit the brakes on reset attempts.
Analysis | Jan 24, 2019
The 1987 INF Treaty now faces an existential threat that could lead to intermediate-range missiles targeting the entire European continent. Three experts weigh in on the consequences and prospects.
Analysis | Aug 07, 2018
Examining Putin’s three military interventions abroad, the author sees a pattern in which two conditions must be present for Russia to intervene with force: a threat to its vital interests and a reasonable chance of success.
Analysis | Dec 07, 2017
Russia, according to U.S. officials, has violated the INF Treaty. The U.S. is on the verge of violating, if it has not already done so. What’s needed now is a new treaty focusing on warheads instead of delivery systems.
Analysis | Aug 30, 2017
Past experience suggests that two conditions must exist for Russia to use military exercises as a cover for foreign military interventions and neither one is in place today.